[Back]
[Index]
[Next]

3: japan and india:

Dangerous Democracies


the inevitable rise of japan and india
china's assessment of japan and india differs sharply from America's. This chapter surveys 82 Chinese authors on the future role of Japan and India. Chinese authors have addressed Japan's predicted rise to become the strongest or second-strongest world power by 2020, its alleged ambitions to dominate China, its drive to attain equivalence with the United States in both nuclear and conventional weapons, its prospects to implement a revolution in military affairs (RMA), and its efforts to contain China's rise by instigating conflict between China and the United States. Differences do exist among Chinese analysts about Japan's future, but the range of debate is not extensive. There are those who see only "some elements" in Japan having the above-mentioned ambitions, rather than a dedicated Japanese elite. (279) Chinese assessments of India resemble (on a smaller scale) their views of Japan's future role, suggesting that similar premises are at work in the way China's authors examine its two democratic and capitalist neighbors. Following India's nuclear tests in May 1998, in particular, numerous Chinese authors have accused India of pursuing a policy of military expansion since attaining independence, in order to become a military power, contain China, and dominate and control South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

In the short term, Chinese authors (and the Chinese Government) advocate good relations with both Japan and India, through "shelving" territorial disputes for later resolution. However, in the long term, Chinese analysts appear to hold exaggerated estimates of the prospects of future geopolitical threats to China from both Japan and India, to include support of "dismemberment" of China. India could join the United States in aiding Tibetan independence, and Japan might support an independent Taiwan. (280) One reason for this wariness may be that Chinese Marxism counsels suspicion of the predatory motives of any capitalist power. Another may be that ancient Chinese statecraft recommends vigilance toward nearby rivals, especially those with whom one has disputed territory, as China does with Japan and India. Chinese authors themselves suggest that an additional cause for concern has to do with history and culture, particularly the still prevalent memories of past wars. For example, an extreme assessment comes from General Li Jijun, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science (AMS), who writes that Japan's strategic culture is fundamentally ruthless, bloodthirsty, and a "self-made freak." (281) While not as bad as the Japanese, the Indians as a culture are also described as ambitious. A report written by the late Premier Zhou Enlai described India's "blood relationship" (interbreeding) with the British and explained that the Indian middle classes "took over from British imperialism this concept of India as the center of Asia," and want to have "a great Indian empire" that dominates Asia. (282)

CASS calculates that by 2010 Japan will become equal to the United States in Comprehensive National Power (CNP), at a growth rate that will allow it to surpass the United States by 2020. Prior to May 1998, Chinese military authors had been predicting that India would become a nuclear power; now they estimate that Japan will follow suit and that both countries will each maintain at least two aircraft carriers. They assert these two democracies will probably become nationalistic, aggressive military powers. In other words, the fact that Japan and India are democracies counts for little in the eyes of Chinese analysts assessing the future security environment. Instead, several Chinese authors use ancient statecraft and strategic culture arguments to portray Japan and India in derogatory terms usually reserved for totalitarian regimes. Japan's national goal is purportedly to replace the United States as world hegemon, while India is merely in pursuit of regional hegemony. No author says so, but it appears that few welcome Japan or India as a potential strategic partner for China. Instead, these two are "nearby" powers to be opposed rather than "distant" states with whom to seek partnerships.

India's CNP will remain inferior to China's, according to civilian analysts, but military analysts write that India is already ahead of China in naval power and defense spending. Japan's prospects with respect to the RMA are rated as high. Japan is expected to become a major nuclear and conventional military power, co-equal or superior to China, Russia, and the United States. Japan's future military equivalence to the United States can come through its superior CNP or through its implementation of the RMA, and "Japan's Self Defense Forces will strive to be on an equal footing with the United States in the area of conventional military forces." (283) A more nationalistic Chinese author, He Xin, warned in 1989 about Japan's long-term goals in harsher terms: "Japan in the overall strategic arrangement will completely carve up and isolate China. Casting off the United States, nibbling at China, fostering cordial relations with the Soviet Union, and striving for world hegemony very likely will be Japan's basic strategic world policy." (284) Such Chinese predictions about Japan's intentions and capabilities contrast sharply with orthodox American views of Japan.

A provocative article by Feng Zhaokui, a Japan specialist at CASS, appeared in 1997 alleging that Japan is seeking to engineer a severe conflict between China and the United States. Following a classic Warring States tactic of "Murder With a Borrowed Knife" (the third of the 36 Stratagems), (285) Japan's long-term strategy for the future multipolar world is said to be devious efforts to turn the United States against China in the decades ahead so that Japan can "sneak" past the United States in CNP while the United States is distracted by the pseudo threat of China. (286) Japan's motive is said to be to continue its historical ambition to dominate Asia, in pursuit of which it must weaken China's CNP and also break free of its dependency on the United States. Both these goals can be achieved if Japan (or India) succeeds in persuading the Americans that China is a threat and a challenge to American world leadership. Even the usually moderate Beijing Review asserted in 1997 that the sinister China Threat Theory was manufactured first in Japan in 1990 for just this purpose. (287)

India, too, is seen to have menacing designs for the future multipolar world and also is said to employ the tactic of playing the China Threat card. An article by Zhang Wenmu of the CICIR asserts that India's intention is to separate Tibet from China, because, "Tibetan independence will create a buffer zone between China and India and enable India to take bolder action on the South Asian continent, and subsequently, in the Indian Ocean region, without the fear of being attacked front and rear." Consequently it used the China Threat as its excuse for conducting nuclear tests in May 1998. Zhang argues India realized that "in order to ease pressure from the United States (regarding its nuclear tests), India must challenge China," because India and the West have similar strategic aims concerning containing China. Zhang writes,

In the next century, to split China's western part, or more specifically, to split China's Tibetan region . . . is probably the target of the Western world's geopolitical strategy. Having pushed Russia northward, creating a political barrier like Tibet or Xinjiang between China and the oil-producing countries in Central Asia conforms to the strategic interests of the West to control permanently the world's geographic and energy center. This dovetails with India's political plot to create a Tibetan buffer zone between China and India. Currently, India is pulling out all the stops to convince the West that it is willing to play the vanguard for the West's effort to achieve this goal, under the prerequisite that the West will adopt an appeasement policy towards its nuclear option.

According to Zhang, the mutual objective explains why the sanctions imposed on India by the West were not as harsh as those inflicted on Iraq for a similar problem. (288)

Chinese authors assess the future roles of Japan and India in the international security environment mainly as future rivals of China, based both on a belief in their sinister long-term hegemonic strategies and on the military power they will use to back up their plans. Although in overall CNP there are definite differences in the three countries' scores, in terms of military power, both Japan and India are today assessed as roughly equal to China; Japan is slightly superior while India slightly inferior. AMS estimates that:

AMS assessments of India show that China is:

These current "scores" comparing China to India and Japan are not static in Chinese assessments. Instead, many authors focus on the probability of ultranationalist, militarist takeovers of the governments of either Tokyo or New Delhi, or both. In such scenarios, China could find itself facing military giants to the east and south, two nations that might even form a coalition against China. A stream of articles in the 1990s by Chinese specialists on Japan and India tends to ignore the democratic and even pacifist sentiment on which Western analysts focus. Rather, the Chinese seem to be debating among themselves as to how soon current indicators of political, economic, and religious trends will result in nationalistic, militarist regimes in Japan and India.

japan

Future Rivalries

Chinese authors do not lack knowledge of Japan; they cite Japanese language sources and interviews in Japan. They predict Japan's future based on its domestic development and other factors that will make Japan, like all capitalist nations, behave in a predatory imperialist fashion. (291)

The Chinese have not always been so negative in their views of Japan's military development and actually encouraged it in the 1970s. Indeed, it was not until the mid-1980s that China reassessed its support (offered since 1972) for Japanese military modernization. Chinese military figures had encouraged Japan to increase its defense spending to meet the Soviet threat. At one point the Chinese deputy chief of the general staff encouraged Japan to increase its share of defense expenditures from 1 percent of the gross national product (GNP) up to 3 percent, nearly triple Japanese defense expenditures. If this advice had been followed by Tokyo, Japan's budget today would not be U.S. $40 billion but U.S. $150 billion, more than 20 times China's claimed military budget.

Deng Xiaoping told a Japanese delegation to Beijing in September 1978, "I am in favor of Japan's Self Defense Force buildup." (292) At that time, China faced a threatening security environment, and its support for Japan's enlarged defense efforts may have been related in part to Beijing's interest in acquiring Japanese weapons and defense-related technology. China also was clearly interested in recruiting a new partner to their united anti-Soviet front. (293) However, 10 years later, China's security environment had changed, and by the time Japan announced in January 1987 that it would actually increase its defense spending slightly above 1 percent of GNP, the Chinese reacted strongly, attributing it to Japan's larger military ambitions. One of the first strong criticisms of Japanese military goals that authoritatively reversed earlier encouragement of Japan came from Huan Xiang, who served as Deng's national security advisor. (294)

Today, Chinese security experts seem united in the view that in the future security environment, Japan will be primarily locked in a long-term competitive struggle with the other great capitalist power centers, Europe and America; this is a consistent Chinese Marxist-Leninist view of Japan. In 1986, Deng Xiaoping's national security adviser, Huan Xiang, declared that America's allies would all begin to free themselves from U.S. domination. Japan's future strategy toward China and Russia is seen in this larger global geopolitical framework of a powerful Japan now escaping from an ever-declining America, but also colliding with America's escaping European capitalist allies. The 1990s have seen no change since Huan Xiang's assessment in 1986. For example, Japan's present and future geopolitical goals are treated as being the same in five subsequent annual reviews of the international security environment conducted by CICIR, which, as part of its duties for the Ministry of State Security, publishes an annual "World Outlook" article. The authors are not the same each year, but their views on Japan's future role appear to be consistent:

1993: "Japan and Germany, the twin rising economic giants, are cashing in on the golden opportunity of the demise of the former Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and the relative decline of the United States . . . in pursuit of the status of major powers in the year ahead." (295)

1994: "Changes will occur in the tripartite relationship among America, Europe, and Japan . . . and contention for supremacy among the trio will flare up accordingly." (296)

1995: "The United States . . . is confronted with an enlarged and deepening European Union and a Japan seeking to become a major political power. . . . Washington intends to dominate global affairs and constrain any major power from challenging its 'leadership role,' but its intentions are greater than its power." (297)

1996: "The United States, Europe, and Japan will encounter new competition with each other in the context of economic regionalism. The European Union (EU) will speed up its involvement in the East Asian economy, which will inevitably lead to a triangular competition. . . . The intensified efforts made by Europe and Japan to infiltrate Latin America will also pose a threat to the dominant position enjoyed by the United States in its 'backyard.' In short, the unfolding competition among the United States, Europe, and Japan within the framework of their existing relationships will cause more troubles to America in its endeavor to maintain its leading position." (298)

1997: "The United States will strive for maintaining global unipolarity with its status as the sole superpower intact. Its strong desire for world leadership will meet with ever-mounting challenges and rejection. The EU, armed with increasing CNP, will try hard to reach out for the center of the world stage. Japan will come up with more measures for winning the status of a great power." (299)

