THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty) signed at Moscow on January 3, 1993. In addition to the main body of the text, the START II Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and Conversion Protocol); The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on Attribution). Also attached, for the information of the Senate, are documents that are associated with, but not integral parts of, the START II Treaty. These include three exchanges of letters by the sides addressing SS-18 missiles on the territory of Kazakhstan, heavy bomber armaments, and heavy ICBM silo conversion. Although not submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, these documents are relevant to the consideration of the START II Treaty by the Senate. INTRODUCTION The START II Treaty builds upon the reductions that will be implemented pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed at Moscow on July 31, 1991 (the START Treaty), and yet goes even further than the START Treaty. The START Treaty was negotiated over a nine-year period; it requires a reduction of 30 to 40 percent in the overall number of long-range nuclear warheads deployed by both Parties, with a 50-percent reduction in the most threatening systems. The START II Treaty will further substantially reduce those numbers and enhance stability. The START II Treaty's central limits require the Parties to reduce their strategic offensive arms so that specified limits are reached by the year 2003, with the possibility of those limits being reached by the end of the year 2000 if both Parties agree on a program of U.S. assistance within a year after entry into force. The START II Treaty, together with the START Treaty, will reduce both nations' deployed strategic offensive arms by more than two-thirds, and will completely eliminate land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed with multiple warheads. Strict, lower limits will be imposed on all deployed strategic offensive arms, including warheads carried on ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers. Stabilizing sea-based forces will be retained but will carry significantly lower numbers of warheads. In contrast to the START Treaty, all heavy bombers will be attributed with warheads based on the number of nuclear weapons for which they are actually equipped. There are five Parties to the START Treaty: the United States and, as START Treaty successors to the Soviet Union, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, as well as the Russian Federation. In contrast, the START II Treaty is bilateral: the United States and the Russian Federation are its only Parties since, in association with the Lisbon Protocol, the other three Parties to the START Treaty have pledged to eliminate strategic offensive arms located on their territories. Accordingly, no nuclear warheads or deployed strategic offensive arms will be located on their territories at the time the first phase of the reductions in this Treaty are required to be completed. Nevertheless, the START II Treaty draws upon the START Treaty for definitions, counting rules, prohibitions, and verification provisions and only modifies those as necessary, to meet unique requirements of the START II Treaty. The START II Treaty is therefore built upon the START Treaty and will not enter into force without the prior entry into force of the START Treaty. BACKGROUND The terms of the START II Treaty are based on the Joint Understanding signed between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992. Its impetus was the desire to strengthen stability by eliminating the most destabilizing systems remaining under the START Treaty. The Joint Understanding established the START II Treaty guidelines. CENTRAL LIMITS At the core of the START II Treaty is the obligation to reduce and limit ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy beomber nuclear armaments in two phases. Seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty, the aggregate number for each Party shall not exceed 4250 deployed strategic warheads. By the same date the following sublimits are to be reached as well: 2160, for warheads on deployed SLBMs; 1200, for warheads on deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs; and 650, for warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs. Upon the completion of the above reductions, the Parties shall further reduce their strategic offensive arms so that no later than January 1, 2003, and thereafter, the aggregate number for each. Party shall not exceed 3,500 deployed strategic warheads. By the same date the following sublimits would also apply: 1750, for warheads on deployed SLBMs; Zero, for warheads on deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs; and Zero, for warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs. Under the terms of the START II Treaty, the final numerical limits shall be fulfilled by the end of the year 2000, rather than by January 1, 2003, provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after, entry into force of the START II Treaty, an agreement on a program of assistance to promote the reduction and conversion obligations of the START II Treaty. MULTIPLE-WARHEAD ICBMs AND SLBMs The START II Treaty provides that after January 1, 2003 (or after the end of the year 2000, if accelerated), neither Party may deploy land-based missiles with more than one warhead and all heavy ICBMs must be destroyed. Specifically, all launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty, including test and training launchers, must either be destroyed or be converted to launchers of ICBMs to which no more than one warhead is attributed. This will require, for the United States, the elimination or conversion of launchers of Peacekeeper ICBMs-and, for the Russian Federation, the elimination or conversion of launchers of SS-24 ICBMs and the elimination of conversionof those launchers of SS-19 ICBMs, excepting those that contain the permitted number of SS-19s downloaded to a single- warhead configuration. Also excepted from this provision are launchers of non-heavy ICBMs located at space launch facilities that are permitted under the START Treaty. For the United States, this means the Peacekeeper can be used as a vehicle for space launch. All launchers of SS-18 ICBMs, including all those at space-launch facilities, must be physically destroyed. There is one exception--90 deployed-launchers-may be converted, under agreed provisions, to launchers of single-warhead SS-25 type ICBMs with canisters of no more than 2.5 meters, in diameter, such that rapid reconversion is effectively precluded. All Minuteman III ICBMs, for the United States, and 105 of the 170 SS-19 ICBMs, for the Russian Federation, may be retained and downloaded to one warhead pursuant to Article III of this Treaty. Any number of SLBMs with multiple warheads may also be downloaded by up to four warheads per missile. Thus, the United States will be able to meet the numerical constraints of the START II Treaty on SLBM warheads by downloading and retaining 18 Trident submarines with missile warhead loads reduced from eight warheads to four. HEAVY ICBMs The START Treaty requires that 154 of the 308 former Soviet heavy ICBM launchers must be destroyed by the end of the seven year reduction period. The START II Treaty goes further and requires the elimination or physical conversion of all heavy ICBM launchers. Under the START II Treaty, the Russian Federation will be allowed to convert, under agreed constraints and subject to inspection, 90 of these deployed missile launchers within which, thereafter, only single- warhead missiles of the SS-25 type ICBM may be deployed. The remaining 64 heavy ICBM launchers must be destroyed by the end of the second phase of reductions in accordance with START Treaty procedures. The constraints on SS-18 silo conversion require that the Russians pour concrete to a height of five meters above the silo base and mount in the upper portion of the silo a restrictive ring that is smaller in diameter than the diameter of the SS-18. These modifications preclude an SS-18 from being launched from these silos, and would be extremely difficult and time-consuming to reverse. The constraints also require the destruction of all deployed and non-deployed SS-18 missiles and their launch canisters. BOMBERS In the START II Treaty, all deployed heavy bomber nuclear armaments will be counted according to how the bombers are actually equipped. Each deployed heavy bomber (except for 100 bombers reoriented to a conventional role) will be attributed with the aggregate number of long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, nuclear-armed air-to-surface missiles with ranges of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear gravitv bombs for which it is actually equipped. Under this Agreement, heavy bombers will be attributed with a realistic number of warheads that reflects operational considerations; in many cases, this number may be lower than the maximum number of wepons that could be physically loaded on the aircrapf using all available attachement points. In addition, each Party may reorient to a conventional role up to 100 of its heavy bombers that were never accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bonbers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Such bonbers would not count toward START II warhead ceilings, but would continue to count against the START Treaty limits. Each Party may, on a one-time basis, return such bombers back to a nuclear role, if it wished. If some, but no all, bombers within a specific type or variant, in the START Treaty sense, are reoriented to a conventional role, they must be given a difference observable by national technical means form the bombers within that type or variant that remain in a nuclear role. Likewise, if a bomber that has been reoriented to a conventional role is subsequently returned to a nuclear role, it must receive an observable difference from other heavy bombers of the same type and variant. VERIFICATION The START Treaty provisions will be used to verify the START II Treaty's limits except as otherwise provided. The START II Treaty provides for additional inspections to confirm the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as additional inspections to confirm the conversions of heavy ICBM silo launchers. In addition, the START II Treaty provides for exhibitions and inspections to observe the number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers are actually equipped and their relevant observable differences. COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS The START II Treaty requires the elimination or conversion of launchers of deploy ICBMs with multiple warheads. To reinforce this limitation, it prohibits the acquisition, after the second phase of reductions, of such weapons from another state. After that date, the START II Treaty also prohibits the production, flight-testing (except from space launch facilities), or deployment of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed. The Parties are obligated under the Treaty not to produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more warheads than it has been attributed with under the START II Treaty. Also, the Parties are obligated not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any other state, including any other Party to the START Treaty. The START II Treaty provides that this last prohibition is to be applied provisionally from the date of signature of the START II Treaty. It has no effect on the United States since there are no U.S heavy ICBMs. IMPLEMENTATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE To provide a forum for discussion of implementation of the START II Treaty, the Treaty establishes the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC). Through the BIC, the Parties can resolve questions of compliance and agree upon additional measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The START II Treaty will enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratificaiton by the Parties. However, since the START II Treaty is built upon the START Treaty, it cannot enter into force prior to the START Treaty's entry into force. It will remain in force as long as the START Treaty remains in force. CONCLUSION Accompanying this report is an analysis of th START II Treaty. This Treaty is truly an historic achievement. By significantly reducing strategic offensive arms, and by eliminating those that pose the greatest threat to stability, the START II Treaty will enhance the national security of the United States. It is in the best interest of the United States of America, the Russian Federation, and, indeed, the entire world that this Treaty enter into force promptly. I strongly recommend its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Respectfully submitted, LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER. Attachments: As stated. ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY TEXT The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty) consists of the main Treaty text and three documents which are integral parts thereof: The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Elimination and Conversion Protocol); The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol); and The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the Memorandum on Attribution). The START II Treaty shall enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratffication between the United States and the Russian Federation, but Article VI of the START II Treaty specffically provides. that it shall not enter into-force prior to entry into force of the START Treaty. In addition to the documents that are integral parts of the START II Treaty, there are three exchanges of letters associated with START II. The first exchange of letter relates to the ongoing negotiations of an agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers now on the territory of Kazakhstan. In his December 29, 1992, response to Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's commitment of December 29, 1992, to spare no effort to conclude such an agreement, Secretary of State Eagleburger confirmed that the START II Treaty would be submitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent on the understanding that the agreement referred to by Minister Kozyrev (providing for the movement to Russia and elimination of heavy ICBMs from Kazakhstan) would be signed and nnplemented, and that, not later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty, all deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs now located on the territory of Kazakhstan will have been moved to Russia where they and their launch canisters will have been destroyed. The second exchange of letters of December 29, 1992, and December 31, 1992, between secretary of state Eagleburger and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, relates, to heavy bombers, and constitutes the assurance of the United States of America, during the duration of the START II Treaty, never to have more nuclear weapons deployed on any heavy bomber than the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution for that type or variant. This letter creates no new legal obligation for the United States but merely reiterates the obligation already assumed under paragraph 3 of Article IV of the START II Treaty. The third exchange of letters of December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, between Russian Minister of Defense Grachev and Secretary of Defense Cheney, sets forth a number of assurances on Russian intent regarding the conversion and retention of 90 silo launchers of P.S- 20 (referred to by the U.S. as SS-18) heavy ICBMs. In his letter, which is politically binding on Russia, Minister Grachev reaffirms the steps that Russia will take to convert these silos and assures the Secretary of Defense that mimilos of the SS-25 type will be deployed in these converted silos. TITLE AND PREAMBLE The title of the START II Treaty is the "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms." Of primary importance is the word "further," which establishes from the outset the integral relationship between the START Treaty and the START II Treaty. As will become evident as this analysis progresses, without entry into force of the START Treaty there can l be no entry into force or implementation of the START II Treaty. This is true not only with respect to the formalities of the entry into force of the two Treaties, but also with respect to every aspect of implementation of the START II Treaty. Indeed, paragraph 1 of Article V states that except as otherwise specifically provided for, "the provisions of the START Treaty, including the verification provisions, shall be used for implemention of this Treaty." Thus, whenever a question arises, reference must be made to the START Treaty. It is on this basis that the terms used throughout the START II Treaty have their meaning, beginning with Article I. This means that terms such as "reduction and limitation" and "strategic offensive arms" are to be understood in precisely the same manner as in the START Treaty. As in the START Treaty, the term "reduction and limitation" highlights the fact that START II also calls for elimination of arms, not merely the imposition of ceilings. The arms subject to "further" reductions beyond those of the START Treaty are "strategic," in the same sense that the term is used in the START Treaty. There, it should be noted, in term itself is undefined, but as explained in the Article-by-Article Analysis of the START Treaty, the term refers to ICBMs and their associated launchers, SLBMs and their associated launchers, and heavy bombers. These strategic offensive arms covered by the Treaty are systems of intercontinental range, in contrast to shorter-range and intermediate-range systems covered by the 1987 Treaty Between the United Sates of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Similarly, the term "offensive" is used in contrast to "defensive" arms, such as anti-ballistic missile systems covered by the 1972 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and under discussion in the talks on a Global Protection System. The Preamble commences with the designation of the United States of America and the Russian Federation as "the Parties," to obviate the use of their full names throughout the Treaty. The Parties to the START II Treaty are different from the Parties to the START Treaty. While the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are Parties to the START Treaty, they are not Parties to the START II Treaty. It was not necessary to involve these three states because, within seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty, all nuclear weapons and deployed strategic offensive arms are to be eliminated from their territories. The second and third paragraphs of the Preamble contain a reaffirmation of commitment to the START Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The fourth paragraph calls attention to the commitment of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, as set forth in the Lisbon Protocol, to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. The fifth paragraph of the Preamble is similar to the fifth paragraph of the Preamble to the START Treaty, but adds to the list of undertakings of which the Parties are mindful two documents signed since the conclusion of the START Treaty: the Joint Understanding on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms and the Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by President Bush and President Yeltsin on June 17, 1992, in Washington, that relate to START II and the creation of a global system against ballistic missile attack. The sixth through tenth paragraphs parallel paragraphs two through four of the Preamble to the START Treaty. There is also a reference to UN General Assembly resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992, which specifically welcomes the Joint Understanding on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation of June 17, 1992, and urges the early conversion of this Joint Understanding into a formal treaty. ARTICLE Paragraph 1 of Article I obligates the United States and Russia each to reduce its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, along with ICBM and SLBM warheads and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that by seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty neither Party has more than a total of 4250 warheads attributable to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, as counted pursuant to Articles III and IV of this Treaty (importantly, not the START Treaty, whose counting rules differ in some respect from those of the START II Treaty). The paragraph underscores through repetition that the aggregate number must never exceed 4250, and adds that a Party may establish a lesser aggregate number for itself. The reference to the number 3800 implies no legal constraint but rather represents the lower end of a range of deployments contemplated by the Parties. Paragraph 2 sets forth the sublimits within the overall 4250 limit that each Party must observe. It does so by reference to the numbers of warheads that are attributed to deployed SLBMs, deployed ICBMs of types of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed, and deployed heavy ICBMs in the Memorandum on Attribution or, if the data are not present in the categories contained in the Memorandum on Attribution, in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty. In order to understand precisely what is meant by, inter alia, "warhead," "deployed SLBM," "deployed," "heavy ICBMs." etc., reference must be made to the START Treaty, its counting rules, and its Annex on Terms and Their Definitions. The discussion of such terms and their application, set forth in the Article-by-Article Analysis of the START Treaty, will not be repeated here. But it is worth calling special attention to the fact that, for the purposes of the START Treaty and therefore START II, a warhead is not a physical object, but a unit of account. The sublimits set forth in paragraph 2, described in terms of the total number of warheads attributed to certain missiles, are: (a) 2160 for deployed SLBMs, (b) 1200 for those types of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed, and (c) 650 for deployed heavy ICBMs. Paragraph 3 provides that, once a Party has fulfflled its obligations pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall continue the reductions process so that by January 1, 2003, it does not have more than a total of 3500 warheads attributable to its deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. As in the case of the first phase of further reductions set forth in paragraph 1, a Party is free to establish a lower aggregate number for itself. Also, as in the first phase of further reductions, there is mention made of a number, in this case 3000, that implies no legal constraint, but which represents the lower end of a range of deployments contemplated by the Parties. Paragraph 4 establishes the sublimits applicable to the aggregate of 3500 or less as follows: (a) 1750 for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs; (b) zero for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead is attributed; and (c) zero for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. The effect of these reductions is that by January 1, 2003, the aggregate number for deployed warheads must not exceed 3500 (no more than 1750 of which can be attributed to deployed SLBMs) and neither Party may have a deployed launcher of an ICBM to which more than one warhead is attributed nor a deployed launcher of heavy ICBMs or any heavy ICBMs. Note that, in a sense, subparagraph 4(c) is redundant. The only deployed heavy ICBM (the SS-18) is in fact a deployed ICBM of a type to which more than one warhead is attributed, and under the terms of both the START and the START II Treaties, the number of warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs may not be reduced through downloading. However, in light of the separate reference to heavy ICBMs that is maintained throughout the START Treaty and in the START II Treaty for other purposes, the separate treatment in subparagraph 4(c) leaves no room for doubt that the complete elimination of heavy ICBMs is necessary and recognizes that their elimination has great military and political significance. Also, under START rules for eliminations, launchers may either be destroyed or converted and, in most cases, the missiles need not be destroyed. The START II Treaty, like the START Treaty, is more severe on heavy ICBMs than on other strategic offensive arms. Under START II, all heavy ICBM silo launchers must be destroyed (except for 90 that may be converted under stringent procedures) and all heavy ICBMs must also be destroyed. Paragraph 5 establishes that the Parties have committed to a sustained rate of reductions throughout the entire period of reductions. It makes it clear that the Parties may not delay commencing their reductions, and repeats the obligation set forth in paragraph 3 that, upon the completion of the first phase of further reductions, the second phase of reductions must be commenced. The effect of this provision is to provide significant additional reductions, as compared to the phased reductions provided in the START Treaty. For example, in the seven-year reduction period set forth in the START Treaty, Russia and Kazakhstan are required to destroy deployed heavy ICBM launchers at the rate of no fewer than 22 a year, in order to reach the requisite reduction of 154 no later than at the end of seven years. Under this Treaty, Russia is to reach the level of 65 deployed heavy ICBM launchers at the endof the seven-year START reduction period (650 attributed warheads, 10 warheads per missile). Thus, to reach this level at a "sustained" rate, Russia will have to destroy or convert (conversion being permitted under the START II Treaty up to a level of 90 heavy ICBM silo launchers) at a rate significantly greater than that to which it is obligated under the START Treaty. Whereas the START Treaty rate of 22 per year is a specific obligation to a minimum rate of reductions, the requirement of paragraph 5 of Article I for sustained reductions throughout the reductions period is a more generalized commitment and not a specific legal obligation to reduce at a given rate. Thus, Russia is not obligated to eliminate or convert exactly 35 SS-18 silo launchers a year, but eliminating or converting substantially fewer over a sustained period could cause concern with regard to compliance with the commitment contained in paragraph 5 of Article I. It is important to note that, while the Parties agreed to sustained reductions, they did not agree to "straight-line" or annual reduction rates. The Parties understood that sustained reductions refer to the continual decline of the strategic offensive arms associated with the aggregate number of warheads and are not necessarily related to specific systems. Stralght-line reductions, or the reduction of warheads at a constant annual rate, are not practical due to the "step" nature of many reductions. For example, a Party cannot take credit for ICBM downloading until all ICBMs at a base have been downloaded. Similarly, SLBM downloading is not credited until all the SLBMs on submarines based adjacent to one ocean have been downloaded. On the other hand, partial steps in the conversion or elimination process, such as the notification that a single launcher was being converted or that a few heavy bombers were being eliminated, will provide confidence that the reductions are being sustained. Paragraph 6 sets forth the agreement of the Parties, that if they reach a separate agreement within one year after entry into force on a program of assistance to promote the implementation of these reductions, then the time frame for accomplishment of the second phase of further reductions, as well as meeting additional constraints contained in Article II, will not extend beyond December 31, 2000. Bearing in mind that seven years after entry into force of the START II Treaty will probably closely approach the end of the year 2000, it becomes apparent that the Parties must be prepared to complete their reductions in less time than the periods in which they are originally obligated to complete such reductions. The qualification of this obligation that agreement on such a program of assistance must be achieved by one year after entry into force was added at Russian request. The Parties wanted to make it clear that such an agreement must be reached long before the accelerated completion date for the second phase of reductions, in order to give Russia the requisite time to meet this revised obligation. ARTICLE II Article II consists of nine paragraphs. Paragraph 1 contains several different undertakings that are at the heart of the START II Treaty. Foremost is the requirement that each Party, no later than January 1, 2003, will have either eliminated all of its deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty (including test launchers and training launchers), or else will have converted them to launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead is attributed, and will not thereafter have launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed. An exception to this requirement is made for those launchers, other than launchers of heavy ICBMs, that are allowed under the START Treaty at space launch facilities. Paragraph 1 goes on to state the agreement of the Parties that ICBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM of the former type. Thus, for example, converted SS-18 silos must not be capable of launching SS-18s. The Parties also agree to carry out such elimination or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise provided in paragraph 3 of this Article. Paragraph 2 excepts from the obligations of paragraph 1 silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads has been reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III of the START II Treaty. Thus, for example, the launchers of all Minuteman III ICBMS and the 105 launchers of SS-19 ICBMs that have been downloaded to one warhead pursuant to Article III of the START II Treaty need not be eliminated, even