International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular (Unofficial electronic edition) |
INFCIRC/209/Rev. 1
November 1990
GENERAL Distr.
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INFCIRC/209/Rev. 1
Annex
I have the honour to refer to [relevant previous communication in which the Government of [Member State] informed you that it had decided to act in accordance with certain procedures in relation to exports of nuclear material and certain categories of equipment and other material which you circulated to all Member States of the Agency as document INFCIRC/209, and to [relevant subsequent communications] informing you of its desire to clarify certain items described in the Annex "Clarification of Items on the Trigger List" to Memorandum B and circulated as documents INFCIRC/209/Mods.1,2,3 and 4.
In the interests of clarity it has become desirable, in the view of my Government, to consolidate these communications, without change in their substance, in a single document a copy of which is attached hereto.
As hitherto, my Government reserves to itself the right to exercise discretion with regard to the interpretation and implementation of the procedures set out and the right, to control, if it wishes, the export of relevant items other than those specified in the aforementioned attachment to this letter.
I should be grateful if you would circulate the text of this letter and its attachment, together with the appended background paper, to all Member States for their information.
INFCIRC/209/Rev. 1
Annex
Attachment
The Government has had under consideration procedures in relation to exports of nuclear materials in the light of its commitment not to provide source or special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to safeguards under an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
The definition of source and special fissionable material adopted by the Government shall be that contained in Article XX of the Agency's Statute:
The Government is solely concerned with ensuring, where relevant, the application of safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)* with a view to preventing diversion of the safeguarded nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If the Government wishes to supply source or special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to such a State, it will:
In the case of direct exports of source or special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the NPT, the Government will satisfy itself, before authorizing the export of the material in question, that such material will be subject to a safeguards agreement with the Agency as soon as the recipient State takes over responsibility for the material, but no later than the time the material reaches its destination.
The Government, when exporting source or special fissionable material to a nuclear-weapon State not party to the NPT, will require satisfactory assurances that the material will not be re-exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State not party to the NPT unless arrangements corresponding to those referred to above are made for the acceptance of safeguards by the State receiving such re-export.
Exports of the items specified in sub-paragraph (i) below, and exports of source or special fissionable material to a given country, within a period of 12 months, below the limes specified in sub-paragraph (b) below, shall be disregarded for the purpose of the procedures described above:
Natural uranium 500 kilograms;
Depleted uranium 1000 kilograms; and
Thorium 1000 kilograms.
The Government has had under consideration procedures in relation to exports of certain categories of equipment and material, in the light of its commitment not to provide equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material produced. processed or used in the equipment or material in question is subject to safeguards under an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The designation of items of equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material (hereinafter referred to as the "Trigger List ) adopted by the Government is as follows (quantities below the levels indicated in the Annex being regarded as insignificant for practical purposes):
The Government is solely concerned with ensuring, where relevant. the application of safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States not party to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with a view to preventing diversion of the safeguarded nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. If the Government wishes to supply Trigger List items for peaceful purposes to such a State, it will:
In the case of direct exports to non-nuclear weapon States not party to the NPT, the Government will satisfy itself, before authorizing the export of the equipment or material in question, that such equipment or material will fall under a safeguards agreement with the Agency.
The Government, when exporting Trigger List items, will require satisfactory assurances that the items will not be re-exported to a non-nuclear weapon State not party to the NPT unless arrangements corresponding to those referred to above are made for the acceptance of safeguards by the State receiving such re-export.
The Government reserves to itself discretion as to interpretation and implementation of its commitment referred to in paragraph 1 above and the right to require, if it wishes, safeguards as above in relation to items it exports in addition to those items specified in paragraph 2 above.
Nuclear reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a controlled self-sustaining fission chain reaction, excluding zero energy reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a designed maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per year.
EXPLANATORY NOTEA "nuclear reactor" basically includes the items within or attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls the level of power in the core, and the components which normally contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant of the reactor core.
It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably be capable of modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for sustained operation at significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium production, are not considered as "zero energy reactors".
