ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL ANNEXES
ANNEX 1 - PROCEDURES FOR THE INSPECTION OF COVERED OBJECTS, CONTAINERS, LAUNCH CANISTERS, VEHICLES, AND STRUCTURES
This Annex sets forth the procedures that may be used for the inspection of covered objects, containers, launch canisters, vehicles and structures.
Paragraph 1 of Annex 1 specifies that, during baseline data, data update, new facility, and post-exercise dispersal inspections, inspectors have the right to confirm the numbers, types, variants or versions of items of inspection (as defined for such inspections in paragraph 20 of Section VI of the Protocol) that are specified for the facility to be inspected. For these types of inspections and for suspect-site, close-out and formerly declared facility inspections, inspectors also have the right to confirm the absence of any other item of inspection at the inspection site. This paragraph states that the size criteria of paragraph 23 of Section VI of this Protocol are to be used during such inspections for making decisions about whether the size of any covered object, container, launch canister, vehicle, or structure, and the accesses to their interiors, could make them subject to further inspections as outlined in this Annex.
Paragraph 2 of Annex 1 contains procedures for inspecting items of inspection that are not contained in a container or launch canister (i.e., that are out in the open) and that are not covered or environmentally protected, either initially or after the completion of procedures in other paragraphs in this Annex. There is no substantive difference between being covered and being environmentally protected; this analysis will use the term covered" for both. As described in this paragraph, in the case of an item of inspection that is directly visible, the inspectors have the right to confirm that it is an item of inspection of the declared type, variant, or version by viewing it, and by taking measurements of its external dimensions at points designated by a member of the in-country escort (that are the same locations at which measurements were taken in establishing the dimensions for the technical characteristics of the item of inspection).
Paragraph 3 of Annex 1 contains procedures for inspecting an object" that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered, but that has not been declared as an item of inspection. In this case, inspectors have the right to view the object and to take measurements of its external dimensions at points designated by a member of the in-country escort to confirm that it is not an item of inspection.
Paragraph 4 of Annex 1 addresses the case of a covered object. For such an object, the inspected Party bears the burden of proving to the satisfaction of inspectors that the object is an item of inspection of the declared type, variant or version, or that the object is not an item of inspection. To accomplish this task of convincing inspectors, the in-country escort can choose among several optional procedures, which involve: (1) viewing it after a member of the in-country escort has partially or, if necessary, completely removed the cover or environmental protection, with additional procedures possible depending on the results of viewing; or (2) measuring.
Paragraph 5 of Annex 1 addresses the case of a container. As with the case of a covered object, the in-country escort has a choice of procedures that can be used to convince inspectors that the container contains an item of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant of that type, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. Among the procedures that the in-country escort can choose from are the following: measuring the dimensions of the container, viewing the interior after a member of the in-country escort has opened the container, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents, or viewing and measuring, if necessary, the contents of the container after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the container.
Paragraph 6 of Annex 1 refers to a launch canister that is declared to contain an item of inspection. Inspectors may view and measure the dimensions of the launch canister to be sure it is of the declared type. Upon completion of the viewing and the measurements, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.
Paragraph 7 of Annex 1 refers to a launch canister declared not to contain an item of inspection. A member of the in-country escort must convince inspectors that this is true using one or more of the following procedures: viewing the interior of the launch canister after a member of the in-country escort has opened the launch canister by removing at least one of the end caps from the launch canister and, as necessary, measuring the dimensions of its contents; or viewing and, if necessary, measuring the contents after the contents have been removed by a member of the in-country escort.
If a launch canister is declared to contain a training model of a missile, paragraph 8 of Annex 1 requires that a member of the in-country escort demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors the features that confirm that such a launch canister contains a training model of a missile. How this is to be demonstrated is not specified in the Treaty.
Paragraph 9 of Annex 1 addresses obligations related to vehicles. The inspected Party is required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspecting Party whether the vehicle contains one or more items of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant or version, or that it does not contain an item of inspection, by allowing inspectors to carry out one or more of the following procedures: make measurements of the dimensions of the enclosed space of the vehicle or the accesses into such a space; make measurements of the dimensions of a partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space; or view the interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle or the open bed of a vehicle from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort that allows inspectors to view the entire interior. Upon completion of these procedures, an inspected vehicle may depart the inspection site.
Paragraph 10 of Annex 1 addresses structures other than fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs ("fixed structure" is a defined term involving unique structures at restricted areas or rail garrisons), e.g., buildings, sheds, or other construction at a site that could contain an item of inspection. A member of the in-country escort must demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that such a structure either contains one or more items of inspection of the declared type that it was declared to contain, or that it does not contain an item of inspection, by allowing inspectors to carry out one or more of the following procedures: make measurements of the dimensions of the structure or of the dimensions of the accesses into the structure; make measurements of the dimensions of the partitioned enclosed space within the structure or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space; or view the interior of the structure or partitioned enclosed space within the structure from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort that allows inspectors to view the entire interior. This location need not be within the structure.
Paragraph 11 of Annex 1 addresses fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs. A member of the in-country escort must demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors, using the listed procedures, that a fixed structure contains the declared items of inspection and no other item of inspection, or it does not contain items of inspection. The Parties must limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers at a restricted area so that they cannot contain more than the number of launchers specified for that site. Inspectors have the right to confirm that fixed structures in a restricted area cannot contain more than the number specified. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article VI and paragraph 3 of Article II of the Treaty, inspectors have the right to make measurements of all fixed structures in a restricted area to confirm that such fixed structures cannot contain more than the number of road-mobile launchers specified for that restricted area. Inspectors also have the right to measure all fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers to confirm the specified dimensions of these structures. Note that, under all procedures in this paragraph, inspectors have the right to read the data from unique identifiers of mobile ICBMs. Note also that the total number of inspectors allowed in a fixed structure that actually contains a mobile launcher is four -- not at any one time, but rather throughout the inspection of that structure. The subparagraph 11(c) right of the inspectors to view the entire interior of the structure, if the escorts choose viewing as the means of proof of the contents of the structure, is intended to ensure that the inspector can see fully into very long or oddly configured structures, and can view covered objects. Subparagraph 11(c) grants a right to enter structures for viewing in the event that it is impossible to obtain a complete view from outside.
ANNEX 2 - PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTION OF SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs, MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs, AND SLBM LAUNCHERS
This Annex provides procedures that may be used in conducting inspections of silo launchers, mobile launchers, and SLBM launchers. The following situations permit such inspections: when inspectors discover more ICBMs at the maintenance facility of an ICBM base than the number of non-deployed ICBMs allowed pursuant to paragraph l(b) or 1(e) of Article IV of the Treaty, they have the right to inspect the silo launchers or the mobile launchers that a member of the in-country escort declares are associated with the extra missiles at the maintenance facility to confirm that those launchers do not contain ICBMs; in accordance with subparagraph 10(d), 11(g), 12(e), 13(f), or 19(b) of Section IX of the Inspection Protocol, inspectors have the right to inspect one launcher or one fixed structure declared to be empty when designated for a reentry vehicle inspection; and, in accordance with paragraph 15 of Section VII, inspectors have the right to inspect one silo declared to be empty at test ranges.
Because many silo launchers look similar from ground level, paragraph 1 of Annex 2 confirms the right of the inspection team subgroup to determine that the silo being inspected is the designated silo launcher of ICBMs by comparing its geographic coordinates using satellite system receivers as described in Section IV of Annex 8 to this Protocol. After confirmation of the coordinates, the inspected Party shall open the silo door and inspectors have the right to view the interior of the silo launcher from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort to confirm that it does not contain an ICBM or first stage.
Paragraph 2 of Annex 2 states that in the event that inspectors are unable to confirm by viewing the exterior of the launcher that a road-mobile launcher declared not to contain a deployed ICBM actually does not contain an ICBM, they must be allowed to view the interior of the launcher through a maintenance hatch. This procedure is not required for any system existing as of Treaty signature, but could be required in the future.
Paragraph 3 of Annex 2 states that in the event that inspectors are unable to confirm by viewing the exterior of the launcher that a rail-mobile launcher does not contain an ICBM, they must be allowed to view the interior of the railcar of the launcher through a maintenance hatch or from the entry compartment of the railcar. This procedure is necessary because, for the Soviet rail-mobile launcher, the canister is completely enclosed within the launcher.
The procedures of paragraph 4 of Annex 2 for inspecting SLBM launchers are the same as those for silo launchers of ICBMs except that there is no right to use a satellite system receiver to identify the specific location.
Paragraph 5 of Annex 2 indicates where the inspection team subgroups are to go at the conclusion of the inspections mentioned in this Annex. For baseline data, data update, and new facility inspections, after the viewing has been completed in accordance with paragraph 1, the inspection team subgroup shall return to the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, or, for a reentry vehicle inspection, after the viewing in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 has been completed, the inspection team subgroup shall have the right, at its choice, to rejoin the inspection team or to go to the designated location where post-inspection procedures will be carried out.
