START II SEEN SERVING INTERESTS OF BOTH U.S. AND RUSSIA

ACCESSION NUMBER:00000
FILE ID:95051702.POL
DATE:05/17/95
TITLE:START II SEEN SERVING INTERESTS OF BOTH U.S. AND RUSSIA

TEXT:
(Slocombe sure Russians will see value of arms cuts) (1010)
By Jacquelyn S. Porth
USIA Security Affairs Writer

Washington -- The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II)
serves both U.S. and Russian interests because it makes possible
substantial cuts in strategic nuclear systems, reduces the danger of
the "misuse or diversion of nuclear materials," and contributes
positively to "the overall state of relations" between the two
nations, a senior U.S. defense official says.

While the prospects for Russian ratification of START II are
uncertain, according to Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe,
Russian President Boris Yeltsin assured President Clinton during their
Moscow summit that his government "will make every effort to press the
parliament for early ratification."

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 17,
Slocombe noted that U.S. officials have been "working actively to
discuss START II with leaders of all political groups" in the Russian
parliament. "We are confident that the Russian people and their
elected representatives will see that START II reflects a new
cooperative relationship between our countries that allows each to
avoid the future burden of excessively large strategic arsenals, while
preserving each country's security interests," he said.

Without the treaty, Slocombe explained, "Russia would need to invest
significant resources to maintain its strategic nuclear forces at or
near" that of the original START levels. "By permitting both sides to
reduce their forces in tandem," he said, START II allows Russia and
the United States "to shift scarce resources toward more productive
sectors" of their economies. Also, by eliminating the most threatening
strategic systems on both sides, START II will improve "strategic
stability" and the political relationship between the two countries,
he said.

The United States is expected to ratify START II much more quickly
than Russia, but it will not implement any strategic reductions
unilaterally. Slocombe said the United States will not begin to reach
START II limits until treaty ratification has occurred in both
countries. Successive U.S. administrations have supported START II
ratification, he said, because it "achieves a long-standing U.S. arms
control goal by eliminating all multiple-warhead and heavy ICBMs
(intercontinental ballistic missiles)."

Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, director for strategic plans and
policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who testified with Slocombe,
said Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces "will be suspended at
levels of rough equivalence; a balance with greatly reduced incentive
for a first strike." START II is in "the best interests of the United
States, he told the Senate committee, because U.S. forces will remain
militarily sufficient and "crisis stability will be greatly improved."

Clark also expressed the confidence of the Joint Chiefs in the
military's ability "to effectively verify" treaty implementation.
START II, he said, builds on "the interlocking and mutually
reinforcing verification provisions" established in the first START.

Clark said the U.S. military believes "the majority of monitoring
requirements for START II can be accomplished with high confidence"
that there is "little chance that the Russians can engage in
militarily significant cheating." He went on to note that while it is
unlikely that Russia would try to break out from START II constraints,
"we are confident that such a breakout would be detected in time to
respond."

In response to questions from committee members, Clark said U.S.
military experts have examined possible cheating scenarios closely and
have been unable to construct "a militarily significant" one "that has
any rationality to it."

He also said that the 3,500 warhead force which the United States will
retain under START II "is militarily sufficient" for a viable
deterrent. The triad of air, land and sea forces will consist of 14
Trident submarines with D-5 missiles, 66 B-52 bombers, 20 B-2 bombers,
and between 450 and 500 Minuteman III missiles.

Slocombe noted that START II reflects the reality that nuclear weapons
have "a smaller role" to play in U.S. security "than at any other time
in the nuclear age." At the same time, he stressed that the United
States "must maintain a nuclear force of sufficient size and
capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by
potentially hostile political and military leaders."

With efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union
"neither complete nor irreversible," Slocombe sketched out what he
described as a three-part U.S. hedging strategy. It involves
maintaining deterrence at reduced force levels; developing, consistent
with the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, ballistic missile
defenses against existing and potential threats from states other than
Russia; and "developing non-nuclear counters to the threat of weapons
of mass destruction in regional conflicts."

Describing the second element of the strategy in more detail, Slocombe
said U.S. and Russian officials are trying to "clarify" the terms of
the ABM agreement so that both governments "can develop and deploy
effective theater missile defenses while maintaining the integrity of
this important, stabilizing agreement." Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to
a set of principles during the summit, he said, designed to help the
two sides "reach agreement on the demarcation between ABM and TMD
(Theater Missile Defense) systems."

The official said the United States believes "these principles restate
the meaning of the ABM Treaty and reaffirm our ability to deploy
advanced TMD to protect our forces, friends, and allies while
preserving the viability and integrity of the treaty." They also point
out that the treaty doesn't apply to TMD systems "that may simply have
a theoretical capability against some strategic missiles," he
explained, "but which would not be militarily significant in the
context of operational considerations."

Asked about possible START III negotiations, Slocombe said U.S. and
Russian officials reaffirmed this month in Moscow their desire to
"begin discussion" on future arms reduction measures post-START II.
The United States views this "as a step-by-step process," he
explained, and the way to reach START III is to complete the key step
required for START II: treaty ratification.
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