China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with substantial Soviet assistance. Before 1960 direct Soviet military assistance had included the provision of advisors and a vast variety of equipment. Of the assistance provided, most significant to China's future strategic nuclear capability were an experimental nuclear reactor, facilities for processing uranium, a cyclotron, and some equipment for a gaseous diffusions plant.
When Sino-Soviet relations cooled in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans and data for an atomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on transferring defense technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet advisers in 1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break "the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinese security against the Soviet and United States threats, and to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.
When China decided in 1955 to develop atomic bombs it faced a number of technological choices as to the most appropriate route to follow. At that time China could only work on one path, and had to choose between producing Pu239 from a reactor, or developing the method of producing U235 through isotope separation. The uranium path offered two alternatives, either system, either chemical separation or physical separation. Chemical separation of Pu235 from the mixed system of U235 and U238 would have been easier than physical separation, but the separation of plutonium and uranium was difficult due to the high radioactivity of the Pu-U system, and the severe toxicity of plutonium. Therefore, the chosen path was the physical separation of U235 and U238 isotopes. The implosion method of detonating an atomic bomb was considered more technically advanced, though there were questions as to whether China was capable of producing a uranium bomb detonated by the implosion method.
China made remarkable progress in the 1960s in developing nuclear weapons. In a thirty-two-month period, China successfully exploded its first atomic bomb (October 16, 1964), launched its first nuclear missile (October 25, 1966), and detonated its first hydrogen bomb (June 14, 1967.
The first Chinese nuclear test was conducted at Lop Nor on 16 October 1964 (CHIC 1). It was a tower shot involving a fission device with a yield of 25 kilotons. Uranium 235 was used as the nuclear fuel, which indicates Beijing's choice of the path of creating high-yield nuclear weapons right away. Of the ten test shots that followed by 29 September 1969, six are believed to have been related to thermonuclear development. The others had as their goals the adaptation of CHIC 1 for bomber delivery and test of a missile warhead (CHIC 4). The third nuclear test was conducted on 9 September 1966 using a Tu-16 bomber. In addition to uranium 235, this nuclear device, with a yield around 100 KT, this time contained lithium 6, which attested to China's readiness to test a thermonuclear explosion. CHIC 6, an airdrop test on 17 June 1967, was the first full-yield, two-stage thermonuclear test. Although the Cultural Revolution disrupted the strategic weapons program less than other scientific and educational sectors in China, there was a slowdown in succeeding years. The successes achieved in nuclear research and experimental design work permitted China to begin series production of nuclear (since 1968) and thermonuclear (since 1974) warheads.Subsequent nuclear tests (CHIC 12, CHIC 13) were suggestive of a new phase of the PRC test programs. Both were low yield weapons. It appeared possible that CHIC 13 was delivered by an F-9 fighter aircraft and may have been a proof test of a weapon.
One of the objectives of the final series of Chinese nuclear tests was to miniaturize China's nuclear warheads, dropping their weight from 2200 kgs to 700 kgs in order to accommodate the next generation of solid-fueled missile systems.In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons remained unconfirmed in 1987. In 1988 Chinese specialists tested a 1-5 KT nuclear device with an enhanced radiation yield, advancing the country's development of a very low yield neutron weapon and laying the foundation for the creation of nuclear artillery.
There is considerable uncertainly in published estimates of the size of the Chinese nuclear weapons stockpile. In the late 1980s it was generally held that China was the world's third-largest nuclear power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of 225 to 300 nuclear weapons. Other estimates of the country's production capacities suggested that by the end of 1970 China had fabricated around 200 nuclear weapons, a number which could have increased to 875 by 1980. Assuming an average annual production of 75 nuclear weapons during the 1980s, some estimates even suggested that by the mid-1990s the Chinese nuclear industry had produced around 2,000 nuclear weapons for ballistic missiles, bombers, artillery projectiles and landmines.
In 2005 and 2006, the Department of Defense's annual report on China's military
forces included a detailed table of China's ballistic missiles. The table
suggested that China had 250-296 launchers with 793-916 missiles of seven types.
