WEU Parliamentary Assembly

Document 1364 17th May 1993 Technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty REPORT (1) submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (2) by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur TABLE OF CONTENTS DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty DRAFT RESOLUTION on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty DRAFT ORDER on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur I. Introduction II. The treaty The choice of the observation aircraft Sensors Raw data Open Skies Consultative Commission Entry into force, duration and provisional application of the treaty III. Importance of the air observation regime IV. Co-operation between WEU member countries V. Prospects of WEU co-operation with the Russian Federation VI. Imagery evaluation - a role for the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejon? VII. Future prospects for the further development of the open skies regime VIII. Conclusions APPENDICES I. The CSCE Declaration on the Open Skies Treaty, Helsinki, 24th March 1992 II. Quotas and maximum flight distances III. Information transmitted by the Executive Secretariat CSCE Vienna, CFE, JCG, OSCC IV. Option, using an aircraft equipped with a special pod V. Synopsis Draft Recommendation on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty The Assembly, (i) Welcoming the new possibilities of transparency and openness regarding military forces and activities offered by the opening of the airspace of North America, Europe and the Asian parts of the Russian Federation from Vancouver to Vladivostok for reciprocal aerial observation agreed by the Open Skies Treaty signed in Helsinki on 24th March 1992; (ii) Emphasising that this important confidence- and security- building measure can reach its goal of creating a new multinational co- operative security approach only if all member states of the Community of Independent States accede to the treaty and if no member country of the CSCE is excluded; (iii) Stressing further that more than one year after the signature of the treaty the parliaments of WEU member states should shoulder their responsibility for allowing early entry into force and full implementation of the treaty by accelerating their ratification procedures; (iv) Welcoming the decision of the WEU Council to form a single group of states in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty; (v) Noting however the difficulties encountered by the WEU Open Skies Expert Group in harmonising the different options for a practical WEU-co-operation during nearly two years of discussions which made it impossible to reach an agreement for the use of a single type of observation aircraft; (vi) Noting that the WEU aircraft pool envisaged now is to be based on the number of aircraft actually available equipped with appropriate sensors in order to conduct joint air observation missions in accordance with the treaty in its most cost-effective conditions; (vii) Considering that a number of questions are still open such as: the selection of appropriate sensors to equip the aircraft; the status of associate members and observers within the WEU group of states; cost-sharing; whether and to what extent should the WEU Satellite Centre be asked to take on the task of interpreting the images gathered by the sensors; (viii) Welcoming the efforts of the Council to negotiate the conditions of co-operation with the Russian Federation, in particular regarding its participation in the WEU aircraft pool; (ix) Stressing however that the WEU contacts with the Russian Federation should not be exclusive and that co-operation should be enlarged to include all interested countries of the Community of Independent States and also the eight Central and Eastern European countries with which the Council has established regular consultations; (x) Deeming it necessary for WEU as a group of states within the Open Skies Treaty to elaborate at an early stage concepts for the possible extension of the open skies regime to wider areas as provided for in the treaty and to establish close working contacts with the Open Skies Consultative Commission, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 1. Provide the Assembly with detailed information on its decision regarding the creation of a WEU aircraft pool intended for air observation missions in the framework of the open skies regime; 2. Ensure that no type of aircraft made available by a member country shall be excluded from the pool; 3. Inform the Assembly: (a) whether Greece, the associate members and the observers are already part of the group of states created by the WEU Vienna declaration; (b) whether WEU has decided in the meantime to transform this group in accordance with Article III, Section II, paragraph 3 of the Open Skies Treaty, as announced in Vienna; 4. Give an enlarged mandate to the WEU expert group: (a) to examine all the additional consequences not yet tackled and which arise from the decision taken in Vienna to act as a group of states; (b) to evaluate the conditions for mandating the WEU Satellite Centre to interpret sensor imagery; (c) in liaison with the NATO Verification Co-ordinating Committee, to determine how to use the open skies observation means for the CFE Treaty; (d) to examine the possible extension of the open skies regime to wider areas such as conflict prevention, crisis management and protection of the environment; 5. Take a joint initiative urging Armenia, Azarbaijan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to accede to the Open Skies Treaty; 6. Seek co-operation similar to that envisaged with the Russian Federation also with other member states of the Community of Independent State, in particular with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and inform the Assembly of the results of the relevant negotiations; 7. Establish a permanent WEU representation with the Open Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna. Draft Resolution on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty The Assembly, (i) Welcoming the new possibilities