though under the START Treaty they would be attributed with more than one warhead at entry into force. Paragraph 3 sets forth the means by which silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including test launchers and training launchers, are to be eliminated or converted. Eliminations are to be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol to the START Treaty. Not more than 90 silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be converted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol to the START II Treaty; the remainder must be physically destroyed. Paragraph 4 sets forth the undertaking of the Parties not to emplace an ICBM launch canister which has a diameter greater than 2.5 meters in any silo launcher of heavy ICBMs that has been converted in accordance with subparagraph (b) of paragraph 3 of Article II. This is one of the constraints placed on the 90 SS-18 heavy ICBM silo launchers that may be converted rather than eliminated pursuant to paragraph 3. Although this paragraph, standing alone, would not preclude the subsequent installation of a new type of single-warhead ICBM different from the SS-25, its purpose is to reinforce the assurance from Defense Minister Grachev, during the negotiations, that only ICBMs of the SS-25 type will be installed in converted heavy ICBM launchers. The U.S. interpretation of this Russian political commitment would preclude such subsequent installation. The political commitment is contained in a letter, dated December 29, 1992, from Defense Minister Grachev to Secretary of Defense Cheney, which offers five assurances with respect to the conversion of 90 silo launchers of RS-20 (SS-18) heavy ICBMs under the Elimination and Conversion Protocol in order to install single-warhead missiles other than heavy ICBMs into such silo launchers. The first assurance is the Russian commitment to install in the upper portion of each converted SS-18 silo launcher a restrictive ring with a diameter of not more than 2.9 meters, so as to preclude loading of a heavy ICBM in the silo launcher. The second assurance is that each such converted silo launcher will be filled with concrete to a depth of five meters, thereby making the usable depth of the silo too short to contain a heavy ICBM. The third assurance is that Russia will not install in a converted silo launcher a missile launch canister with a diameter exceeding 2.5 meters. The fourth assurance is that a single-warhead ICBM of the RS-12M (SS-25) type missile will be installed in such converted silo launcher. The word "type" is understood to refer to an ICBM in the sense that the term is described in the START Treaty. During the negotiations the Defense Minister stated that "only single-war-head ICBMs of the RS-I2M (SS-25) type would be installed in such a converted launcher of heavy ICBMs." The United States, therefore, understands the political commitment contained in the letter to be a permanent commitment not to install any missile other than an SS-25 type in these converted silos. The fifth assurance is that such a conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs (including filling with concrete) will be verified in accordance with the agreement reached between the Parties. Except for the fourth assurance, all of the assurances in the letter are obligations included in either the main body of the START II Treaty or its Elimination and Conversion Protocol. Thus, the 90 converted heavy ICBM silos must never again contain heavy ICBMs or ICBMs equipped with MIRVs and may contain only an SS-25 type missile. Paragraph 5 requires that elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities be carried out only in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of Article II. Thus, such launchers may not be converted but must be destroyed. There are so such launchers in Russia at the present time and, during the negotiations, the Russians said they had no plans for such launchers. Should, however, Russian plans change such that any be designated as part of a space launch facility, they must be destroyed by January 1, 2003, pursuant to this paragraph and paragraph 1 of this Article (which does not exempt such launchers used at space launch facilities). Paragraph 6 addresses the elimination of deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters. All such missiles must be eliminated no later than January 1, 2003, either in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Elimination and conversion Protocol, or by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. The Parties also agree not to have such missiles or launch canisters thereafter. The heavy ICBMs must be removed from their canisters before they are eliminated. The United States has the right to observe these eliminations. The provisions of this Article were not meant to exclude elimination through test flights during the period of reductions. In this context the exchange of letters on Kazakhstan is important. Russia pledges its best efforts to reach agreement with Kazakhstan, as contemplated by the Lisbon Protocol, on the movement of the SS-18 heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, which are now located in Kazakhstan, to Russia, where they will be destroyed. The United States asserts for its part that it is entering into the START II Treaty regime on the understanding that this agreement will be signed and implemented, and all the SS-18 missiles in Kazakhstan will be returned to Russia and destroyed along with their launch canisters. Paragraph 7 gives each Party the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as inspections in connections with the conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Except as otherwise provided in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections must be conducted subject to the applicable provisions of the START Treaty. Paragraph 8 sets forth the commitment of each Party not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article VI, this obligation is to be applied provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty. This provides a useful collateral constraint since there are SS-18 silo lunchers located outside Russia, and such transfers by Russia to the other Parties to the START Treaty--Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--are not prohibited by the START Treaty. Paragraph 9 requires that, beginning on January 1, 2003, and thereafter, neither Party will produce, acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities conducted in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty), or deploy an ICBM to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of the START II Teaaty. This provision adds to the START Treaty prohibition "not to produce, flight-test, or deploy," an explicit ban on acquisition of such systems from a third state--a relevant concern since other countries (particularly Ukraine) presently have sophisticated ballistic missile production facilities. The practical impact of paragraph 9 is that, after the specified date, Peacekeeper and the SS-24 ICBMs can be launched only from space launch facilities to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space. ARTICLE III Article III sets forth the specific Treaty provisions regarding the attribution of warheads to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Paragraph 1 of Article III specifies that the number of nuclear warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM will be determined in accordance with START procedures, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of Article III. Since paragraph 2 covers only downloading, this means that the warhead attribution of existing ICBMs and SLBMs is that listed in Section I of the START Memorandum of Understanding, unless they are downloaded in accordance with the START Treaty or in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, and that the provisions for determining the warhead attribution of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs set forth in paragraph 4 of Article III of the START Treaty apply with equal force to the START II Treaty. Paragraph 2 of Article III sets forth rules for reducing the warhead attribution (downloading) of existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs other than heavy ICBMs. The actual number of reentry vehicles on any given ballistic missile may be less than the attributed number of warheads, but that missile still counts at the attributed number. Like the START Treaty, the START II Treaty bans downloading of heavy ICBMs and of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs. Downloading under this Treaty follows the same rules as downloading under the START Treaty, except that the following provisions apply only to downloading for the purposes of the START II Treaty: Subparagraphs 2(a) and 2(b) allow a Party to exceed the 1250 START Treaty total warhead downloading limit and the 500 START Treaty warhead limit on downloading ICBMs and SLBMs other than the U.S. Minuteman III ICBM and the Russian SS-N-18 SLBM. This provision would allow the United States to maintain the viability of the sea-based component of the Triad while meeting the limit of 1750 SLBM warheads found in subparagraph 4(a) of Article I of the Treaty by, for example, downloading each of the 432 Trident SLBMs on 18 Trident ballistic missile submarines from eight to four warheads. Subparagraph 2(c) allows downloading no more than 105 ICBMs of one type of existing ICBM by more than four, but not more than five, warheads. (Downloading otherwise is limited to no more than four warheads per missile by subparagraph 5(c)(iii) of Article III of the START Treaty.) The ICBM so downloaded must be one of the two types of ICBM or SLBM whose downloading is permitted by subparagraph 5(c)(ii) of Article III of the START Treaty. This provision has the practical effect of allowing Russia to download 105 SS-19 ICBMs from six warheads to one warhead, and thus to retain them past January 1, 2003, when all MIRVed ICBMs are banned. The 105 downloaded SS-19 ICBMs must be deployed only in silos in which an SS-19 ICBM was deployed on July 31, 1991, the date of signature of the START Treaty. Subparagraph 2(d) allows downloading of a ballistic missile type by more than two warheads without destroying the re-entry vehicle platform and replacing it with a new reentry vehicle platform. Such destruction and replacement would otherwise be required by subparagraphs 5(b)(iii) and 5(c)(vi) of Article III of the START Treaty, in order to take advantage of that Treaty's downloading provisions. Not requiring reentry vehicle platform destruction will allow the Parties to restructure their forces under START II to meet the START II Treaty's lower limits in a more economical manner. All other downloading provisions of the START Treaty apply to this Treaty as well. In particular, downloading of ICBMs must be accomplished base-by-base, while downloading of SLBMs must include all SLBMs at bases adjacent to the same ocean. Neither Party may download more than two existing types of ballistic missiles, either ICBMs or SLBMs, in addition to the Minuteman III and the SS-N-18. As a result of the differences in the provisions of the two Treaties, the warhead attribution of a given ICBM or SLBM may differ under START and under the START II Treaty. For example, if the United States were to elect to download the Trident II (D-5) SLBM from eight to four warheads, without replacing the reentry vehicle platform, it could be attributed with four warheads under this Treaty, while it could continue to be attributed with eight warheads under START (or a number of seven or six consistent with START Treaty downloading rules). The United States would not be in violation of the 1250 or 500 warhead downloading limit in START. As noted above, there are no numerical limits on the aggregate numberer of reentry vehicles that may be downloaded under this Treaty, except as implied by other constraints, e.g., the limits on the number of existing types of missiles and the number of warheads per missile that can be downloaded. In a similar fashion, the United States could elect to download the Minuteman III to one warhead for purposes of the START II Treaty without destroying the reentry vehicle platform. Since this Treaty cannot amend the START Treaty, in this case the Minuteman III would continue to be attributed with three warheads for purposes of the START Treaty. Paragraph 3 of Article III of the START II Treaty contains two requirements that parallel similar requirements in paragraph 12 of Article V of the START Treaty. Subparagraph 3(a) translates the warhead attribution rule into a physical prohibition by banning production, flight- testing, or deployment of an ICBM or SLBM with more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to it. Subparagraph 3(b) bans uploading of ICBMs or SLBMs that have been downloaded. The provisions of subparagraph 3(a) do not preclude production of Trident SLBMs for transfer to the United Kingdom, regardless of the number of reentry vehicles with which the United Kingdom subsequently equips them. As the Article-by-Article Analysis of the First Agreed Statement in the Agreed Statements Annex to the START Treaty makes clear: "... as a sovereign nation, the United Kingdom has the right to test and deploy the Trident II missile with any warhead configuration the UK deems appropriate." Paragraph 3 is necessary, even though similar provisions exist in the START Treaty, since the warhead attribution under START and under the START II Treaty may differ. For example, if all Trident II (D-5) SLBMs were downloaded to four warheads under this Treaty, while continuing to be attributed with eight warheads under START, there would, absent this paragraph, be no legal bar to continuing to test and deploy them with eight reentry vehicles. Similarly, without the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Treaty, there would be no bar to uploading. For example, START provisions against uploading would not preclude returning the Trident II (D-5) SLBMs to an attribution of eight warheads under the START II Treaty, since, in terms of START accountability, its accountability would always have been eight. ARTICLE IV Article IV establishes the constraints on heavy bombers. Paragraphs 1 through 6 deal with attributing warheads to heavy bombers; paragraphs 7 through 14 regulate nuclear-armed heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role. Article IV is complemented by the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article IV provide the basic counting rules for heavy bomber nuclear armaments. Paragraph 1 specifies that the number of nuclear warheads attributed to a deployed heavy bomber (other than heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role) shall be equal to the number of nuclear weapons (including long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear gravity bombs, an short-range nuclear missiles) with which any bomber of that type or variant is actually equipped. This is a significant departure from the START Treaty, under which 150 U.S. and 180 Soviet ALCM-equipped heavy bombers were discounted up to 50 percent and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons other than long-range nuclear ALCMs were attributed with only one warhead. Paragraph 2 provides that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall be the number listed in the Memorandum on Attribution, while paragraph 3 prohibits heavy bombers from being equipped with more nuclear weapons than are attributed to it. One of the most difficult issues during the START II negotiations was what was meant by the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped. The Russian delegation initially asserted that any approach other than one based on counting attachment points (i.e., the physical devices used to attach weapons to heavy bombers or weapons racks), and the subsequent calculation of the maximum number of weapons that could physically be loaded on the aircraft given those attachment points, would not result in a "real" counting rule. The design of U.S. heavy bombers makes counting attachment points an inappropriate and misleading measure that could greatly overstate the realistic operational load that a U.S. heavy bomber could carry on a strategic mission. The United States successfully rejected this approach, arguing in favor of an approach that would count all bombers of any type or variant with the largest number of nuclear weapons for which any bomber of that type or variant would be actually deployed. In support of the U.S. position, the December 29, 1992 letter from Secretary of State Eagleburger to Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev provided assurances that the United States has an "absolute legal and political requirement" to have no more nuclear weapons deployed on a heavy bomber than the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The letter does not create a new U.S. obligation, but simply notes a series of provisions set forth in the Treaty. The word "type," as used in the letter, as in the Treaty, to refer to heavy bombers, is used in the same sense as the term is used in the START Treaty. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, in his response to Secretary of State Eagleburger's letter of December 29, 1992, agreed that, on the basis of the U.S. letter, "all questions associated with heavy bombers have been resolved for the purposes of [the START II] Treaty to our mutual satisfaction." This provides formal assurance that Russia no longer insisted on counting attachment points to determine the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped or on eliminating "excess" attachment points that would allow the aircraft to carry a larger number of nuclearweapons than listed. Instead, the Parties agreed that the number of warheads attributed to a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type would be the number listed in the Memorandum on Attribution. This agreement paved the way for agreement on the heavy bomber portions of the Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article IV requires a one-time exhibition of one heavy bomber of each type and variant specified in the Memorandum on Attribution for the purpose of demonstrating the number of nuclear weapons for which such bombers are actually equipped. No distinction is made between heavy bombors equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and those that are not so equipped. In a signfficant departure from the proceduresof the START Treaty, these exhibitions will include the U.S. B-2 heavy bomber. The exhibitions are to be conducted no later than 180 days after entry into force of the START II Treaty. This date was selected for two reasons: to allow adequate time to prepare for the exhibitions, especially for shrouding of the B-2 (and, if necessary, shrouding other heavy bombers) permitted by paragraph 2 of Section II of the Exhibition and Inspection Protocol, and to avoid conflict with START Treaty baseline inspections in the event that the START and START II Treaties enter into force at approximately the same time. The START II Treaty allows each Party to increase or decrease the number of warheads for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped. Paragraph 5 of Article IV requires exhibitions similar to those required by paragraph 4 in the event the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped is changed. This paragraph also provides for the timing of any change in attribution. Both the exhibition and the accountability change are triggered by a notification of intent. Ninety days after such notification both the change in accountability and the exhibition occur. While the Parties may, by agreement, delay the exhibition, this does not delay the change in accountability. In practical terms, the application of paragraph 5 will vary according to circumstances: If a Party intends to decrease the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type and variant is actually equipped, but without the intent to create a new variant, the last heavy bomber would have to be modified before one is exhibited. This is necessary since otherwise a Party would still have one or more heavy bombers equipped for more nuclear weapons than the number listed in the Memorandum on Attribution, which would be in violation of paragraph 3 of Article IV. If a Party intends to increase the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type and variant is actually equipped, but without the intent to create a new variant, the first heavy bomber to be modified would have to be exhibited. Once again, this is necessary to avoid having any heavy bomber equipped for more nuclear weapons than the number listed in the Memorandum on Attribution for heavy bombers of that type and variant. If a Party intends to increase or decrease the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped through creation of a new variant (for example, by removing external ALCM carriage from some, but not all, of a particular type of heavy bomber), the first aircraft of that variant would have to be exhibited. The new variant would, under the START Treaty, need to be made distinguishable (as that term is used in the START Treaty) and to be exhibited in accordance with paragraph 12 of Article XI of the START Treaty. The exhibitions required under START and those required under paragraph 5 of Article IV of the START II Treaty may be combined, but there is no legal requirement to do se. Additional aircraft would count at the changed number of weapons as they were modified to become bombers of the newly declared variant. If a Party intends to increase or decrease the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bombor is actually equipped, incident to converting heavy bombers from heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs to heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, the procedures set forth in. Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol to the START Treaty would be followed, including the inspections provisions associated there with. Once again, the conversion inspection required under the START Treaty and the exhibition required under paragraph 5 of Article IV of the START II Treaty may be combined, but there is no legal requirement to do so. In any of these cases, a 90-day advance notification would be required. Paragraph 6 of Article IV specifies that exhibitions and inspections referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article IV will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol and, to the extent not modified by that Protocol, with the provisions of the START Treaty, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article V of the START II Treaty. Under the START Treaty, older U.S. heavy bombers awaiting limination at the Davis- Monthan conversion or elimination facility are included in the Memorandum of Understanding, since such bombers count against the START Treaty delivery vehicle and warhead totals. Since these older bombers will be eliminated before the expiration of the seven-year reductions period, when the first limits under START II must be reached, it was agreed that the number of nuclear weapons for which they are actually equipped would not be included in the START II Memorandum on Attribution and, in such case, they will not be exhibited. The United States declared two different categories of the B-52G heavy bomber under the START Treaty: a B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and a B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. At the time of signature of the START II Treaty, all B-52Gs equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs had been removed from operational service and were awaiting elimination at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base elimination facility. Therefore, the United States listed only one category of B-52G in the Memorandum on Attribution. The United States informed Russia during the negotiations that, since the only deployed B-52G heavy bombers Russian inspectors will actually encounter at operational air bases will be B-52Gs that are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, that is the configuration of the heavy bomber that the United States will exhibit. The United States further noted that, if U.S. plans were to change and the United States were to return any B-52Gs equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs to operational status, we would conduct an additional exhibition of the ALCM-configured B-52G in order to avoid any confusion during subsequent data update inspections. Paragraph 7 of Article IV gives each Party the right to reorient to a conventional role-- without undergoing any conversion procedures--heavy bombers that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. This provision is applied on an airplane-by-airplane basis; for example, the fact that B-1 test heavy bombers have been tested with long-range nuclear ALCMs is not a bar to reorienting heavy bombers of that type to a conventional role. Note that the right to reorient without any physical conversion is reedflied by the requirement in subparagraph 8(d) of this Article that such reoriented bombers have differences, observable to national technical means of verification (NTM) and visible during inspection, from other heavy bombers that have not been reoriented, so that they can be differentiated from other heavy bombers of the same type and variant with a nuclear role (if any). The right to reorient heavy bombers to a conventional role is in addition to the right under START to convert, using specified procedures, no more than 76 heavy bombers to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. A Party could, if it chose, have both 75 converted non-nuclear heavy bombers and 100 heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that did not require conversion procedures. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role will not count against the START II warhead limits. However, since heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role need not undergo any conversion, they remain fully accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs (i.e., each counts as one delivery vehicle and as one warhead towards the START Treaty's ceilings). Paragraph 8 of Article IV sets forth specific restrictions on heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role. Subparagraph 8(a) limits the number of reoriented bombers to 100 at any one time, while subparagraph 8(b) mandates segregated basing for such bombers. Subparagraph 8(c) bans use of reoriented heavy bombers for nuclear missions or in nuclear exercises and bars their crews from training or exercising for nuclear missions. This prohibition does not ban such training or exercising by crews of bombers of the same type and variant that have not been reoriented. Subaragraph 8(d) requires that heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role have differences observable to national technical means (NTM) from heavy bombers of that type and variant that have not been reoriented. This provisions aids in confirming adherence to the requirements of subparagraph 8(b) for segregated basing. The specific differences are listed in the Memorandum of Attribution. While these observable differences are primarily an aid to NTM, they are also required to be visible during on-site inspections. Alternately, if all heavy bombers of a type have been reoriented to a conventional role, the requirement to have differences observable to NTM is unnecessary since these aircraft are observably different from other types or variants and it would be clear in which category they fell. In addition, there would be no need or purpose in exhibiting an aircraft if all heavy bombers of that type and variant fell into the same category. The observable differences referred to in subparagraph 8(d) need not be functional. As a result, they need not necessarily make heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role "distinguishable" (as that term is defined in the START Treaty) from other heavy bombers. Paragraph 9 of Article IV provides each Party the right, following 90-day advance notification to the other Party, to return to a nuclear role heavy bombers that have been reoriented to a conventional role. This right is important to the United States. We currently plan to reorient B- 1 heavy bombers to a conventional role, but need to preserve the option to return these bombers to a nuclear role if and when B-52H heavy bombers are retired. Once returned to a nuclear role, such heavy bombers will count "as actually equipped" and may not subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role a second time. Paragraph 9 also requires observable differences if only some, but not all, reoriented heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are returned to a nuclear role. These differences aid in enforcing the prohibition on a subsequent reorientation to a conventional role. As a result of the combination of paragraphs 8 and 9, a Party may be obligated to allow the other Party to identify, both through its NTM and through inspections, three separate groups of heavy bombers within a given variant: those that have never been reoriented to a conventional role, those that are currently reoriented to a conventional role, and those that were once reoriented to a conventional role but have subsequently been returned to a nuclear role. Paragraph 10 of Article IV requires at least 100 kilometers separation between air bases for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role and storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments. This restriction is based on a similar restriction in subparagraph 11(e) of Article IV of the START Treaty. Note that this restriction would not preclude nuclear weapons for other strategic or tactical systems (e.g., ICBM reentry vehicles or weapons for tactical air- craft) from being stored within the 100 kilometers specified, nor would it preclude deployment of nuclear warheads on ICBMs at ICBM bases co-located with air bases for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role. There are no specific verification provisions specified in the START II Treaty for this restriction. Paragraph 11 provides that reoriented heavy bombers remain subject to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions. Such heavy bombers are accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long- range nuclear ALCMs. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article IV provide for exhibitions related to observable differences. In the case where only some bombers of a given type and variant have been reoriented to a conventional role, while others of the same type and variant continue to have a nuclear role, there is a requirement for the former to have a difference observable to NTM from the latter. This obligation is provided for in subparagraph 8(d) of Article IV. Similarly, if only some bombers of a given type and variant are returned to a nuclear role after having been reoriented to a conventional role, and there are other bombers of the same type and variant that have a conventional role, or have a nuclear role but that have never been reoriented to a conventional role then the bombers in the first "category" (the word "category" is not used in this Analysis in the sense of the term as used in the START Treaty) must be observably different to NTM from bombers in the latter two categories. This obligation is recorded in paragraph 9 of the START II Treaty. The purpose of these obligations is to allow the other Party to determine into which category a particular aircraft falls (i.e., original nuclear, reoriented to a conventional role, or nuclear that had once been reoriented to a conventional role). This is required not only for the purposes of warhead counting (heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are not attributed with warheads; other deployed heavy bombors count as actually equipped), but also to confirm adherence to the ban on reorienting a heavy bomber to a conventional role for a second time. Of course, such observable differences are not necessary in the case in which all the aircraft of a given type or variant are reoriented to a conventional role, or are returned to a nuclear role from a conventional role. Since these aircraft are already observably different from aircraft of other types or variants, it would already be clear into which category they fell. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article IV of the START II Treaty record the obligations for an exhibition of an aircraft for the purpose of demonstrating, and allowing the inspection of, the observable difference identified. As noted above, there would be no need or purpose in exhibiting an aircraft if all aircraft of that type and variant fell into the same category. However, if a Party has two different types or variants that have changed categories, e.g., B-Is and B-52s, and only one of them falls into more than one category (and has been given a difference observable to NTM), the use of the phrase "each type" in these paragraphs does not mean that a requirement exists to exhibit an aircraft of the second type or variant whose status could not be confused since all aircraft of that type or variant fall into the same category. This was clearly not the intent of the Parties, since there would be no purpose in exhibiting an aircraft of the second type or variant, because all of them had been reoriented. Paragraph 14 of Article IV specifies that exhibitions and inspections referred to in the preceding two paragraphs will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol. ARTICLE V Article V sets forth provisions for the implementation of the Treaty. Paragraph 1 of Article V specifies that, except as provided for in the START II Treaty, the provisions of the START Treaty, including its verification provisions, shall be used for implementing START II. As noted above, this includes, for example, the counting rules, the definitions in the Definitions Annex and elsewhere in the START Treaty, as well as the various inspection procedures and related notification requirements and agreed statements. Paragraph 2 of Article V establishes the bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC). The BIC will meet at the request of either Party and will serve as the framework within which the Parties will seek to resolve any questions related to compliance with the START II Treaty and agree on any additional measures that might be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the START II Treaty. The language establishing the BIC is identical to that establishing the START Treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Both Parties envision that the two Commissions would work together closely. ARTICLE VI Article VI consists of four paragraphs covering ratification, entry into force, provisional application, duration, and withdrawal. Paragraph 1 of Article VI provides that the two Protocols and the Memorandum on Attribution are integral parts of the Treaty. Paragraph 1 also specifies that the Treaty is subject to ratification prior to entering into force, and will not enter into force prior to entry into force of the START Treaty. Paragraph 2 of Article VI specifies that paragraph 8 of Article II, the ban on the transfer of heavy ICBMs to a third state or states, shall be provisionally applied as of the date of signature of the START II Treaty. Paragraph 3 of Article VI provides that the START II Treaty shall remain in force for the duration of the START Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article VI, identical in content to paragraph 3 of Article XVII of the START Treaty, provides each Party the right to withdraw from the Treaty on six months notice if extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. ARTICLE VII Article VII, identical in content to Article XVIII of the START Treaty, provides for amendments to the START II Treaty. Such amendments would be subject to ratification as specified in Article VI of the Treaty. ARTICLE Vlll Article VIII, identical in content to Article XIX of the START Treaty, provides for registration with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. The entire Treaty, including the two Protocols and the Memorandum on Attribution, are to be so registered. FINAL PROVISION The final paragraph of the START II Treaty records that the Treaty was done at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, and each being equally authentic. ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE ELIMINATION AND CONVERSION PROTOCOL STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL The Elimination and Conversion Protocol consists of two Sections. The first Section sets forth procedures for the elimination of heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters. The second Section establishes procedures for the conversion and confirmation of conversion of silo launchers, silo training launchers, and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs. Although written as general procedures, these procedures were designed for Russian SS-18 silo launchers. SECTION I--PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF HEAVY ICBM'S AND THEIR LAUNCH CANISTERS Paragraph 1 of Section I provides two alternatives for eliminating heavy ICBMs. A Party may either use the procedures set forth in Section I, which are to take place at elimination facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty, or it may eliminate heavy ICBMs by using them for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or outer space. For the former, notice of elimination must be provided to the other Party, via the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs), 30 days in advance of the initiation of the elimination process at the particular facility involved. If, however, the elimination of a heavy ICBM is to be accomplished by the "space launch" alternative, notification thereof shall be governed by the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988, which requires notification 24 hours in advance through the NRRCs. Paragraph 2 lists several steps that either shall or may be taken, in any order, by the inspected Party before the confirmatory inspection provided for in paragraph 3 of Section I. The inspected party shall remove the missile's reentry vehicles; may remove the electronic and electro-mechanical devices of the missiles's guidance and control system from the missile an its launch canister, as well as other elements that are not ("shall not be" in the text is used in the sense of "are not") subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section I (which addresses the elimination process for heavy ICBMs); shall remove the missile from its launch canister and disassemble the missile into stages; shall remove liquid propellant from the missile; may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister; may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism. Paragraph 3 describes the confirmatory inspection, which is to take place after arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the actual destruction. During the confirmatory inspection, the inspectors are to confirm the type and number of missiles to be eliminated. Inspectors have the right to both visually observe and measure items (including missiles outside of their launch canisters) presented for elimination to confirm that they are SS-18 missiles and missile canisters. The elimination process for the missiles and the launch canisters may begin once the above procedures have been carried out. Paragraph 3 requires that inspectors observe the elimination process. On-site observation is necessary since NTM cannot confirm that the objects presented for destruction are real. Other provisions governing the inspection team and the inspection are found in the START Treaty. Paragraph 4 specifies the elimination process to be followed for destruction of heavy ICBMs. Missile stages, nozzles, and missile interstage skim are to be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and the self-contained dispensing mechanism (as well as the front section), including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section should, is to be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and crushed. In the negotiations, the Russian side assured the U.S. side that this process would ensure the destruction of all the critical elements of the missile system-stages, including propellant tanks; engines (since the nozzle, which is destroyed, is the most critical engine element); interstage skirts; and self-contained dispensing mechanisms and their elements. Paragraph 5 states that during the process of destruction of launch canisters of heavy ICBMs, the launch canister shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or, alternatively, into three pieces such that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of the launch canister. These procedures apply to launch canisters eliminated with their heavy ICBMs, as well as to launch canisters for missiles eliminated through flight-testing, or through launching into the upper atmosphere or space. They also apply to empty launch canisters existing at the time of entry into force of the Treaty. Paragraph 6 requires that the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort confirm that the inspection team has completed its inspection. Such confirmation shall be included in a factual written report by them that contains the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process. Such confirmation shall be made upon completion of the requirements set forth in Section I. Paragraph 7 states that heavy ICBMs will no longer be subject to the limitations of this Treaty upon completion of the procedures set forth in Section I. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol to the START Treaty. SECTION II--PROCEDURES FOR CONVERSION OF SILO LAUNCHERS, SILO TRAINING LAUNCHERS, AND SILO TEST LAUNCHERS OF HEAVY ICBM'S Paragraph 1 requires that conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs (including silo training launchers of heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs) be carried out in situ and be subject to inspection. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article II of the Treaty, launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities may not be converted, but must be destroyed. Silo elimination, as opposed to conversion, follows START Treaty rules. Paragraph 2 provides that, prior to the initiation of the conversion process for any of the silo launchers described in paragraph 1, the missile and launch canister must be removed from the silo launcher. Paragraph 3 states that a Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs (including silo training launchers of heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs) as soon as the silo door has been opened and a missile and its canister have been removed from the silo launcher. Notification thereof is to be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 and 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol to the START Treaty. Paragraph 4 sets forth steps to be included in the conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs (including silo training launchers of heavy ICBMs and silo test launchers of heavy ICBMs). They are: opening of the silo door and removal of the missile and the launch canister from the silo launcher; pouring of concrete into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher; and installing a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters into the upper portion of the silo launcher in a manner that precludes removal without destruction of the ring and its attachment to the silo wall. Paragraph 5 provides each Party the right to confirm that the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II have been carried out. For purposes of confirming that such procedures have been carried out, the Party doing the conversion is required to notify the other Party (through the NRRCs) (a) no later than 30 days in advance of the date when the process of pouring concrete will commence, and (b) upon completion of all of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II. Once it receives the first notification, the inspecting Party has two options for confirming compliance with the conversion procedures. These are set forth in paragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of Section II. The primary difference between paragraphs 6 and 7 is whether a Party chooses to observe the concrete being poured into the silo (paragraph 6) or not (paragraph 7). Paragraph 6 confers upon the Parties the right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each heavy ICBM silo launcher that is to be converted and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. Subparagraph 6(a) requires the other party to inform the party converting the heavy ICBM silo no later than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will observe the filling of the silo in question. Subparagraph 6(b) requires the Party converting a silo to take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible to the inspecting Party and that the depth of the silo can be measured by the inspecting Party. This must be done immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that the inspecting Party can view the bottom of the silo and accurately measure its depth prior to the concrete being poured. Subparagraph 6(c) states