Of these, approximately 105 are thought to be armed with nuclear warheads:
Pentagon Overview of China's Missile Forces, 2006 |
|||
China's Missile Inventory |
Launcher |
Missiles | Estimated Range |
DF-5/CSS-4 ICBM |
20 |
20 |
8,460+ km |
DF-4/CSS-3 ICBM |
10-14 |
20-24 |
5,470+ km |
DF-3/CSS-2 IRBM |
6-10 |
14-18 |
2,790+ km |
DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM Mod 1/2 |
34-38 |
19-50 |
1,770+ km |
JL-1 SLBM |
10-14 |
10-14 |
1,770+ km |
DF-15/CSS-6 SRBM |
70-80 |
275-315 |
600 km |
DF-11/CSS-7 SRBM |
100-120 |
435-475 |
300 km |
JL-2 SLBM |
DEVELOPMENTAL |
8,000+ km |
|
DF-31 ICBM* |
DEVELOPMENTAL |
7,250+ km |
|
DF-31A ICBM |
DEVELOPMENTAL |
11,270+ km |
|
Total |
250-296 |
793-916 |
|
* China defines the DF-31 as a long-range ballistic missile, not an
intercontinental ballistic missile. DF stands for Dong Feng which means “east wave.” The U.S. designation CSS stands for Chinese Surface-to-Surface. Color codes: Red (nuclear), Blue (possibly nuclear), Black (not nuclear). Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2006, May 23, 2006, p. 50. Colors and notes added. Table reproduced and further analyzed in Hans M. Kristensen, et al., Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning, Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006, p. 38. |
The DOD table followed a fact sheet published by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2004, which stated: "Among the nuclear-weapon states, China...possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal." Since Britain has declared that it has less than 200 operationally available warheads, and the United States, Russia, and France have more, the Chinese statement could be interpreted to mean that China’s nuclear arsenal is smaller than Britain’s. Not surprisingly the devil is in the details; does the word “arsenal” refer to the entire stockpile or just the portion of it that is operationally deployed?
Based on these, and numerous other declassified and unclassified documents, FAS and NRDC in 2006 estimated the composition of the Chinese nuclear arsenal as follows:
Estimated Chinese Nuclear Forces 2006 |
||||||
China Designation |
U.S./NATO |
Year |
Range |
Warhead |
Missiles deployed |
Warheads deployed |
Land-based missiles* |
||||||
DF-3A |
CSS-2 |
1971 |
3,100a |
1 x 3.3 Mt |
16 |
16 |
DF-4 |
CSS-3 |
1980b |
5,500 |
1 x 3.3 Mt |
22 |
22 |
DF-5A |
CSS-4 Mod 2 |
1981 |
13,000 |
1 x 4-5 Mtc |
20 |
20 |
DF-21A |
CSS-5 Mod 1/2 |
1991 |
2,150 |
1 x 200-300 kt |
35 |
35 |
DF-31 |
(CSS-X-10) |
2006 ? |
7,250+ |
1 x ? |
n.a. |
n.a. |
DF-31A |
n.a. |
2007-2009 ? |
11,270+ |
1 x ? |
n.a. |
n.a. |
Subtotal |
|
|
|
|
93 |
93 |
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)** |
||||||
JL-1 |
CSS-NX-3 |
1986 |
1,770+ |
1 x 200-300 kt |
12 |
12 |
JL-2 |
CSS-NX-4 |
2008-2010 ? |
8,000+d |
1 x ? |
n.a. |
n.a. |
Subtotal |
|
|
|
|
12 |
12 |
Total strategic ballistic missiles |
|
|
|
105 |
105 |
|
Aircraft*** |
||||||
Hong-6 |
B-6 |
1965 |
3,100 |
1-3 x bomb |
100 |
20 |
Attack |
(Q-5, others?) |
|
|
1 x bomb |
|
20 |
Subtotal |
|
|
|
|
|
40 |
Short-range tactical weapons |
||||||
DF-15e |
CSS-6 |
1990 |
600 |
1 x low |
~300 |
? |
DH-10? |
(LACM)f |
2006-2007 ? |
? |
1 x low ? |
n.a. |
n.a. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
|
|
|
|
|
~145g |
* DF stands for
Dong Feng, which means “east wave.” ** JL stands for Julang. The
single SSBN equipped with the JL-1 has never sailed on a deterrent
patrol. *** Figures for aircraft are for nuclear-configured versions
only. Hundreds of aircraft are deployed in non-nuclear versions.
Aircraft range is equivalent to combat radius. Assumes 20 bombs for
the force, with yields estimated between 10 kilotons and three
megatons. |
China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conventional forces, serve to deter both nuclear and conventional attack. Chinese leaders repeatedly have pledged never to be the
first to use nuclear weapons, and they have accompanied the no-first -use pledge with a promise of certain nuclear counterattack if nuclear weapons are used against China. China envisioned
retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets. The combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response time might further limit the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China is seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its
nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening its missile silos.