ANNEX 3 - PROCEDURES FOR REENTRY VEHICLE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY
This Annex provides procedures that may be used in conducting reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. Such inspections assist in confirming that the actual number of reentry vehicles carried on a deployed missile does not exceed the number of warheads attributed to that missile.
Paragraph 1 of Annex 3 states that for reentry vehicle (RV) inspections, the inspected Party has the right to prepare the front section for viewing in the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, in close proximity to the launcher, in a vehicle, or at a specially allocated site. The procedures for viewing the front section of a missile in the launcher are less complex than in the other cases, because in those other cases there are requirements to inspect the other sites before and after the movement of the front section there, and to maintain surveillance of RV transport or other vehicles while the inspected Party is moving the front section from the launcher to the other site. In addition, for mobile launchers and submarines that may need to be taken to a specially allocated site, the launcher or submarine must be kept under surveillance while it is traveling to this other site.
Paragraph 2 of Annex 3 provides the generic procedures for the preparation for viewing of the front section of an ICBM in its silo or of an SLBM in its launcher, and the preparation for removal of the front section of such missiles for inspections at a specially allocated site.
Subparagraph 2(a) provides that, for silo launchers, inspectors have the right to confirm that the silo launcher to which the in-country escort has taken them is the launcher that was designated by the inspection team leader. This is accomplished by using a satellite system receiver.
Subparagraph 2(b) provides that, for both silo and SLBM launchers, a member of the in-country escort must designate positions that are not greater than 50 meters from the launcher from which inspectors may observe the activities that are associated with preparing the front section for viewing in the launcher or for removing the front section for viewing at a specially allocated site. These positions must be chosen so that inspectors can have a clear and unobstructed view of the upper edge of the launcher and any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave in the vicinity of the launcher. If there are no positions within the prescribed 50 meters that offer a clear and unobstructed view of the launcher, a member of the in-country escort and the inspection team leader may agree on positions that could be farther from the launcher but that do offer such a view.
Subparagraph 2(c) provides that inspectors may, at the request of the inspection team leader upon arrival at the launcher, have the opportunity to familiarize themselves with this area so as to orient themselves and have an understanding of the relative positions of the launcher and vehicles and structures that may be in the vicinity.
Subparagraphs 2(d) and 2(e) provide that the inspectors will be informed of when the silo door or SLBM launcher hatch is to be opened. Inspectors have the right to observe the opening of the ICBM silo door or SLBM launcher hatch; the time of the opening is at the discretion of the inspected Party. Inspectors also have the right to maintain continuous visual observation of the upper silo or tube edge of such an ICBM or SLBM launcher and of vehicles, devices, or temporary structures used for the removal of the missile or front section from the launcher or for the preparation of the front section for viewing. A member of the in-country escort will demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher do not contain reentry vehicles.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Annex 3 permit the inspected Party to move mobile ICBM launchers and submarines, respectively, to a specially allocated site where the viewing of the front section will be carried out, or where the front section will be separated from the missile, or the missile from its launcher. In the case of a submarine, the submarine must proceed on the surface to that site. In both instances, the inspection team has the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the mobile launcher and submarine.
Paragraph 5 of Annex 3 prohibits removing reentry vehicles from the front section, from the time of the designation of the launcher for inspection until the completion of viewing of the front section.
Paragraph 6 of Annex 3 provides the specific procedures for viewing of the front section in the launcher, including examining the interior of the vehicles and devices that were used in the preparation of the front section for viewing.
Paragraph 7 of Annex 3 provides the generic procedures to be used to prepare the front section outside an ICBM or SLBM launcher for viewing. This paragraph stipulates rights of the inspecting Party to ensure that the front section that ultimately is viewed is not tampered with. Inspectors have the right to view the interior of the vehicles or devices used to remove a missile or front section from an ICBM or SLBM launcher prior to their use. If the inspected Party separates the front section in the ICBM or SLBM launcher and then removes it, no more than two inspectors have the right to view the interior of the launcher for no more than one minute. If, in the process of preparing for the demonstration, the front section or missile with its front section is placed into a vehicle, inspectors have the right to view the interior of the vehicle before the missile or front section is placed in it. If the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site, inspectors will have the right to follow the vehicle during the transportation of the missile with its front section or the front section in the vehicle to the site, in such a way as to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the vehicle; after the missile with its front section or the front section has been unloaded from that vehicle, inspectors have the right to view the vehicle again.
Paragraph 8 of Annex 3 stipulates that preparation of the front section for viewing requires the removal of any shroud (missile ascent aeroshell) or portions of any shroud, as necessary. The preparation may be carried out outside the field of view of inspectors as long as inspectors can ascertain that no reentry vehicles are removed from the front section.
Paragraph 9 of Annex 3 refers to viewing the front section in a vehicle (a procedure to be used for some U.S. systems), and states that inspectors have the right to keep the vehicle under observation from the time that the front section is brought up into the vehicle until the viewing of the front section is completed. This complements the right to keep that vehicle under observation from the time that the launcher was opened, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Annex.
Paragraph 10 of Annex 3 pertains to procedures when the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site. The procedures include assuring, before the shroud is removed, that no front sections or reentry vehicles are within the area that will be used for the direct viewing of the front section. This examination of the viewing area is required because, in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 11 of Annex 3, the inspected Party may prepare the front section for viewing and may install reentry vehicle covers outside the direct view of the inspectors.
Paragraph 11 of Annex 3 allows the inspected Party to cover reentry vehicles and the mounting platform with either hard or soft covers that have been viewed (and, in the case of hard covers, measured) by the inspectors. The covers are installed before the inspectors view the front section. Such covers must not hamper inspectors in ascertaining that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type. The area in which this preparation is done must be free of other front sections or reentry vehicles. For the same reason, inspectors have the right to either seal the exits or observe all exits. During the process of preparation of the front section for viewing, no vehicle, container, launch canister, or object shall leave the site until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it.
Paragraph 12 of Annex 3 limits the viewing of the prepared front section by inspectors to 15 minutes, for their confirmation that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type deployed at that location. It also requires that the location provide a clear unobstructed view of the front section. If the inspectors observe more objects on the front section than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type deployed at that location, and this situation is not resolved in accordance with paragraph 13 of this Annex, an ambiguity exists.
Paragraph 13 of Annex 3 addresses the situation when a member of the in-country escort declares that an object contained in the front section is not a reentry vehicle. In this case, the inspected Party must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that this object is not a reentry vehicle. The definition of reentry vehicle" does not require the presence of a nuclear weapon, so demonstrating the absence of nuclear radiation would not by itself be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this paragraph.
Paragraph 14 of Annex 3 confirms the right to view the vehicle or specially allocated site where the front section was viewed, including the space under the shroud, upon completion of viewing the front section and prior to the reinstallation of the shroud, in order to confirm that there are no reentry vehicles outside the front section.
Paragraphs 15 and 16 address the administrative details of providing sufficient lighting in the vicinity of the ICBM and SLBM launcher and at the site where the viewing of the front section will be carried out, and transportation to a site where the inspection report can be written.
ANNEX 4 - PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS, FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS, LONG-RANGE ALCMs, AND THEIR FACILITIES
Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol consists of five sections. Section I addresses the procedures for inspections of individual airplanes and long-range ALCMs during exhibitions, while Section V addresses overall procedures for such exhibitions. Section II addresses general procedures for airplane inspections during short-notice inspections, with Section III providing special procedures for alert heavy bombers. Section IV addresses the procedures for confirming the absence of long-range nuclear ALCMs from weapons storage areas at heavy bomber facilities.
Section I provides procedures for the inspection of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range ALCMs during exhibitions scheduled by the exhibiting Party. Paragraph l establishes the right to confirm distinguishing features. It specifically provides for linear measurement (i.e., length, width) to confirm the presence of the distinguishing features that have been specified for a particular classification (i.e., category, type, and variant) of heavy bomber in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding for the heavy bomber itself, and in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding for data about long-range nuclear ALCMs if that data pertains to the distinguishing features specified for the heavy bomber. If the exhibiting Party has specified no distinguishing feature in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding that relates to data in Annex H, then the data in Annex H is not relevant to the exhibition. (The specific issue underlying the relationship between Annexes G and H is the question of attachment joints for long-range nuclear ALCMs, which the Soviet Union uses as a distinguishing feature, but the United States does not. In separate statements during the final START plenary, the United States asserted that attachment joints are inappropriate to be used as distinguishing features for US systems; the Soviet Union considers attachment joints to be non-mandatory" distinguishing features.) Paragraph 1 also provides that there is no right to inspect areas of the interior of the heavy bomber during exhibitions unless the exhibiting Party specifies technical data or distinguishing features there.
Paragraph 2 provides similar procedures for former heavy bombers. Because all former heavy bombers are unarmed, there is no reference to Annex H on long-range nuclear ALCMs.
Paragraph 3 provides the right to make linear measurements to confirm technical data specified for each type of long-range nuclear ALCM, and any variants thereof.
