START II
Treaty
Ratified by the US Senate January 26,
1996
Resolution of
Ratification, Adopted 87 to 4
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That
(a) The Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993, including the following protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the `START II Treaty' (contained in Treaty Document 103-1), subject to the conditions of subsection (b) and the declarations of subsection (c):
(1) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the `Elimination and Conversion Protocol').
(2) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the 'Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol').
(3) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (also known as the `Memorandum on Attribution').
(b) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:
(1) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that a party to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1991 (in this resolution referred to as the `START Treaty') or the START II Treaty is acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the respective Treaty or is in violation of either the START or START II Treaty so as to threaten the national security interests of the United States, then the President shall--
(A) consult with and promptly submit a report to the Senate detailing the effect of such actions on the START Treaties;
(B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
(C) in the event that a party other than the Russian Federation is determined not to be in compliance--
(i) request consultations with the Russian Federation to assess the viability of both START Treaties and to determine if a change in obligations is required in either treaty to accommodate the changed circumstances; and
(ii) submit for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification any agreement changing the obligations of the United States; and
(D) In the event that noncompliance persists, seek a Senate resolution of support of continued adherence to one or both of the START Treaties, notwithstanding the changed circumstances affecting the object and purpose of one or both of the START Treaties.
(2) Treaty obligations.--Ratification by the United States of the START II Treaty--
(A) obligates the United States to meet the conditions contained in this resolution of ratification and shall not be interpreted as an obligation by the United States to accept any modification, change in scope, or extension of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (commonly referred to as the `ABM Treaty'), and
(B) changes none of the rights of either party with respect to the provisions of the ABM Treaty, in particular, Articles 13, 14, and 15.
(3) Financing implementation.--The United States understands that in order to be assured of the Russian commitment to a reduction in arms levels, Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the implementation of the START II Treaty. The costs of implementing the START II Treaty should be borne by both parties to the Treaty. The exchange of instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty shall not be contingent upon the United States providing financial guarantees to pay for implementation of commitments by Russia under the START II Treaty.
(4) Exchange of letters.--The exchange of letters--
(A) between Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992, regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers now on the territory of Kazakstan,
(B) between Secretary of State Eagleburger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992, and December 31, 1992, regarding heavy bombers, and
(C) between Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, dated December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, making assurances on Russian intent regarding the conversion and retention of 90 silo launchers of RS-20 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (all having been submitted to the Senate as associated with the START II Treaty),
are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the START II Treaty. The United States shall regard actions inconsistent with obligations under those exchanges of letters as equivalent under international law to actions inconsistent with the START II Treaty.
(5) Space-launch vehicles.--Space-launch vehicles composed of items that are limited by the START Treaty or the START II Treaty shall be subject to the obligations undertaken in the respective treaty.
(6) NTM and Cuba.--The obligation of the United States under the START Treaty not to interfere with the national technical means (NTM) of verification of the other party to the Treaty does not preclude the United States from pursuing the question of the removal of the electronic intercept facility operated by the Government of the Russian Federation at Lourdes, Cuba.
(7) Implementation Arrangements.
(A) The START II Treaty shall not be binding on the United States until such time as the Duma of the Russian Federation has acted pursuant to its constitutional responsibilities and the START II Treaty enters into force in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.
(B) If the START II Treaty does not enter into force pursuant to subparagraph (A), and if the President plans to implement reductions of United States strategic nuclear forces below those currently planned and consistent with the START Treaty, then the President shall--
(i) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such reductions on the national security of the United States; and
(ii) take no action to reduce United States strategic nuclear forces below that currently planned and consistent with the START Treaty until he submits to the Senate his determination that such reductions are in the national security interest of the United States.