of transparency and openness regarding military forces and activities offered by the opening of the airspace of North America, Europe and the Asian parts of the Russian Federation from Vancouver to Vladivostok for reciprocal aerial observation agreed by the Open Skies Treaty signed in Helsinki on 24th March 1992; (ii) Emphasising that this important confidence- and security- building measure can reach its goal of creating a new multinational co- operative security approach only if all member states of the Community of Independent States accede to the treaty and if no member country of the CSCE is excluded; (iii) Stressing further that more than one year after the signature of the treaty the parliaments of WEU member states and of all the other signatories should shoulder their responsibility for allowing early entry into force and full implementation of the treaty by accelerating their ratification procedures, Urges the governments and the parliaments of WEU member states and of all the other signatories of the Open Skies Treaty to ensure that the ratification procedure is concluded before the end of 1993. Draft Order on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty The Assembly, Invites the President of the Assembly to transmit the resolution on technical co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty to all signatories of the Open Skies Treaty. Explanatory Memorandum (submitted by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur) I. Introduction There are several reasons why the Technological and Aerospace Committee and the Assembly take a special interest in the Open Skies Treaty. The first is that this treaty establishes a new type of confidence- building measure in opening to aerial inspection for the first time in history, the airspace of the whole of North America, Europe and the Asian part of Russia from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The second reason is that so far only five states have ratified the treaty1. Consequently it is necessary to urge the parliaments of member countries and of other states to proceed to early ratification, so that the treaty may enter into force. The third reason is that in conformity with the treaty, WEU member countries have decided to act as a group for the practical and technical implementation of the treaty which raises a number of problems which will be studied in this report, with particular regard to WEU Council plans to establish a pool of aircraft and sensors for joint use in conducting observation flights with a view to cost sharing and facilitating WEU co-operation with the Russian Federation in these matters. Your rapporteur will complete this report later in the light of decisions to be taken by the WEU Ministerial Council on 19th May on WEU co-operation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty. The fourth reason is that there is a need to monitor the willingness of signatory states, and in particular that of WEU member countries, to bear the cost of effectively implementing the treaty. Another risk is that for financial reasons interest in implementing the treaty may flag in certain countries. As your rapporteur has already done in his report on Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council in December 19882, he wishes to point out again that disarmament and its verification is not cheap and needs appropriate financial means. This is also true for the confidence- building measures envisaged in the Open Skies Treaty. It is therefore very important to verify whether member governments are ready to take advantage of all reasonable industrial offers and proposals regarding the appropriate technical observation means allowed by the Open Skies Treaty. The fifth, but not last, reason is the importance of raising political interest in the possibilities offered by the Open Skies Treaty for verifying a number of other existing or future agreements for arms control, conflit prevention, crisis management and possibly the extention of its regime to additional areas such as the protection of the environment. II. The treaty The Open Skies Treaty was signed in Helsinki on 24th March 1992 by twenty-five countries, including the sixteen member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, the former East-European members of the Warsaw Pact, and Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia as successor states to the Soviet Union. The treaty is open for signature by all the other successor states to the Soviet Union such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but so far only Kirgizstan has signed it. Certain difficulties have prevented the full participation of all CSCE member countries in the treaty negotiations and in the signature process in Helsinki. First, there were differences between France and the United States over France's position that the Open Skies regime should become part of the CSCE process. Second, Turkey refused to agree to the inclusion of Cyprus. As a compromise, during a six-month period after the treaty's entry into force, Article XVII of the treaty now allows any of the CSCE members states to apply for accession to the treaty, although this requires the agreement of all the signatory states. It is to be hoped that the difficulties raised so far to the participation of a number of countries will be resolved in the meantime. A CSCE declaration3 linked to the Open Skies Treaty initiated by Finland offers certain countries - such as Sweden and Finland - the possibility of participating in the implementation of the treaty prior to their accession. On that basis, they were granted a quota of three observation flights over the territory of Russia and Belarus. Furthermore, six months after its entry into force, the signatory states may decide on the accession to the treaty of any other interested countries outside the CSCE. According to the leader of the German Delegation in the negotiations4, participants had in mind, in particular Japan and China, but at a later stage the treaty will be open to any members of the United Nations or might be used as a model for after