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Obtained Under the Freedom of Information Act by Hans M. Kristensen

Defense Estimative Brief

Nuclear Weapons Systems in China (U)

SUMMARY

(a) China has established itself as a nuclear power. The nuclear forces in China, however, will remain small when compared to the Soviet nuclear forces. The Chinese will not try to match the superpowers. The Chinese however, will continue to seek Western technology support for their underground nuclear test program.

(b)(1)

(c) Between 150 and 160 warheads are estimated to be in the PRC nuclear stockpile. The limit of the number of warheads is not restricted by nuclear materials production, but on what the Chinese perceive their needs to be.

(b)(1)
4. (C/NOFORN) Qualitative improvements that the Chinese are developing for their nuclear warheads will depend on the benefits that Chinese are now deriving from both overt contact with U.S. scientists and technology, and the covert acquisition of U.S. technology. There is evidence that the Chinese have been successful in assimilating into their nuclear weapons program United States technology in areas such as high explosive, radiochemistry, metallurgy, welding, super computers, numerical modeling, high speed photonics, and underground drilling. Throughout the history of the Chinese nuclear weapons program they have followed closely advances in western technology. Increased access to this technology and continued Chinese efforts will in the 1980s and early 1990s show up as qualitative warhead improvements in terms of: (1) increased warhead reliability and confidence, (2) development of more compact warheads, especially for tactical nuclear applications and possibly for MRV warheads,
(3) increased hardening of warheads in a nuclear antiballistic missile environment, (4) tailored output devices, such as enhanced radiation and (5) improved warhead safety, storage, and logistics procedures. Thus, in some areas, the gap between United States and Chinese nuclear warhead technology may begin to narrow.

6. However, two important factors are not taken into account in the estimates: (1) a Chinese strategy for building survivable or redundant production capacity and (2) the effect of the turmoil during the Cultural Revolution. There is evidence of both redundant nuclear production facilities built to increase survivability and instances where nuclear weapons facilities were disrupted during the Cultural Revolution. Given continued internal stability, the Chinese have a nuclear industrial complex in place that will allow them to increase the size of their stockpile even beyond the current estimate, if so desired.

8. We estimate that all currently deployed CSS-1, CSS-2, CSS-3, and CSS-4 missiles have nuclear warheads. A small number of the nuclear capable aircraft probably have nuclear bombs, even though we are unable to identify associated airfield storage sites. We also estimate that the Chinese maintain ADMs in their
inventory, although there is no evidence confirming their production or deployment. See table 1 for the best estimate of the number of warheads allocated to the projected forces.

**TABLE 1**

**NUCLEAR WARHEADS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSS-1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-2</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS-4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid ICBM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR/IRBM Follow-on</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombs</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADM's</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRBM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-on Systems</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. **Implications for the West.** China has established itself as a nuclear power. The nuclear forces in China, however, will remain small when compared to the Soviet nuclear forces. The Chinese will not try to match the superpowers. The Chinese however, will continue to seek Western technology support for their underground nuclear test program.

Prepared by:  

Approved by:  

(b)(3)  

(b)(3)
U-6,045/DAN-1A(FOIA) 30 October 2003

Mr. Hans M. Kristensen  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
1200 New York Avenue, NW 
Suite 400  
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Kristensen:

This responds to your request under the Freedom of Information Act, dated 31 July 2003, your reference number 03-043H. Therein you requested copies of Defense Estimate Brief 49-84 and DDE-1500-19-84. A search of DIA's systems of records located the documents responsive to the subject of your request.

Upon review it was determined that some portions of one document are not releasable. The portions withheld are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), Freedom of Information Act. Subsection (b)(1) applies to information properly classified under the criteria provided by Executive Order 12958, as amended. Subsection (b)(2) applies to information which pertains solely to the internal rules and practices of the agency. Subsection (b)(3) applies to information specifically exempted by a statute establishing particular criteria for withholding. The applicable statute is 10 U.S.C. Section 424. All reasonably segregable portions of this document are attached hereto.

All substantive portions of DDE-1500-19-84 are not releasable. The withheld portions are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3), Freedom of Information Act. There are no reasonably segregable portions of this exempt material.

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Defense Intelligence Agency  
ATTN: DAN-1A(FOIA) 
Washington, D.C. 20340-5100

Sincerely,

[Signature]

1 Enclosure a/s  ROBERT P. RICHARDSON  
Chief, Freedom of Information Act Staff