(8) Presidential Certification and Report on National Technical Means.--Within 90 days after the United States deposits instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty, the President shall certify that United States National Technical Means are sufficient to ensure effective monitoring of Russian compliance with the provisions of the Treaty governing the capabilities of strategic missile systems. This certification shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate of the United States indicating how United States National Technical Means, including collection, processing and analytic resources, will be marshalled to ensure effective monitoring. Such report may be supplemented by a classified annex, which shall be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the following declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:
(1) Cooperative Threat Reductions.--Pursuant to the Joint Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, agreed to in Moscow, May 10, 1995, between the President of the United States and the President of the Russian Federation, it is the sense of the Senate that both parties to the START II Treaty should attach high priority to--
(A) the exchange of detailed information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile materials, and on their safety and security;
(B) the maintenance at distinct and secure storage facilities, on a reciprocal basis, of fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to national security requirements for the purpose of confirming the irreversibility of the process of nuclear weapons reduction; and
(C) the adoption of other cooperative measures to enhance confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material stockpiles.
(2) Asymmetry in Reductions:
(A) It is the sense of the Senate that, in conducting the reductions mandated by the START or START II Treaty, the President should, within the parameters of the elimination schedules provided for in the START Treaties, regulate reductions in the United States strategic nuclear forces so that the number of accountable warheads under the START and START II Treaties possessed by the Russian Federation in no case exceeds the comparable number of accountable warheads possessed by the United States to an extent that a strategic imbalance endangering the national security interests of the United States results.
(B) Recognizing that instability could result from an imbalance in the levels of strategic offensive arms, the Senate calls upon the President to submit a report in unclassified form to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of each year beginning with January 31, 1997, and continuing through such time as the reductions called for in the START II Treaty are completed by both parties, which report will provide--
(i) details on the progress of each party's reductions in strategic offensive arms during the previous year;
(ii) a certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the START II Treaty or specifies any act of noncompliance by the Russian Federation; and
(iii) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance endangering the national security interests of the United States exists.
(3) Expanding Strategic Arsenals in Countries Other Than Russia: It is the sense of the Senate that, if during the time the START II Treaty remains in force or in advance of any further strategic offensive arms reductions the President determines there has been an expansion of the strategic arsenal of any country not party to the START II Treaty so as to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States, then the president should consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to determine whether adherence to the START II Treaty remains in the national interest of the United States.
(4) Substantial Further Reductions: Cognizant of the obligation of the United States under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at any early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control', and in anticipation of the ratification and entry into force of the START II Treaty, the Senate calls upon the President to seek further strategic offensive arms reductions to the extent consistent with United States national security interests and calls upon the other nuclear weapon states to give careful and early consideration to corresponding reductions of their own nuclear arsenals.
(5) Missile Technology Control Regime: The Senate urges the President to insist that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakstan, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR]. For purposes of this paragraph, the term `Missile Technology Control Regime' means the policy statement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, announced April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive missile-relevant transfers based on the MTCR Annex, and any amendments thereto.
(6) Further Arms Reduction Obligations.--The Senate declares its intention to consider for approval international agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power as set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
(7) Treaty Interpretation.--The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in the Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term `INF Treaty' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Short Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum of understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
(8) Compliance.
(A) Concerned by the clear past pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and continued cases of noncompliance by the Russian Federation, the Senate declares that--
(i) the START II Treaty is in the interests of the United States only if both the United States and the Russian Federation are in strict compliance with the terms of the Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, such compliance being measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to comply; and
(ii) the Senate expects the Russian Federation to be in strict compliance with its obligations under the terms of START II Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification;
(B) Given its concern about compliance issues, the Senate expects the executive branch of government to offer regular briefings, but not less than four times each year, to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services on compliance issues related to the START II Treaty. Such briefings shall include a description of all United States efforts in United States/Russian diplomatic channels and bilateral fora to resolve the compliance issues and shall include, but would not necessarily be limited to, a description of the following:
(i) Any compliance issues the United States plans to raise with the Russian Federation at the Bilateral Implementation Commission, in advance of such meetings.
(ii) Any compliance issues raised at the Bilateral Implementation Commission, within thirty days of such meetings.