EXPORTS
The export of the whole set of major items within this boundary will take place only in accordance with the procedures of the Memorandum. Those individual items within this functionally defined boundary which will be exported only in accordance with the procedures of the Memorandum are listed in paragraphs 1.2 to 1.7. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Memorandum, the Government reserves the right to apply the procedures of the Memorandum to other items within the functionally defined boundary.
Metal vessels, as complete units or as major shop-fabricated parts therefor, which are especially designed or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above and are capable of withstanding the operating pressure of the primary coolant.
EXPLANATORY NOTEA top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is covered by item 1.2. as a major shop-fabricated part of a pressure vessel.
Reactor internals (eg support columns and plates for the core and other vessel internals, control rod guide tubes, thermal shields, baffles, core grid plates, diffuser plates, etc.) are normally supplied by the reactor supplier. In some cases, certain internal support components are included in the fabrication of the pressure vessel. These items are sufficiently critical to the safety and reliability of the operation of the reactor (and, therefore, to the guarantees and liability of the reactor supplier), so that their supply, outside the basic supply arrangement for the reactor itself, would not be common practice. Therefore, although the separate supply of these unique, especially designed and prepared, critical, large and expensive items would not necessarily be considered as falling outside the area of concern, such a mode of supply is considered unlikely.
Manipulative equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing fuel in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above capable of on-load operation or employing technically sophisticated positioning or alignment features to allow complex off-load fuelling operations such as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is not normally available.
Rods especially designed or prepared for the control of the reaction rate in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above.
EXPLANATORY NOTEThis item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing part, the support or suspension structures therefor if supplied separately.
Tubes which are especially designed or prepared to contain fuel elements and the primary coolant in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above at an operating pressure in excess of 50 atmospheres.
Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of tubes or assemblies of tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg in any period of 12 months, especially designed or prepared for use in a reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above, and in which the relation of hafnium to zirconium is less than 1:500 parts by weight.
Pumps especially designed or prepared for circulating liquid metal as primary coolant for nuclear reactors as defined in paragraph 1.1. above.
Deuterium, heavy water (deuterium oxide) and any other deuterium compound in which the ratio of deuterium to hydrogen atoms exceeds 1:5000 for use in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1.1. above in quantities exceeding 200 kg of deuterium atoms for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.
Graphite having a purity level better than 5 parts per million boron equivalent and with a density greater than 1.50 g/cm3 in quantities exceeding 3. 104 kg (30 metric tons) for any one recipient country in any period of 12 months.
INTRODUCTORY NOTEItems of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase "and equipment especially designed or prepared" for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements include:Reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel separates plutonium and uranium from intensely radioactive fission products and other transuranic elements. Different technical processes can accomplish this separation. However. over the years Purex has become the most commonly used and accepted process. Purex involves the dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel in nitric acid, followed by separation of the uranium, plutonium, and fission products by solvent extraction using a mixture of tributyl phosphate in an organic diluent.
Purex facilities have process functions similar to each other, including: irradiated fuel element chopping, fuel dissolution, solvent extraction, and process liquor storage. There may also be equipment for thermal denitration of uranium nitrate, conversion of plutonium nitrate to oxide or metal, and treatment of fission product waste liquor to a form suitable for long term storage or disposal. However, the specific type and configuration of the equipment performing these functions may differ between Purex facilities for several reasons, including the type and quantity of irradiated nuclear fuel to be reprocessed and the intended disposition of the recovered materials, and the safety and maintenance philosophy incorporated into the design of the facility.
A "plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements", includes the equipment and components which normally come in direct contact with and directly control the irradiated fuel and the major nuclear material and fission-product processing streams.
These processes, including the complete systems for plutonium conversion and plutonium metal production, may be identified by the measures taken to avoid criticality (eg by geometry), radiation exposure (eg by shielding), and toxicity hazards (eg by containment).
EXPORTS
The export of the whole set of major items this within this boundary will take place only in accordance with the procedures of the Memorandum.
INTRODUCTORY NOTERemotely operated equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above and intended to cut, chop or shear irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods.This equipment breaches the cladding of the fuel to expose the irradiated nuclear material to dissolution. Especially designed metal cutting shears are the most commonly employed, although advanced equipment such as lasers, may be used.