Chinese analysts often write about the increasing friction in the U.S.-Japan relationship and how Japan is no longer willing to be America's unequal partner. Gao Heng of CASS writes that the United States recognizes the growing threat from Japan and is attempting to use their alliance to diminish the danger. "Political power that dares to say 'no' to the United States is converging into a powerful historical trend. Under these conditions, the United States has begun to use the 'military political alliance' to contain Japan's development. Especially in military affairs, the United States wants to firmly control the scale and direction of its use." However, he explains, the effectiveness of U.S. strategy is limited, because "Facts make clear that the move toward further relaxation in the Japanese-U.S. military and political alliance is a difficult-to-reverse trend." (300) Some analysts, such as Feng Zhaokui, also from CASS, suggest Japan's nuclear ambitions will estrange it from the United States and "will very likely damage the 50-year-old U.S.-Japan security relationship." (301) An article in the Liberation Army Daily predicts, "taking the long-term view, this relationship may be a 'two-edged sword.' Japan's move in strengthening its military alliance relationship with the United States is a means and not an end for becoming one of the world's poles. . . . as Japan spreads its wings and gradually advances toward becoming one of the world's poles, its tendency to break away from the United States will grow." (302)

An article in the foreign ministry journal World Knowledge also points to Japan's increasing power and confidence in the relationship. It forecasts that American-Japanese relations "have entered the most turbulent period in the postwar era, and Japan no longer plays the obedient lamb of the United States." However, like other analysts, the author claims that there is no urgency to this problem: "Although there are contradictions of sorts in U.S.-Japanese relations, no radical change in the basic pattern of relations between the two countries is on the horizon in the foreseeable future." (303) According to some Chinese analysts, the reason that the relationship will not be greatly altered in the near term, despite the increasing discord and Japan's growing power and ambitions, is Japan's continued economic, political, and security dependency on the United States. One author explains that while "there are obvious economic conflicts between Japan and the United States," and "the United States is worried that it may lose out to Japan. . . . Due to mutual political and military needs, with Rightist forces in Japan wishing to rely on the United States to achieve their target of building Japan into a political and military power and the United States wishing to rely on Japan to consolidate its 'line of defense' in East Asia, the two countries have come closer together in recent years." (304) A CICIR analyst elaborates further: "For a long time Japan will not part company with America, although it will change its policies toward the latter. This is because Japan's economy relies heavily on the United States. Its security and politics also need support from the United States. In the new times the Japanese-U.S. relationship is one of cooperation and competition, and of conflict and coordination." (305)

However, Japan's dependency on America will be greatly reduced and overcome, if the assessments of other Chinese analysts regarding Japan's current and future development are correct. For example, one of the major areas in which many Chinese believe Japan holds the world's most advanced position is high technology. Praising the progress it has made in research and innovation, one author writes, "This basic research will be in a leading position in the future science and technology competition, especially nuclear energy, space navigation, civil aviation, ocean development, bio-engineering, superconduction, the magnetic suspension train, fiber-optics communications, high-definition television, and fifth-generation computers, etc." (306) Even in the area of military technology, Chinese authors write that Japan is encroaching on U.S. dominance. A 1996 article, "Japan: Leading the U.S. in Military Technology," stated, "Japan has had great progress in the area of military computer application . . . Without Japan's technology, the U.S. military's F-117A stealth fighter, which was tremendously intimidating in the Gulf War, essentially would not have been created." (307)

Not only do Chinese authors emphasize specific areas in which they believe Japan already is superior to America, but some perceive Japan to be catching up and even pulling ahead of the United States in overall national power. According to an article in World Knowledge, the major U.S. competitive adversary is shifting to Asia, specifically to Japan, because a number of indicators show "Japan is swiftly shrinking its gap with the United States in the fields of economics and science and technology, and engaging in sharp competition with the United States":

The United States has become the world's largest debtor nation, while Japan has become the world's largest creditor nation.

Japan provides more foreign aid than the United States and is the country that provides the most foreign aid in the world.

This article seems to "favorably" forecast Japan's catching up to the United States in the future. For example, it goes on to assert, "By 2010, Japanese direct overseas investment will account for about one-third of global transnational direct investment. Japan is going to exploit these advantages to catch up to the United States faster . . . by 2025 the Japanese economy will overtake the U.S. economy. Even in purchase price parity power, by 2045, the Japanese economy will overtake the U.S. economy." (308) As will be discussed in chapter five, Chinese analysts who quantitatively measure CNP also have predicted that Japan will surpass the United States in the future.

However, it must be pointed out that in the past year negative assessments of Japan's short-term development have been appearing in Chinese journals, particularly when comparing its economic situation with that of its leading rivals, the United States and Europe. As an example, Chen Feng, a senior Research Fellow at the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), suggests, "Japan's performance is rather bad among the developed nations. Suffering from the aftermath of the collapse of the bubble economy, the Japanese economy has been weak in recovery with repeated fluctuations and is estimated to barely maintain growth by 1 percent." (309) Another author, Jian Yuechun of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), forecasts, "The Japanese economy will be weak for a long time. The period of real recovery for the Japanese economy will not come for some time." (310) The Deputy Director of the Division of East Asian Studies at CICIR has even written that the country's economic problems are having a negative impact on its rivalry with the United States and Europe for global dominance: "The unstable political situation and weak economy shook the pillars supporting Japanese diplomacy, and the 'Japan can say no' position that used to be seen in its relations with big powers vanished." (311) However, the former president of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), Chen Qimao, predicts that the diminishing of Japan's diplomatic capabilities is not permanent, and that in the long term its strong overall CNP will allow it to overcome its current problems:

In the past, Japan regarded its sound economic foundation as a diplomatic pillar. Now that the Japanese economy has reached a low ebb, I believe that Japan's diplomatic development will be slowed down. However, I believe that with its comprehensive national strength, Japan will tide over these temporary economic problems sooner or later. In this sense, we must not underestimate Japan's diplomatic development. (312)

Contrasting Views

Before going into a discussion of Chinese views on Japanese militarism, it is useful to contrast a carefully selected "mainstream" American view of Japanese strategic policies with the Chinese "mainstream" view. (313) There is no more respected American specialist on Japan than the late Edwin Reischauer, who served as President John F. Kennedy's Ambassador to Japan after more than two decades at Harvard University, where he trained a generation of American scholars in Japanese studies. He is the co-author with John K. Fairbank of a college textbook on East Asia used for three decades. In addition to his scholarly writings, Reischauer frequently wrote essays on Japan, including the centerpiece for a Life cover story. (314) Reischauer saw the American occupation of Japan (1945-50) as "restoring" democracy to a Japan that had already been operating well as a democracy in the 1920s. He wrote that the Japanese are a "populace devoted to the concepts of individual human rights, democracy, and world peace," concluding by stating, "Most important, we have come to share much the same ideals. With such shared ideals, we are inevitable partners." (315) Reischauer's emphasis on the 1920s is important. In that period, Japan's military spending was low compared to later years, it seemed to have active political parties and a lively parliament, and the role of the military in politics was extremely limited. Japan agreed at the Washington Conference (1921-22) to limit its naval development for a decade. In Reischauer's view, the American occupation purged Japan of the Fascist and military leaders of the 1930s and returned Japan to its roots in democracy and responsible diplomacy of the 1920s. However, this is not the Chinese assessment.

Future Militarism

There is a range of debate among China's leading Japan specialists about the direction of Japan's future development. (316) Almost all see it as inevitable that Japan will seek and assume a greater international political role commensurate with its global economic influence, and that an increase in its military power will accompany this new position. What is debated, however, is the extent to which the country's drive to be a world power and its growing military force will affect its democracy and foreign policy. Will the conservative rightists in Japanese society and politics gain the ascendency and Japan once again head down the "road to militarism?" Chinese analysts question whether Japanese democracy is enduring and stable. One author writes, "Objectively speaking, Japan's becoming a major political nation is the general trend of the times, and no individual's will can change that. The question is, what kind of major political nation will it become? What kind of role will it play?" (317)

In 1995, Liu Jiangyong, chief of Japan studies at CICIR, published a lengthy criticism of Japanese democracy and called into question the extent to which the American occupation influenced the Japanese political system. Its implications for Japanese future policy is as pessimistic as Reischauer's is optimistic. (318) According to Liu Jiangyong, "Japan's militarism has never been thoroughly exposed and criticized." He acknowledges that the American occupation took "some measures for Japan's demilitarization and democratization, such as disbanding its armed forces, arresting the war criminals, as well as supervising the formulation and adoption of Japan's postwar constitution of peace." However, in Liu's view, the American occupation failed to terminate the century-old force of Japanese militarism. A class-A war criminal was released and became Japan's prime minister in 1957. Troop 731, which had engaged in biological warfare experiments, was exempted from trial. In March 1950, all remaining class-A Japanese war criminals in custody were released, thus "preserving the remnants of Japanese militarism." (319) More recently, in 1995 "Japan's right-wing forces have collected and published a series of materials in preparation for reversing the verdict." Liu was particularly concerned that Japan's prewar imperial perception of history still has considerable influence. This theory first appeared in a message of the Meiji emperor, when the government claimed, "The emperor is the supreme deity who has been Japan's ruler ever since the birth of the universe." Liu writes that the myth was "derived from Japan's earliest fairy tale, Kojiki." Today, Japanese "right wingers" are still "deeply immersed in the imperial perception of history and now want to amend Japan's constitution to restore the old imperial system." One year in the nineties, nine out of twenty members of the Japanese cabinet then in power payed homage at the Yasukuni Shrine, which was established in 1979 and used for "spiritual mobilization for further aggressive expansion in China." (320)

Liu writes that because Japan has become "an economic power, it is now moving toward becoming a great military power." He sees "a contempt for Asia" in past and present Japanese policies. The scholar who originated many of these Japanese concepts, Yukichi Fukuzawa, even defined the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894-95 as a "war between civilization and barbarism," in which Japan found itself with a sense of superiority against a "barbarian" China. Liu argues that Japan's "sense of superiority" has again "gained ground" and is "daily expanding." Liu lays emphasis on the 1995 effort by the Japanese prime minister to pass a resolution in parliament in symbolic opposition to war and aggression. Nearly 40 percent of the membership of the parliament opposed passage of the resolution, and two associations collected more than five million signatures, 4 percent of Japan's population, to oppose it. Liu notes the significance of the Diet members who voted against the resolution, including a number of "second-generation heredity Diet members" who are "influenced by their fathers in their perception of war."