regional agreements. The cornerstone of the treaty is that all participants shall have the right to conduct observation flights, at short notice, over the territory of any other signatory states and shall be obliged to accept observation flights over their territory in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. Restrictions are allowed only for reasons of flight security, but not because of the national security interests of the observed country. Article III and Appendix A of the treaty establish the rules for active and passive flight quotas5. The number of observation flights every state party is obliged to tolerate over its territory (passive quota) depends in general on the size and importance of the observed country; for instance the quotas for the United States and Russia Belarus are forty-two each; for France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Turkey and Ukraine, twelve each; for smaller countries such as Bulgaria and Hungary, four each, or for Portugal, two. Every state party shall have the right to conduct a number of observation flights over the territory of any other state party equal to the number of observation flights which that other state party has the right to conduct (active quota, Article III, Section I, paragraph 3). The total active quota of a state party shall not exceed its total passive quota (Article III, Section I, paragraph 5 at the end). However, in the first three years after the entry into force of the treaty, the number of observation flights is limited to 75% of the passive quota6. After the entry into force of the treaty, the distribution of active quotas shall be subject to an annual review for the following calendar year (Article III, Section I, paragraph 7). The results of such a review will depend on the individual interests of states parties and on the development of the general political situation. So far the main interest during the negotiations were concentrated on observation flights over the territories of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. The treaty allows the establishment of different kinds of "group of states parties". According to Article XIV, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg are to be considered as a single state party, called Benelux. The Russian Federation and Belarus have formed a group of states parties sharing their total active and passive flight quotas in accordance with Article III, Section II, paragraph 3. On the other hand, the member countries of WEU have formed a group of state parties sharing their active flight quotas, while retaining their individual passive quotas in accordance with Article III, Section II, paragraph 2 of the treaty. Furthermore, the Head of the German Delegation representing the chairman-in-office of the WEU Council, declared at the plenary Open Skies Conference in Vienna on 18th March 1992 : "We also reserve our right to transform in due course this group according to paragraph 3 of the section referred to. In this connection I should like to recall the invitation which the member states of WEU have extended to a number of other states in their declaration issued on the occasion of the 46th European Council meeting on 9th and 10th December 1991 at Maastricht." That means that all countries invited to become full members or associate members of Western European Union or observers, may join the WEU group of state parties in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty. The choice of the observation aircraft In Article II, paragraph 4, the treaty defines as "observation aircraft" an unarmed, fixed wing aircraft designated to make observation flights, registered by the relevant authorities of a state party and equipped with agreed sensors. The term "unarmed" means that the observation aircraft used for the purposes of the treaty is not equipped to carry and employ weapons. Furthermore, each observation aircraft shall be capable of carrying the flight crew and the necessary personnel. (Article V, paragraph 5). Article II, paragraph 11 and Appendix A define, for the length of the observation flights, individual "maximum flight distances" in accordance with the size of the relevant country. The term means the maximum distance over the territory of the observed country from the point at which the observation flight may commence to the point at which that flight may terminate. The maximum flight distance for Germany, for instance, is 1 200 km ; for the United States, 4 900 km ; for Russia/Belarus, 6 500 km. Sensors The treaty allows two different kinds of sensors configuration, i.e.: a podded installation (outside the aircraft) which shall be denoted by the code "POD"; an internal installation (inside the aircraft) which shall be denoted by the code "INT". After the expiration of an initial phase of three years beginning from the entry into force of the treaty, the sensors installed on an observation aircraft shall permit observation of military activities and installations even during darkness and in all weather conditions. Article IV, paragraph 1, allows equipment with sensors only from amongst the following categories : (a) optical panoramic and framing cameras ; (b) video cameras with real time display ; (c) infra-red line scanning devices and (d) sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar (SAR). The allowable ground resolution of the sensors - which means the minimum distance on the ground between two closely-located objects distinguishable as separate objects - is determined specifically in order to permit the identification of significant types of military equipment such as tanks, artillery and armoured personnel carriers. The maximum obtainable resolution from the optical, framing and video cameras is 30 cm, this makes it possible to distinguish a tank from a truck for instance, but it is not sufficient to distinguish one type of tank from another. For infra-red devices, the maximum resolution is 50 cm. These sensors allow viewing in poor light conditions and, thanks to their ability to detect sources of heat, the operational state of installations such