Paragraph 4 concerns the exhibition of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. Inspectors may use radiation detection equipment to confirm that an exhibited ALCM is non-nuclear, and may make linear measurements to confirm distinguishing features. Because it is anticipated that future long-range non-nuclear ALCMs may be containerized, this paragraph also provides procedures for inspecting such a container and the missile after it is removed from the container. Because stealth technology may be used in future long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, the inspectors do not have the right to view the removal. This allows shrouding to be installed, as specified in paragraph 5 of this Section, prior to access. Inspectors may also confirm that such a container is unable to shield radiation. This lays the foundation for procedures during data update inspections where inspectors may use radiation detection equipment on an unopened container declared to contain a long-range non-nuclear ALCM, to indicate that it does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM.
Paragraph 5 applies to all exhibitions made under the preceding paragraphs, while paragraph 6 amplifies paragraph 4 for long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. It is the exhibiting Party that designates where linear measurements are made. The exhibiting Party has the right to use shrouding on any item so long as technical characteristics and distinguishing features are not obscured. There must be sufficient lighting to facilitate the inspection. Also, references are given to the appropriate provisions on photography and the use of radiation detection equipment.
Section II provides specific procedures for inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers during baseline data, data update, and new facility inspections, and also during baseline exhibitions. Paragraph l states the purpose of such inspections.
Paragraph 2 addresses the confirmation of distinguishing features. Inspectors may make linear measurements to confirm distinguishing features, as long as they can be made without changing the configuration of the airplane by adding any equipment to or removing any equipment from the airplane as it is found. There is one exception, in that inspectors may request the removal of one pylon from one non-alert heavy bomber. This heavy bomber either must be a heavy bomber that is both equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and of a type that does not carry long range nuclear ALCMs externally, or must be a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. This provision, therefore, does not apply to any current types of US heavy bombers. The particular aircraft pylon is chosen by the inspectors. This paragraph also precludes the inspection of interiors unless something about the interior has been specified to be a distinguishing feature.
Paragraph 3 provides that, having been informed during pre-inspection procedures of what airplanes are present at a base, the inspectors will identify which airplanes they intend to inspect. All others are free to depart the base. For an airplane that arrives during the inspection, the inspection team leader must, immediately after its arrival, designate an intention to inspect it, or the airplane is free to leave. If a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber is selected for inspection, it is free to leave after it has been inspected.
Paragraph 4 repeats the general provisions from the previous Section regarding the designation of where measurements may be made, shrouding, and lighting.
Section III provides special procedures for the inspection of alert heavy bombers at nuclear heavy bomber bases, as introduced in paragraph l. On September 27, 1991, President Bush announced the termination of the practice of maintaining such bombers on alert. (The Soviet Union has not routinely maintained heavy bombers on daily alert and does not do so now.)
Paragraph 2 provides that the location of alert heavy bombers will be provided to inspectors during pre-inspection procedures. If an alert heavy bomber is designated for inspection under the quota provided for in subparagraph 14(d) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, it may be prepared for inspection by the inspected Party. Preparation, which may include moving the heavy bomber, must be viewable by inspectors. Shrouding is allowed so long as it does not prevent inspectors from counting the number of ALCMs for which the aircraft is equipped. No distance is specified for viewing the preparation; there is no requirement that inspectors be close enough to see in detail whatever it is that the inspected Party chooses to shroud. Paragraph 2 also clarifies that an area where alert heavy bombers are located is subject to no other inspection other than that provided for in this Section. In other words, unless the inspected Party elects to have the chosen alert heavy bomber inspected in the area where alert heavy bombers are located, it is possible that the inspectors would have no right to enter this area. Although not stated explicitly, the Parties intend that no non-alert heavy bombers would be in such an area.
Paragraph 3 provides the details of special procedures that apply to the inspection of alert heavy bombers. Total elapsed time during which any one or more inspectors may view a particular alert heavy bomber is thirty minutes. No more than four inspectors may inspect any airplane. This does not mean four at a time, but a total of four during the 30-minute inspection period. Measurements are forbidden except for closed weapons bay doors. Weapons bay doors will be opened only for a heavy bomber whose internal weapons bay doors are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding to be large enough to contain a long-range nuclear ALCM. The inspected Party will direct inspectors to a position outside the weapons bay where they can view the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the weapons bay is equipped. The purpose for these constraints is safety and lack of space.
Section IV contains procedures for the inspection of weapons storage areas. The purpose of such inspections is to verify the absence of long-range nuclear ALCMs. Paragraph l provides that the procedures in this Section apply only to those facilities where long-range nuclear ALCMs are banned, as listed in Paragraph 22 of Article V.
Paragraph 2 provides that during pre-inspection procedures at such facilities, the inspected Party will identify the location of weapons storage areas and provide site diagrams showing all structures in weapons storage areas large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party.
Paragraph 3 provides that searches for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be conducted using the general procedures for items of inspection in Annex l, with one exception. This exception is that containers large enough to contain a long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party will be inspected only in accordance with the remaining paragraphs of this Section. Further, except as provided for in this Section, linear measurements are restricted to covered objects, containers, vehicles, and structures, i.e., where long-range nuclear ALCMs might be contained. Finally, the maximum number of inspectors allowed in any structure is four; again, this does not mean that inspectors can be rotated in and out under this quota, but rather that a total of four inspectors can have entered the structure during its inspection. The reasons for this number are safety and lack of space.
The procedures for initial exhibitions for long-range non-nuclear ALCMs include confirmation of the distinguishing features of the ALCM, confirmation of the fact that such missiles are non-nuclear, as well as confirmation that containers do not shield radiation sources that may be inside. The purpose of this extra effort during exhibitions is to allow confidence, without having to open every container during subsequent data update inspections, that long-range nuclear ALCMs are not being presented as long-range non-nuclear ALCMs. Paragraph 4 establishes a quota of three objects that are subject to special procedures during the inspection of weapons storage areas at each inspectable facility. (In other words, three per base, not three per distinct weapons storage area.) An object can be either a container of any sort large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM, or an object can be an ALCM stored outside of a container.
Subparagraph 4(a) details the special procedures if the object inspected is a container. Inspectors may measure the container and use radiation detection equipment on its exterior. If a radiation source is detected, then the container must be opened. If simple viewing of the contents of the container does not allow inspectors to confirm the absence of a long-range nuclear ALCM, then the contents of the container must be removed. The contents may be removed in such a way that they are not viewed by the inspectors, so long as the inspectors can know that the contents and the original container have not been removed and replaced by some others. Shrouding is allowed. The contents can then be viewed and measured to confirm distinguishability. Radiation detection equipment may not be used on the contents. (The foregoing inspection has already demonstrated the container to be a source of radioactivity). If inspectors still have doubts, they can request photographs of the ambiguity, and they will record the ambiguity in their inspection report. No further redress is provided for during the inspection.
Subparagraph 4(b) provides specific procedures if a selected object is an ALCM stored outside a container. Beyond viewing, there is no obligation on the part of the inspected Party to allow inspectors to make measurements, to allow inspectors to use radiation detection equipment, or to allow any other measure to resolve an apparent ambiguity. The procedures recognize that the inspected Party may wish to allow such measures, however. If the inspected Party believes that such measures would result in unacceptable technology transfer, then it need not offer these measures. Unresolved ambiguities may be photographed, and will be included in the inspection report. Differences between the Parties may be pursued in the JCIC.
Paragraph 5 establishes a separate and additional quota for opening containers that are declared to be containers for long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, which will have been exhibited in accordance with one of the provisions of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. Three such containers that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party may be opened during any three-year period in order to confirm that they do not contain long-range nuclear ALCMs. Rather than a single annual quota, three openings in a three-year period allows the inspecting Party to manage the use of its quotas to ensure that there is no period of time during which the inspected Party knows that containers cannot be requested to be opened. Special procedures call for the container to be opened and, if viewing alone does not confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, then the contents will be removed from the container. In this case, linear measurements and radiation detection equipment may be used. The removal operation may be hidden from the inspectors so long as the inspectors can know that the selected container and its contents are not removed and replaced by others. Further, a radiation source may be used to reconfirm the results of the initial exhibition of this type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM, that the container does not shield radiation. Again, if ambiguities remain, photographs may be taken and the ambiguities will be recorded.
Paragraphs 6 and 7 contain provisions that are applicable to all the procedures detailed in this Section: these paragraphs specify that where linear measurements are taken is directed by the inspected Party, that shrouding is allowed, that lighting must be sufficient, and that the procedures for using radiation detection equipment specified in Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol will be followed.
Section V details additional procedures for the overall conduct of distinguishability exhibitions, baseline exhibitions, and long-range non-nuclear ALCM exhibitions. Paragraphs l and 2 address distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs.