INTRODUCTORY NOTECritically safe tanks (eg small diameter, annular or slab tanks) especially designed or prepared for use in a reprocessing plant as identified above, intended for dissolution of irradiated nuclear fuel and which are capable of withstanding hot, highly corrosive liquid, and which can be remotely loaded and maintained.Dissolvers normally receive the chopped-up spent fuel. In these critically safe vessels, the irradiated nuclear material is dissolved in nitric acid and the remaining hulls removed from the process stream.
INTRODUCTORY NOTEEspecially designed or prepared solvent extractors such as packed or pulse columns, mixer settlers or centrifugal contactors for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. Solvent extractors must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. Solvent extractors are normally fabricated to extremely high standards (including special welding and inspection and quality assurance and quality control techniques) out of low carbon stainless steels, titanium, zirconium, or other high quality materials.Solvent extractors both receive the solution of irradiated fuel from the dissolvers and the organic solution which separates the uranium, plutonium, and fission products. Solvent extraction equipment is normally designed to meet strict operating parameters, such as long operating lifetimes with no maintenance requirements or adaptability to easy replacement, simplicity of operation and control, and flexibility for variations in process conditions.
INTRODUCTORY NOTEEspecially designed or prepared holding or storage vessels for use in a plant for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel. The holding or storage vessels must be resistant to the corrosive effect of nitric acid. The holding or storage vessels are normally fabricated of materials such as low carbon stainless steels, titanium or zirconium, or other high quality materials. Holding or storage vessels may be designed for remote operation and maintenance and may have the following features for control of nuclear criticality:Three main process liquor streams result from the solvent extraction step. Holding or storage vessels are used in the further processing of all these streams, as follows:
- (a) The pure uranium nitrate solution is concentrated by evaporation and passed to a denitration process where it is converted to uranium oxide. This oxide is re-used in the nuclear fuel cycle.
- (b) The intensely radioactive fission products solution is normally concentrated by evaporation and stored as a liquor concentrate. This concentrate may be subsequently evaporated and converted to a form suitable for storage or disposal.
- (c) The pure plutonium nitrate solution is concentrated and stored pending its transfer to further process steps. In particular, holding or storage vessels for plutonium solutions are designed to avoid criticality problems resulting from changes in concentration and form of this stream.
INTRODUCTORY NOTEComplete systems especially designed or prepared for the conversion of plutonium nitrate to plutonium oxide, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimize toxicity hazards.In most reprocessing facilities this final process involves the conversion of the plutonium nitrate solution to plutonium dioxide. The main functions involved in this process are:
process feed storage and adjustment, precipitation and solid/liquor separation, calcination, product handling, ventilation, waste management, and process control.
INTRODUCTORY NOTEComplete systems especially designed or prepared for the production of plutonium metal, in particular adapted so as to avoid criticality and radiation effects and to minimize toxicity hazards.This process, which could be related to a reprocessing facility, involves the fluorination of plutonium dioxide, normally with highly corrosive hydrogen fluoride, to produce plutonium fluoride which is subsequently reduced using high purity calcium metal to produce metallic plutonium and a calcium fluoride slag. The main functions involved in this process are: fluorination (eg involving equipment fabricated or lined with a precious metal), metal reduction (eg employing ceramic crucibles), slag recovery, product handling, ventilation, waste management and process control.
EXPORTSPursuant to paragraph 6 of the Memorandum B, the Government reserves to itself the right to apply the procedures of the Memorandum to other items within the functionally defined boundary.
A "plant for the fabrication of fuel elements" includes the equipment:
EXPORTSThe export of the whole set of items for the foregoing operations will take place only in accordance with the procedures of the Memorandum. The Government will also give consideration to application of the procedures of Memorandum to individual items intended for any of the foregoing operations, as well as for other fuel fabrication operations such as checking the integrity of the cladding or the seal, and the finishing treatment of the sealed fuel.