as airports, military bases and industrial sites can be determined. The maximum SAR (sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar) resolution of three meters will enable overflights to locate potential concentrations of equipment, which could then be more thoroughly investigated using the other sensors7. Since all the treaty's signatories do not now possess the same sophisticated sensor technology, Article XVII of the treaty stipulates that during the initial three-year phase in period, only camera-type sensors will be allowed. The use of infra-red line scanning devices will not be permitted during that period, unless otherwise agreed between the observing and observed parties. In the final stage, all states parties shall have equal commercial access to sensor systems capable of producing the maximum allowable image resolution. The treaty also establishes a procedure for the introduction of additional categories and improvements to the capabilities of existing sensors. (According to Peter Jones, member of the Canadian delegation to the Open Skies Conference8, air sampling devices have already been discussed as one type of new sensor package. These devices would permit Open Skies overflights to monitor environmental degradation and could assist in the verification of the chemical weapons convention). Raw data Article IX of the treaty provides that all raw data are to be fully shared between the signatories on a shared-cost basis. This provision enables the smaller countries to have access to the entire raw-data pool of the regime, rather than being limited to the data obtained from their small number of overflights. Open Skies Consultative Commission The treaty provides for the creation of an "Open Skies Consultative Commission" in Vienna which started its activities on 2nd April 1992. Its objectives are to settle practical and technical questions in connection with the implementation of the treaty, details of which are defined in Article X and Appendix L. Its first task was to settle a number of questions not resolved at the date of signature, for instance the details of cost-sharing, whereas a general consensus exists that the observing country in principal bears the cost of the observation flights. Other open questions9 were settled by the commission prior to 30th June 1992, thus fulfilling the conditions for the ratification of the treaty. At a later stage, the Open Skies Consultative Commission will also be responsible for questions of treaty amendments and examining the possible accession of new member countries to the treaty. Entry into force, duration and provisional application of the treaty The treaty shall be of unlimited duration (Article XV). It enters into force sixty days after the deposit of twenty instruments of ratification, including those of the depositaries, and of state parties whose individual allocation of passive quotas is eight or more (Article XVII, paragraph 2). Some treaty provisions are already provisionally applicable in order to facilitate its implementation. This applies in particular to the work of the Open Skies Consultative Commission, the transmission of notifications and reports required by the treaty and the designation of personnel who will carry out duties relating to the conduct of observation flights, including monitoring of sensor output. III. Importance of the air observation regime The treaty is inherently of political importance: it constitutes the first confidence-building regime to include all of the territory of North America, Europe and the Asian part of Russia for aerial inspection, with the possibility of extending the regime to other countries and regions in the world. A proposal made already in July 1955 by President Eisenhower to the Soviet Union, which was revived thirty-four years later by President Bush, in May 1989, led to negotiations between the two alliances in Ottawa in February 1990 which successfully concluded after two years negotiations with a comprehensive multilateral treaty open for the accession of any interested country. Experience gained in bilateral reconnaissance overflight agreed in the framework of the Egyptian- Israeli disengagement agreements in 1974/1975, then from the trial Canadian-Hungarian trial open skies overflight in January 1992 and the conclusion of a bilateral Open Skies Treaty between Hungary and Romania on 11th May 1991, were certainly helpful in demonstrating the usefulness and feasibility of establishing an overall open skies regime. For this purpose, it may be assimilated to the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) drawn up in the CSCE. CSBMs form a special chapter among overall arms control measures. Their main aim is to reduce the possibility of a conflict breaking out as a result of an incident. However, their main purpose is to improve in a tangible manner the standard of the political environment at bi- and multilateral levels. They are in fact part of a highly psychological process designed to reduce suspicion in the perception of an another country's military posture. To this end, the application of a CSBM must give rise to an accurate, reliable exchange of information between the parties concerning the state and posture of their respective forces and such information can be verified by on-site inspections. However, the Open Skies Treaty is wider in scope than the CSBMs which were described in the 1990 Vienna document and then further developed in the 1992 document. On the one hand, they are the first confidence-building measures to extend beyond the territory normally covered by the CSCE process (Atlantic to the Urals). Indeed, the area covered by the treaty also includes the entire territory of Canada, the United States and Russia, i.e. almost the whole of the earth's northern hemisphere. Moreover, the treaty is the first example of a confidence- building measure being introduced by treaty and thus having a juridical and consequently binding status, unlike those introduced by the CSCE, which are merely a moral constraint. Thus, the Open Skies Treaty is perhaps the most extensive confidence-building measure ever introduced by multilateral agreements. As John H. Hawes, the United States representative at the open skies negotiations in Ottawa, wrote: "Open Skies is intended as a serious confidence-building measure, that is, one in which international confidence derives from the substance of what the regime produces, and not solely or even primarily from the symbolism or novelty of the fact that the regime exists at all." The treaty implies no obligation for a state to declare beforehand the state and number of its forces, each party consenting a priori to be observed. In this context, the accuracy (resolution) of the images supplied is less decisive than for a verification regime. The most important aspect of such a regime would lie, according to Joe Clark, former Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the "positive political act of opening a nation's activities to detailed, intrusive monitoring - a symbolic opening of the doors. It would be a clear, unequivocal gesture that a nation's intentions are not aggressive"10. The end of the East-West confrontation, the transformation of the Soviet Union into a Community of Independant States and the new quality of relations with Russia might have relativised the initial western interest in the regime. But in view of the uncertainty of future developments in this region and other areas, the possibility of conducting regular observation flights can have a stabilising effect. Regarding the military importance of the regime, one has to admit that its observation means are not as intrusive as those provided for the verification of a number of disarmament and arms control agreements. Furthermore, the regime represents only a relatively modest enhancement of the existing satellite surveillance capabilities of the United States and Russia. As the United States representative of the Open Skies negotiations reported to the Senate, the sensors will not provide very much new information to the United States but will primarily benefit nations which do not have sophisticated national technical means such as satellites. On the other hand, many satellites are limited in their ability to manoeuvre in response to events, whereas aircraft can revisit an area quickly and can remain there for extended periods11. More generally, an open skies system is flexible and economical, making it certainly interesting, particularly compared with satellite means, which are an expensive solution within the reach only of the great powers. The open skies system, on the contrary, allows each participating state to have information about the military activities of other countries. The use of aircraft is also more flexible and observation flights can be made in the least foreseeable manner. The trajectories of satellites are imposed by their orbits. Their possibilities of manoeuvre in the light of events and their ability to follow different courses are fairly limited. Conversely, an aircraft can follow a flight plan for observing several different sites during the same mission, it can hover an objective, etc., all this within a very short lapse of time. To effect the same type of observation with a satellite, several readjustments would have to be made to its orbit at considerable expenditure and loss of time. Finally, it is easier for an airborne system to have sensors: for instance, a faulty system can be repaired, systems can be inspected before, during and after the flight, etc. Furthermore, the observation means of the Open Skies Treaty have a special advantage over the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) whose area of application is limited from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU Zone). Shortly before the CFE Treaty was signed in 1990, the Soviets transferred vast quantities of military equipment to regions East of the Urals. These transfers released this equipment from the CFE requirement to be destroyed and from CFE verification provisions as well. Therefore, apart from satellite surveillance, the observation means of the Open Skies Treaty became the only way to keep an eye on military equipment beyond the Urals and to verify the destruction of many of these weapons promised by the Soviet Union in 1991. On the other hand, there is no formal link between the Open Skies and CFE Treaties. Conceptually, they concern two distinct areas: open skies - confidence; CFE - verification. In spite of this distinction, which was intentional in order to avoid reducing the scope of the treaty, it is generally accepted that the two treaties are in some respects complementary. This is mainly due to the fact that the CFE Treaty contains no provisions relating to aerial verification. This question had a direct influence on the Open Skies Treaty negotiations. Since then, a number of people have wished a link to be established between the two regimes. Some even considere that the open skies regime is de facto the aerial verification regime of the CFE Treaty. This matter was in fact left open in the text of the treaty, which lays down that : "Upon completion of the 120-day residual level validation period, each state party shall have the right to conduct, an agreed number of aerial inspections within the area of application. Such agreed numbers and other applicable provisions shall be developed during negotiations referred to in Article VIII12." Thus, aerial inspections under the CFE Treaty are merely a future possibility after an initial stage of armament reductions, i.e. not earlier than 1995-96. Clearly, if there were to be such a protocol, it would necessarily be the result of experience acquired through application of the Open Skies Treaty. Moreover, the CFE Treaty as such establishes a very elaborate verification system to be conducted by site inspection teams13. However, the scope of the treaty is limited by the fact that the area concerned by CFE reductions extends only from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU area). The reductions provided for in the treaty concern only certain categories of equipment: tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces with a calibre over 100 mm, aircraft and helicopters defined as equipment limited by the treaty (TLE). A fortiori, these reductions concern only certain units. The Open Skies Treaty, on the other hand, covers a much broader area of application but is not really appropriate in its present form for carrying out verification tasks. With the sensors provided for in the treaty and the accompanying limits, it is not possible to identify equipment limited by the CFE Treaty. The Open Skies Treaty nevertheless offsets some of the limitations of the CFE Treaty. Inter alia, the entire territory of the former Soviet Union can be monitored. Futhermore, the state of forces not included in the TLE category can be monitored, and in particular: conventional equipment not corresponding to the specific definitions laid down in the treaty; equipment covered by the treaty but deployed outside the ATTU area; naval equipment; space equipment; missiles; air transport means, etc. These measures therefore help to complete the CFE framework and avoid the emergence of major imbalances and reductions under the CFE Treaty leading to increases elsewhere. In the framework of the application of the treaty itself, open skies flights would allow on-site inspections to be better directed, in particular challenge inspections on suspect areas. The Open Skies Treaty would allow detection. This would avoid mistakes relating to the interest of the site to be inspected. It can thus be seen how the two regimes might in practice be complementary. This leaves open a number of further options for enlarging its application areas which will be examined more closely in Chapter VII of the report. It should therefore not be considered as the end but rather as a beginning and a challenge not only for establishing new standards for security relations between former enemies but also for enhanced international co-operation. IV. Co-operation between WEU member countries The implementation of the open skies regime requires considerable financial means. To take only two examples: according to United States sources, the equipment of the first United States aircraft with the necessary sensors for the mission would cost $18 million to $20 million. Each United States flights would cost approximately $200 000. The German defence budget for the financial year 1993 provides DM 24 million, for 1994 approximately DM 37 million, for 1995 approximately DM 40 million and for 1996 approximately DM 10 million, for aircraft alterations and for meeting equipment and staff requirements for the implementation of the treaty. It is not so much the procurement of aircraft for aerial observation purposes that has to be taken into account, since, in most countries, appropriate types of aircraft are already available, it is rather the investment necessary for sensors, the cost of films and their analysis and running costs. This is why almost no states will in the long run be able to carry out observation flights by means of their own aircraft. The treaty offers the following cost-sharing possibilities: co-operation by groups of states; participation in the observation flights of another state party, i.e. by means of multinational teams of observers; chartering observation aircraft from another state party; purchasing a copy of the film obtained. These possibilities of lowering costs allow all states parties to carry out their own aerial observations or use the results obtained by another state14. After the decision taken by Western European Union member countries to form a "group of states parties in accordance with Article III, Section II, paragraph 2 of the treaty (see paragraph 15), it was necessary to work out the objectives, consequences and ways and means of such WEU co-operation. Two new WEU working groups have been created: one on verification in 1991, one on open skies in 199215. After the mandate addressed to the WEU expert groups by the declaration of Vianden on 27th June 199116 to explore the possibilities of practical co-operation regarding the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty, WEU ministers agreed according their Petersberg declaration of 19th June 199217: "...in principle to a feasibility study to identify the most cost-effective means of implementing the Open Skies Treaty co-operatively among member states. They tasked the group of experts to agree assumptions for the study, to identify the options which merit further study and to consider the question of costs, with a view to taking a decision at their next ordinary meeting to proceed with the study, stressed the readiness of WEU to co-operate with third parties at a later stage, and in this context welcomed the contacts which had taken place with other European allies, as well as with the Russian Federation. They agreed that experts should investigate the possibilities for intensified co-operation with the Russian Federation, which could include a joint feasibility study and/or a trial overflight." According to the Secretary-General's information letter of 1st July 199218: "The Expert Group on the verification of arms control agreements held several working meetings on the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty. On 26th and 27th March, a WEU fact-finding mission visited Moscow to examine the possibility of using a single type of observation aircraft for open skies, as proposed by France. When, in three years' time, the treaty is implemented in full, there will be a need to use specially equipped aircraft. A fleet of between five and eight aircraft should be sufficient for the 200 observation flights planned each year. A solution consisting of developing a single type observation aircraft which could also be used for CSCE transport missions might be adopted, and would offer major advantages in terms of cost-effectiveness. The Russians taking part in the WEU mission suggested two types of aircraft which might be suitable. All the practical arrangements for technical co-operation were considered during the discussions in order to provide experts with the necessary information for