For initial distinguishability exhibitions, conducted before entry into force under the Early Exhibitions Agreement or shortly after entry into force, the exhibiting Party is required to exhibit together all possible classifications (i.e., categories and variants) of each type of heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested. Along with the bombers, one of each classification (i.e., type and variant) of long-range nuclear ALCM must be exhibited. US early distinguishability exhibitions were conducted 17-19 September, l99l; Soviet early distinguishability exhibitions were conducted September 26-27, l99l. The requirement for the United States was as follows: for the B-2, no exhibition (because a long-range nuclear ALCM has never been tested from a B-2); for the B-l, one deployed (i.e., operational) heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, and one test heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and, for the B-52, a B-52H and a B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and a B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. Although the B-ls could have been exhibited at a separate site from the B-52s under subparagraph 1(a), they were not. The Soviets also chose a single site, Uzin, at which they displayed a total of nine airplanes: a Blackjack equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; Bear H's equipped for six and 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs; a Bear B and a Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs; a Bear A and a Bear B training heavy bomber; a Bison former heavy bomber; and a Bear D naval airplane, which is not accountable under Treaty central limits, and which must be exhibited, pursuant to the exchange of letters between Heads of Delegation on Bear D airplanes.
Subparagraph 1(b) addresses subsequent distinguishability exhibitions for new types, categories, or variants.
-- For a new classification (i.e., type, variant, category) of heavy bomber subject to exhibition, a bomber of that classification must be exhibited; other categories or variants of the same type of heavy bomber need be exhibited only if newly-identified distinguishing features associated with the new classification of bomber were not exhibited previously on these other bombers.
-- If a long-range nuclear ALCM is flight-tested for the first time from a type of heavy bomber, the minimum requirement is that a heavy bomber of the type and one of each variant of heavy bomber of that type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs must be exhibited.
-- In the case of a new type of long-range nuclear ALCM, only the ALCM itself must be exhibited. Heavy bombers must be exhibited only if distinguishing features associated with the new ALCM were not previously displayed when the heavy bombers themselves were previously exhibited.
Paragraph 2 details pre-inspection procedures for distinguishability exhibitions. The exhibiting Party has to identify what is going to be displayed. Using both photographs and drawings, or using both slides and drawings, the exhibiting Party must identify all the distinguishing features that make the airplanes to be exhibited different from all other classifications of airplanes of the same type. Photographs of the distinguishing features must be given to the inspectors. If long-range nuclear ALCMs are to be exhibited, these same procedures regarding photographs, slides, and drawings apply. Additionally, inspectors must identify where long-range nuclear ALCMs are carried on all heavy bombers so equipped.
Paragraph 3 addresses long-range non-nuclear ALCM exhibitions. Using both photographs and drawings, or using both slides and drawings, the exhibiting Party must identify the distinguishing features from its long-range nuclear ALCMs. Photographs demonstrating these features must be provided.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 concern baseline exhibitions. Paragraph 4 provides that the required baseline exhibitions of all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers that exist as of entry into force may be held at more than one exhibition site. This provision is written in such a way that the inspecting Party may choose to conduct baseline inspections at facilities simultaneously with the baseline exhibitions that may be scheduled by the inspected Party at these facilities.
Paragraph 5 details pre-inspection procedures for baseline exhibitions, including initial baseline exhibitions for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers, as well as subsequent baseline exhibitions for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range ALCMs when a long-range nuclear ALCM is first tested from that type. The inspected Party must inform inspectors of the number of aircraft of each classification to be inspected. Distinguishing features of heavy bombers (or recognition features of Bison former heavy bombers) must be identified using photographs and drawings, or using slides and drawings.
ANNEX 5 - PROCEDURES FOR CONTINUOUS MONITORING
This Annex sets forth the procedures that may be used during continuous monitoring.
Paragraph 1 of Annex 5 specifies that the objectives during continuous monitoring are to confirm the numbers, types, and, if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring (defined in paragraph 24 of Section VI of the Protocol) that are declared to exit from the monitored facility, and to confirm that no other items of continuous monitoring exit from the monitored facility. The paragraph states that the size criteria as defined in paragraph 24 of Section VI of the Protocol is to be used for making decisions about whether the size of any observed object, container, launch canister, or vehicle, and the accesses to their interiors, make them subject to further inspections as outlined in this Annex.
Paragraph 2 of Annex 5 stipulates that if the inspected Party intends to pass anything through the portal that is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort must inform the monitors of that intention no less than 30 minutes before it appears at the portal, must declare whether or not it is or contains an item of continuous monitoring, must declare the estimated time of arrival at the portal, and must identify the numbers, types, and, if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring. This paragraph also limits the number of items of continuous monitoring per container or launch canister to one.
Paragraph 3 of Annex 5 states that monitors have the right to read the data from unique identifiers at the portal on each launch canister declared to contain an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs.
Paragraphs 4 and 9 of Annex 5 refer to vehicles exiting from the monitored facility. The procedures to be used for inspecting such vehicles are comparable to those of paragraph 9 of Annex 1 of the Protocol, with weighing of a vehicle declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring as an added option for the inspected Party to choose for inspecting a vehicle declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring.
Paragraphs 5 and 12 of Annex 5 refer to covered or environmentally protected objects exiting from the monitored facility. The procedures to be used for inspecting such objects are identical to those of paragraph 4 of Annex 1 of the Protocol.
Paragraphs 6 and 10 of Annex 5 refer to containers other than launch canisters exiting from the monitored facility. The procedures to be used for inspecting such containers are comparable to those of paragraph 5 of Annex 1, with the additional right to image the contents of containers declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring. Because installing non-damaging imaging equipment is a time-consuming process, if the inspected Party prefers this method of inspecting containers declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring, subparagraph 10(d) requires a notification of such a preference at least six months in advance of the planned exit of a container to be imaged.
Paragraphs 7 and 11 of Annex 5 refer to launch canisters exiting from the monitored facility. The procedures to be used for inspecting such launch canisters are comparable to those of paragraph 7 of Annex 1, with the added measure of imaging the contents of a launch canister that is declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring. Again, for imaging, a notification must be provided to the monitoring Party at least six months in advance of the planned exit of the first launch canister that the inspected Party prefers to have imaged.
Paragraph 8 of Annex 5 refers to an item of continuous monitoring that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, either initially or after the accomplishment of procedures in other paragraphs of this Annex. The procedures to be used for external viewing of such items of continuous monitoring and measurements of their dimensions are identical to those of paragraph 2 of Annex 1.
Paragraph 13 of Annex 5 refers to objects outside a container or launch canister and not covered or environmentally protected. Monitors have the right to confirm by external viewing and by making measurements of its dimensions that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring. These procedures are identical to those of paragraph 3 of Annex 1.
Paragraph 14 of Annex 5 refers to vehicles exiting from the monitored facility through a road exit other than the portal. Monitors may make measurements of any such vehicle to determine whether it is large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, and if it is, the vehicle must proceed to the portal, where the procedures for vehicles exiting the portal pertain.
Paragraph 15 of Annex 5 provides for an annual quota of up to five opportunities, spread across all the monitored facilities where MIRVed mobile ICBMs are produced, to inspect containers or vehicles to confirm that no solid rocket motors for the first stages of mobile ICBMs with nozzles attached exit the monitored facility. The size criterion for these inspections is as defined in paragraph 25 of Section VI of this Protocol. These inspections are conducted at the portal of the monitored facilities. While paragraph 15 refers explicitly to the procedures in paragraphs 9 and 10 of this Annex, in specific cases monitors also have the right to carry out procedures in paragraph 11, 12, or 13 of this Annex, since these are incorporated by reference in paragraphs 9 and 10.
ANNEX 6 - PROCEDURES RELATING TO UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS
The Parties have agreed in paragraph 4 of Article IX of the Treaty that there will be a missile identification regime established for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Annex 6 provides for the procedures to be used in the application and reading of such identifiers.
Paragraph 1 of Annex 6 defines a unique identifier as a non-repeating, alpha-numeric production number, or a copy thereof, that has been applied by the inspected Party using its own technology to mobile ICBMs. Because unique identifier is defined in this paragraph, it is not found in the Definitions Annex. Production number" is intended to be a factory serial number normally used by the inspected Party. During the negotiations, Soviet negotiators said that their unique indicators might be embedded in a longer number and that the non-relevant portions of the longer number would be masked out. Provided that the unique identifier itself was readable, such a practice would not be inconsistent with the Treaty.
Paragraph 2 of Annex 6 cross-references the provisions of the Notification Protocol that specify when the data from unique identifiers must be provided by the Party possessing the mobile ICBMs. Those notifications require that a Party provide the unique identifier data for all mobile ICBMs that exist at Treaty signature not later than 30 days after the Treaty enters into force, and for those produced after Treaty signature, no later than five days after production.