Items of equipment that are considered to fall within the meaning of the phrase "equipment other than analytical instruments, especially designed or prepared" for the separation of isotopes of uranium include:
INTRODUCTORY NOTEThe gas centrifuge normally consists of a thin walled cylinder(s) of between 75 mm (3 in) and 400 mm (16 in) diameter contained in a vacuum environment and spun at high peripheral speed of the order of 300 m/s or more with its central axis vertical. In order to achieve high speed the materials of construction for the rotating components have to be of a high strength to density ratio and the rotor assembly, and hence its individual components, have to be manufactured to very close tolerances in order to minimize the unbalance. In contrast to other centrifuges, the gas centrifuge for uranium enrichment is characterized by having within the rotor chamber a rotating disc-shaped baffle(s) and a stationary tube arrangement for feeding and extracting the UF6 gas and featuring at least 3 separate channels, of which 2 are connected to scoops extending from the rotor axis towards the periphery of the rotor chamber. Also contained within the vacuum environment are a number of critical items which do not rotate and which although they are especially designed are not difficult to fabricate nor are they fabricated out of unique materials. A centrifuge facility however requires a large number of these components, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.
If interconnected, the cylinders are joined together by flexible bellows or rings as described in section 5.1.1.(c) following. The rotor is fitted with an internal baffle(s) and end caps, as described in section 5.1.1.(d) and (e) following, if in final form. However the complete assembly may be delivered only partly assembled.
EXPLANATORY NOTEThe materials used for centrifuge rotating components are:
- (a) Maraging steel capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 2.05. 109 N/m2 (300,000 psi) or more;
- (b) Aluminium alloys capable of an ultimate tensile strength of 0.46. 109 N/m2 (67,000 psi) or more;
- (c) Filamentary materials suitable for use in composite structures and having a specific modulus of 12.3. 104m or greater and a specific ultimate tensile strength of 0.3. 104m or greater ("Specific Modulus is the Young's Modulus in N/m2 divided by the specific weight in N/m2; "Specific Ultimate Tensile Strength" is the ultimate tensile strength in N/m2 divided by the specific weight in N/m3).
INTRODUCTORY NOTEThe auxiliary systems, equipment and components for a gas centrifuge enrichment plant are the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the centrifuges, to link the individual centrifuges to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the "product" and "tails" UF6 from the centrifuges, together with the equipment required to drive the centrifuges or to control the plant.
Normally UF6 is evaporated from the solid using heated autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the centrifuges by way of cascade header pipework. The "product" and "tails" UF6 gaseous streams flowing from the centrifuges are also passed by way of cascade header pipework to cold traps (operating at about 203 K (-70oC)) where they are condensed prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because an enrichment plant consists of many thousands of centrifuges arranged in cascades there are many kilometers of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with a substantial amount of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
Especially designed or prepared process systems including:
This plant, equipment and pipework is wholly made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF6 within the centrifuge cascades. The piping network is normally of the 'triple' header system with each centrifuge connected to each of the headers. There is thus a substantial amount of repetition in its form. It is wholly made of UF6-resistant materials (see EXPLANATORY NOTE to this section) and is fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking 'on-line' samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:
Frequency changers (also known as converters or invertors) especially designed or prepared to supply motor stators as defined under 5.1 .2.(d), or parts, components and sub-assemblies of such frequency changers having all of the following characteristics:
EXPLANATORY NOTEThe items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the centrifuges and the passage of the gas from centrifuge to centrifuge and cascade to cascade.
Materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel.
INTRODUCTORY NOTEIn the gaseous diffusion method of uranium isotope separation, the main technological assembly is a special porous gaseous diffusion barrier, heat exchanger for cooling the gas (which is heated by the process of compression), seal valves and control values, and pipelines. In as much as gaseous diffusion technology uses uranium hexafluoride (UF6), all equipment pipeline and instrumentation surfaces (that come in contact with the gas) must be made of materials that remain stable in contact with UF6. A gaseous diffusion facility requires a number of these assemblies, so that quantities can provide an important indication of end use.
Especially designed or prepared hermetically sealed cylindrical vessels greater then 300 mm (12 in) in diameter and greater than 900 mm (35 in) in length, or rectangular vessels of comparable dimensions, which have an inlet connection and two outlet connections all of which are greater than 50 mm (2 in) in diameter, for containing the gaseous diffusion barrier, made of or lined with UF-6 resistant materials and designed for horizontal or vertical installation.