that the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of concrete pouring from a location providing an unobstructed view of the silo interior, and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been poured into the base of the launcher to a depth of five meters. Measurements are to be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened. Subparagraph 6(d) states that following notification of completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II, the inspecting Party may measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, that during such inspection the ring shall not be shrouded, and that the Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections. Subparagraph 6(e) requires that the results of the measurements conducted to subparagraphs 6(c) and 6(d) above be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort. Subparagraph 6(f) states that inspection teams are to consist of no more than ten inspectors, all of whom are to be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty. The list referred to is that specified by Section II of the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty, which also sets forth the legal status of such inspections. Subparagraph 6(g) states that such inspections shall not count against any inspection quotas established by the START Treaty. In addition, heavy ICBM elimination inspections do not count against START Treaty quotas. Subparagraph 7 provides an alternative method for confirming conversion. It provides for the right to measure the depth of each heavy ICBM silo launcher that is to be converted before the concrete has been poured, and to return and remeasure the silo depth after the concrete has hardened. This alternative was suggested by the Russian side as a cost-reduction measure since the on-site presence required by it could be considerably lower than that required by the first method. The U.S. indicated an interest if appropriate equipment to confirm the integrity of the concrete fill could be identified. In addition, paragraph 7 provides for the right to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. Subparagraph 7(a) requires the other Party to inform the Party converting the heavy ICBM silo no later than seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will measure the depth of the silo in question both before and after the concrete has been poured. Subparagraph 7(b) requires the Party converting a silo to take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo launcher is visible and that the depth of the silo can be measured. This must be done immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete. The purpose of these requirements is to ensure that the inspecting Party can view the bottom of the silo and accurately measure its depth. Subparagraph 7(c) states that the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete. Subparagraph 7(d) states that, following notification of completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II, the inspecting Party may measure the diameter of the restrictive ring, and remeasure the depth of the silo launcher, and that the Parties shall agree on the date for such inspect.ions. The restrictive ring may not be shrouded during such inspections. Subparagraph 7(e) states that, for purposes of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo, measurements are to be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo door to the top of the concrete fill, after the concrete has hardened. Subparagraph 7(f) requires that the results of the measurements conducted to subparagraphs 7(c), 7(d), and 7(e) above the recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort. Subparagraph 7(g) states that inspections teams are to consist of no more than ten inspectors, all of whom are to be drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty. Subparagraph 7(h) states that such inspections shall not count against any inspection quotas established by the START Treaty. Paragraph 8 gives the Party converting a silo the right to carry out further conversion measures after the completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 6 or 7 of Secion Ii or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section II. In addition to the reentry vehicle inspections provided for the START Treaty, paragraph 9 authorizes four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year of ICBMs deployed in silo lauchersthat have been converted pursuant to Section II. Procedures set forth in the Inspection Protocolto the START Treaty will be used during these inspections. In addition to confirming that the missile installed in the converted silo has only one reentry vehicle, these inspections permit the inspecting Party visually to confirm the continued presence of the restrictive ring and of the launch canister (and missile) that the inspected Party has placed in the silo. Towards this end, the inspectors have the right visually to confirm both the presence of the ring and that the observable portions of the launch canister if the deployed ICBM do not differ externally from that of the launch canister that was exhibited pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the START Treaty. While the sides agreed that launch-related equipment and instrumentation could be placed on the ring and could be shrouded, they further agreed that any shrouding of the upper portion of the silo launcher shall not obstruct observation of the upper portion of the launch canister and the restrictive ring. To further ensure that the necessary observations could be made, the Parties also agreed that, if requested by the inspecting Party, the inspected Party must partially remove any shrouding of the restrictive ring, except for shrouding of instruments installed thereon, to confirm its presence. In discussions of this provision, the Russian side assured the U.S. that there would be places on the ring where equipment or instruments would not be emplaced and inspectors could see the integrity of the ring and that the ring was permanently attached to the sides of the launcher. These additional rights apply only to the four extra inspections authorized by this paragraph and do not apply to reentry vehicle inspections which are conducted solely pursuant to the START Treaty. Paragraph 10 states that, upon completion of the procedures specified in paragraphs 6 or 7 of Section II (or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after notification of completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 4 of Section 11), the silo launcher of heavy ICBMs being converted shall, for purposes of this Treaty, be considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead is attributed. Without this provision, the silo would continue to be considered to contain a heavy ICBM until the installation of a new missile or a new training model of a missile (which will remain the case with respect to accountability under the START Treaty). This provision was included at the Russians request to avoid exceeding START II Treaty limits in the event of delay in the installation of the replacement single-warhead ICBM. SECTION III--EQUIPMENT; COSTS Paragraph 1 provides the right to use agreed equipment to support the inspection activities of the Protocol and requires the Parties to agree in the Bilateral Implementation Commission on such equipment, including but not limited to equipment for the measurement of the concrete fill in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Paragraph 2 addresses costs for inspections conducted pursuant to Section II of his Protocol. Such costs shall be handled in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty. For practical purposes, this means that the United States will bear almost all of the costs of inspections under this protocol, since there are no U.S. heavy ICBMs to inspect. The United States accepted this provision because of the great importance we place on verification of heavy ICBM silo conversion. This Protocol concludes with a statement that it is an integral part of the Treaty, shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. The Parties agree that they may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. They agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty. ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE EXHIBITIONS AND INSPECTION PROTOCOL The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections (the Protocol) consists of a Preamble and two Sections and sets forth detailed procedures for the conduct of exhibitions of heavy bombers, as well as for the conduct of inspections conducted incident to those exhibitions. PREAMBLE The Preamble links the Protocol to the basic rights and obligtions with respect to heavy bomber exhibitions and inspections set forth in Article IV. SECTION I -- EXHIBITIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS Section I provides for heavy bomber exhibitions that are different from the heavy bomber exhibitions required under the START Treaty. Paragraph 1 repeats the requirements of Article IV for three types of exhibitions: Exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Paragraph 4 of Article IV specifies that the purpose of such exhibition is to demonstrate to the other Party the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped. Paragraph 5 of Article IV requires a similar exhibition if the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped is changed. (See the analysis accompanying Article IV for a discussion of the meanging of the phrase "number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bobmer is actually equipped.") Exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role. Paragraph 12 of Article IV specified that the purpose of such exibitions is to demonstrate to the other Party the specified differences between such reoriented bombers and other heavy bombers of the same type or variant of a type with a nuclear role. Paragraph 8(d) of Article IV mandates that such differences be both ovservable by national technical means of verification and visible during on-site inspection. Exihibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role. Such exhibitions serve both to demonstrate the number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber being returned to a nuclear role is actually equipped and also to demonstrate the differences between the heavy bombers being returned and heavy bombers of the same type and variant that are either (a) still in a conventional role or (b) were never reoriented to such a role. Providing observable differences between heavy bombers returned to a nuclear role and those of the same type and variant that were never reoriented to a conventional role helps enforce the prohibition of paragraph 9 of Article IV against subsequently reorienting to a conventional role any heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role. Paragraph 2 of Section I provides identical basic rules on location, date, duration, and inspection team composition for each of the three types of exhibitions. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article V, the procedures of the START Treaty apply to these exhibitions, except as modified by the Protocol. Subparagraph 2(c) limits the time that each heavy bomber shall be subject to inspection to no more than two hours. Subparagraph 2(d) requires that inspectors for these exhibitions be drawn from the list of START Treaty inspectors. The list referred to is that specified by Section II of the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty, which also sets forth the legal status of such inspectors. Subparagraph 2(e) requires the provision of certain photographs of observable differences. The number of such photographs is determined by the inspected Party, but the photograph or photographs provided must be sufficient to show all relevant differences. Subparagraph 2(f) ensures that these exhibitions do not count against any START Treaty inspection quotas. SECTION II--INSPECTIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS Section II provides rules for the inspections of heavy bombers during the exhibitions provided for in Section I. In addition, Section II provides additional procedures for data update inspections and new facility inspections conducted pursuant to the START Treaty beginning 180 days after the entry into force of the START II Treaty. New facility inspections are included since, under the provisions of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty, such inspections include inspection of applicable heavy bombers at new air bases. The delay of 180 days is to allow the initial exhibitions required by paragraph 4 of Article IV of the START II Treaty to be conducted. These exhibitions provide an initial demonstration of the number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of a given type and variant are actually equipped. The additional inspection procedures for data update and new facility inspections allow periodic reconfirmation of this number. The Protocol does not specify whether or not actual, simulated, or no weapons are to be used during these initial demonstrations. During the negotiations, U.S. negotiators told their Russian counterparts that U.S. heavy bombers would have either weapons or training shapes loaded on launchers, pylons, and bomb racks during the exhibitions in a way that demonstrated an operational load. The Russian negotiators were also told, however, that during data update and new facility inspections their inspectors would normally see heavy bombers without weapons. Since the United States has discontinued the practice of maintaining U.S. heavy bombers on peacetime alert, it is normal that these bombers not be loaded with weapons on a routine basis. The purpose of the additional inspection rights provided under this Protocol for data update and new facility inspections is fully satisfied by access to weapons bays and external weapons stations with no weapons loaded. The Parties understood during the negotiations that weapons bays are normally empty and that no requirement exists to load armaments for inspections. Members of inspection teams conducting data update and new facility inspections pursuant to the START Treaty could be citizens of Belarus, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine, as well as of Russia. Although the START II Treaty is only between the United States and Russia, the United States intends to grant access to all members of such inspection teams without regard to nationality. Subparagraph 1(a) covers inspections to confirm the number of nuclear weapons for which a specffic heavy bomber is actually eqquipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The access inspectors are given is, therefore, limited to that necessary to accomplish the stated purpose. Provided that this requirement is met, the extent of access is at the discretion of the inspected Party. There is, for example, no requirement to give direct access to the underside of the wings of the B-2 heavy bomber in order to "prove" that no weapons are located there. The Parties agreed there would be no access to the interior of heavy bombers (except for weapons bays) because it is not