START TREATY

The Parties note that, in having agreed that silo training launchers may be shown on site diagrams within the boundaries of the inspection site, and in having agreed that silo training launchers nonetheless shall not be subject to inspection, they have done so as one of the few exceptions to the general rule that everything within the boundary shown on a site diagram is inspectable, as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

The Parties note that, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Annex 7 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, cargoes consisting of equipment and supplies listed in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph l of Annex 7 to the Inspection Protocol may, at the choice of the inspected Party, be examined at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or directly at such a facility.

The Parties understand that the normal practice of the Parties will be to examine such cargoes at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility.

The Parties to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, namely, the United States of America, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, agree that the form of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission agreements that are not signed by all Parties to the Treaty shall follow the form of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 6 and shall include the following:

In addition, such agreements shall include signature blocks only for those Parties that sign the agreement.

The Parties further agree that, for Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission joint statements that record agreements, the initialing of such a joint statement for the Government of a Party shall express the consent of that Party to be bound by the joint statement. In the event that the joint statement is not initialed by all the Parties to the Treaty, the following paragraph shall be included in the joint statement: "The consent of _____ and _____ (Parties not initialing) to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex l to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty."

The Parties may agree to use other forms of documents for recording agreements, as provided for in Section V of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the JCIC Protocol.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the JCIC Protocol.

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 6

ON THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE APPLICATION OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

The Parties understand that, when, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, certain rights and obligations under the Treaty begin to apply a specific number of days after an event, those rights and obligations shall begin to apply at 00:00 hours, Greenwich Mean Time, after the expiration of the specific number of days specified in the Treaty. Such specific number of days shall be counted from the day following the day of the event specified in the Treaty.

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 7

ON THE INSPECTABILITY OF ICBM EMPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT

The Parties understand that information about ICBM emplacement equipment that is specified for an inspection site, but that is absent from the inspection site at the time of the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, shall be provided during the pre-inspection briefing, along with the reason for its absence, pursuant to subparagraph 8(d) of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991.

The Parties further understand that, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty:

(a) ICBM emplacement equipment that is specified for an inspection site is not required to be located within the inspection site;

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 8

ON TRAINING MODELS OF MISSILES

The Parties understand that training models of missiles differ from ICBMs or SLBMs of corresponding types on the basis of the following declared external and functional differences that are visible during inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty:

(a) for training models of Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II types of missiles, one hole, no less than 25 millimeters in diameter, drilled through the casing of the first stage rocket motor and into the inert propellant;

Nothing in this Joint Statement shall be deemed to prejudice the right of each Party to declare other external and functional differences to differentiate training models of missiles from ICBMs or SLBMs of the corresponding type.

The Parties agree that, for existing and new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, all declarations of differences between training models of missiles and ICBMs or SLBMs of the corresponding types shall be subject to discussion in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

To assist inspectors, the Parties shall either provide a photograph of each of the differences of training models of missiles or, if a photograph of any of such differences has not been provided prior to the first inspection of an item declared to be a training model of a missile on the basis of such a difference, the inspected Party shall provide to the inspecting Party, during that inspection, a photograph of the difference, taken in accordance with paragraph 18 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty.

The consent of Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by its Government in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 9

ON ADDITIONAL CONFIRMATION OF THE DIMENSIONS OF FIRST STAGES OF SLBMS

The Parties understand that each exhibition conducted pursuant to Annex 13 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, shall be a one-time exhibition, provided that, as a result of each such exhibition, the United States of America confirms, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 13 to the Inspection Protocol, that the SLBM being exhibited is an SLBM of the declared type and that the dimensions of the SLBM stages being confirmed pursuant to Annex 13 to the Inspection Protocol correspond to the data specified for those items in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991.

ON THE AGREEMENT OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF U.S. EQUIPMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES AT THE VOTKINSK MACHINE BUILDING PLANT, VOTKINSK, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Parties understand that the list of equipment provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Votkinsk Continuous Monitoring Facility at the Beginning of Continuous Monitoring Activity" on October 15, 1992, fulfills the obligation of the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, to provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list of items of equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to the Inspection Protocol indicating the manufacturer's name and the model.

Pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, the Parties agree that the technical specifications for the U.S. equipment listed in Annexes 8 and 9 to the Inspection Protocol, provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "Technical Specifications of U.S. Equipment for the Conduct of Continuous Monitoring Activities" on October 15, 1992, shall be the technical specifications for the equipment specified on the list provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Votkinsk Continuous Monitoring Facility at the Beginning of Continuous Monitoring Activity" on October 15, 1992.