Paragraph 3 establishes that for canisterized mobile ICBMs unique identifiers shall be applied to the launch canister for those ICBMs that exist as of Treaty signature, and to both the canister and the first stage of such ICBMs that leave the production facility after Treaty signature. In the latter case, there shall be a permanent relationship between the data from the unique identifier on the launch canister and the data from the unique identifier on the first stage. In the former case, Soviet negotiators stated that the data from the unique identifiers on the first stages of canisterized missiles is not known with great certainty, and that opening the canisters of such missiles for the purpose of reading the data from the unique identifier was an unacceptable burden. Therefore, only the data from the unique identifier on the canister must be provided, but such unique identifiers may not be changed. These provisions apply to both the SS-24 and SS-25. The United States has no ICBMs existing as of Treaty signature that employ launch canisters. The Small ICBM would not fall under the provisions of this paragraph, even if it were declared as a mobile ICBM, unless it was maintained, transported, and stored in a launch canister.
Paragraph 4 of Annex 6 establishes that for mobile ICBMs that are not canisterized, the unique identifiers shall be applied on the first stage. The provisions of paragraph 4 apply to the US Peacekeeper ICBM and would apply to the Small ICBM if it were declared as a mobile ICBM and not maintained, transported, and stored in a launch canister.
Paragraph 5 of Annex 6 lists the inspections during which the data from unique identifiers may be read, and states that they may also be read during the conduct of continuous monitoring. It specifies that they are to be read on the launch canister for canisterized systems, on the first stage for non-canisterized systems, and, as the circumstances permit, on the first stage of canisterized systems (e.g., if the missile is removed from its launch canister during an elimination). It also stipulates that the data from unique identifiers will not be read on mobile ICBMs that are deployed in silo launchers, since such reading would be impossible without removing the ICBMs from their silos.
Paragraph 6 of Annex 6 states that a member of the in-country escort will specify the position from which inspectors or monitors may read the data from the unique identifier and requires that the position ensure a correct reading of such data. It further states that the inspected Party must replicate the unique identifier on a place accessible for reading its data if the original is not accessible for reading. This is necessary since the design of some mobile ICBM launchers may limit access.
Paragraph 7 of Annex 6 requires that for a newly-produced mobile ICBM the inspected Party will inform the monitors of the data from its unique identifier before the item exits through the portal of the monitored facility, and also will provide this data to the inspecting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.
ANNEX 7 - PROCEDURES FOR DELIVERING AND EXAMINING EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TRANSPORTED BY INSPECTION AIRPLANES USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 4 OF SECTION IV OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL
This Annex provides procedures for the unique requirements of handling bulk cargoes of equipment and supplies used for continuous monitoring activities. It parallels the provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol for the examination and impoundment of equipment and supplies that are hand-carried by monitors to the point of entry aboard airplanes transporting them in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol. This Annex provides for the transportation of cargoes of monitoring equipment and supplies, as well as hand-carried items, aboard cargo airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol. It further provides for the examination of the equipment and supplies at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or at the facility itself.
The Annex obligates the Parties to agree within the JCIC on the timelines for providing an inventory of bulk cargo in advance of its arrival and on the provisions for any repacking of equipment and supplies that may be required as a result of examination of the cargo at the point of entry or airport associated with the monitored facility.
Paragraph 1 describes the information concerning the contents of the cargo that is to be provided in the inventory documents by the sender. These documents are to be delivered through the inspecting Party's embassy in advance of the arrival of the cargo on the territory of the inspected Party. The timeline for providing that inventory will be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Paragraph 2 requires the inclusion in the inventory documents of a packing list on each shipping container on a pallet.
Paragraph 3 provides for the location of the examination of cargoes to be at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the monitored facility, or at the monitored facility itself, at the option of the inspected Party. It also allows for the examination of monitoring equipment and supplies to be conducted in the presence of the aircrew, rather than monitors, at the discretion of the inspecting Party, if the location of the examination is either the point of entry or airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring. Finally, it refers to Section V of the Inspection Protocol for the examination of hand-carried items of equipment or supplies that are not contained in the cargo and not listed in the inventory documents.
Paragraph 4 calls for a separate joint inventory to be completed by the in-country escort and the monitoring team leader. This joint inventory records the items of equipment and supplies actually delivered. The procedures recognize that errors in the original inventory documents may be discovered and provide for agreed corrections on the spot. Completion of the joint inventory also initiates authority to begin using the equipment and supplies, once these items have arrived at the facility, provided that the manuals and installation drawings for the equipment have been provided in accordance with paragraph 25 of Section XVI.
Paragraph 5 obligates the inspected Party to assist the inspecting Party in providing security and protection from inclement weather for unloaded cargoes until the joint inventory is signed. The inspected Party must supply storage areas. Access to cargo when it is placed in such areas is to be under joint control, and the inspecting Party must be allowed access to such areas.
Paragraph 6 provides procedures for the handling of cargoes that are unloaded and examined at the point of entry or airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. It states the Parties' responsibilities concerning the security, handling, protection, and integrity of the shipment, and refers the issue of provisions for repacking to the JCIC.
Paragraph 7 gives the inspecting Party the right to observe its cargo during its handling and transits or during any delays.
Paragraph 8 provides procedures for equipment and supplies shipped as cargo. These procedures are parallel to those for examination and impoundment of hand-carried items in paragraphs 11, 12, and 13 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol. Paragraph 8 gives the in-country escort the right to impound items that the escort believes can perform functions unconnected with the requirements of continuous monitoring activities. In addition, it requires discontinuing the use of items of equipment or supplies that have already arrived or been installed at a monitored facility if the inspected Party concludes that they perform functions unconnected with the requirements. The paragraph includes a mechanism for resolving disputes concerning equipment and supplies by discussion in the JCIC or in other channels if agreed by the Parties. Paragraph 8 also obligates the inspecting Party to remove impounded equipment from the territory of the inspected Party. It also obligates the inspected Party to assist in transporting impounded equipment or supplies back to the point of entry or back to the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. Unless the inspected Party says otherwise, the inspecting Party's obligation to remove equipment or supplies impounded at the point of entry or associated airport from the host country no later than the next departure of monitors is set forth in paragraph 13 of Section V in the Inspection Protocol. Paragraph 8 of the Annex does not specify a timeframe for the removal of equipment or supplies impounded at the monitored facility itself. This is because such removal from the site may not be required, depending on the decision of the inspected Party. The Treaty allows impounded equipment and supplies to be stored at the POE, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or at such a facility itself, at the choice of the inspected Party.
ANNEX 8 - EQUIPMENT FOR INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES
Sections I through V of Annex 8 list the portable equipment used by inspectors and monitors for each of the types of inspections and for perimeter and portal continuous monitoring conducted under provisions of the Treaty and the Inspection Protocol. Each of the sections separately lists US and Soviet equipment. The equipment list for the United States is very similar to that used in INF. The equipment is essentially the same for each type of inspection and for monitoring, with the exceptions detailed below. Section VI contains the agreed methods of use of the equipment listed in the first five sections.
For each of the items of equipment in Annex 8, with the exception of monitoring equipment, the United States listed the manufacturer, model, and quantity. Such detail expedites examination of the equipment at the point of entry when it is brought to the territory of the inspected Party. The United States did not include that detail for monitoring equipment, since the requirements for the quantities and specific makes and models of equipment are dependent on the characteristics of the particular site at which monitoring will occur and upon the ability of the monitors to repair or replace such equipment when it breaks.
The Soviet Union listed quantities for all its equipment in Annex 8, including its monitoring equipment, but it included the manufacturer and model for virtually none of its equipment. Soviet negotiators explained that it did not have that level of detail available at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty. The Parties agreed instead to include the provision in paragraph 17 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol that obligates the inspecting Party to provide the manufacturer and model number of any equipment listed without that detail in Annex 8, prior to the first time that equipment is brought to the territory of the inspected Party. That same provision obligates the Parties to agree on the technical specifications" of such equipment (i.e., equipment for which the manufacturer and model number is not included in Annex 8) without undue delay and prior to the first time that equipment is brought to the territory of the inspected Party.
In accordance with paragraph 15 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, inspectors may bring with them from the point of entry to the inspection site, as a kind of toolbox," the maximum number of items listed in Annex 8 for any type of inspection, but they may use, as specified in Annex 8, only the number of items of equipment from the toolbox listed for that type of inspection. This permits the inspection team to conduct sequential inspections without telegraphing" the type of inspection it will do next.
Section I lists the basic inspector toolbox" and is the list that is agreed for use during baseline data, data update, new facility, suspect-site, post-exercise dispersal, conversion or elimination, close-out, and formerly declared facility inspections. It includes the radiation detection equipment agreed for use during inspections of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs in accordance with Annex 4 of the Inspection Protocol.
The camera equipment and film will be used in accordance with paragraph B of section VI, of Annex 8 (Methods of Use).
The satellite system receivers specified in paragraph 4 of Section I, for both the United States and the Soviet Union, are to be used by inspectors during inspections other than reentry vehicle inspections to determine the position of a specific silo declared not to contain an ICBM in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol. (The provision of such receivers for reentry vehicle inspections is governed by Section II of this Annex.) These systems will be provided by the inspected Party to the inspection team under the provisions of Section VI, of Annex 8 (Methods of Use) -- i.e., Global Positioning System (or GPS) by the US and GLONASS by the Soviet Union. In deference to Soviet security concerns, the Parties agreed during the negotiations that such receivers could be modified to display coordinates only to the nearest minute. In accordance with Section VI of Annex 8 to the Inspection Protocol, the Parties also agreed that procedures for using the satellite system receivers are subject to agreement in the JCIC.
Section II lists the equipment for reentry vehicle inspections. It limits the number and types of linear measurement devices and deletes, as unnecessary for the inspection, the camera equipment specified in Section I. The inspecting Party will have the right to use satellite system receivers during reentry vehicles inspections at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to confirm that inspectors are at the silo they designated; use of such receivers is subject to the conditions previously discussed.
Section III lists, in addition to those in Section I, linear measurement tools needed for technical characteristics exhibitions. The list excludes the radiation detection equipment listed in Section I, but adds weighing devices. The type of weighing devices to be used are to be agreed within the framework of the JCIC, and used for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, and of the existing type to which it is compared. The measuring tapes that are used by the United States are calibrated by the National Bureau of Standards; to achieve very accurate measurements the United States uses equipment such as measuring tape clamps, hand levels, calipers, and string line levels.
The US list of photographic equipment for technical characteristics exhibitions lists a type of Polaroid film that will produce a photograph that meets the requirements of paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, but does not specify a quantity of film for the inspection. The Soviet equipment specifies a quantity of film and lists three types of Polaroid film, two of which will not provide the required quality. For technical characteristics exhibitions, such equipment will be used in the event there is an ambiguity; the Parties agreed during the negotiations that this would include the situation where the inspected Party cannot provide the quantity and quality of photographs required by paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.
In Section IV, the list of inspection equipment for heavy bomber distinguishability and baseline exhibitions is the same as the list in Section III, except that it excludes weighing devices. Note that no specific list of equipment is provided for the exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs pursuant to Section VII of the Notification Protocol. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to this Protocol, however, do provide for making linear measurements, using radiation detection equipment, and taking photographs during such exhibitions.
Section V lists portable equipment for perimeter and portal continuous monitoring. It also includes the equipment which the Parties may use during the engineering site survey, which the Parties have the right to conduct commencing 30 days after entry into force, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Section XVI of the Inspection Protocol. The Soviet list of site survey equipment differs from the US list by including equipment to measure the tension of the chain link fence at the US facility subject to continuous monitoring by the Soviet Union. That tension measuring equipment coincides with the Soviet plan to use a perimeter fence integrity monitoring system listed in Annex 9 to the Inspection Protocol. The Soviet equipment list excludes portable computers, facsimile machines, and copiers planned for use by US monitors during the survey.
Section VI provides the detailed methods of use for the equipment of either Party listed in Annex 8. Subsections A, B, and C are for linear measurement devices, camera equipment, and engineering site survey equipment, respectively. Subsections A and B are very similar to methods of use of equipment in INF. Subsection C provides for joint access to the structure or room where the portable facsimile machine will be stored. The fax machine will be operated by a member of the monitoring team in the presence of a member of the in-country escort. The inspected Party has the right to examine the information to be transmitted prior to the use of the fax machine in order to assure itself that it does not contain images that are not connected with the purposes of the engineering site survey. Subsection D records the obligation of the Parties to agree within the framework of the JCIC on the methods of use of weighing devices used to confirm the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type.
Subsection E provides for the methods of use of the satellite system receivers. In deference to Soviet security concerns, these methods are designed to simultaneously ensure accurate position determination at the silo of concern, while precluding determination of any other geographic positions. There is no difference between the words "functional" in paragraph 1 and "functioning" in paragraph 2 of this subsection. Paragraph 8 of this subsection obligates the Parties to agree within the framework of the JCIC on procedures for using the satellite system receivers.
Subsection F contains the methods of use for the radiation detection equipment of the Parties. Such equipment is provided by the inspecting Party. The references to agreed procedures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this subsection mean that the Parties will agree on such procedures within the framework of the JCIC.
ANNEX 9 - CHARACTERISTICS AND METHODS OF USE OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM
Section I of Annex 9 lists the equipment the Parties have agreed to use for perimeter and portal continuous monitoring -- Part A containing Soviet equipment for use at the US facility subject to continuous monitoring by the USSR, and Part B containing US equipment for use at the Soviet facility. Section II of the Annex records the methods of use for the respective suites of equipment in the same order.
The equipment of each Party is similar to that of the other Party and to that which it has installed at the facility it currently monitors under provisions of the INF Treaty. However, no equipment is listed for non-damaging imaging of a vehicle or container. (Non-damaging imaging equipment could be agreed for use at a monitored facility under the provisions of subparagraphs 10(d) or 11(c) of Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol .) Weighing equipment may be used if it is provided by the inspected Party and used in accordance with paragraph 9 of Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol. Both Parties have provided for the use of remote (Soviet) or automatic (US) dimensional screening equipment, by which monitors identify vehicles or cargoes that leave the monitored facility and fall within the size criteria specified in paragraphs 24 and 25 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. Manual dimensional measurement may also be used by monitors.
Both Parties have provided for the installation of traffic control equipment to alert monitors to the approach of vehicles leaving the monitored facility and to direct those vehicles through the monitoring equipment in a manner that allows dimensional screening to occur. Both Parties list surveillance equipment to observe the areas within the perimeter continuous monitoring area at the portal and at each of the road exits. Both Parties have provided for using that equipment to take video snapshots (single-frame video images) of vehicles leaving the monitored facility, and of activity at the portal and road exits. The United States has provided for using the same surveillance equipment in conjunction with video motion detection equipment to monitor the perimeter of the facility. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has provided for installing a perimeter fence integrity system, which alerts Soviet monitors to changes in fence tension that might indicate a breach of the perimeter. Both Parties have provided for the use of other sensors as might be agreed between them, and both have provided for a system to record the activities that are monitored within the perimeter continuous monitoring area.
The detailed procedures for examining items that leave the monitored facility are contained in Annex 5 to this Protocol.
Annex 9 does not address items of supply that are required to support the continuous monitoring activities or needed to operate, maintain, and sustain the monitoring site and the monitoring team on a continuous basis. The right to bring in such supplies is provided for in Sections V and VI of the Inspection Protocol.
The United States did not include that detail for monitoring equipment, since the requirements for the quantities and specific makes and models of equipment are dependent on the characteristics of the particular site at which monitoring will occur and upon the ability of the monitors to repair or replace such equipment when it breaks.
Section I -- Equipment: The chapeau to the Section reaffirms the right of the Parties to install equipment at each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and to store sufficient spare parts and equipment to keep the system operating on a continuous basis.
Subparagraph 1(b) provides for magnetometric sensors which the US system does not use, but for which there is a functional equivalent (i.e., induction loop sensors).
Subparagraph 1(c) provides for gate position sensors which would be placed on gates belonging to the United States. The US system uses no equivalent.
Subparagraph 1(d) provides for floodlights to be used with the remote measuring and video snapshot equipment. The US system has no equivalent.
Subparagraph 2(e) includes infrared arrays and doppler sensors for the exits. Neither of these items is listed for the portal.
Paragraph 3 lists the equipment for the perimeter fence integrity monitoring system for which there is no US equivalent.
Paragraph 1 includes dimensional screening equipment, a surveillance system, and vehicle sensors and control equipment that are the functional equivalent to those currently employed at the US continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, USSR under the INF Treaty.
Subparagraph 2(g) provides for the use of gate seals at the exits when there is no traffic and the exits are to be monitored from the operations center at the portal.
Paragraph 3 provides for the use of video motion detection equipment in conjunction with the video surveillance system around the perimeter of the monitored facility. There is no functional equivalent in either the Soviet system or in the system employed by the United States under the INF Treaty.
Paragraph 4 provides for the use of a personal (micro)computer" (i.e., desktop workstation) for selecting and processing video snapshots. There is a functional equivalent in the US INF system.
Subparagraph 1(a) provides for initial comparison of the size of vehicles and cargoes leaving the portal with the size criteria specified in paragraph 24 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. Note that, in accordance with paragraph 15 of Annex 5, inspectors also have a right to inspect a quota of vehicles and containers smaller than that size criteria.
Subparagraph 1(b)(i) describes the Soviet remote measurement system. The Soviet remote measuring and surveillance system requires cameras that are installed up to 50 meters from the road and perpendicular to it, and also up to 30 meters from the center of the screening area and facing in the direction of traffic. The subparagraph specifies that the field of view of surveillance and measurement cameras will be agreed by the Parties and fixed. There is a reciprocal provision for fixed field of view cameras in methods of use for US surveillance equipment.
Subparagraph 1(b)(ii) describes the use of the magnetometric sensors.
Subparagraph 1(b)(iv) describes the use of the floodlights for contrast lighting.
Paragraph 2 includes essentially the same equipment for the exits as for the portal. Subparagraph 2(b)(iii), however, describes the use of a Doppler sensor, which is not listed with portal equipment, and infrared arrays to produce a computer-generated profile of a vehicle leaving the facility via an exit. US INF equipment functions in the same manner, but without a Doppler sensor.