Liu is also concerned that Japanese right-wing organizations, 237 of which were disbanded in 1945, have made a comeback since the mid-1990s and now number 1,900. Some have "propaganda vans on the streets of Tokyo shouting slogans to sing praises of the holy war for greater East Asia." Some of these organizations have collectively published the book, Listen! Japan's Innocent Cry, which is aimed at blocking any further investigation into the Emperor's responsibility for the war. Liu contrasts Japan's attitude with the anti-Nazi legislation of Germany, a law passed in 1994 that sentences to 5 years in prison anyone who denies the truth of the Holocaust. He writes, "People cannot help thinking that Japan has legally retained the freedom for the right-wing forces to reverse the verdict on Japan's history of aggression." (321)

Liu is not alone in his analysis of Japan; other scholars point to similar issues in their assessments. For example, a Research Fellow at CIISS, also is alarmed by the Japanese cabinet members who visited the Yasukuni Shrine and "have been increasingly spreading fallacies denying Japan's history of militarist aggression." The author goes on to state,

This demonstrates fully the fact that within Japan there is quite a batch of militarists refusing to conscientiously plead guilty, and attempting to revive the old dream of the so-called "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere."  . . . The trend of politically right deviations in Japan has aroused grave worries and high vigilance among the peoples of Asia. (322)

The release in Japan in May 1998 of "Pride, The Fatal Moment," a movie eulogizing one of the great advocates of the Co-prosperity Sphere and a Japanese class-A war criminal, Hideko Tojo, drew numerous attacks in China for "boisterously glorifying" Tojo and the "Japanese evil war of aggression" and was cited as an example of the continued existence and pervasiveness of militarism. "The making of this reactionary movie is not something accidental. It reflects the continuing existence of militarist thinking in Japan. The ideas expressed in it are not anything new, but belong to the same category promoted by Japan's postwar ultrarightist force. What is worrying after all is that the ultra-rightist force does still have some following in Japan. Otherwise, this reactionary movie would not have been screened for the public." (323)

The adoption of the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines by the Japanese parliament and the passage of relevant bills in spring 1999 also raised concerns about the growing strength of the right-wing and militarism. An article in the Liberation Army Daily warns:

Rightist forces in Japanese politics are on the rise, and certain right-wing politicians have come out from behind the stage to the front and are trying to sway Japan's policy directions. . . . and in recent years more and more agitation for revising the constitution has been stirred up; following the passage of the bills related to the new guidelines, quite a number of people in Japanese political circles have again clamored for revising the constitution, babbling that the constitution enacted 50 years ago can no longer meet the demands of the development of the times. Under their agitation, many people in Japan agree that the constitution should be revised; and once this is done, the development of Japanese military strength is bound to become "uncontrollable." (324)

Some Chinese authors temper their discussions of Japanese militarism by pointing out that it is only one segment of Japanese society and politics that advocates extreme nationalism, not the general public. For example, Gao Heng of CASS believes that the American occupation did not eradicate militarism in Japan, and worse, because the United States wanted to use Japan to counter the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China during the occupation, "It preserved Japan's entire national machinery and war machinery (although the names were changed)." Today, he writes, "In the Northeast Asian region, the greatest undetermined factor is Japan. Facts make clear that the people who advocate that Japan should restore the militarist line are continuously getting more power." However, Gao believes the general Japanese public does not support the militarists, although he warns, "If Japan's domestic society and the international society lose vigilance, and lack a restricting mechanism, then the possibility that Japan will follow the same disastrous road to militarism still exists." (325) The Deputy Director of the Division for East Asian Studies at CICIR, Yang Bojiang, even believes that currently the political trend of militarism is on the decline in Japan. "Generally speaking, the influence of the conservative hard liners, who are pursuing a domestic policy of cooperating with conservatives and a foreign policy of carrying out extreme nationalism toward the Japanese politics is decreasing." However, he also cautions, "Taking the Japanese diplomatic environment into account, in the next 5 to 7 years, if the political and economic development is not smooth, the nationalism is likely to continuously rise. For example, some Japanese will possibly spread extreme views regarding its historical act of aggression, some will even raise the question of revising the Constitution." (326)

Lu Guangye, a fellow at the Chinese National Defense Strategic Institute, argues that a revival of militarism is not inevitable in Japan, because not only are the Japanese people opposed to it, but it runs counter to the main trend of peace and development in the world today: "The main current in the world today . . . is peace and development, and the cries of the people of the whole world in demanding justice and equality and the establishment of a new international political and economic order cannot be blocked. The Japanese people dearly love peace and will absolutely not permit the country to again march into the abyss of war." (327)

Impact of Militarism

The prospects of future Japanese militarism are worrisome for the Chinese because of the role Japan may try to play in the Asia-Pacific. Japan is viewed as breaking free of its links to the West and shifting its focus to Asia. One author writes, "A historical issue that has confronted Japan ever since the Meiji Restoration is this: should Japan exist as part of Asia or part of the United States and Europe?" He suggests that for the "third time Japan has changed its national direction." The author continues to say that recently Japan has decided to become more involved with Asian economic affairs, and "this strategic shift naturally has attracted profound concern in nations around the world, particularly its neighbors in Asia." (328) Therefore, the issue for Chinese analysts becomes how will Japan act with regard to its new focus. An article by four CICIR analysts states, "Japan is now on the third historical turning point since the Meiji Restoration. A debate is well under way in the country on whether Japan should grow into a 'peaceful country which emphasizes making contributions to the world' or 'a mini superpower with a military role to play.' " (329)

Of even greater concern to the Chinese is how Japan may view China and Chinese national interests as it strives to become a major political and military power and, particularly, how will it react to the rise of China. The Vice President of CICIR, Lu Zhongwei, points out, "In Asia's diplomatic history, there has never been such a precedent as the coexistence of a strong China and a strong Japan." (330) Cooperation between the two powers is not considered to be a likely option, he argues, because of the "two T's (Taiwan and the security treaty between the U.S. and Japan)," and because China considers itself to be in an unfavorable position in the Sino-U.S.-Japan trilateral relationship. Several Chinese authors mention that in recent years Japanese politicians have stated that Sino-Japanese relations are equally as important to Japan as U.S.-Japanese relations. However, Lu writes that despite these assurances, "It would be very hard for Japan to manage deftly to put the two relationships on an equal footing when it has to make a strategic decision." (331) Other authors argue that Japan sees the relationships as being of equal importance, only because, in its efforts to become a power, it intends to take advantage of China's strength and international standing, while at the same time working to contain China and intervene in its development and affairs:

Additionally, there are the dual concerns that "some elements in Japan also intend to utilize the United States to restrain China" and that the United States wants to use Japan for the same end. (333) At AMS, the director of the foreign military studies department, a Japan specialist, has described the history of Japanese militarism and its consequences for Japan's future military role in Asia. He and others worry that "Attempts by the United States to restore its hegemony by playing China and Japan against each other will be dangerous. The United States may try to encourage differences among the Western Pacific countries." (334)

When asked by outsiders about the prospects for Chinese cooperation with Japan on security issues in the future, the typical Chinese answer generally includes a discussion of the problem of Japanese latent militarism and the growing strength of the "right wing" in Japan. In balance of power terms, it would be in China's interest to avoid a rivalry with Japan that could be exploited by other powers. As East Asia's two great powers, China and Japan could reap benefits from cooperation to prevent Asian instability; it is thus interesting that Chinese perceptions of several Japanese initiatives in the 1990s have been negative. The Chinese believe the initiative of Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa in 1992-93 brought to an end the postwar doctrine of Prime Minister Yoshida, who advocated that Japan concentrate on economic development at home and investment in Asia, while relying on the U.S. security umbrella, with Japan's own defense concentrating solely on the home islands. The so-called Miyazawa doctrine to form a regional forum to discuss Asian security issues modeled on the Conference On Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was criticized by Chinese authors as a thinly veiled effort to contain China. When Japan then supported American efforts in Iraq and passed the Peace Keeping Operations Law, which authorized Japanese forces in U.N. missions for 1 year, Chinese analysts described this as yet another step in the return to militarism in Japan.

When Japan's Self-Defense Forces participated in the U.N. mission in Cambodia, Beijing objected even though Japan sent only unarmed engineers. Beijing seems divided between those who wished to discourage Japan's military buildup and believe it may be underway, and the more pessimistic view that Japan's militarization is inevitable and can only be postponed at best. (335)

China's national security research organizations seem united in the view that in the future Japan will play an independent role as a major military power. (336) This is in sharp contrast with most American views of Japan. Richard Nixon, for example, raised the prospect of a Chinese-Japanese quasi-alliance that could dominate East Asia economically and militarily. (337) According to some calculations, the arithmetic combination of the Japanese and Chinese gross national products in the year 2020 would surpass the GNP of the United States. In China, this concept of a China-Japan alliance seems absurd.

One Chinese journal claimed that the United States had itself begun to become wary about Japan's longer term military ambitions, including the possible event of "Japan taking the road of a military power." (338) The article stressed that the United States had tried but perhaps failed "to control Japan (and to make) Japan its important strategic partner forever." A kind of Marxist economic concept was used to explain that "the present Japan-United States economic frictions have not reached the stage of endangering the strategic cooperation between both sides." In other words, an increase in Japanese-American economic friction beyond a certain threshold may well lead to Japan becoming an independent military power. Nevertheless, The New York Times reported that a Chinese official revealed that the Chinese military has asked for additional defense spending in the 5-year plan to deal with Japanese military capabilities. (339) In November 1995, China called for the closing of American bases in Okinawa and called into question the need for a U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty in the post-Cold War environment.

Against this backdrop, the recent revisions of the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines have proved especially worrisome for China, because the scope of the alliance was expanded in ways that China felt directly threatened its national interests. One author writes, "Last April, the United States and Japan signed a joint declaration on security guarantees to strengthen their military cooperation. This was aimed at preventing China from rising, getting stronger, and positing a challenge to the United States." (340) In the Study Reports on the International Situation-1997-1998, a yearly compilation of the views of authors from a variety of institutes published by the Chinese Society for Strategy and Management, Liu Jiangyong of CICIR points out that the Defense Institute of the Japanese Defense Agency has issued a report, "Long-Term Forecast for Japan's Security at the End of 1996." This report asserts, "By 2015 it is almost certain that China will become a great power economically, militarily, and politically. At any time it will constitute a threat to Japanese navigation passage from the Malacca Strait to the Bashi Channel. The South China Sea will become a Chinese sea." According to Liu, "obviously in revising the defense guidelines with the United States the purpose of Japan and America is to strengthen the strategic deterrence against China . . . China becomes a so-called imaginary enemy under the Japanese-American Security Treaty." (341)

One of the chief causes for Chinese concern is that the new agreement indicates, both in terms of geographic coverage and time of action, that the United States and Japan plan to involve themselves in China's affairs. First, the wording referring to the geographic area encompassed by the guidelines changed from the "Far East" to "Japan's surrounding areas," which means that not only is Taiwan included, but the Nansha Islands as well. Second, the time of joint Japan-U.S. military operations is no longer limited to an attack on Japan, but now includes both peacetime and contingencies in the "surrounding areas." Many Chinese analysts were particularly angered by the comments of Japanese officials on the subject. Zhang Changtai of CIISS stated, "Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Siroku Kajiyama openly declared that 'Japan's surrounding areas should naturally include the Taiwan Strait' and that 'Japan will not sit idle if the U.S. troops set out for the Taiwan issue,' thus exposing clearly their intents of interfering in China's internal affairs by means of the new guidelines." (342)

At present, China is most concerned about a possible Japanese manipulative role in Taiwan politics, possibly encouraging Taiwan to move toward independence and a close relationship with Japan. Zbigniew Brzezinski has revealed in his memoirs that China insisted on a promise from the United States that it would prevent Japan from forming a defense relationship with Taiwan.