The Parties further understand that this Joint Statement does not relieve the inspecting Party from the obligation to provide documentation pursuant to paragraph 25 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol, and does not require the United States of America to bring to the territory of the inspected Party all the items of equipment.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 11

ON THE PRE-INSPECTION RESTRICTIONS AT YAGEL'NAYA AND OLEN'YA SUBMARINE BASES

The Parties agree that, as an exception to the provisions in Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Agreement Number 13, the pre-inspection restriction zones for the Yagel'naya and Olen'ya submarine bases shall be separated as follows: The five-kilometer pre-inspection restriction zone for the Yagel'naya submarine base shall not extend to the entrance of the Olen'ya inlet beyond the intersection of the five-kilometer arc associated with this zone with the five-kilometer arc that is associated with the pre-inspection restriction zone for the Olen'ya submarine base and that abuts on the peninsula between the entrances to the Sayda inlet and the Olen'ya inlet; and the five-kilometer pre-inspection restriction zone for the Olen'ya submarine base shall not extend beyond the intersection of the five-kilometer arc associated with this zone with the peninsula between the entrances to the Sayda inlet and the Olen'ya inlet.

The Parties therefore understand that the provisions of paragraph 4 and subparagraph 8(d) of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to-as the Treaty, regarding pre-inspection restrictions and procedures for reentry vehicle inspections, do not apply to ballistic missile submarines at the Yagel'naya Submarine Base when the Olen'ya Submarine Base has been designated as the inspection site subject to a reentry vehicle inspection, and vice-versa.

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 12

ON PROCEDURES FOR REFUELING IL-76 INSPECTION AIRPLANES AT ANCHORAGE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ANCHORAGE, ALASKA

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties agree that routes to San Francisco, California, via Anchorage, Alaska, specified by the United States of America in subparagraph 10(b) of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, shall be used only for flights of IL-76 inspection airplanes. The Parties further agree that, when the IL-76 airplane used pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, lands to refuel at Anchorage International Airport, Anchorage, Alaska:

(a) The inspecting Party shall specify in the notifications provided in accordance with paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 24 of Section III of the Inspection Protocol, and in the notification, agreed by the Parties, of the intention to conduct a special START flight, its intent to use an IL-76 airplane and the estimated time of arrival at Anchorage International Airport.

The consent of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 13

ON THE AGREEMENT OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF U.S. EQUIPMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES AT THE PAVLOGRAD MACHINE PLANT, PAVLOGRAD, UKRAINE

The Parties understand that the list of equipment provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Pavlograd Continuous Monitoring Facility" on October 15, 1992, fulfills the obligation of the United States of America pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, to provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list of items of equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to the Inspection Protocol indicating the manufacturer's name and the model.

Pursuant to paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, the Parties agree that the technical specifications for the U.S. equipment listed in Annexes 8 and 9 to the Inspection Protocol, provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "Technical Specifications of U.S. Equipment for the Conduct of Continuous Monitoring Activities" on October 15, 1992, shall be the technical specifications for the equipment specified on the list provided to the Parties by the United States of America in the document titled "U.S. Equipment for Use at the Pavlograd Continuous Monitoring Facility" on October 15, 1992.

The consent of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by their Governments in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex l to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 14

ON THE CAPABILITIES OF SATELLITE SYSTEM RECEIVERS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE COORDINATES OF SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that, for Subsection E of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, the inspected Party shall ensure that the satellite system receivers are capable of providing information on the coordinates of the silo launchers of ICBMs located on its territory, at any time when a satellite signal necessary for use by such satellite system receivers is available.

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 15

ON THE ISSUE OF THE SS-N-8 SLBM AT SLBM STORAGE FACILITIES

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, or new facility inspections, assembled SS-N-8 SLBMs without front sections may be located at declared facilities without the detachable front portion of the missile, in which the missile's guidance and control system instruments are located, and that the inspecting Party will not require the attachment of such front portion to the missile in order to confirm the type of such SLBMs during an inspection.

The Parties understand that the photographs of the SS-N-8 SLBM without the detachable front portion of the missile and the declared data on the length of the missile in this configuration, which is 12.1 meters, which were transmitted by the Russian Federation to the United States of America on December 21, 1993, may be used by the United States of America during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, or new facility inspections only for the purpose of confirming this type of SLBM.

The Parties understand that the following length measurement was used to obtain the 12.1 meter length declared for this missile in such configuration: the distance from the edge of the main engine nozzle of the first stage to the place where the missile joins the detachable front portion of the missile.

The Parties agree that when an SS-N-8 SLBM without the detachable front portion of the missile is first encountered during an inspection conducted by the United States of America, the United States of America shall have the right to confirm the declared 12.1 meter length.

The Parties understand that along with the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, the Russian Federation will provide the text of a footnote specifying the 12.1 meter length declared for the missile in such configuration. In subparagraph (a)(ii) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, the number of such footnote will be superscripted after the first mention of the SLBM type designation "SS-N-8".

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 16

ON INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO INSPECTORS UPON
THEIR ARRIVAL AT THE INSPECTION SITE

With respect to paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol, the Parties understand that the requirement to annotate a copy of the site diagram to indicate the location at the inspection site of the items specified in paragraph 8 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, applies only to such items that are located within the boundaries of the inspection site.

In this regard, and for the purposes of paragraphs 6, 8, and 16 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, the Parties agree that ballistic missile submarines, missile tenders, storage cranes, and SLBM launchers located in the waters of a submarine base:

(a) shall not be considered to be within the boundaries of the inspection site;

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 17

ON CHANGES IN THE FUNCTIONS OF FACILITIES

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that each Party shall have the right to change the functions of facilities, specified by that Party in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

The Parties understand that, for facilities, the functions of which are changed in the period between signature and entry into force of the Treaty, the changed functions of such facilities shall be included in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol. Revised site diagrams for such facilities shall be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after such notification.

The Parties understand that, for facilities, the functions of which are changed after entry into force of the Treaty, the changed functions of such facilities shall be included in notifications provided in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 9 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Such facilities shall be considered to be new facilities.

The Parties agree that changing the function of a facility shall not be considered to be its elimination and that a close-out inspection shall not be conducted at such a facility until its elimination.

The Parties understand that if, as a result of a change in the function of a facility, the size criteria used during the inspection of the facility in its new function increase, a Party shall not change the function of such a facility until procedures for the inspection of such a facility are agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION
JOINT STATEMENT NUMBER 18

ON EXCHANGE OF SITE DIAGRAMS OF FACILITIES

With respect to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 3l, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties understand that, for facilities which were not specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty but which were specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, the site diagrams for such facilities will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after such notification is provided.

The Parties, referring to paragraph 4 of Article VIII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that, for providing and receiving notifications relating to the Treaty:

(a) the United States of America shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the United States of America and the Russian Federation shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center of the Russian Federation;

The Parties understand that the United States of America shall provide all of its notifications relating to the Treaty to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall each provide all of its notifications relating to the Treaty to the United States of America.

The Parties understand that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall exchange, by agreement among themselves, the notifications they have provided to the United States of America. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine agree that the provisions concerning releasability of information, set forth in Annex 1 to the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, shall apply to the information contained in the notifications received from each other.

The Parties understand that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, by agreement among themselves, may use the Nuclear Risk Reductions Center, Continuous Communication Link, or Government-to-Government Communications Links, referred to in this Joint Statement for transmitting to the United States of America notifications relating to the Treaty on behalf of any or all of these Parties.

The Parties understand that the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine may, by agreement among themselves, transmit as a single notification, the data on aggregate numbers by the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, provided in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. The Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall be responsible for the timely provision of accurate and complete data to each other in order to ensure the provision of the relevant notifications to the United States of America.

The Parties agree that, in transmitting such notifications, paragraph 1 of each such notification shall specify the designator of the Party providing the notification in fulfilling its obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the following designators shall be specified: for the United States of America -- ANC/STR; for the Republic of Belarus -- BNC/STR; for the Republic of Kazakhstan -- KNC/STR; for the Russian Federation -- RNC/STR; and for Ukraine -- UNC/STR.

ON THE USE OF RADIATION DETECTION EQUIPMENT DURING REENTRY VEHICLE INSPECTIONS

The consent of Ukraine to be bound by this Joint Statement shall be expressed by its Government in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex l to the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty.

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, confirm that the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a type specified in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle is subject to the provisions of the Treaty, and that, for the purposes of the Treaty, such a space launch vehicle is subject to the provisions of the Treaty relating to ICBMs or SLBMs as an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

Pursuant to the authority to agree otherwise, as provided for in the Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty, the Parties shall agree, as appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, that the existence of a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle, during such a space launch vehicle's maintenance, storage, and transportation, including maintenance, storage, and transportation of such a first stage that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle, located separately from other stages of an ICBM or SLBM, does not result in ICBMs or SLBMs of that type being considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages.