required to fulffll the purpose of the inspection. Subparagraph 1(b) covers inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role in order to confirm the observable differences required by subparagraph 8(d) of Article IV. Once again, access is limited to those areas required to fulfill the purpose of the inspection. Subparagraph 1(c) covers inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role. In essence, inspections conducted pursuant to this subparagraph are a combination of those conducted pursuant to subparagraphs 1(a)and l(b). Paragraph 2 of Section II provides a right to shroud portions of a heavy bomber that are not subject to inspection. This right applies to any heavy bomber, but is primarily intended to protect the B-2 heavy-bomber, as well as future advanced technology bombers. Shrouding time shall not count against the period inspection. The "period allocated for inspection" refers both to the two hours allocated by subparagraph 2(c) of Section I of this Protocol for inspections during exhibitions, and to the maximum 32-hour period allowed by paragraphs 31 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty for the ocnduct of data update or new facility inspections. Since the Inspection Protocol to the START Treaty requires that inspectors return to the point of entry immediately following the allowed 32-hour period, there is a possible conflict between the two Treaties. In order to provide for the situation where a longer time would be required than allocated by the START Treaty, the United States will, if necessary, seek, in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission established by the START Treaty, the right to extend the period of inspection to allow for the completion of START II inspection procedures. Paragraph 3 of Section II requires the in-country escort to provide explanations to the inspection team, for inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 1(a) or 1(c) of this Section, of the number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is actually equipped. Paragraph 3 of Section II also requires the in-country escort to provide explanations, for inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph l(b) or l(c) of this Section, of the differences that are observable by NTM and visible during inspection. A final provision provides that, pursuant to subparagraph 2(b) of Article V, additional measures may be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to the Protocol to improve the viability and effectiveness of the START II Treaty. The Parties agree that if changes need to be made to the Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the START II Treaty, then such changes as are agreed upon shall be made within the framework of the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), without resorting to the amendment procedures set forth in Article VII of the Treaty. Pursuant to Article VI, the Protocol is deemed to be an integral part of the START II Treaty. ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE MEMORANDUM ON ATTRIBUTION The Memorandum on Attribution (MOA) consists of a Preamble and four Sections. The MOA establishes the data base needed to record the following data: The number of nuclear weapons for which each heavy bomber of a type and a variant of a type equipped for nuclear weapons is actually equipped; The aggregate number of bomber weapons counted against the limits established in Article I of the Treaty; The numbers and locations for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role and for heavy bombers subsequently returned to a nuclear role; The differences observable to national technical means of verification for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, and for heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently returned to a nuclear role, which differentiate these two groups from each other and from heavy bombers of the same type and variant with nuclear roles that have never been reoriented; The number and location of ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded by amounts greater than allowed by the START Treaty, or ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded without destruction of the re-entry vehicle platform; The number and location of heavy ICBM silos converted to carry single-RV ICBMs; and The number of heavy ICBMs eliminated and remaining to be eliminated. Only Treaty-related data that differ from the data in the START Memorandum of Understanding are included in this Memorandum on Attribution; the Parties chose this approach to avoid duplication. Unlike past arms control treaties, such as the START Treaty and the INF Treaty, the START II Treaty included almost no preliminary data at the time of signing. Instead, the Parties agreed to exchange data 30 days after entry into force, with the data effective as of the date of entry into force. This was done for four reasons. First, there was no immediate need for the data since the limits of the START II Treaty will not take effect for seven years. Second, because many data categories were not agreed until a few days before signature, exchange of preliminary data at signature would have been impractical. Third, much of the data will not exist until specific Treaty actions are taken. Finally, the data exchange associated with the START Treaty provides much of the baseline information necessary to implement the START II Treaty. The one exception to the foregoing is the number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers are actually equipped. This data was exchanged effective as of the date of signature, both because it could not be derived from the START Treaty data and because of the central political importance of these data to the overall agreement. SECTION I--NUMBER OF WARHEADS ATTRIBUTED TO DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS OTHER THAN HEAVY BOMBERS REORIENTED TO A CONVENTIONAL ROLE Section I sets forth the number of warheads for which deployed heavy bombers (other than those reoriented to a conventional role) are actually equipped. Note that the number of warheads for which deployed heavy bombers are actually equipped is not an "agreed" or negotiated number, and the accuracy of the data provided is the responsibility of the Party owning the given heavy bomber. (See the analysis of Article IV of the Treaty for a discussion of the proper interpretation of the term "the number of warheads for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped. ) In addition, this Section provides a record of the aggregate number of warheads attributed to such heavy bombers. This aggregate number is derived by multiplying the number of deployed heavy bombers of a given type and variant (data found in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty) by the number of warheads for which such bombors are actually equipped. As a legal matter, the inclusion of a summary of the provisions of Article IV on heavy bomber warhead attribution is redundant and therefore adds no new obligations. The provisions were included in the MOA at the request of Russia. Under the START Treaty, older U.S. heavy bombers awaiting elimination at the Davis- Monthan conversion or elimination facility are included in the Memorandum of Understanding, since such bombers count against the START Treaty delivery vehicle and warhead totals. Since these older bombers will be eliminated before the expiration of the seven-year reductions period, when the first limits under START II must be reached, the number of nuclear weapons for which they are actually equipped was not included in the START II MOA. The United States declared two different categories of B-52G heavy bombers under the START Treaty: a B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and a B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. At the time of signature of the START II Treaty, all B-52Gs equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs had been removed from operational service and were awaiting elimination at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base elimination facility. Therefore, the United States listed only one variant-the B-52G--in the MOA. The United States stated that it would include the nuclear weapons attributed to all B-52Gs in the aggregate number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers to be provided 30 days after entry into force. The non- operational B-52Gs at Davis-Monthan will only count at the START II attributed number of 12 only until those heavy bombers are actually eliminated. SECTION II--DATA ON HEAVY BOMBERS REORIENTED TO A CONVENTIONAL ROLE AND HEAVY BOMBERS REORIENTED TO A CONVENTIONAL ROLE THAT HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN RETURNED TO A NUCLEAR ROLE Section II provides a location for recording the aggregate number of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role and the bases at which they are located. These data are required in support of paragraph 8 of Article IV of the Treaty, which limits the aggregate number of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role to 100 and requires that they be based separately from heavy bombers with a nuclear role. In addition, this Section allows the recording of observable differences--those betweenheavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role and other heavy bombers of the same type or variant with a nuclear role, and those between heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that have subsequently been returned to a nuclear role and heavy bombers which remain reoriented to a conventional role. In each case, each type or variant of a type of heavy bomber need have only one difference. These distinctions are required by paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article IV of the Treaty, respectively. Since no heavy bombers have yet been reoriented to a conventional role, this Section is unlikely to contain any data when the first data exchange occurs 30 days after entry into force of the START II Treaty. SECTION III--DATA ON DEPLOYED ICBM'S AND DEPLOYED SLBM'S TO WHICH A REDUCED NUMBER OF WARHEADS IS ATTRIBUTED Section III provides data on the numbers and locations of ICBMs and SLBMs downloaded under the provisions of Article III of the Treaty. The format is identical to that of Section III to the START Treaty Memorandum of Understanding; a separate listing in the Memorandum on Attribution is required since the downloading rules under the Treaty differ from those under the START Treaty. SECTION IV--DATA ON ELIMINATED HEAVY ICBM'S AND CONVERTED SILO LAUNCHERS OF HEAVY ICBM'S Section IV provides data on the numbers and locations of heavy ICBM silos (in practice, silo launchers for Russian SS-18 ICBMs) which have been converted pursuant to the Elimination and Conversion Protocol. These data are required because of the limit of 90 such converted silos established in subparagraph 3(b) of Article II. Since the START Treaty requires that geographic coordinates not be released to the public, the locations referred to in this Section will be given by use of the silo designators found in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty that correspond to coordinate data in the Agreement on the Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty. Section IV also provides data on the number of heavy ICBMs (in practice, Russian SS-18 ICBMs) which remain deployed in Russia, remain non-deployed in Russia, or have been eliminated. Such data are needed to measure progress toward the elimination of all heavy ICBMs mandated by paragraph 6 of Article II. See the Article-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty text for further discussion of heavy ICBMs located in Kazakhstan. Although paragraph 6 of Article II of the Treaty requires the elimination of all launch canisters for heavy ICBMs (including empty launch canisters), the Parties elected not to include a separate listing for such canisters in the MOA. Launch canisters for heavy ICBMs will be eliminated as will the heavy ICBMs that they contained. Since the United States has no heavy ICBMs, all U.S. data in this Section will be zero. The United States was included in this Section to meet the Russian request that the Treaty (and thus the MOA) be phrased in a neutral fashion with respect to the rights and obligations of the two Parties. SECTION V--CHANGES Section V requires each Party to notify the other of changes in the attribution and data contained in this Memorandum. Unlike the START Treaty, the START II Treaty does not prescribe in detail the specific content of notifications. Should the Parties wish to agree on specific content, they can do so within the framework of the Bilateral Implementation Commission. The concluding paragraphs note that, in signing the Memorandum, the Parties accept the categories of data contaiued in the Memorandum. These paragraphs also provide that each Party is responsible for the accuracy only of its own data. A final provision, like that in each Protocol, provides that, pursuant to subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, additional measures can be agreed upon by the Parties with respect to the Memorandum to. improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if changes need to be made in the Memorandum that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, then such changes as are agreed upon shall be made within the framework of the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), without resorting to the amendment procedures set forth in Article VII. Pursuant to Article VI, the Memorandum on Attribution is deemed to be an integral part of the Treaty. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON December 29, 1992 Dear Mr. Minister: I have the honor to acknowledge your letter of December 29, 1992, the contents of which read as follows: "I have the honor to inform you that the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, in accordance with the Protocol signed in Lisbon on May 23, 1992, to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are conducting negotiations with a view to prepare an agreement on the procedure for the implementation of the START Treaty. One of the elements of the agreement under elaboration will provide for the movement of all heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters located in Kazakhstan to Russia within the seven year START reduction period. Specific provisions of this agreement are still to be agreed upon. The Russian Federation will spare no effort to reach an agreement with the Republic of Kazakhstan that all heavy ICBMs now located in Kazakhstan would be subject to the requirement of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms providing for the destruction of such missiles and their launch canisters. Once we have concluded such an agreement with Kazakhstan, we will provide you with a copy of this instrument." Taking into account the contents of your letter, the United States is signing the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and submitting it to the Senate on the understanding that the above-mentioned Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan will be signed and implemented and that, not later than seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty, all deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs now located on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan will have been returned to the Russian Federation where they and their launch canisters will be destroyed. His Excellency Andrey Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow Mr. Minister, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. Sincerely, Lawrence Eagleburger DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES (Translation) LS No. 140345 LB/AO Russian December 29, 1992 Dear Mr. Secretary, I have the honor to inform you that the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, in accordance with the Protocol signed in Lisbon on May 23, 1992, to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are conducting negotiations with a view to prepare an agreement on the procedure for the implementation of the START Treaty. One of the elements of the agreement under elaboration will provide for the movement of all heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters located in Kazakhstan to Russia within the seven year START reduction period- Specific provisions of this agreement are still to be agreed upon. The Russian Federation will spare no effort to reach an agreement with the Republic of Kazakhstan that all heavy ICBMs now located Kazakhstan would be subject to the requirement of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms providing for the destruction of such missiles and their launch canisters. Once we have concluded such an agreement with Kazakhstan, we will provide you with a copy of this instrument. Accept, Mr. Secretary, the assurances of my highest considerations. A. Kozyrev Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON December 29, 1992 Dear Mr. Minister: The purpose of this letter is to provide the assurance and guaarantee of the United States government that it will never have more nuclear weapons deployed on any heavy bomber than the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding for the START II Treaty for heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type. We see this as an absolute political and legal requirement of the United States. Our arms control experts have been discussing the subject of heavy bombers and how to determine the number of nuclear weapons for which they are actually equipped. As you and I have discussed, the technical design of U.S. heavy bombers makes attachment joints an inappropriate and misleading measure for determining the number of nuclear weapons for which U.S. heavy bombers are actually equipped. At the same time, I recognize the importance you attach assuring yourself that we have provided accurate information in fulfilling the agreement between our two Presidents that, in the treaty we are now discussing, the number of warheads counted for heavy bombers with nuclear roles will be the number of nuclear weapons they are actually equipped to carry. Let me therefore make the following points: First, the United States regards it as both a legal and a political obligation to ensure that the data we provide on the number of nuclear wapons heavy bombers with nuclear roles are actually equipped to carry is accurate. I have consulted with both Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who join me in assuring you of this fact. His Excellency Andrei Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow Second, I draw your attention to paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty we are now elaborating, which states: Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear weapons than the number listed for heavy bombers of that type and variant in the Memorandum of Understanding on Attribution and Data. This provision clearly imposes a legal obligation not to exceed the specified numbers of nuclear weapons. Third, Article IV of the Treaty provides that neither side may change the neither of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers with nuclear roles are actually equipped except by giving three months notice to the other Party and conducting an exhibition to demonstrate the revised number. I assure you that the United States will scrupulously observe this provision. Fourth, we have agreed to a one time exhibition to aid you in verifying the accuracy of our declared numbers. In addition, we have agreed that, during routine inspections under START, each side's inspectors will be allowed to inspect both the weapons bay and those portions of the exterior where the bomber is equipped with weapons to ensure that the number of nuclear weapons that the heavy bomber is actually equipped to carry continues not to exceed the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. These provisions apply to all heavy bombers, existing and future, including the B-2. Finally, should questions arise, each side will be obligated to meet within the framework of the Bilateral Compliance and Implementation Commission which will be established under Article V of the Treaty to respond to any questions raised regarding a side's compliance with its treaty obligations, including the requirement to count heavy bombers with the number of nuclear weapons for which they are actually equipped. Indeed, one reason for establishing such a Commission is to provide a mechanism to deal with any such concerns. I believe that, with the clarifications and assurances contained in this letter, all questions associated with heavy bombers have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction. Sincerely, Lawrence S. Eagleburger DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES Translating Division LS No. 140415 rsm Russian RUSIAN FEDERATION MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS December 31, 1992 Dear Mr. Secretary: I have the honor to confirm receipt of your letter of December 29, 1992. which reads as follows: "The purpose of this letter is to provide the assurances and guarantees of the United States government that it will never have more nuclear weapons deployed on any heavy bomber than the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding for the START Il Treaty for heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type. We see this as an absolute political and legal requirement of the United States. Our arms control experts have been discussing the subject of heavy bombers and how to determine the number of nuclear weapons for which they are actually equipped. As you and I have discussed. the technical design of U.S. heavy bombers makes attachment joints an inappropriate and misleading measure for determining the number of nuclear weapons for which U.S. heavy bombers are actually equipped. At the same time. I recognize the importance you attach to assuring yourself that we have provided accurate information in fulfilling the agreement between our two Presidents that, in the treaty, we are now discussing. the number of warheads counted for heavy bombers with nuclear roles will be the number of nuclear weapons they are actually equipped to carry. Let me therefore make the following points: His Excellency, Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger Secretary of State of the United States of America Washington First, the United States regards it as both a legal and a political obligation to ensure that the data we provide on the number of nuclear weapons heavy bombers with nuclear roles are actually equipped to carry is accurate. I have consulted with both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who join me in assuring you of this fact. Second. I draw your attention to pargraph 3 of Article IV of the treaty we are now elaborating, which states: Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear weapons than the number listed for heavy bombers of that type and variant in the Memorandum of Understanding on Attribution and Data. This provision clearly imposes a legal obligation not to exceed the specified numbers of nuclear weapons. Third, Article IV of the Treaty provides that neither Party may change the number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers with nuclear roles are actually equipped except by giving three months notice to the other Party and conducting an exhibition to demonstrate the revised number. I assure you that the United States will scrupulously observe this provision. Fourth, we have agreed to a one-time exhibition to aid you in verifying the accuracy of our declared numbers. In addition, we have agreed that, during routine inspections under START, each Party's inspectors will be allowed to inspect both the weapons bay and those portions of the exterior where the bomber is equipped with weapons to ensure that the number of nuclear weapons that the heavy bomber is actually equipped to can'y continues not to exceed the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. These provisions apply to all heavy bombers, existing and future, including the B-2. Finally, should questions arise, each Party will be obligated to meet within the framework of the Bilateral Compliance and Implementation Commission which will be established under Article V of the Treaty to respond to any questions raised regarding a Party's compliance with its treaty obligations. including the requirement to count heavy bombers with the number of nuclear weapons for which they arc actuslly equipped. Indeed, one reason for establishing such a Commission is to provide a mechanism to deal with any such concens. I believe that with the clasifications and assurances contained in this letter, all questions associated with heavy bombers have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction." I agree that. with the assurances and guarantees provided in your letter and the corresponding provisions of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Stralegic Offensive Arms and its Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections, all questions associated with heavy bombers have been resolved for the purposes of that Treaty to our mutual satisfaction. Accept Mr. Secretary, the renewed assurances of my highest consideraion. A. KOZYREV THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Dear Mr. Minister: I would like to thank you for your letter.of December 29, 1992., concerning the conversion of silo launchers for heavy ICBMS, the contents of which reads as follows: "I would like to inform you about the results of the work that we have accomplished in Geneva together with Kozyrev and Mr. Eagleburger. In general, I am satisfied with the outcome of the Geneva meetings since they pave the way towards a major historical event associated with the forthcoming new agreement between our two countries on further reductions of strategic offensive arms. Having examined the issues associated with the conversion of 9O silo launchers of RS- 20 (SS-18) heavy missiles eliminated in order to install singel-warhead missiles other than heavy ICBMs into these silo launchers, we make the following assurances that remove the concerns of the US side on this score . First, we intend to install in the upper portion of each silo launcher of a heavy missile a restricitive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters that would preclude loading a heavy ICBM in such a silo structure. Second, each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs will be filled with concrete to a depth of 5 meters. Third, we will not install in a silo launcher so converted a launch cnaister containing a missile with a launch canister diameter that woudl exceed 2.5 meters. Fourth, a single-warhead ICBM of the RS-12M (SS-25) type missile will be installed in such converted silo launcher. And finally, fifth, in accordance with the agreement reached between the Parties such a conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including filling with concrete, will be verified. Naturally, we proceed from the premise that, as it was stated by President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin, we will have elimated all heavy missiles by January 1, 2003, and will not produce them thereafter." His Excellency Pavel Grachev Minister of Defense Of the Russian Federation, Moscow. DEC 31 '92 17:11 P.2 I understand that the conditions that you stated above will be adhered to by the Russian side in converting silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. I want to acknowledge the central role you personally played in achieving the historic START II agreement. You have my sincere congratulations. This agreement reflects the positive change that has occurred in the relationship between our two countries. I can only hope that this relationship will become even stronger as Russia continues on its chosen path of democracy and reform. You and my successor as Secretary of Defense will have an enormous responsibility to ensure that the START I and START II agreements are actually implemented and that the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons required by those agreements is actually accomplished. I wish you every success in this important endeavor. Sincerely, Richard B. Cheney Secretary of Defense United States of America DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES (Translation) LS No. 140346 LB/AO Russian Official Translation December 29, 1992 Dear Mr. Secretary, I would like to inform you about the results of the work that we have accomplished in Geneva together with Mr. Kozyrev and Mr. Eagleburger. In general, I am satisfied with the outcome of the Geneva meetings, since they pave the way towards a major historical event associated with the forthcoming conclusion of a new agreement between our countries on further reductions of strategic offensive arms. Having examined the issues associated with the conversion of 90 silo launchers of RS-20 (SS-18) heavy missiles to be destroyed in order to install single-warhead missiles other than heavy ICBMs into these silo launchers, we make the following assurances to remove the concerns of the U.S. side on this score. First, we intend to install in the upper portion of each silo launcher of heavy missiles a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters that would preclude loading a heavy ICBM into such a silo structure. The Honorable Richard Cheney Secretary of Defense of the United States of America Washington, D.C. Second, each silo launcher of heavy ICBMs will be filled with 5 meters concrete to a depth of 5 meters. Third, we will not install into a silo launcher so converted a launch canister containing a missile whose diameter exceeds 2.5 meters. Fourth, a single-warhead ICBM of the RS-I2M (SS-25) type missile wiII be installed in such converted silo launcher. And finally, fifth, in accordance with the agreement reached between the Parties such a conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including filling with concrete will be verified. Naturally, we proceed from the premise that, as stated by President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin, we will have eliminated all heavy missiles by January 1, 2003, and will not produce them thereafter. Respectfully, [Signature] R. Grachev Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation