At the national level, air defense was once the responsibility of the Air Defense Command, a separate entity from the air force, but which probably was collocated with the Air Force Headquarters in P'yongyang. However, that function probably was transferred to the air force in the late 1980s. The air combat commands appear to have primary responsibility for integrated air defense and are organized with semiautomated warning and interception systems to control SAMs, interceptor aircraft, and air defense artillery units.
As of 1996 the North Korean air force consisted of six air divisions under the direct control of the national Air Command: three are composed of fighter wings, two of transportation wings, and one for fighter training.
North Korea has approximately seventy air bases, including jet and non-jet capable bases and emergency landing strips, with aircraft deployed to between twenty and thirty of them. The majority of tactical aircraft are concentrated at air bases around P'yongyang and in the southern provinces. P'yongyang can place almost all its military aircraft in hardened--mostly underground--shelters. North Korean aircraft are sheltered in underground hangars and plenty of runways are available. In the KPDR there is absolutely no private vehicle ownership but many highways with concrete surfaces and arched reinforced concrete tunnels (for example the superhighway linking Pyongyang with Wonsan), that in case of hostilities are sure to be used as military airfields. It thus seems highly improbable that the NKAF would be knocked out in one strike. North Korea deployed about fifty percent of its fighters in the front area which makes a possible surprise attack to all areas of South Korea. In 1990-91, North Korea activated four forward air bases near the DMZ, which increased its initial southward reach and decreased warning and reaction times for Seoul.More than 420 fighters, bombers, transport planes, and helicopters were redeployed in October 1995, and more than 100 aircraft were moved forward to the three air bases near the DMZ. More than 20 Il-28 bombers were moved to Taetan which shortened their arrival time to Seoul from 30 minutes to 10 minutes. Over 80 MiG-17s redeployed to Nuchonri and Kuupri are able to attack Seoul in 6 minutes. By these redeployments North Korea intends to make a first strike with outdated MiG-17s and the second strike with mainstay fighters such as MiG-21s and Su-25s.
North Korea produces no aircraft itself, although it does produce spare parts for many of its aircraft. The small village named Tokhyon on the way to Uiju from Sinjuiju is the home to North Korea"s largest munitions factory that produces aircraft. There is another aircraft plant in a suburb of Ch"ongjin, North Hamgyong Province. But it is far smaller than the Tokhyon plant in its size and history.
The North Korean aircraft fleet of Soviet and Chinese manufacture is primarily of 1950s and 1960s technology, with rudimentary avionics and limited weapons systems capability. In the mid- to late 1980s, the Soviet Union supplied a variety of a limited number of more modern all-weather air defense and ground attack aircraft. Most ground attack regiments have older model Soviet and Chinese light bombers and fighters with limited range and combat payloads. P'yongyang was rather late in recognizing the full potential of the helicopter. During the 1980s, the North Korean armed forces increased their helicopter inventory from about forty to about 300. In 1985 North Korea circumvented United States export controls to indirectly buy eighty-seven United Statesmanufactured civilian versions of the Hughes MD-500 helicopters before the United States government stopped further deliveries. Reports indicate that at least sixty of the helicopters delivered were modified as gunships. Because South Korea licenses and produces the MD-500 for use in its armed forces, the modified helicopters were useful in North Korea's covert or deceptive operations. The transport fleet has some Soviet transports from the 1950s and 1960s. The air force has a marginal capability for defending North Korean airspace and a limited ability to conduct air operations against South Korea. Its strengths are its large numbers of aircraft, a system of well-dispersed and well-protected air facilities, and an effective, if rudimentary, command and control system. Its weaknesses include limited flight training; forced reliance on outside sources for aircraft, most of its missiles, radars, and associated equipment; and maintenance problems associated with older aircraft. The effectiveness of ground training--on which the pilots heavily depend--is difficult to judge because there is no information on P'yongyang's acquisition or use of sophisticated flight simulators. Pilot proficiency is difficult to evaluate because it is crudely proportionate to hours and quality of flight time. Although the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense's Defense White Paper, 1990 states that flight training levels are 60 percent of South Korea's, other sources believe the figure is closer to 20 to 30 percent. Lower flight times are attributed to fuel shortages, a more conservative training philosophy, and perhaps a concern for older airframe life expectancies or maintenance infrastructure capacity. The training of pilots on the NKAF's most modern aircraft is much more significant than "seven flying hours per year" sometimes claimed in the West. But air crew are being trained in accordance with outdated procedures and, with lack of fuel, have very little experience. Operational thinking reflects both Soviet doctrine and the North Korean experience of heavy bombing during the Korean War. The result has been in reliance on air defense. Military industries, aircraft hangars, repair facilities, ammunition, fuel stores, and even air defense missile systems are placed underground or in hardened shelters. North Korea has an extensive interlocking, redundant nationwide air defense system that includes interceptor aircraft, early warning and ground-controlled intercept radars, SAMs, a large number of air defense artillery weapons, and barrage balloons. Important military and industrial complexes are defended by antiaircraft artillery. Point defenses are supplemented by barrage balloons. North Korea has an exceptionally large number of antiaircraft sites. The largest concentration is along the DMZ and around major cities, military installations, and factories. The bulk of North Korean radars are older Soviet and Chinese models with vacuum-tube technology, which limits continuous operations. The overall early warning and ground controlled intercept system is susceptible to saturation and jamming by a sophisticated foe with state-of-the-art electronic warfare capabilities. Nevertheless, the multilayered, coordinated, mutually supporting air defense structure is a formidable deterrent to air attack. Overlapping coverage and redundancy make penetration of North Korean air defenses a challenge.| Number | |
|---|---|
| Strength | 70,000 |
| Organization | |
| Air combat commands | 3 |
| Air division | 1 |
| Interceptor regiments | 12 |
| Ground attack regiments | |
| Il-28 | 3 |
| Su-25/7 | 1 |
| MiG-19/A-5 | 2 |
| MiG-15/17 | 2 |
| Transport regiments | |
| An-2 | 6 |
| Unspecified | 6 |
| Helicopter regiments | 6 |
| Equipment | |
| Total aircraft | |
| Jets | 760 |
| Bombers | 82 |
| Transports | 480 |
| Helicopters | 300 |
| MiG-15/17, air-to-air and ground attack | 310 |
| MiG-19, air-to-air | 60+ |
| MiG-19/A-5, primarily ground attack | 100+ |
| MiG-21, air-to-air | 160+ |
| MiG-23, air-to-air | 46 |
| MiG-29, air-to-air | 14 |
| Su-7, primarily ground attack | 20 |
| Su-25, primarily ground attack | 20 |
| Il-28, primarily ground attack | 82 |
| An-2, transport | 250+ |
| An-24, transport | 10 |
| Unspecified transports and trainers | 200+ |
| Mi-2/4/8/17 helicopters | 210+ |
| MD-500 helicopters | 87 |