On the above basis, the Parties agree that the existence of the first stage of an SS-25 ICBM that is incorporated into a space launch vehicle, designated by the Russian Federation as the "Start" space launch vehicle, in a configuration in which the first and second stages of an SS-25 ICBM, together with a new stage, are contained in one section of the launch canister of such a space launch vehicle, and the third stage of an SS-25- ICBM, together with another new stage, is contained in another section of the launch canister of such a space launch vehicle, and its exit as part of the "Start" space launch vehicle from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant after March 1, 1995, do not result in SS-25 ICBMs thereafter being considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, provided that the sections of the launch canister of the "Start" space launch vehicle are maintained, stored, and transported together, solely in this configuration, until the "Start" space launch vehicle is prepared at a space launch facility or test range for launch. The Parties understand that the process of connecting two portions of the "Start" space launch vehicle in final preparation for its launch shall not be considered assembly for the purposes of the Treaty.

The Parties understand that an ICBM or SLBM used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, but which differs from such a type of ICBM or SLBM in terms of the number of stages, dimensions, type of propellant, launch weight or throw-weight, shall not be considered to be a variant of such a type of ICBM or SLBM or a new type of ICBM or SLBM, provided that such an ICBM or SLBM used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including such a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, is not flight-tested with a reentry vehicle.

The Parties understand that technical data on space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM shall not be required in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, and that exhibitions of such space launch vehicles shall not be required.

The Parties agree on the provision, in advance, of information on ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM. Such information shall include technical data, development plans, and photographs or, until such ICBMs and SLBMs, including such space launch vehicles, are available to be photographed, schematic drawings.

The Parties understand that any proposed changes to the telemetry requirements associated with an ICBM or SLBM used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including a space launch vehicle that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, will be discussed and, where appropriate, agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, taking into account the provisions of the Treaty, including the Thirty-first Agreed Statement of the Agreed Statements Annex to the Treaty.

The Parties understand that the Treaty does not prohibit a Party from moving ICBMs or SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, to a space launch facility outside its national territory. ICBMs or SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, located at a space launch facility outside a Party's national territory, shall not be considered to be based at such a facility. The Party conducting such movement shall retain ownership and control of such ICBMs or SLBMs, including such space launch vehicles, as well as their launchers and support equipment.

The Parties further understand that a space launch vehicle that incorporates any stage of an ICBM or SLBM that is not a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, and does not incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, is not subject to the provisions of the Treaty.

The Parties shall discuss and, where appropriate, agree on, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions relating to ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, including space launch vehicles that incorporate the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM.

ON ADDITIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRAINING MODELS OF THE SS-19 TYPE OF MISSILE AND ICBMS OF THE CORRESPONDING TYPE

To assist inspectors, the Parties shall either provide a photograph of each of the additional differences of training models of the SS-19 type of missile, including each configuration provided for in subparagraph (a) of this Joint Statement, or, if a photograph of any of such differences, including any of the configurations provided for in subparagraph (a) of this Joint Statement, has not been provided prior to the first inspection of an item declared to be a t:raining model of a missile on the basis of such a difference, the inspected Party shall provide to the inspecting Patty, during that inspection, a photograph of the difference, including the configuration, if applicable, taken in accordance with paragraph 18 of Section VI of, and Subsection B of Section VI of Annex 8 to, the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty.

[Initialled]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(The Republic of Belarus)___Andrey Sannikov
(The Republic of Kazakstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(The Russian Federation)___Viktor Trifonov
(Ukraine)___Konstantin Hrishchenko

The Parties understand that a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles, and declared data on the length of the first stage without nozzles attached of each of these missiles, which will be provided by the United States of America to the other Parties, may be used by the inspecting Party during data update inspections, new facility inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections only for the purpose of confirming these types of ICBMs and SLBMs at declared facilities.

The Parties understand that the 6.5 meter length of the Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBM first stages, the 7.4 meter length of the Peacekeeper ICBM first stage, the 4.4 meter length of the Trident I SLBM first stage, and the 6.8 meter length of the Trident II SLBM first stage, declared for first stages, in such configuration, of these missiles, is the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case.

The Parties understand that no later than five days after entry into force of this Joint Statement the United States of America will provide texts of footnotes specifying the length declared for the first stage without nozzles attached of each of these missiles in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be superscripted after the first mention of the first stage length of the corresponding ICBM or SLBM type in subparagraph (0)(i) or ~)(ii) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. The United States of America will also provide a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles, that meets the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, either on the date when this Joint Statement is initialed, or through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification specified in this paragraph is provided, or during the first inspection at which a first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles is encountered.

The Parties agree that, during the first inspection at which a first stage, in such configuration, of each of these missiles is encountered, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm that the length of such a first stage corresponds to the length declared for the first stage without nozzles attached of an ICBM or SLBM of that type in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, using procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty applicable to measuring the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case. The inspecting Party shall also have the right during such inspection and subsequent inspections to confirm the type of ICBM or SLBM by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of such a first stage without nozzles attached of an ICBM or SLBM.