Paragraph 3 describes the perimeter fence integrity system and its installation on an existing US fence. It provides for the installation of the system in sections, each of which must also have a means of communication with the operations center. There is no US equivalent.
Subparagraph 4(a) provides for installing the Soviet operations center building in a location with an unobstructed view of the portal. There is a reciprocal provision for the US operations center.
Subparagraph 4(b)(x) provides for the use of communications devices in the operations center, but prohibits the use of the non-dedicated telephone line for the transmission of Treaty information obtained during monitoring of the facility. This provision was inserted at Soviet request to preclude giving commercial operators access to Treaty information. The methods of use section for US equipment contains a reciprocal provision.
Paragraph 1 describes the functioning of the screening, traffic control, and surveillance system at the portal. Note that although subparagraph 1(a) provides for vehicles smaller than the size criteria to not be subject to inspection, such vehicles at monitored facilities where MIRVed mobile ICBMs are produced may nevertheless be subject to inspection if they meet the smaller size criteria specified in paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to the Inspection Protocol.
Subparagraph 1(b)(i) provides for the use of in-road or above-ground induction loop sensors, which are the functional equivalent of the Soviet magnetometric sensors.
Subparagraph 1(b)(vii) describes the use of data authentication devices, which are included in the list of US equipment in Section I but for which there is no Soviet equivalent.
Paragraph 2 describes the functioning of the US equipment at the road exit, which is essentially the same as the equipment used at the portal, except that are no weight scales at an exit. If the inspected Party chooses to use weight scales, they will be used only at portals.
Subparagraph 2(b)(vii) describes the use of gate seals by the US There is no equivalent provision in the Soviet equipment.
Subparagraph 2(b)(viii) provides for the use of data authentication devices at the exits.
Paragraph 3 describes the use of the surveillance and video motion-detection equipment, which may be installed along the entire perimeter.
Subparagraph 3(b)(i) provides for the installation of cameras as close as necessary to each other to obtain a complete view of the corresponding sector of the perimeter. It limits their height, however, to eight meters. There is no functional equivalent to this system in the Soviet equipment.
Paragraph 4 describes the use of the operations center equipment. It contains the reciprocal provisions for placement of the operations center building and use of the communications equipment.
Subparagraph 4(b)(iii) provides for the remote control of all exit equipment from the operations center at times when the exit gate is sealed and no monitors are present at the exits.
Subparagraph 4(c) provides for a backup power generator in the event of an interruption of power provided by the Soviets.
ANNEX 10 - TYPES OF INSPECTION AIRPLANES
Annex 10 lists the airplanes of each Party which are to be used for transporting inspectors and monitors (paragraph 2) or cargoes (paragraph 3). Paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Inspection Protocol provides for the transportation of inspectors and monitors aboard the cargo airplanes listed in this Annex.
Paragraph 1 permits the use of military transport aircraft in their operational paint schemes, which applies particularly to the US aircraft, all of which are US Air Force airplanes. Paragraphs 2 and 3 list specific authorized airplanes. The US airplanes include the C-9 medical evacuation airplane for emergencies. The Soviet airplanes are principally Aeroflot passenger airplanes, except for the cargo aircraft which include the giant AN-124.
Paragraph 4 provides for replacing or adding to the types of aircraft listed for one of the Parties, which is accomplished by simple notification. Such changes take effect three months after the notification of the new aircraft type, unless the Parties agree otherwise.
ANNEX 11 - PROCEDURES FOR CONFIRMING THE DIMENSIONS OF ICBMs AND SLBMs
Annex 11 consists of seven paragraphs that specify the procedures to be used during exhibitions for confirming the missile and stage dimensions of existing and new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition to providing procedures that are generally applicable to US and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs, Annex 11 also provides various exemptions and modifications to those procedures for certain missile types, taking account of limitations imposed by specific missile designs.
Paragraph 1 specifies that during exhibitions, inspectors shall have the right to make measurements on exhibited items at the locations on such items designated by the in-country escort. It should be noted in this regard, however, that in designating such locations, the in-country escort must follow the rules specified in Annex 11 and elsewhere in the Treaty.
Paragraph 2 provides that for existing and new types of liquid fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, the assembled missile and the separate first stage may be exhibited with or without fuel. This provision was adopted to address the fact that, due to the difficulty and hazards of the fueling process, liquid missiles are not normally fueled outside of their launchers. Thus, such missiles would not normally be available in a fueled configuration during an exhibition.
The assembled missile and first stage of existing solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs, however, generally shall be exhibited with propellant. This requirement is dictated by the fact that, unlike liquid fueled missiles, solid propellant missiles contain their propellant at all times, not just when they are placed in a launcher. This requirement is intended to enhance confidence that the dimensions being confirmed reflect those of actual missiles. Paragraph 2 specifies two exemptions from this general rule: the assembled missile of the Soviet SS-25 ICBM and the US Trident II SLBM need not be exhibited with propellant. The SS-25 was exempted because of Soviet claims that it could not be exhibited outside a production facility without incurring significant safety risks and imposing substantial technical difficulties. In exchange for this exemption, the Trident II also was exempted. This exemption reduces the technical burden of the Trident II exhibition. However, in the case of both the SS-25 and the Trident II, the separate first stage must be exhibited with propellant.
For new types of solid propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, a general right to exhibit the assembled missile with or without propellant is provided, except where the new type is declared on the basis of missile length. In such a case, the assembled missile must be exhibited with propellant. This provision is intended to account for the possibility that new types may have similar safety and technical problems as the SS-25. However, in the interest of enhancing confidence of the inspecting Party that the exhibited item fully reflects the dimensions and characteristics of the operational missile, no exemption is made in the case where an ICBM or SLBM is declared to be a new type on the basis of a change in missile length. As with existing types of solid propellant ICBMs, the separate first stage of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs must be exhibited with propellant.
Paragraph 3 specifies that for ICBMs or SLBMs maintained, stored, or transported in stages, the self-contained dispensing mechanism must be exhibited either separately or attached to the third stage for the purpose of confirming missile length. If the self-contained dispensing mechanism is exhibited separately, the inspectors shall have the right to measure its length. Paragraph 13 of Annex J of the Memorandum of Understanding specifies that the length of an assembled missile excludes the front section; thus, the self-contained dispensing mechanism is included in the length of an assembled missile. Because existing missiles that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages do not incorporate a self-contained dispensing mechanism until they are deployed, Paragraph 3 of Annex 11 clarifies that the self-contained dispensing mechanism must be displayed for confirmation of assembled missile length during exhibitions. For missiles maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles, with or without a launch canister, such clarification is not necessary.
Paragraph 4 specifies that for exhibitions of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, the inspected Party may exhibit either a launch canister containing the ICBM without front section, or an empty launch canister associated with such ICBM. Such an exhibition would be in addition to the exhibition of the assembled missile outside its launch canister and the separate first stage. This provision is designed to permit the inspecting Party to establish the relationship between a particular ICBM and a particular launch canister -- a relationship important for subsequent on-site inspection procedures.
Paragraph 5 specifies the procedures by which Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs of each existing type shall be exhibited. These procedures, which vary by missile type, are provided in four subparagraphs. Subparagraph 5(a) states that for the SS-25, SS-24, and SS-18 ICBMs, and each variant thereof, the separate first stage and the assembled missile outside its launch canister shall be exhibited. It also reiterates stipulations made in paragraphs 2 and 4 that the SS-25 assembled missile may be exhibited without propellant and that the Soviet Union may either exhibit an assembled SS-25, an SS-24, and an SS-18 in their respective launch canisters, without front section, or an empty launch canister associated with each of these ICBMs.
Subparagraph 5(b) specifies that the first stage of the SS-13 ICBM shall be exhibited and measured separately and that the second and third stages shall be exhibited and measured as a unit. In recognition of the unique configuration of the SS-13 (unlike all other Soviet ICBMs, the SS-13 is maintained, stored, and transported in stages) it is exempted from the general requirement that assembled missiles be exhibited.
Subparagraph 5(c) addresses the SS-11, SS-17, and SS-19 ICBMs. The exhibition provisions that apply to the SS-24 and SS-18 above also apply to these missiles, except that the SS-11, SS-17, and SS-19 shall be exhibited no later than one year after Treaty signature, during an elimination of an ICBM of each type. This change in the exhibition procedure reflects a compromise that takes account of the fact that these missiles are generally older systems that are in the process of elimination. Thus, the Soviet Union may take advantage of the convenience of exhibiting these missiles during elimination.