(iii) Any Presidential determination that the Russian Federation is in noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner inconsistent with the object and purpose of the START II Treaty, within 30 days of such a determination, in which case the President shall also submit a written report, with an unclassified summary, explaining why it is in the national security interests of the United States to continue as a party to the START II Treaty.
(9) Submission of Future Agreements as Treaties.--The Senate declares that, following Senate advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty, any agreement or understanding which in any material way modifies, amends, or reinterprets United States or Russian obligations under the START II Treaty, including the time frame for implementation of the Treaty, should be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
(10) Nature of Deterrence.
(A) On June 17, 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin issued a Joint Understanding and a Joint Statement at the conclusion of their Washington Summit, the first of which became the foundation for the START II Treaty. The second, the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System, endorsed the cooperative development of a defensive system against ballistic missile attack and demonstrated the belief by the governments of the United States and the Russian Federation that strategic offensive reductions and certain defenses against ballistic missiles are stabilizing compatible, and reinforcing.
(i) The long-term perpetuation of deterrence based on mutual and severe offensive nuclear threats would be outdated in a strategic environment in which the United States and the Russian Federation are seeking to put aside their past adversarial relationship and instead build a relationship based upon trust rather than fear.
(ii) An offense-only form of deterrence cannot address by itself the emerging strategic environment in which, as Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said in January 1994, proliferators acquiring missiles and weapons of mass destruction `may have acquired such weapons for the express purpose of blackmail or terrorism and thus have a fundamentally different calculus not amenable to deterrence. . . . New deterrent approaches are needed as well as new strategies should deterrence fail.'.
(iii) Defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should deterrence fail. Because deterrence may be inadequate to protect United States forces and allies abroad, theater missile defense is necessary, particularly the most capable systems of the United States such as THAAD, Navy Upper Tier, and the Space and Missile Tracking System. Similarly, because deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States against long-range missile threats, missile defenses are a necessary part of new deterrent strategies. Such defenses also are wholly in consonance with the summit statements from June 1992 of the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation and the September 1994 statements by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, who said, `We now have the opportunity to create a new relationship, based not on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.'.
(iv) As the governments of the United States and Russia have built upon the June 17, 1992, Joint Understanding in agreeing to the START II Treaty, so too should these governments promptly undertake discussions based on the Joint Statement to move forward cooperatively in the development and deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles.
(11) Report on Use of Foreign Excess Ballistic Missiles for Launch Services.--It is the sense of the Senate that the President should not issue licenses for the use of a foreign excess ballistic missile for launch services without first submitting a report to Congress, on a one-time basis, on the implications of the licensing approval on nonproliferation efforts under the Treaty and on the United States space launch industry.
(12) United States Commitments Ensuring the Safety, Reliability, and Performance of Its Nuclear Forces: The Senate declares that the United States is committed to ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces. To this end, the United States undertakes the following additional commitments:
(A) The United States is committed to proceeding with a robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities, that will ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the United States nuclear arsenal at the START II levels and meet requirements for hedging against possible international developments or technical problems in conformance with United States policies and to underpin deterrence.
(B) The United States is committed to reestablishing and maintaining sufficient levels of production to support requirements for the safety, reliability, and performance of United States nuclear weapons and demonstrate and sustain production capabilities and capacities.
(C) The United States is committed to maintaining United States nuclear weapons laboratories and protecting the core nuclear weapons competencies therein.
(D) As tritium is essential to the performance of modern nuclear weapons, but decays radioactively at a relatively rapid rate, and the United States now has no meaningful tritium production capacity, the United States is committed to ensuring rapid access to a new production source of tritium within the next decade.
(E) As warhead design flaws or aging problems may occur that a robust stockpile stewardship program cannot solve, the United States reserves the right, consistent with United States law, to resume underground nuclear testing if that is necessary to maintain confidence in the nuclear weapons stockpile. The United States is committed to maintaining the Nevada Test Site at a level in which the United States will be able to resume testing within one year following a national decision to do so.
(F) The United States reserves the right to invoke the supreme national interest of the United States to withdraw from any future arms control agreement to limit underground nuclear testing.