Especially designed or prepared axial, centrifugal, or positive displacement compressors, or gas blowers with a suction volume capacity of 1 m3/min or more of UF6, and with a discharge pressure of up to several hundred kN/m2 (100 psi), designed for long-term operation in the UF6 environment with or without an electrical motor of appropriate power, as well as separate assemblies of such compressors and gas blowers. These compressors and gas blowers have a pressure ratio between 2:1 and 6:1 and are made of, or lined with, materials resistant to UF6.
Especially designed or prepared vacuum seals, with seal feed and seal exhaust connections, for sealing the shaft connecting the compressor or the gas blower rotor with the driver motor so as to ensure a reliable seal against in-leaking of air into the inner chamber of the compressor or gas blower which is filled with UF6. Such seals are normally designed for a buffer gas in-leakage rate of less than 1000 cm3/min.
Especially designed or prepared heat exchangers made of or lined with UF6-resistant materials (except stainless steel) or with copper or any combination of those metals, and intended for a leakage pressure change rate of less than 10 N/m2 (0.0015 psi) per hour under a pressure difference of 100 kN/2 (15 psi).
INTRODUCTORY NOTEThe auxiliary systems, equipment and components for gaseous diffusion enrichment plants are the systems of plant needed to feed UF6 to the gaseous diffusion assembly, to link the individual assemblies to each other to form cascades (or stages) to allow for progressively higher enrichments and to extract the "product" and "tails" UF6 from the diffusion cascades. Because of the high inertial properties of diffusion cascades, any interruption in their operation, and especially their shutdown, leads to serious consequences. Therefore, a strict and constant maintenance of vacuum in ail technological systems, automatic protection from accidents, and precise automated regulation of the gas flow is of importance in a gaseous diffusion plant. All this leads to a need to equip the plant with a large number of special measuring, regulating and controlling systems.
Normally UF6 is evaporated from cylinders placed within autoclaves and is distributed in gaseous form to the entry point by way of cascade header pipework. The "product" and "tails" UF6 gaseous streams flowing from exit points are passed by way of cascade header pipework to either cold traps or to compression stations where the UF6 gas is liquefied prior to onward transfer into suitable containers for transportation or storage. Because a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant consists of a large number of gaseous diffusion assemblies arranged in cascades, there are many kilometers of cascade header pipework, incorporating thousands of welds with substantial amounts of repetition of layout. The equipment, components and of piping systems are fabricated to very high vacuum and cleanliness standards.
Especially designed or prepared process systems, capable of operating at pressures of 300 kN/m2 (45 lb/in2) or less, including:
Especially designed or prepared piping systems and header systems for handling UF6 within the gaseous diffusion cascades. This piping network is normally of the "double" header system with each cell connected to each of the headers.
Especially designed or prepared manual or automated shut-off and control bellows valves made of UF6-resistant materials with a diameter of 40 to 1500 mm for installation in main and auxiliary systems of gaseous diffusion enrichment plants.
Especially designed or prepared magnetic or quadrupole mass spectrometers capable of taking "on-line" samples of feed, product or tails, from UF6 gas streams and having all of the following characteristics:
EXPLANATORY NOTEThe items listed above either come into direct contact with the UF6 process gas or directly control the flow within the cascade. All surfaces which come into contact with the process gas are wholly made of or lined with, UF6-resistant materials. For the purposes of the sections relating to gaseous diffusion items the materials resistant to corrosion by UF6 include stainless steel, aluminium, aluminium alloys, aluminium oxide, nickel or alloys containing 60% or more nickel and UF6-resistent fully fluorinated hydrocarbon polymers
INFCIRC/209/Rev. 1
Annex
Appendix
"Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article."
The Rules of the Game - INFCIRC/209 Series
The "Trigger List"
Trigger List "Clarification"
Details of the four clarification exercises are set out below:
The text of the new clarification was published in the IAEA document INFCIRC/209/Mod.3 of August 1985.
The text of the new clarification was published in the IAEA document INFCIRC/209/Mod.4 of February 1990.
Status of the Committee
Membership
AUSTRALIAChairman
AUSTRIA
BELGIUM
CANADA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
DENMARK
FINLAND
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
GREECE
HUNGARY
IRELAND
ITALY
JAPAN
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
NORWAY
POLAND
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
VIENNA
July 1990