Subparagraph 5(d) deals with Soviet SLBMs. It provides that such missiles will be exhibited as assembled missiles only; a separate first stage will not be exhibited. Thus, to confirm the length and diameter of the first stage, measurements will be made on the assembled missile. This exception to the procedure that applies to ICBMs is due to the fact that Soviet SLBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles and the Soviet claim that once these missiles leave the production facility, they are not and cannot be separated into separate stages. Because confirming the length of the first stage on an assembled missile may result in ambiguities (i.e., uncertainty concerning where the first stage ends and the second stage begins), the subparagraph stipulates that the United States may request additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stage of a particular SLBM. After the United States designates what it seeks to confirm regarding the dimensions of the first stage, the Soviet Union must exhibit the SLBM during its first elimination. Procedures for such an exhibition shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to entry into force of the Treaty. During the negotiations, the United States made it clear that the only logical way to remove such an ambiguity, should one arise, would be to separate the first stage from the assembled missile so that its length could be measured independently.
Subparagraph 5(d) also exempts the SS-N-17 from exhibitions, since it was retired prior to Treaty signature, and specifies that the diameter of the third stage of the SS-N-20 shall be confirmed during the first elimination of a missile of that type. With respect to the SS-N-20, this provision is an exemption to paragraph 8 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol which specifies that during exhibitions the inspecting Party may confirm the diameter of the second and third stage of an ICBM or SLBM when different from the diameter of the first stage. Although the SS-N-20 third stage is slightly smaller in diameter than its first stage, the missile design incorporates a cap that is placed over the third stage which the Soviets stated remains on the missile at all times until it is launched. Because the Soviets also stated that this cap can be removed only with great difficulty, the United States agreed that confirmation of the third stage diameter would occur during the missile's first elimination, rather than during exhibitions.
Paragraph 6 addresses exhibition procedures for existing types of US ICBMs and SLBMs. As in the case of Soviet exhibition procedures, US procedures are tailored to specific missile types in three subparagraphs.
Subparagraph 6(a) specifies that for all US ICBMs and SLBMs, except the Peacekeeper ICBM, both the separate first stage and the assembled missile shall be exhibited. The self-contained dispensing mechanism of the Minuteman III shall be exhibited separately. For purposes of clarity, the subparagraph also specifies that the guidance ring and forward spacer ring of the Minuteman II will be exhibited separately (such elements are included in the length of an assembled missile). The Minuteman II has no self-contained dispensing mechanism.
Subparagraph 6(b) provides that all stages of the Peacekeeper ICBM shall be exhibited and measured separately. Because the Peacekeeper ICBM is maintained, stored, and transported in stages and cannot be assembled outside its launcher, it will not be exhibited as an assembled missile. This exemption is similar to that provided the Soviet SS-13.
Subparagraph 6(c) reiterates the exemption for the Trident II SLBM made in paragraph 2 from the general requirement that the assembled missile of solid propellant ICBMs and SLBMs be exhibited with propellant. The assembled missile of the Trident II may be exhibited without propellant or as an inert missile. The separate first stage of the Trident II will be exhibited with propellant.
Paragraph 7 of Annex 11 addresses exhibition procedures for ICBMs and SLBMs of a new type and their variants not addressed in paragraph 2. For such missiles, the assembled missile outside its launch canister, and separate first stage will be exhibited. In addition, as applicable, either the launch canister containing the assembled missile without front section or the empty launch canister associated with the missile, at the discretion of the inspected Party, shall be exhibited. If an assembled missile cannot be exhibited, separate stages shall be exhibited. Finally, the paragraph specifies that in the event an ICBM or SLBM is declared to be a new type on the basis of a change in the length of the first stage (with or without an increase in throw-weight), the separate first stage shall be exhibited in a configuration that allows confirmation of the length of such stage as defined in paragraph 15 of Annex J of the Memorandum of Understanding (i.e., for a solid propellant ICBM or SLBM, the solid rocket motor, and for a liquid propellant ICBM or SLBM, the liquid fuel tank). Note that no allowance or exception is made to this requirement for new types of ICBMs or SLBMs.
ANNEX 12 - SIZE CRITERIA TO BE USED DURING INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING
Annex 12 lists specific size criteria derived in accordance with rules listed in paragraphs 23, 24, and 25 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. As specified in paragraph 12 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, dimensions less than 2 meters are given to the nearest centimeter; dimensions greater than 2 meters, to the nearest tenth of a meter.
Paragraph 1 lists the actual size criteria to be used in determining whether an object is large enough to be, or to contain, an item of inspection; it pertains to baseline data, data update, new facility, close-out and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than heavy bomber facilities. Note that the length values for ICBMs and SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are 90 percent of the values listed in the Memorandum of Understanding as specified by subparagraph 23(a)(ii) of Section VI to the Inspection Protocol. This reduction in length ensures that the fundamental unit of the stage is captured.
For the United States, both the Trident I/Poseidon and the Minuteman II/III are listed because Minuteman II/III first stages share the smallest diameter and Trident I/Poseidon first stages share the smallest length. For an item to be inspectable, it must be large enough to be an item of inspection. Thus, if something were at least as long as a Poseidon first stage but not as long as a Minuteman first stage, it would have to be at least as wide as the diameter of the Poseidon first stage to be inspectable. Conversely, an object that is at least as wide as the diameter of Minuteman, but not as wide as the diameter of Poseidon, would have to be at least as long as a Minuteman first stage. The critical point is that an object could be longer than a Poseidon first stage and wider than the diameter of a Minuteman, but still not be inspectable because it could not be either missile.
For the Soviet Union, strict application of the size criteria rules in Section VI of the Inspection Protocol would result in listing the SS-N-6 as the size criteria for inspections. However, the sides had agreed during the July l99l Ministerial in Washington and in subsequent negotiations in Geneva that the dimensions of the SS-25 solid rocket motor would be the inspection size criteria, so these are the dimensions listed in Annex 12 although it is not specifically stated as such. This specific exception is noted in paragraph 23 of Section VI.
The SS-25 first stage length is said to be reduced by an agreed percentage" from the value listed for the first stage of the SS-25 in the Memorandum of Understanding, in accordance with subparagraph 23(a)(i) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. The language was negotiated for the purpose of capturing the solid rocket motor, but without explicitly stating this in the Treaty. An agreed percentage" is not explicitly listed. (See the analysis of Section VI for a discussion of agreed percentage.") The Parties will have the opportunity, by measuring both the first stage and the solid rocket motor during the technical characteristics exhibitions, to confirm the reference cylinder dimensions in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Annex and paragraph 7 of Section XIV. As a practical matter, this permits inspectors to confirm that the size criteria (first-stage dimensions, minus an agreed percentage" in length) capture the solid rocket motor.
Paragraph 2 lists the specific size criteria to be used for suspect site inspections. For the United States, Peacekeeper is the only mobile ICBM, so the size criteria for suspect site inspections in the United States are the length of the Peacekeeper first stage, measured end-dome to end-dome, and the diameter of that stage. The same method is used for the Soviet Union in relation to the SS-25. The phrase agreed percentage" is used in Section VI of the Inspection Protocol to describe the calculation of the size criteria, although a percentage is not listed in the Treaty.
Paragraph 3 lists the specific size criteria for continuous monitoring. A strict interpretation of the size criteria rules of Section VI would require listing both the SS-24 and SS-25 reference cylinders for the size criterion at Soviet facilities. As with the inspection criteria, however, the sides had agreed at the July l99l Washington Ministerial that the criteria would be based on the SS-25. This exception is noted in paragraph 24 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. For the United States, the only ICBM considered to be a mobile ICBM for Treaty purposes is Peacekeeper, so the Peacekeeper reference cylinder provides the size criteria in accordance with subparagraph 24(b) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol. Since the Peacekeeper is maintained, stored, and transported in stages, when the reference cylinder is determined there is no reduction in the length or diameter in accordance with subparagraph 24(b) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol.
Since Soviet mobile missiles are maintained, transported, and stored as assembled missiles in launch canisters, the Soviet criteria is based on the SS-25 reference cylinder associated with the assembled missile in its launch canister. The length and diameter of the canister is then reduced by ten percent, in accordance with paragraph 24(a) of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol, in order to reflect the missile's dimensions outside of its canister. It is important to note that, if a separate stage of a SS-25 is ever found outside allowed locations, the missile will be considered to be maintained, transported and stored in stages and the size criteria will change accordingly.
The size criteria in paragraph 4 for the quota inspections at the portal of a monitored facility where MIRVed mobile missiles are produced, in accordance with paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, are based on a reference cylinder whose diameter is 97 percent of the diameter of the first stage of a MIRVed mobile ICBM (the Peacekeeper for the United States and the SS-24 for the Soviet Union) and whose length is 97 percent of the distance from the lower edge of the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case of that stage. These two points, combined with the three percent reduction in length and diameter, were selected to capture Soviet production units" or unfinished stages, should one exit the portal.
The specific size criteria values listed in Annex 12 are based on the general rules of Section VI of this Protocol applied to the current forces of each Party. If a Party were to deploy a new ICBM or SLBM, this could affect size criteria. Paragraph 5 states that the Parties shall change the size criteria, if necessary, when such a new system is deployed. Paragraph 7 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol requires the inspected Party to exhibit the first stage of a new mobile ICBM in a configuration that allows inspectors to make an end-dome to end-dome measurement.