The Parties understand that a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM and declared data on the length of the first stage without nozzle attached of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, which will be provided to the United States of America, may be used by the inspecting Patty during data update inspections, new facility inspections, or conversion or elimination inspections only for the purpose of confirming this type and variant of ICBM at conversion or elimination facilities.

The Parties understand that the 7.3 meter length of the first stage of the SS-24 ICBM for rail mobile launcher and the 7.1 meter length of the first stage of the SS-24 ICBM for silo launcher, declared for first stages, in such configuration, of these variants of the SS-24 ICBM, is the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case.

The Parties understand that no later than five days after entry into force of this Joint Statement Ukraine will provide texts of footnotes specifying the length declared for the first stage without nozzle attached of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. In this connection, the respective numbers of the footnotes will be superscripted after the first mention of the first stage length of the corresponding variant of this ICBM type in subparagraph (a)(i) of Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding. Except as provided below, Ukraine will also provide a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the SS-24 ICBM, that meets the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, either on the date when this Joint Statement is initialed, or through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification specified in this paragraph is provided, or during the first inspection on the territory of Ukraine at which a first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM is encountered. If the first stage, in such configuration, of a variant of the SS-24 ICBM is first encountered during an inspection on the territory of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation will, during that inspection, provide a photograph of the first stage, in such configuration, of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM, unless Ukraine provided a photograph of that variant earlier.

The Parties agree that, during the first inspection at which a first stage, in such configuration, of each variant of the 55-24 ICBM is encountered, the inspecting Party shall have the right to confirm that the length of such a first stage corresponds to the length declared for the first stage without nozzle attached of that variant of the SS-24 ICBM in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding, using procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty applicable to measuring the distance from the extreme point of the aft end dome of the motor case to the extreme point of the forward end dome of the motor case, without taking into account protruding elements attached to such end domes of the motor case. The inspecting Patty shall also have the right during such inspection and subsequent inspections to confirm the type and variant of ICBM by external viewing and by measurement of the dimensions of such a first stage without nozzle attached of a variant of the SS-24 ICBM.

ON MEASURING ITEMS OF INSPECTION IN CONTAINERS,
VEHICLES, OR ICBM EMPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT

The Parties, referring to Annex 1 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that when an item of inspection is encountered in a container, vehicle, or ICBM emplacement equipment during any inspection, inspectors may use indirect measurement procedures to measure the dimensions of the item of inspection. The indirect measurement procedures shall include making measurements of the distance between locations designated by a member of the in-country escort on the item of inspection and on the container, vehicle, or ICBM emplacement equipment. The results of such measurements shall be added or subtracted, as appropriate, to determine the dimensions of the item of inspection.

The Parties understand that measurements of an item of inspection in a container, vehicle, or ICBM emplacement equipment may be taken with the use of additional equipment provided by the inspected Party.

The Parties understand that, for the purposes of confirming the type of an item of inspection contained in ICBM emplacement equipment, or the absence of an item of inspection therefrom, the procedures provided for in paragraph 9 of Annex 1 to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty shall be used.

The Parties, referring to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, understand that when, during data update inspections or new facility inspections, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are located at declared facilities attached to other stages ofs Such ICBMs or SLBMs, the type of an ICBM or SLBM in such a configuration may be confirmed by viewing and measuring the dimensions of the first stage of such an ICBM or SLBM using the procedures provided for in Annex I to the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol. The length of such a first stage is the distance set forth in subparagraph l4~) of Annex 3 to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment Of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

The Parties understand that when, during data update Inspections or new facility inspections, ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters are located at conversion or elimination facilities disassembled into stages or in a state in which one or more assemblies or elements constituting the assembled missile without front section have been removed, the type of an ICBM or SLBM in such a configuration may be confirmed by viewing and measuring the dimensions of the first stage of such an ICBM or SLBM using the procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Annex 1 to the Inspection Protocol. The length of such a first stage is the distance set forth in subparagraph 14(a) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.

The Parties understand that for the purposes of paragraph 1 of subsection a of Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol, the places set forth in subparagraph b 14(a) or l4(b) of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, as applicable, that are used for measuring the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, are the extreme points of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM.

[Initialled]
(United States of America)___Steven Steiner
(The Republic of Belarus)___Andrey Samnikov
(The Republic of Kazakstan)___Kairtay Zhanbatyrov
(The Russian Federation)___Viktor Trifonov
(Ukraine)___ Anatoliy Shevtsov