TEXT: PRESIDENT'S REPORT ON HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENT
(On US approach to implementing Helsinki Joint Statement) (1250)
Washington -- President Clinton submitted to Congress a report on the
U.S. approach to implementing the Helsinki Joint Statement, as
required by the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Department Authorization Act
Conference Report.
Following is the text of President Clinton's April 23 letter
submitting the report to the Senate Armed Services Committee and House
National Security Committee, and the text of the report:
(Begin text)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
April 23, 1998
TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE CHAIRMEN AND RANKING MEMBERS OF
THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES AND
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
April 23, 1998
Dear Mr. Chairman: (Dear Ranking Member:)
As required by section 1229 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-85), attached is a report on the
Helsinki Joint Statement.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
REPORT ON HELSINKI JOINT STATEMENT
This report responds to Section 1229 of the FY 98 DoD Authorization
Act Conference Report, which requests information regarding "the
United States approach (including verification implications) to
implementing the Helsinki Joint Statement, in particular, as that
Statement relates to the following:
1. Lower aggregate levels of strategic nuclear warheads.
2. Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead
inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads.
3. Deactivation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
4. Measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise
missiles and tactical nuclear systems.
5. Issues related to transparency in nuclear materials."
To encourage ratification of START II and demonstrate our commitment
to that Treaty, the United States has adopted a policy that we will
not begin START III negotiations until Russia ratifies START II. As
Congress is aware, the Russian parliament has not yet approved START
II. However, to be ready to begin START III negotiations soon after
the parliament ratifies START II, the Administration is undertaking
various preparations. For example, the United States has an extensive
internal work program under way to identify critical issues and
options related to the various elements of the Helsinki Joint
Statement and to develop the U.S. approach for implementing these
elements. No decisions have yet been made, however. Furthermore, since
most of the elements listed above will either be components of the
START III Treaty or discussed in the context of the treaty
negotiations, we will not begin to address them in any detail with
Russia until after START II is ratified. As it has done with previous
treaties, the Administration will keep Congress informed of U.S. START
III positions and the status of negotiations.
1. Lower aggregate levels of strategic nuclear warheads. In the
Helsinki Joint Statement, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin committed to
establish a 2,000-2,500 limit on deployed strategic nuclear warheads
as part of a START III treaty and to achieve this limit by December
31, 2007. The President agreed to this limit only after detailed
analysis and careful deliberations indicated that the United States
would be able to retain survivable, effective nuclear deterrent forces
at a 2000-2500 deployed strategic warhead level. This Helsinki
commitment will be the basis for START III negotiations, which will
begin after Russia ratifies START II. The executive branch is
currently developing objectives and options for U.S. proposals in
START III, but decisions have not yet been made regarding which
proposals to adopt.
2. Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead
inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. At
Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin also committed to include in
START III measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear
warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads.
In part, this commitment addresses Administration and Congressional
concern regarding our limited information about Russia's nuclear
weapon stockpile; it is also intended to promote irreversible deep
reductions in an equitable manner for both sides. Once again, the
executive branch is developing objectives and options for U.S.
proposals, but no decisions have yet been made. Because this Helsinki
commitment will be part of START III, its negotiation also awaits
Russia's ratification of START II.
3. Deactivation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The Helsinki
Joint Statement contains a commitment that the United States and
Russia will deactivate, by December 31, 2003, all strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles to be eliminated under START II by removing nuclear
warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. This commitment is
codified in legally binding letters which were signed and exchanged by
Secretary of State Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov on September
26, 1997, in New York. These letters also stipulate that after START
II enters into force, both sides will begin working to develop
understandings on methods of deactivation and on the parameters of an
appropriate program of U.S. assistance to help Russia implement
deactivation. With the extension of the deadline for completing START
II reductions from January 2003 to December 2007 (codified in the
START II Protocol), the deactivation commitment ensures that the
United States and Russia will realize START II's security benefits in
roughly the same time frame as originally intended. After Russia
ratifies START II, the Administration will submit the
Albright-Primakov letters, along with the START II Protocol and Joint
Agreed Statement, to the Senate for advice and consent to
ratification. (The Joint Agreed Statement ensures that de-MIRVing of
ICBMs under START II will occur in a stable and equivalent manner for
both parties.)
The U.S. preferred method of deactivation is warhead removal because
it effectively removes a missile's combat capability in a manner
equivalent for both sides, would take more time and be more observable
to reverse than most other methods, and could be monitored through use
of national technical means and START Treaty re-entry vehicle on-site
inspections. While both the United States and Russia explicitly
recognized this particular approach in the Helsinki Joint Statement
and the New York letters, Russia has indicated that it will propose
alternative deactivation methods. The letters formally commit the
United States to discuss such Russian proposals, but alternatives to
warhead removal will have to be evaluated based on their effectiveness
and verifiability. The Administration will keep Congress informed of
the progress of deactivation discussions with Russia.
4. Measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise
missiles and tactical nuclear systems. The Helsinki Joint Statement
contains a commitment that the United States and Russia will explore
possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise
missiles and tactical nuclear systems in the context of START III.
U.S. concerns include the large asymmetry between U.S. and Russian
tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles and protecting our conventional
SLCM capability. The executive branch is developing objectives and
options for U.S. proposals in this regard, but no decisions have yet
been made.
5. Issues related to transparency in nuclear materials. The Helsinki
Joint Statement contains a commitment that the United States and
Russia will consider issues related to transparency in nuclear
materials. The sides already have initiatives under way in this area,
particularly through the DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction program and
the DoE Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program. This
Helsinki commitment is intended to complement these initiatives and
promote U.S. efforts aimed at reducing proliferation risk and
enhancing the security of nuclear materials. The Executive Branch is
developing objectives and options for U.S. proposals on transparency
measures, but no decisions have yet been made.
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