Another extremely troublesome aspect of the new U.S.-Japan security guidelines for the Chinese is that Japan's military functions in the alliance have been broadened. Its activities are no longer solely confined to defending its own territories, but include providing the United States with logistic support. According to the Deputy Director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at CASS, "During the Cold War, . . . Japan played the role of a 'shield' and America that of a 'spear.' The new strategic assignment the Joint Declaration has allotted to Japan is through providing logistic support, to play a corresponding military role in preventing disputes in the Asia-Pacific region. In other words, the role of Japan has changed from a 'shield' in the past to one of an auxiliary 'spear.' " (343) The Chinese fear is that Japan's expanded role and functions will further fuel the development of militarism and the growth of the Right. A Research Fellow at CIISS writes that there is a direct connection between U.S.-Japan security cooperation and the efforts of some Japanese to put their country back on the road to militarism:

Adjustment in Japan-U.S. military relations will enable Japan to have the opportunity to achieve a new breakthrough in military policies and further encourage the turn to the right in domestic politics in Japan. . . . For quite some time, there has been growth of the rightist tendency in seeking reversal of the verdict on the history of Japan's aggression and trying to rid itself of the status of the vanquished nation. Although this is a stubborn manifestation of the rightist forces in Japan, it should also be noted at the same time that it is closely related to Japan's strengthening of its military relations with the United States, which indicates that there are indeed some people in Japan attempting to seek a military upswing by strengthening its military relations with the United States. (344)

Similarly, CICIR's Liu Jiangyong writes that if America and Japan actually implement the Security Treaty, "it will lead to political turmoil in Japan." (345)

Following NATO military strikes in Yugoslavia and the Japanese parliament's adoption of the U.S.-Japan Security Guidelines in the spring of 1999, Chinese authors expressed even graver concerns about the U.S.-Japanese military relationship. "This NATO of the Asian version has brazenly included the 'emergencies in areas surrounding Japan,' including China, into the sphere of its military intervention and attempted to include China's Taiwan into its 'theater missile defense system,' thus sowing the seed of trouble for the future peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region." (346) Lu Guangye, a fellow at the Chinese National Defense Strategic Institute, went so far as to warn:

The NATO bloc and the Japanese-US military alliance have become the two black hands helping the tyrant to do evil. . . . Everything that NATO does can be regarded as the most direct and most realistic mirror of what we understand as the substance of the Japanese-US military alliance and of how Japan and the United States will act in the Asia-Pacific region. The "experiment" carried out in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by U.S.-led NATO also provides a vivid example for the Asia-Pacific countries. (347)

He Xin: A Dissenting View

At the "high end" of alarm about Japan's future intentions and capabilities toward China, one must count He Xin, perhaps China's best known hypernationalist author and an advisor to then Premier Li Peng. In a article written at the end of 1988, He Xin predicted that Japan's predatory need for resources would cause it try to "colonize" China. The only hope for China's survival would be comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union. (348) He Xin forecast the following:

Military Development

The discussion of future Japanese militarism sets the foundation for Chinese authors to analyze the country's military planning. Several authors point to Japan's growing defense budget as being indicative of efforts to become a military power: "It is . . . still increasing its military budget, which is already the second largest in the world." (349) Further, "Japan's defense expenditure has been increasing since 1991, though its economic growth is constantly declining." (350) Chinese analysts argue that the level and extent of Japan's military development reveal that it is moving beyond self-defense, to overseas operations and potential military expansionism. Liu Jiangyong of CICIR writes,

The Japanese Government has repeatedly promised that "Japan will not become a military power threatening the security of other countries." Its actions, however, seem to indicate otherwise. In recent years, there are signs showing that Japan is no longer satisfied with a capability to defend its own security. More and more it shows an aspiration to involve itself in international military activities and to increase rapidly the power of its high-tech conventional forces. For this purpose, it plans to invest about U.S. $50 billion each year in the coming four years. Not long ago, the Japanese Institute for Defense Studies under the Ministry of Defense advocated that Japan should build its own nuclear-propelled submarines and have long-range troop projecting capability before the year of 2015. These will no doubt raise increasing concerns of its Asian neighbors. (351)

An immediate problem for China is the Japanese development of an antiballistic missile defense system in cooperation with the United States. Detailed Chinese commentary has also emphasized Japanese plans to acquire additional military airlift, aerial refueling, long-range antishipping fighter aircraft (the FSX), and other military acquisition plans as clear evidence of Japan's gradual transition over the coming decade into a major military power, including the Japanese goal of acquiring nuclear weapons and two aircraft carriers within two decades. (352) Chinese analysts claim that Japan already has transport ships that "have the functions of an air-craft carrier" and are able to carry helicopters and vertical-flight jet fighters. (353)

Chinese authors also point out how being "militarily strong in technology" will put Japan in a beneficial position in developing the RMA. (354) For example, a Research Fellow at CIISS, which is sponsored by military intelligence, writes, "Japan is unwilling to lag behind the tide of the new military revolution. Using every opportunity, Japan has not only changed its practice of 'building the country through scientific and technological copying' to 'building the country through scientific and technological creativity,' but also put the emphasis of military reform on enhancing the five capabilities, i.e., the capabilities of intelligence, sea lane defense, island defense, theater missile defense, and long-distance transportation." (355) Even on the issue of nuclear weapons, some analysts predict that in the future, Japan will, like India, become a nuclear power:

Evidence indicates that Japan is increasing its nuclear potential under the slogan of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, and is possibly utilizing nuclear energy to serve its political and military goals. As one of the limited number of nuclear power countries in the world, Japan's nuclear power facilities take over one tenth of the world's total. . . . The development of nuclear electricity is an indicator of the increase of nuclear potential. There is no doubt that Japan has the capacity to produce a nuclear bomb. . . . It should not be excluded that some day Japan can possibly start research on and produce nuclear weapons. . . . As the only country attacked by nuclear weapons in the world, Japan has a particular advantage in research on nuclear protection. From the viewpoint of technique, Japan has measures to avoid international supervision and undertake secret research on nuclear weapons. Inference can be drawn that Japan can increase the transparency of nuclear research by publicizing its plutonium storage, gaining trust from other countries, as well as imposing a deterrent. It is predicted that if North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, Japan will develop such weapons as well. (356)

india

Chinese assessments of India's future development and international role frequently stress its dangerous military potential and the instability of Indian democracy. For many years, Chinese analysts have been attuned to the prospects of intense rivalry with India, another great ancient empire. In spite of a well-publicized agreement in September 1993 on confidence-building measures regarding their disputed territory, they recently have become concerned that there are countervailing manifestations of Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry. They include Chinese M-11 missile component sales to Pakistan in response to concern about Indian nuclear and missile development; Chinese irritation about India's tacit support for Tibetan independence; Indian allegations about a disruptive Chinese role in the Kashmir dispute; and China's efforts to sell weapons to India's neighbors. (357) After May 1999, PLA authors such as Peng Guangqian of AMS warned that the United States will exploit India to contain China, adding another kind of "danger" from India. Writings from 25 Chinese authors are reviewed in the following section.

A Future Asian Great Power?

There is some debate among Chinese analysts about the position and role of India in the 21st century. As discussed in chapter one, orthodox and reform views differ over whether or not Third World nations will rise in strength to occupy a significant position in the future multipolar world. Orthodox authors predict that today's developing nations will be crucial in transforming world politics, while reformists do not foresee that they will develop enough power to exert a major influence and compete with the five poles. India, as one of the major Third World nations, is at the center of this debate. At one end of the spectrum, Zhang Changtai, a Research Fellow at CIISS, writes, "Besides the five major powers, India is also a major power with great potential for development so far as population and territorial size and regional influence are concerned. It is expected that India will become a newly rising force not to be neglected in the upcoming structure of the Asia-Pacific." (358) Chen Qimao, former president of SIIS, believes that India's power "will greatly increase, but until the early 21st century (before 2010) there is no prospect for . . . [it] to become one of the world's poles." (359) On the other side of the debate is the view that India is too weak to contend in the future world structure. "After 50 years of development . . . India has not extricated itself from its status as a poor country, and its average output per capita is far down in world rankings. India has been demanding for a long time to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, and to achieve an international status commensurate with having the second highest population in the world. In fact, however, India's international status has been continually declining in recent years." (360) This debate about India will be echoed in chapter five, where orthodox and reform quantitative assessments of India's CNP predict very different placements for India in the hierarchy of the world's future major powers.

In general, when assessing India and its power, Chinese analysts emphasize that the country's development has both positive and negative factors. Ye Zhengjia of CIIS writes, "India is a very complex developing major nation, it has a dual nature in multiple areas. India has tremendous potential, and faces numerous grim challenges." (361) For example, in terms of India's economic development, Chinese assessments tend to discuss both that India has made great strides and that it still has a long way to go. Hua Biyun of CICIR, while noting that India's reforms "have attained spectacular results," and predicting continued accomplishments, also lists numerous "restricting factors" that will hinder rapid success: (362)

1. The people's standard of living is low. 2. Base facilities are poor and there is a serious shortage of energy resources. 3. After initial success in correcting financial imbalance, a relapse appeared. 4. Reform of state-owned enterprises is slow. 5. In a democratic system opposing parties often tie up government policy. (363)

When discussing the influence of India's economic development on China, Hua predicts that although "as a parallel rising market, India becomes China's main competitor in international funds, technology and commodity markets," theirs is "not a life or death relationship," because China's economy is stronger. "India's influence in Asia and the Indian Ocean will expand. From now until 2010, its economic development speed is predicted to be 6 to 8 percent, while China's will be above 8 percent. The two countries' development levels will grow further apart . . . therefore, India cannot become 'China's replacement market,' although its influence is rising." (364)

China's research on India's future also focuses on the range of divergent factors affecting stability in Indian politics and government. One Chinese concern has been the role played in Indian politics by religious extremist organizations, and the extent to which they will influence the orientation of Indian domestic and foreign policies. (365) One important article stresses that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) may take over India and turn it toward intense, Hindu chauvinistic policies. (366) The rise of nationalism is another point of concern for Chinese analysts, because the BJP drew on Indian nationalism to gain support for the nuclear tests, and the government may draw on it again to boost its efforts to attain regional hegemony. One analyst asserts, "Great power ambitions form a strong contrast with the decline of real international status, and this is an important reason for the continual rise of nationalism in India in recent years. . . . The BJP, which rode this whirlwind of nationalism to take power, has seized the opportunity brought by the nuclear tests to play the 'people's will' card to the outside world and the 'interests of national security card' for domestic consumption, and has used international pressure to further fan nationalist emotions." (367)

Political instability in general is predicted for India. "In the future a multi-party alliance government is very possible, representing different classes and interests, but India's historical experiences have proved that this type of government often is short lived. A turbulent situation could once again emerge in India. In addition, religious, ethnic, and sex contradictions are very complex, making it difficult for the country to maintain long term stability." (368)

One area where Chinese authors assess India as having significant power is in military affairs. For example, Hua Biyun asserts, "India's military strength is number four in the world." (369) Two CICIR analysts write, "During the past few decades, India has enhanced its military strength and rapidly developed its national defense industry." They explain that India's stress on the development of science and technology has been a key factor in developing its military power. "India currently has 3 million scientists and technicians, following only the United States and Russia, to be third in the world. These science and technology troops are India's precious 'intelligence resource,' and play a decisive role in national defense studies and war production." They predict that India's military power will continue to grow in the future:

Through several years of continuous effort . . . India's national defense science and technology and war production has undergone a huge change, its reliance on other countries has been reduced, and its degree of self-sufficiency has increasingly risen. Now India has the capacity to build large vessels and submarines. It designs and produces aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, missile destroyers, and equips Russian-made C-grade nuclear submarines with medium-range missiles. The new tanks produced by India can resist high-speed armor piercing shells and anti-tank bombs, and are of world standard. India has started to manufacture modern light fighters, which will be put into operation in 2005. The light fighters have modern navigation and aiming systems, and can have the capacity of continuous flight and inflight fueling. Such fighters are equivalent to M-27s. . . . Before 2010 it will enter the ranks of the "top level world military powers." (370)

The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean has caused India to focus on naval development, and many analysts stress India's powerful Navy in their discussions of the country's military capabilities. "In order to attain its strategic objective of seeking regional hegemony and exercising control over the Indian Ocean, India has focused attention on strengthening its navy. India's Navy now ranks 7th in the world and it is one of a small number of countries in the world, and the only one in South Asia, to possess aircraft carriers." (371) An article written following India's nuclear tests in 1998, stated, "The Indian Navy is the strongest one in the South Asian subcontinent, being charged with the missions of 'countering' the Pakistan Navy and controlling the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea on the east and west wings of the Indian peninsula, and, when conditions permit, deterring the superpowers within Indian sea space." It details India's future development plan as forming:

a sea-based, submarine-launched nuclear strike capability by the early 21st century. . . . By the late 20th century to the early 21st, the Indian Navy will add dozens of new warships of all types including 20-plus more advanced large and medium combat ships, with its naval might topping 100,000 troops. By that time, the Indian naval fleet will have extended its naval defense line 600 nautical miles beyond a blue-water fleet with a nuclear combat capability. . . . The Indian Navy's steadily stronger control of the Indian Ocean, particularly of the two strategic channels of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca, is likely not only to cause potential conflict with navies operating in the region and to affect the navigational order in the key international lanes of the Indian Ocean, but also to pose a threat to the maritime security of the Asia Pacific region. (372)

Instability in South Asia

As the Chinese see it, India's prospects seem to depend on the chances for resolution of its conflicts with Pakistan and its ultimate ambitions. Chinese authors urge caution, specifically recommending against China becoming a mediator between India and Pakistan. For example, Sheng Huipeng, a professor at Beijing University, argues that two of the "important purposes of India's nuclear policy are . . . to counter what it considered a possible nuclear threat from China; and . . . to use its status as a nuclear power to become a permanent member state of the U.N. Security Council." (373) Sheng is more generous toward Pakistan, which he says maintains its nuclear program because

it is the most economical way of facing up to India. . . . It is said that Pakistan is able to produce 10-15 nuclear warheads and uranium raw materials. Pakistan's nuclear stance has become the pillar of its national defense strategy. . . . It is very difficult to break the nuclear deadlock between the two countries. From now on either party's imprudence on this issue will not only destroy any progress made in the security dialogue, but will probably push these countries to the brink of nuclear war.

He adds that the Kashmir issue

is more fundamental than the nuclear issue, and the solution to it is more difficult. The letter K in the name Pakistan stands for Kashmir. Thus, the Pakistanis believe without Kashmir, Pakistan holds the country as incomplete. . . . India claims that the legal position of Kashmir has already been determined, because soon after a partition, the ruler of Kashmir declared that Kashmir had joined India. Pakistan believes that Kashmir's Moslems belong with Pakistan; India believes it cannot recognize religious ethnic groups. . . . Hence in a sense fighting for Kashmir is equivalent to defending a faith. To both countries, to give up Kashmir means to give up not only territory, but also a principle and a belief.

Shang is not optimistic, noting that "there is a complete stalemate at the moment on Kashmir." (374) In the security dialogue between India and Pakistan, Shang advocates that "China should not try to serve as a mediator, but continue to provide advice on promoting the alleviation of tension." (375)

A new assessment of the Indian-Pakistan dispute in Kashmir comes from an article in the Liberation Army Daily, which "sees a U.S. conspiracy" in the conflict, and believes, "Fighting between India and Pakistan over Kashmir would benefit the United States regardless of the outcome." The editorial by Ding Zengyi depicted "the United States as 'sitting on a hill watching the tigers fight,' waiting to reap the benefits of their conflict." The current U.S. "South Asia strategy is to control India and Pakistan, maintain the balance of power in South Asia and use India to contain China." The article concluded that "In the present India-Pakistan armed clash over Kashmir, it would be hard to avoid a scenario where both parties are losers again. . . . This would result in a weakened Pakistan and a limited India for the United States. . . . As long as the exchange of fire between India and Pakistan does not turn into a nuclear war, it would benefit the United States' South Asia strategic scheme." (376)

China's analysts are clearly worried about either India or Japan becoming part of a future balance of power system in Asia that may emerge in response to a common perceived threat from China. They would have sufficient economic and military strength to join the United States to form a balance of power system. Forming such an anti-China coalition seems an unlikely possibility to Western analysts. At present, some idea of the pressure threshold required to drive together Asian nations can be observed in the failure of the ASEAN member nations to achieve any multinational security cooperation. In the decades ahead, an Asian multinational security coalition to deter China would have to include several larger powers, roughly equivalent to Chinese economic and military capacity. Using the CNP scores of Chinese analysts, for example, it could be calculated that Japan, Russia, and India would be needed to balance China. Rapid growth rates for Russia and India, however, may bring these two Asian nations into the same league as China and Japan. They would then be available as strong partners in a coalition in Asia, rather than weak states that would tend to ally themselves with the threatening power or seek isolation and neutrality. Because of their potential to affect the Asia balance of power, the quality of economic decisionmaking in New Delhi and Moscow in the near term will determine whether these powers will have the capability to form coalitions, let alone the intention to do so. Some Chinese authors have considered this possibility.

Historical Rivalries

Chinese authors debate whether the historical origins of India's rivalry with China can ever be resolved, or must inevitably remain a source of military conflict. On the optimistic side of this debate, some authors imply that this historical issue can be overcome and no longer be a barrier to improving future Sino-Indian relations. On the pessimistic side, however, far more authors emphasize the depth of Indian hostility. Even the optimists use the word "dangerous" to warn of the consequences if India does not revisit the past and see it the "right" way. For example, Ye Zhengjia, a Senior Research Fellow at CIIS, stated in an interview with the Indian magazine Frontline, "My personal view is that it is a precondition [for the development of Sino-Indian relations] to see the right situation in 1962," that the two sides "can not go forward smoothly without clarifying all the facts." He explains, "Because the Indian side did not see the facts right in 1962, from a wrong notion, India and China came to conflict. The BJP government wants to force a boundary settlement on China on its terms. As a scholar, I would like to warn that if we do not take this boundary question on the right track, it could turn out to be dangerous." Another problem with historical roots discussed by Ye involves Tibet. He criticizes Prime Minister Nehru's reluctance "to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet," and states that today,

I do not think India is doing the right thing on the Dalai Lama. . . . In my personal view, the Tibetan problem is even more important than the boundary question. The British (imperialist Raj) perception, as it has influenced the mind of the Indian ruling classes, is very wrong and dangerous: 'when there is a problem in Tibet, raise it!' . . . but if you always think of interfering in Tibetan affairs, the future could be dangerous." (377)

At the height of the polemics in 1962, after China had attacked Indian frontier posts (claiming self-defense), the Chinese Government provided its opinion of why India had expansionist ambitions. The Chinese view of Indian motives was that Indian leaders had interbred with their British colonial occupiers, thereby absorbing "British imperialism" and leading to "a blood relationship" with the British. (378) China also implied that India's reliance on Western aid meant that India had been "bought" by the West. Finally, China quoted this sentence from Prime Minister Nehru's Autobiography to show his imperialist expansionist ambitions: "Though not directly a Pacific state, India will inevitably exercise an important influence there."

China claimed that this statement shows that the "goal pursued by this ambitious Nehru is the establishment of a great empire unprecedented in India's history." A small national state "can only be a vassal in Nehru's great empire." Nehru was not alone in his ambition, China stated, for the Indian middle classes "took over from British imperialism this concept of India as the center of Asia" and "this has led to Nehru's idea of a great Indian empire. . . . India is the only country in Asia that has a protectorate." (379)

It might be imagined that China's rivalry with India may also be based on other historical factors, like the challenge of Buddhism to Chinese core beliefs, jealousy about the achievements of India's ancient empire, or India's large population and territory. There were also more immediate issues in 1962. Premier Zhou Enlai's public letter to Nehru said, "The Indian Government has stepped up its persecution of Chinese nationals in India . . . publicly spread seeds of hatred for the Chinese people." (380)

Another cause for China's hostility was the claim that India "instigated treason" in Tibet in 1950. While China's security was "seriously threatened by the U.S. aggression in Korea," India "brazenly did what the British imperialists had not dared to do. They forcibly occupied more than 90,000 square kilometers of China's territory." In 1959, "the fourth day after" Tibet started its rebellion in March, Nehru wrote to Zhou Enlai repeating the demand for 90,000 square kilometers and adding a claim for another 33,000 in the west, making the total area claimed three times as large as Holland.

China responded testily to Indian charges that China is an expansionist power, stating, "It is true that historically China had been powerful and had invaded other countries, but that occurred under the rule of the feudal landlord class." (381) Nehru's statements were "utterly outrageous" and "preposterous" and formed a slander campaign from 1959 to 1962, when Nehru made more than 300 speeches using "the most malicious language vilifying China," such as saying that China is "trying to flaunt her strength in a crude and violent way . . . to keep a foot on our chest." Nehru is "slandering China noisily" on the boundary question and "he has also tried in the most despicable sinister way to sow dissension between China and other countries." (382)

Particularly galling for China was this statement by Nehru: "A strong China is normally an expansionist China. Throughout history this has been the case. . . . Even if we were 100 percent friendly with them, the fact remains that here is a mighty power sitting on our borders. That in itself changes the whole context, the whole picture. . . . The continuous failure of harvest has created an explosive situation." China replied that Chinese population pressure is less than in India, China's per square kilometer population being 67 and India's 148. China asked Nehru, "According to your logic, do you or do you not think that India's huge population is also a menace to other countries?"

A final motive for the activation of the rivalry was India's effort to protect Tibet from China's suppression of the Buddhist monks in the name of social progress. India's actions seemed closely related to the road to Tibet China had built secretly across the disputed territory prior to the 1959 Tibet uprising. India's effort in Tibet to protect Buddhism from a society that had rejected Buddhism was a source of hostile comments by China, especially because India seemed to be cooperating with the American CIA in this supposedly "religious" effort. (383)

China and India also had military skirmishes again in 1987. Despite the appearance of improved diplomatic relations, India and China cannot find common ground to settle their border dispute. Behind that dispute, an enduring rivalry exists that has been intensified by India's development of both nuclear weapons and a ballistic missile, which put much of China within range of Indian nuclear warheads.

The Enduring Relevance of History

Following its nuclear tests in May 1998, the Indian Government alleged a China threat--a clear manifestation of the continued influence of the historical rivalries in Sino-Indian relations. A China Daily article stated that Indian leaders "thought spreading the theory of a China threat was very useful. However, since they could not find any factual basis, they wracked their brains to come up with some age-old events in an attempt to confuse public opinion. In a letter to the U.S. President, the [Indian] Prime Minister slung mud at China, saying that China 'launched an armed invasion against India in 1962,' and that India's security environment has 'continued to worsen' for several years. That is to say, India was developing its nuclear weapons because of a China threat." (384)

Chinese authors reacted strongly to India's new China Threat Theory, blasting the government for creating the theory as an excuse for their nuclear tests, and to keep the BJP in power. (385) They were particularly disgusted because it "wrecked in a single day the results of improving relations between these two countries over the past 10 years and more." (386) A Liberation Army Daily article stated, "Unexpectedly, just as Sino-Indian relations are improving continually, the Indian authorities have insolently jumped out and raised a hue and cry about the China Threat Theory, openly regarding China as an obstacle to India seeking regional hegemony in an attempt to land China in a difficult position and boost its own morale. If this is not regional hegemonism, what is it then?" (387)

Yan Xuetong of CICIR expressed concern that India may try to turn the China Threat Theory into reality. "What merits attention is that India's vigorous spread of the China Threat Theory may betoken a new regional danger. For a long time India has repeatedly pushed forward its expansionist policy, threatening its neighboring countries in various ways. In 1962 it even started a large-scale border war against China; it also provided bases in Indian territory for the Dalai clique and encouraged them to engage in activities splitting China. People should wait and see whether the current Indian Government will create new trouble that may lead to a regional danger, to prove to the world a 'China Threat' really exists." (388)

At the same time India was using the China threat and the 1962 war as its excuse for conducting nuclear tests, Chinese analysts were employing arguments and phrases from the same era to respond to and criticize the tests. They frequently referred to Nehru's ambitions and India's British legacy as the sources of Indian aspirations of hegemony and its related goal of possessing nuclear weapons. For example, an article in the Liberation Army Daily stated, "The desire among some Indians to seek regional hegemony has swollen and they are bent on intimidating others and forcing neighboring countries to "respect" India. . . . Prior to India's independence, Indian Congress Party leader Nehru pointed out in his book, India's Discovery: 'With its current position, India simply cannot play a secondary role in the world. India should either be vigorous or disappear from the scene.' " (389)

Far from disappearing from the scene, Chinese authors argue that "Through 50 years of efforts, India now boasts a mighty army," and its "military strategic targets" are "to seek hegemony in South Asia, contain China, control the Indian Ocean, and strive to become a military power in the contemporary world." One reason for India's "ambition of scrambling for military hegemony in the region" is that "it believes that since the Indian Ocean was formerly the 'lake of Britain,' it should now be included in the sphere of influence of India." (390)

Another article also mentions the British legacy in Indian aspirations, but argues that India lacks the real strength to achieve its goals. "In the contemporary era, India has always considered itself to be the 'natural successor to the great British empire.' It is dreaming of becoming a regional big nation and a world power as well. However, it is also a developing country. Of its over 900 million population (1993-1994), 169 million are impoverished, accounting for 19 percent of the total number." Therefore, the article argues, "It can only place its hope on wantonly engaging in military ventures and making a show of force. . . . Its fond dream of regional hegemony is a nightmare to the world!" (391) According to Chinese analysts, India believed the way to achieve its dreams of regional hegemony was to possess nuclear weapons. A Liberation Army Daily article states, "For a long time, succeeding Indian Governments have viewed nuclear weapons development as an important means to seek great-power status and to dominate South Asia and the Indian Ocean." (392) Wang Chiming of NDU agrees, although he argues that Pakistan's strong foreign ties, rather than India's domestic situation, are the factor hindering hegemony.

India is self assured of being the South Asian region's number one major nation, its economic and military power has absolute superiority, and it has the objective conditions to serve as South Asia's 'hegemon.' Pakistan is the number two major nation on the South Asian subcontinent, and although its strength is far inferior to India's, it seeks a power balance on the South Asian subcontinent, and its determination to contend with India is great. To India, Pakistan still has the support of the United States and the Middle Eastern Muslim nations, so it is truly possible that it has the capability to present a challenge to India's senior position, thus destroying the strategic structure with India at the center, on the South Asian subcontinent. Therefore, India has tried to achieve its regional strategic goals through building a military force that has a powerful deterrent effect on the countries of South Asia, and nuclear weapons are . . . its tool. (393)

findings

China's assessments of Japan and India are similar because both "fit" the analytic premises the Chinese use about nations that have territorial disputes with China, that are capitalist, and that are democratic. India is assessed as a sort of half-scale version of Japan. Chinese authors surveyed in this chapter suggest that Japan:

China's analysts write that India, as a smaller scale version of Japan, also has a militaristic, religion-based strategic culture, seeks to dominate its neighbors, has had covert nuclear ambitions for two decades prior to its nuclear tests in 1998, attempts to foment conflict between China and other nations, and has some areas of military superiority over China, such as its current navy. However, India's economic reforms are judged insufficient to catch up with China and enter the multipolar world as the sixth pole. India's CNP scores for 2010 place it no higher than number nine (AMS) or thirteen (CASS), only about half of China's CNP score in 2010.

References

279. For example, Shen Qurong, the President of the China Institute of Contemporary International Studies (CICIR), writes that only "some elements" in Japan are trying to promote conflict between the United States and China. Feng Shaokui of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), however, writes that it is Japan's official policy goal to do so.

280. Zhang Wenmu, "Meiguo de shiyou diyuan zhanlue yu Zhongguo Xizang Xinjiang diqu anquan" (U.S. petroleum--geostrategy and the regional security of China's Tibet and Xinjiang), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management) 27, no. 2 (1998): 100-104. Zhang is on the staff of CICIR.

281. Li Jijun, "Lun zhanlue wenhua" (Strategic culture), Zhongguo junshi kexu (China Military Science) 38, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 8. Lieutenant General Li is Vice President of AMS.

282. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1962), 103. Views on how India inherited the British imperialist philosophy continue to be expressed today; for example, an article in the Liberation Army Daily claimed that, "India has always considered itself to be a 'natural successor to the great British empire.' It believes that since the Indian Ocean was formerly the 'lake of Britain,' it should now be included in the sphere of influence of India." See Liu Yang and Guo Feng, "What is the Intention of Wantonly Engaging in Military Ventures--India's Military Development Should be Watched Out For," Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), May 19, 1998, 5, in FBIS-CHI-98-141, May 23, 1998.

283. Han Shengmin, ed., Zouxiang 21 shiji de waiguo jundui jianshe (Foreign military development toward the 21st century)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996), 75-76. Several Chinese books on the RMA stress Japan's potential.

284. He Xin, Zhongguo fuxing yu shijie weilai (China's rejuvenation and the world's future)(Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 3.

285. The text of the "Murder with a Borrowed Knife" (jie dao sha ren) strategy is, "When the enemy's intention is obvious and the ally's attitude hesitant, induce the ally to fight the enemy while preserving one's own strength." According to a translation of the 36 Stratagems by Sun Haichen, the purport of this strategy is, "To avoid getting incriminated for his act of murder, a person can sometimes conduct the act with a 'borrowed knife,' which generally refers to someone who holds a grudge against the victim. By inducing a third party to commit the murder, one will be able to achieve one's goals without being held responsible for it. In military contexts, the idiom advises the commander to exploit the conflicts among various powers. To fight a strong enemy, he should find out the power groups that are at odds with this enemy and thereby induce them to fight it in his stead. In this way, he will get twice the result with half the effort." Sun Haichen, ed. and trans., The Wiles of War: 36 Military Strategies from Ancient China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1991), 24-25.

286. Feng Zhaokui, "Ri-Mei anbao tizhi yu Riben de daguo zhanlue" (The Japan-U.S. security system and Japan's strategy for world power status), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics) 204, no. 8 (August 1997): 47-49. Feng serves in the Japan Institute of CASS.

287. Wang Zhongren, "China Threat Theory Groundless," Beijing Review (July 16, 1997): 14-20. The Japanese protagonist was Professor Murai of the National Defense Academy (NDU).

288. Zhang Wenmu, "The Issue of South Asia in Major Power Politics," Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, September, 23, 1998, B1, in FBIS-CHI-98-293, October 21, 1998.

289. Huang Shuofeng, Guojia shengshuai lun (On the rise and fall of nations)(Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), 496.

290. Ibid., 497.

291. For an overall study of Japan's politics, society and economics see Liu Jiangyong, ed., Kua shiji de riben--Zhengzhi, jingji, waijiao xin qushi (Japan across the century--new political, economic, and foreign relations trends)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1995). The editor of this major collection is the CICIR director for Japan studies. See also Chen Shao, "Zhanhou Riben zonghe guoli de fazhan ji pinggu" (An assessment of Japan's postwar comprehensive national power development), Taipingyang xuebao (Pacific Journal), no. 3 (December 1995): 96-101. Chen is on the staff of IWEP at CASS.

292. Cited in Michael Pillsbury, "A Japanese Card?," Foreign Policy, no. 33 (Winter 1978-1979): 6.

293. Ibid., 16.

294. See Huan Xiang, "Sino-U.S. Relations Over the Past Year," Liaowang (January 11, 1988), in FBIS-CHI, January 15, 1988.

295. Li Zhongcheng and Guo Chuanlin, "World Trends 1993," Contemporary International Relations 3, no. 1 (January 1993): 2. Li and Guo are Research Fellows at CICIR.

296. Yang Mingjie, Ouyang Liping, and Bing Jinfu, "World Outlook 1994," Contemporary International Relations 4, no. 1 (January 1994): 9. Yang, Ouyang, and Bing are researchers in the Division for Comprehensive International Studies at CICIR.

297. Li Zhongcheng and Wang Zaibang, "World Outlook 1995," Contemporary International Relations 5, no. 1 (January 1995): 7-8. Li is Director of the Division for Comprehensive International Studies and Wang is a Doctor of Laws at CICIR.

298. Wang Zaibang and Yang Mingjie, "World Political Outlook 1996," Contemporary International Relations 6, no. 1 (January 1996): 5-6. Wang and Yang are both on the staff at CICIR.

299. Li Zhongcheng, "World Politics," Contemporary International Relations 7, no. 1 (January 1997): 1.

300. Gao Heng, "Dongbei Ya de anquan geju ji weilai qushi" (Northeast Asia's security structure and future trends), 21 Shiji (The 21st Century), no. 6 (1995): 34.

301. Feng Zhaokui, "Lengzhan jiexu dui Ri-Mei keji guanxi de xiangying" (The impact of the end of the Cold War on U.S.-Japan relations in science and technology), Heping yu fazhan (Peace and Development) 48, no. 2 (May 1994): 5-13.

302. Liang Ming, "A New Trend that Merits Vigilance," Jiefangjun bao, June 5, 1999, 4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0616, June 17, 1999.

303. Zi Jian, "Two Problems in U.S.-Japanese Relations," Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge)(July 1, 1990), in FBIS-CHI, August 6, 1990: 1-2.

304. Xiao Feng, "World Trends Under US Global Strategy, Part One of Two," Renmin Ribao, May 31, 1999, 6, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0601, May 31, 1999.

305. Xu Zhixian, "Xin shiqi Riben waijiao zhanlue de tiaozheng" (Readjustment of Japan's foreign policy in the new era), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) 74, no. 12 (December 1995): 12.

306. Chen Shao, "Zhanhou Riben zonghe guoli de fazhan ji pinggu," 99.

307. "Riben: Junshi jishu lingxian Meiguo" (Japan: leading the U.S. in military technology), Junshi wenchai (Military Digest) 4, no. 2 (1996): 18.

308. Li Changjiu, "The Asian Century and the Shift to Asia in the Focus of U.S. Foreign Trade Relations," Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge)(July 1, 1994): 1-7.

309. Chen Feng, "1997 nian de guoji zhanlue xingshi" (The international strategic situation of 1997), Guoji zhanlue yanjiu (International Strategic Studies) 47, no. 1 (January 1998): 3. Chen is a Senior Research Fellow at CIISS.

310. Jiang Yuechun, "Features, Causes and Prospects of the Protracted Japanese Recession," International Studies, no. 2-3 (1995): 18. Jiang is the Deputy Head of Asia Pacific Studies at CIIS.

311. Yang Bojiang, "The Trans-Century Tendencies of Japan," Contemporary International Relations 8, no. 8 (August 1998): 17.

312. Chiang Feng, "Japan Is Not Cross-Strait Relations Mediator--Interviewing Chen Qimao, Shanghai International Relations Society President," Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, February 16, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-055, February 26, 1998.

313. There are dissenters from the U.S. mainstream whose views are closer to those of the Chinese. For example, in Blindside: Why Japan is Still on Track to Overtake the U.S. by the Year 2000 (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1997), 324, Eamonn Fingleton states, "The world seems headed for a truly dramatic change in the balance of power in the next two or three decades. . . . Japan could be outproducing the United States by a factor of two or three times by the year 2050." However, Fingleton avoids claiming this is inevitable and prescribes several policies the United States can employ to save itself. See also George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991).

314. Life, September 11, 1964, 27-28.

315. Some American scholars dissent from Reischauer's positions, as shown by Henry Rosovsky, who argues that Japanese and Western models of capitalism and democracy are quite different. Henry Rosovsky, Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976), 10-12.

316. In interviews, He Fang of the State Council's International Study Center was cited as a moderate about Japan's future, while Major General Pan Junfeng is perceived to be more alarmed about the future threat of Japanese militarism. Pan heads the AMS Foreign Military Studies Department.

317. Zheng Yin, "Duoyuanhua de Yatai diqu xin geju" (The Asia-Pacific region's new pluralized structure), in Kua shiji de shijie geju da zhuanhuan (Major changes in the world structure at the turn of the century), ed. Chen Qimao (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), 199.

318. Liu Jiangyong, "Distorting History will Misguide Japan," Contemporary International Relations 5, no. 9 (September 1995): 1-11.

319. Ibid., 3.

320. Ibid.

321. Ibid., 10. In another article concerning Japanese militarism, Liu argues that in the 1990s, "when Japanese politics are sharply turbulent, divisive, and in the midst of reorganization, a neonationalist ideological trend is lifting its head in Japan." His main example is of a Japanese leader who wishes to "have Japan become an ordinary country" that can send troops abroad and take part in international conflicts just like the United States, Britain and France. According to Liu, this leader has suggested adding a Section 3 to the Japanese Constitution following Article 9, Section 2, the substance of which is that Japan could "possess self-defense forces aimed at peace making as well as an international joint mobile force that would operate at the invitation and under the command of the United Nations." Liu says that "this would open a channel for Japan to intervene militarily in international matters, creating the external terms for Japan to strengthen its military force, and giving itself defense forces that can really use force." He adds that "there is a 'great debate' among all Japanese circles over these suggestions. See Liu Jiangyong, "Japanese Politics and Hata's Diplomatic Alignment," Xiandai Guoji Guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), no. 6 (June 1994): 6-10.

322. Zhang Changtai, "Some Views on the Current Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region," Guoji zhanlue yanjiu (Strategic International Studies) 43, no. 1 (January 1997): 31-32. Zhang is a Research Fellow at CIISS. In August, the Chinese press did report that Prime Minister Obuchi and other Japanese Ministers stated they would not visit the Yasukuni Shrine this year, "to avoid stirring criticism from neighboring countries." See the Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service report of August 7, 1998, "Xinhua Reports Obuchi Not To Visit Yasukuni Shrine," in FBIS-CHI-98-219, August 19, 1998.

323. Da Jun, "A Japanese Movie Confusing Right and Wrong," Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, May 23, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-143, May 27, 1998. See also, "No Whitewashing for War Criminals--Comment on Japanese Reactionary Movie 'Pride, the Fateful Moment'," Renmin ribao (People's Daily), May 14, 1998, 6, in FBIS-CHI-98-135, May 15, 1998.

324. Liang Ming, "A New Trend that Merits Vigilance," 4.

325. Gao Heng, "Dongbei Ya de anquan geju ji weilai qushi," 35-36. A similar argument concerning the view that overall Japanese society and politicians are not advocates of military expansionism, can be found in Zheng Yin, "Duoyuanhua de Yatai diqu xin geju," 200. "It should be pointed out that although the ideological trend of militarism in Japan is deep-rooted and continuously crops up in Japan's political circles, this does not illustrate that this trend of thought already occupies a political position in Japan. All previous governments in post war Japan have upheld and effectively carried out the policy of light arms, strong economy . . . Japan cannot easily change this policy, the Japanese people will not again be easily pulled down the road to militarism. In the future, Japan will still mainly rely on its economy, science and technology strength, coordinated foreign affairs, culture and other various means, as well as appropriate military force to realize its strategic objectives."

326. Yang Bojiang, "The Trans-Century Tendencies of Japan," 17. For an extensive study on the Japanese Constitution and efforts to revise it see, Song Zhangjun, Riben guo xianfa yanjiu (Studies on Japan's Constitution)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997).

327. Lu Guangye, "Going Against the Tide of History, Threatening World Peace," Jiefangjun bao, June 6, 1999, 4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0617, June 18, 1999. Lu's argument is echoed by other authors. For example see, Wang Dajun, "An Important Step in Pursuit of Power Politics," Xinhua, May 24, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0526, May 24, 1999. "The path that Japan chooses today is very similar to one that led it to war many years ago. Whereas many years ago Japan promoted the so-called 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,' now it has consorted with the United States to engage in their so-called 'new world order.' Such a practice apparently runs counter to the wishes of the majority of peace-loving people in Japan, to the wishes of Japan's neighboring countries that want mutual respect and peaceful existence, and to the tide of the times."

328. Zhang Dalin, "Economic Regionalism, Protectionism Drive Japan's Move Back to Asia," International Studies (January 1994): 17-21.

329. Yan Xiangjun, Yang Bojiang, Chu Shulong and Dao Shulin, "A Survey of Current Asian Pacific Security," Contemporary International Relations 4, no.7 (July 1994): 3.

330. Lu Zhongwei, "On China-U.S.-Japan Trilateral Relations--A Comment on Their Recent Exchanges of Top-Level Visits," Contemporary International Relations 7, no. 12 (December 1997): 7.

331. Ibid., 3, 5.

332. Xu Zhixian, "Xin shiqi Riben waijiao zhanlue de tiaozheng,"13. Japan's need of China could also be viewed from a different angle, as a sign of weakness; for example, "There is every indication of Japan's four 'worries' at present when considering its China policy. First, in the general setting of the successive fixes of the Sino-Russian relationship, Sino-French relationship and Sino-American relationship, the sustained laggard in the Japan-China relationship is bound to lighten Japan's weight in the foreign policy of China, which will put Japan in a disadvantageous position. Second, the excessive reliance on the United States will not only cause damage to Japan's image, but will also be detrimental to the future development of Japan-China relations. Third, Japan may fall short of its desire to become the permanent member of the U.N. Security Council for lack of the necessary support from China. Fourth, if by any chance the development of Japan-China economic relations cannot be rationalized, Japan will lose its geoeconomic superiority. Therefore, Japan has no choice but to enhance China's status in its diplomatic agenda, making the Japan-China relationship the backbone second only to the Japan-U.S. relationship, for it needs help from China in geostrategies, economic interests, and the pursuit of a position as a political big power." Xu Zhixian, Zhang Minqian, and Hong Jianjun, "On the Foreign Strategy and Trends in the China Policy of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan at the Turn of the Century," Contemporary International Relations 8, no. 3 (March 1998): 16.

333. Shen Qurong, "Postwar Asia Pacific--Historical Lessons and Common Efforts for a Bright Future," Contemporary International Relations 5, no. 11 (November 1995): 5, 7.

334. Liu Jiangyong, "On the Establishment of Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Dialogue Mechanisms," Contemporary International Relations 4, no. 2 (February 1994): 28.

335. Li Defu, Daoguo kun bing--Riben (The hard pressed soldiers of the island nation)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997).

336. Lu Lei, Wu Youchang, and Hu Ruoqing, Riben fu guo zhi mi (The riddle of Japan, the wealthy country)(Beijing: Jiefangjun wen yi chubanshe, 1994).

337. See the interview with Richard Nixon in Time, April 2, 1990, 49.

338. Zhao Jieqi, "The Present Status and Prospect of Japan--U.S. Military Relations," International Strategic Studies (English edition), no. 4 (1989): 12-15. See also Ge Gengfu, "Changes in the Development of Japan's Defense Policy and Defense Capabilities," International Studies (English edition), January 13, 1989, in JPRS-CAR-89-032, 6-12.

339. See Nicholas D. Kristof, "China, Reassessing its Strategy, Views Japan Warily," New York Times, October 23,1993.

340. Zhu Chun and Xie Wenqing, "The U.S. China Policy and Sino-U.S. Relations Moving Toward the 21st Century," International Strategic Studies (English edition) 43, no. 1 (January 1997): 36. Zhu and Xie are Senior Research Fellows at CIISS.

341. Liu Jiangyong, "Sino-Japanese Relations and the New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines," in Guoji xingshi genxi baogao--1997-1998 (Study reports on the international situation--1997-1998)(Beijing: Zhanlue yu guanli chubanshe, 1998), 121.

342. Zhang Changtai, "1997 nian Yatai diqu xingshi zongshu" (Roundup of the Asian-Pacific situation in 1997), Guoji zhanlue yanjiu (International Strategic Studies) 47, no. 1 (January 1998): 23. Zhang is a Research Fellow at CIISS.

343. Zhao Jieqi, "'Redefinition' of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and its Repercussions," Waijiao jikan (Foreign Affairs Journal), no. 41 (September 1996): 36-37.

344. Zhang Taishan, "Ri-Mei junshi guanxi de xin fazhan--Cong Ri-Mei xiugai fangwei hezuo zhidao fangzhen kan" (New developments in the Japan-U.S. military relationship--a perspective on the revision of the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation guidelines), Guoji zhanlue yanjiu (International Strategic Studies) 46, no.4 (October 1997): 17.

345. Liu Jiangyong, "Sino-Japanese Relations and the New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines," 118.

346. "Commentary on U.S. Intention," Xinhua, June 6, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0606, June 6, 1999.

347. Lu Guangye, "Going against the Tide of History, Threatening World Peace," No. 3 in series, "Experts Comment on the Strengthening of the Japanese-U.S. Military Alliance," Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), June 6, 1999, 4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0617, June 18, 1999. See also Zhang Jinfang, "Serious Threats to China's Security," No. 1 in series, "Experts Comment on the Strengthening of the Japanese-U.S. Military Alliance," Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), June 4, 1999, 4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0616, June 17, 1999; and Liang Ming, "A New Trend that Merits Vigilance," No. 2 in series, "Experts Comment on the Strengthening of the Japanese-U.S. Military Alliance," Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), June 5, 1999, 4, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0616, June 17, 1999.

348. He Xin, Zhongguo fuxing yu shijie weilai (China's rejuvenation and the world's future), (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), 1-3. After He Xin presented this article to the leadership, an abstract was published in Zixue (Independent Studies), no. 5 (1989).

349. Yan Xiangjun, Yang Bojiang, Chu Shulong, and Dao Shulin, "A Survey of Current Asian-Pacific Security," 4.

350. Chen Peiyao, "East Asian Security: Situation, Concept and Mechanism," SIIS Journal 3, no. 2 (July 1997): 4.

351. Liu Jiangyong, "Japan in 1997," Contemporary International Relations 7, no. 1 (January 1997): 23.

352. Colonel Xu Weidi, "Post-Cold War Naval Security Environment," World Military Trends (Beijing: National Defense University, 1996).

353. Li Jiensong, "Continued Naval Developments in Nations on China's Periphery" (in Chinese), Bingqi zhishi (Ordinance Knowledge)(May 12, 1997): 17-20.

354. Zhang Changtai, "Some Views on the Current Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region," 27.

355. Li Qinggong, "Dangdai de guoji junshi anquan xingshi" (The current international military security situation), Guoji zhanlue yanjiu (International Strategic Studies) 47, no. 1 (January 1998): 9.

356. Ding Bangquan, "Adjustments and Trends in Japan's Military Strategy," World Military Trends (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, no date).

357. J. Mohan Malik, "China-India Relations in the Post Soviet Era: the Continuing Rivalry," The China Quarterly (June 1995): 317-355.

358. Zhang Changtai, "Some Views on the Current Situation in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Strategic Studies (English edition) 43, no. 1 (January 1997): 28.

359. Chen Qimao, "Qianyan" (Introduction) in Kua shiji de shijie geju de da zhuanhuan (Major changes in the world structure at the turn of the century), ed. Chen Qimao (Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996): 153-154. Hua Biyun of CICIR also discusses the subject: "India is a major Asian nation," not only strategically located on the Indian Ocean, a major thoroughfare, but in "area, population, and economic development level, common developing nations cannot compare with it. It possesses relatively strong Comprehensive National Power (including the factors natural resources, manpower, economics, science and technology, military power, and political and international influence). According to the research of specialists, in 1989 India's CNP was number 9 in the world, and it will rise to number 8 by the end of the century." Hua Biyun, "Indu lizheng chengwei xia shiji de jingji daguo" (India: striving to be an economic power in the next century) Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) 75, no. 1 (January 1996): 21.

360. Hu Weimin, "India Uses the 'Nuclear Counter' to Bargain," Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) (Guangzhou South China News Supplement), July 28, 1998, 14, in FBIS-CHI-98-209, July 28, 1998.

361. Ye Zhengjia, "Buru 21 shiji de Yindu" (India enters the 21st century), International Studies (English edition) 61, no. 3 (July 1996): 20.

362. According to Hua, India's successes include, "the national economy has steadily grown . . . the state of international income and expenditures has improved . . . investment in private industry is brisk . . . the investment market has gradually been perfected." Hua Biyun, "Indu lizheng chengwei xia shiji de jingji daguo," 22-23.

363. Ibid., 23-24. Ye Zhengjia makes a similar assessment: "Looking at the overall process of India's economic development in the 50 years since independence, its characteristics are that it has been both stable and slow. . . . In more than 40 years, India has already established a relatively complete national industry system, and industrial output value is at the world's forefront. The township and village middle class has reached about 200 million, and is one of the world's ten newly rising markets. However, on the other hand, India still is the country with the most people in abject poverty in the world." Ye treats India's science and technology in a similar manner, focusing on both the positive and the negative. "India's science and technology is in a leading position among developing nations," but there exist a number of "defects." Ye Zhengjia, "Buru 21 shiji de Yindu," 22.

364. Hua Biyun, "Indu lizheng chengwei xia shiji de jingji daguo," 26.

365. For example, see Jiang Yili, "Yindu jiaojiaopai zuzhi shijie Yindujiao dahui (VHP) pouxi" (An analysis of the VHP--A Hindu religious organization), Nanya yanjiu (South Asian Studies) 56, no. 3 (1994): 62-68. Jiang is in the Asia-Pacific Institute of CASS.

366. Jiang Yili, "Dangdai Yindujiao" (Contemporary Hinduism), Shijie zongjiao xue (Studies in World Religions) 61, no. 3 (September 1995): 18. Ye Zhengjia also discusses the trend that Hinduism is gaining prominence in Indian politics. Ye Zhengjia, "Buru 21 shiji de Yindu," 21. See also Yang Xuexiang, Indu wenhua shenmi zhi mi (The riddle of India's cultural mystery)(Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1994).

367. Hu Weimin, "India Uses the 'Nuclear Counter' to Bargain."

368. Hua Biyun, "Indu lizheng chengwei xia shiji de jingji daguo," 24. See also, Liang Jiejun, "Evolving Indian Political Scene," Contemporary International Relations 6, no. 6 (June 1996): 1-16.

369. Hua Biyun, "Indu lizheng chengwei xia shiji de jingji daguo," 22. For other discussions about the prospects for India's future military development example see, Wu Hua and others, Nanya zhi shi--Indu (The lion of south Asia--India)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1997), and Gong Wei, "Yindu daodan neng dadao Beijing ma?" (Can Indian missiles hit Beijing?"), Junshi wenchai (Military Digest), no. 1 (1995): 43.

370. Liu Xiaofei and Pan Xiaozhu, "Indu lizheng chengwei junshi gongye daguo" (India is striving to become a military industrial power), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) 77, no. 3 (March 1996): 26-28.

371. Ding Zengyi, "India's Attempt to Seek Hegemony has been Long-Standing--Interview with Liu Wenguo, A Member of the China South Asia Society," Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), May 26, 1998, 5, in FBIS-CHI-98-154, June 3, 1998.

372. Zhang Minhui, "The India and Pakistan Navies After the Nuclear Tests," Jianchuan zhishi, no. 7 (July 4, 1998), in FBIS-CHI-98-224, August 12, 1998.

373. Ye Zhengjia of CIIS has put forward a similar argument, stating, "The goal of India's current defense and security strategy is to counter Pakistan . . . its long term goal is to counter China. . . . India's basic relations with other South Asian nations can be summed up as both interdependent and mutual contradictions and antagonism. This last aspect is a significant obstacle to India's efforts to establish a world power position. Of course, the fundamental factor determining whether India attains a world power position lies in India's own comprehensive power." (24) India has said, "now there is a 'multipolar world,' and thus has made itself one of the six world poles along with the United States, Russia, China, the EU, and Japan. On this basis it has put forward that India has the qualifications to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council." Ye Zhengjia, "Buru 21 shiji de Yindu," 25.

374. Shang Huipeng, "Indian-Pakistani Security Dialog and China's Policy Toward South Asia," in Guoji xingshi genxi baogao, 1997-1998 (Study reports on the international situation 1997-- 1998)(Beijing: Zhanlue yu guanli chubanshe, 1998), 192. This was written before India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons in the summer of 1998.

375. Ibid., 197.

376. "PRC Sees U.S. Conspiracy in Indo-Pakistan Conflict," Hong Kong Agence France Presse, June 12, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0612, June 12, 1999.

377. "Clarifying the Facts About 1962 is a Precondition," Frontline 15, no. 19 (September 12-15, 1998), http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1519/15190170.htm.

378. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, 103.

379. Ibid., 97.

380. Ibid., 33.

381. Ibid., 106.

382. Ibid.

383. Sun Keqin and Cui Hongjian, eds., Ezhi Zhongguo--Shenhua yu xianshi (Containing China--myth and reality)(Beijing: Zhongguo yanshi chubanshe, 1996). Chapter 2 discusses the CIA in Tibet. For U.S. articles on CIA operations in Tibet, see William M. Leary, "Secret Mission to Tibet," Air and Space (December 1997/January 1998): 62-71, and Jim Mann, "CIA Gave Aid to Tibetan Exiles in 60s, Files Show," Los Angeles Times, September 15, 1998.

384. "History Shall Not be Denied, Facts Speak Louder than Words," reprinted by Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, May 18,1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-139, May 19, 1998.

385. "One of the main purposes of creating a theory [China Threat Theory] is to keep a grip on political power. . . . It is now choosing to create an external threat to meet the needs of ultra-nationalist parties and thus keep them in the government." Yan Xuetong, "Why Has India Created a 'China Threat Theory'," Guangming Ribao, May 19, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-140, May 20, 1998.

386. Li Wenyun, "India: Nuclear Tests Condemned, Lobbying Suffers Setbacks," Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), June 28, 1998, 3, in FBIS-CHI-98-187, July 6, 1998.

387. Dong Guozheng, "Hegemonist Ambition is Completely Exposed," Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), May 19, 1998, 5, in FBIS-CHI-98-140, May 20, 1998.

388. Yan Xuetong, "Why Has India Created a 'China Threat Theory."

389. Ding Zengyi, "India's Attempt to Seek Hegemony has been Long-Standing--Interview with Liu Wenguo, A Member of the China South Asia Society."

390. Liu Yang and Guo Feng, "What is the Intention of Wantonly Engaging in Military Ventures--India's Military Development Should Be Watched Out For," Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), May 19, 1998, 5, in FBIS-CHI-98-141, May 21, 1998.

391. Dong Guozheng, "Hegemonist Ambition is Completely Exposed."

392. Zhang Changtai, "It Would be Hard for the Indian Government to Get Out of Its Dilemma by Conducting Nuclear Tests,"Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), May 20, 1998, 5, in FBIS-CHI-98-140, May 20, 1998.

393. Wang Chiming, "Qian xi Indu kuayue 'he menkan' de beijing" (A brief analysis of the background of India's crossing the "nuclear threshold"), Heping yu fazhan (Peace and Development) 65, no. 3 (August 1998): 24.


[Back]
[Index]
[Next]