subsequent feasibility studies on the pooling of aircraft and/or sensors. At an informal meeting in Vienna on 29th April of heads of delegation, these explanatory talks on co-operation with Russia were continued and other options were discussed, such as a common WEU pool with national aircraft being used in rotation. Then, on 13th May, experts met in London at the WEU Secretariat to hear a presentation on the German national study and to prepare the activity report for ministers." In their Rome communique of 20th November 199219: "Ministers reiterated their commitment to the early entry into force of the Open Skies Treaty. They took note of the progress report prepared by experts and tasked them to continue the search for cost-effective solutions for implementating the Open Skies Treaty, including the possibilities for establishing a WEU pool. Ministers stressed the readiness of WEU to co- operate with third parties and welcomed the intention of the presidency to inform them of the state of play of WEU's work." The Secretary-General's information letter of 24th November 199220 specified that: "The Expert Group on the verification of arms control agreements held several working meetings on the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty (6th July, 25th September and 27th October). Since the Ministerial Council had given its agreement in principle on 19th June 1992 for a feasibility study to be carried out to determine the most cost-effective means of implementing the Open Skies Treaty within the framework of co-operation between the WEU member states, the experts discussed the assumptions on which the study should be based, the definition of options meriting further study and considered the study's likely costs and the way in which it might be funded." So far, the last official information on the subject is contained in the second part at the thirty-eighth annual report of the Council to the Assembly which states that: "The Open Skies Experts Group had, by the end of the year, passed the stage of preparing a feasibility study. Its activities were now centred on the establishment of an aircraft pool based on the number of aircraft actually available."21 Your rapporteur is grateful for certain additional information he was able to obtain from the Secretary-General and a number of the WEU member countries concerned. It follows from this additional information, that the idea of elaborating a single joint feasibility study has been given up since it appeared impossible to harmonise the various interests and proposals of member countries. The discussions are now concentrated mainly on ways and means of establishing a fleet of WEU aircraft (WEU Pool) to which each state might assign one or more aircraft equipped with appropriate sensors. The treaty provides for two stages of implementation. In the first stage, the parties will use available aircraft and sensors that will not have to meet all the criteria laid down in the treaty. However, studies concerning co-operation in the framework of the WEU relate mainly to the second stage of implementation, which would start in 1997. Four options have been selected from a series of proposals concerning the formation of the fleet: France: a totally integrated WEU fleet (on the lines of AWACS, using a single type of aircraft); Germany: a fleet of national aircraft that can be made available to the WEU fleet; United Kingdom: fleets of national aircraft assigned in turn to the WEU fleet; Benelux: national C-130 aircraft using a jointly-procured pod of sensors. These options would require more detailed study. In particular, the question of management and financing required close examination. A collective WEU study should therefore be conducted for this purpose. The report submitted to the ministers at their meeting on 20th November 1992 contained the following observations and recommendations: the mandate for the study was approved; at the stage reached at that time, none of the four options could be rejected; all were to be studied in greated detail; a ministerial decision on carrying out a single study was not expedient at this stage; conversely, the report asked the Council to approve a six-month explanatory stage during which identical criteria, parameters and structures would be worked out for conducting, in a national framework, four studies on the various options, so as to be able to make a comparative estimate and take an appropriate decision. At their meeting at the beginning of January 1993, the WEU experts terminated their discussion of the WEU study which, on the whole, was neither fruitful nor progressive and concentrated their work on a pragmatic initiative in order to achieve rapid results that were as concrete as possible. This new step was based on the principle that conducting the four feasibility studies so far envisaged would take up too much time and their results would probably be overtaken by events in the various countries. It emerged from relevant declarations made by member countries that the WEU fleet would initially be composed of a German Tupolev-154, a British Andover (until 1995) and national C-130s equipped with the Benelux sensor pod. Consequently, two working documents were to be devoted to the organisational and financial aspects of joint facilities of this type. The United Kingdom and France have assumed responsibility for preparing the working document on the organisation of the fleet, Benelux the study of the special case of the C-130 equipped with a pod and Germany the financial aspects. The result of these studies was endorsed by the Open Skies Working Group on 16th April 1993 and will be submitted to the ministers for approval at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers on 19th May. This document consists of definitions and various chapters on training, organisation and the operation of the fleet. All member countries agree that the effective implementation of the treaty should not be delayed until the aircraft pool is brought into service but that it should be used from ther very start after the treaty come into force. It appears from the expert studies that a majority of member countries are inclined to organise the WEU pool on the basis of the Benelux option, using Hercules C-13022 aircraft equipped with a special pod. C-130s are used in the airforces of most NATO member countries with the exception of Germany. The Belgian airforce, for instance, is prepared to equip its C-130 Hercules with a pod developped by Lockheed's Airlift Derivatives Programs Division, called SAMSON (Special Avionics Missions Strap-On Now). This system is described by Lockheed as a high-technology surveillance system "housed in a pod beneath the (C-130) aircraft's wing in place of an external fuel tank, it can installed in less than six hours with no permanent modifications to the aircraft." Normally, the C-130 is already designed to receive control cables allowing instruments in the pod to be linked to the operators' control panels in the airframe. The panels and the seats for inspectors are installed on loading pallets in the cargo compartment of the airframe. The various elements composing the system can thus be installed or removed relatively quickly. As the C-130 requires no structural changes, the system can be transferred from one aircraft to another and thus be available for several successive operators. This system, therefore seems a practical, economical solution but is nevertheless not without drawbacks. In the event of the sensors not working properly during an observation flight, it would be impossible for the operators to repair them. For instance, the reels of film could not be replaced when they run out. So far, tests have been carried out only with sensors of American origin that do not corresponds to the treaty limitations. Thus, it would also have to be checked whether if all types of sensors allowed by the treaty can be properly installed in the pod. This is the case of the SAR, for instance which sports a fairly large antenna. Finally, doubts have been expressed about the possibility of a C-130 aircraft being authorised to overfly the territory of the former Soviet Union for reasons connected with air control and ground support, etc. However this may be, this system is certainly a simple, economical solution. So far however, countries which have C-130s are not yet unanimous about the conditions for a joint use of pods. The following questions remain to be settled: what type of sensor will be installed in the pod? how many pods should be procured? how many consoles should be procured to ensure that the sensors work? who will share the cost of procurement and operation in the long run and what will be the breakdown of costs? It is mainly on the last point that a decision still has to be taken, and also the question of whether all countries with C-130s will participate or not in solving the above mentioned problem. Other member countries, in particular Germany, France and the United Kingdom, are studying alternative solutions regarding aircraft and sensors. Whereas the United Kingdom favours the Andover aircraft, Germany was the only member country presenting a comprehensive national study containing proposals for using a Tupolev 15423, internal installed sensors and a number of operating arrangements. The German solution, which is actually rather isolated within the WEU group of state parties, might be rather more expensive than the Pod-solution. It has, however, according to its advocates, a number of advantages, such as: facilitating sensor installations and supervising, during observation flights, that all sensors are working properly; offering possibilities for European industry to provide the necessary sensor technology, improved sensors output, and facilitating eventual co-operation with the Russian Federation. The United States seems to favour using an adapted C-135 aircraft with internal installed sensor, whereas Canada seems to advocate the C- 130 Pod solution. Within a minority of member country, in particular in Germany, there is sound concern that the outcome might be that the pool envisaged between WEU member countries might finally be reduced to C- 130 Hercules aircraft equipped with a pod. V. Prospects of WEU co-operation with the Russian Federation After the first WEU fact-finding mission in Moscow at the end of March 1992, the Russian representatives insisted, at an informal meeting in Vienna on 29th April 1992, on their "taxi-option" which means that an important part of the flights over the Russian territory should be conducted by Tu-154 M aircraft provided by the Russian Federation. This is allowed by the treaty as an exception to the general rule according to which flights are conducted in principle by aircraft of the observing party. When the WEU Ministerial Council approves the management rules of the WEU pool, it is planned to contact the Russian Federation again in order to start official negotiations for elaborating arrangements allowing the Russian side to co-operate with the WEU group. Co- operation to be arranged with Russia will have to relate to the management of the pool and flight quotas. This should also allow the question of "taxi-option" to be settled in view of the fact that setting up a joint fleet with the Russian Federation depends on the possibility of using all the aircraft in it, including, therefore, those of WEU, to overfly Russia. WEU may therefore invite the Russian to make one or more of their aircraft available to the joint fleet. This aircraft will thus be in competition with the other aircraft in the pool. It is an open question whether the Russians will agree to such a solution or whether they will insist on guarantees that their aircraft really will be used. It is therefore to be foreseen, that the co-operation envisaged with the Russia will be preceeded by difficult negotiations. To that are to be added a number of technical problems, too. Greater co-operation with Russia means using common standards for the equipment to be used (e.g. sensitivity of the film). However, western and former Warsaw Pact equipment are notoriously incompatible. These matters are now being discussed in the Open Skies Consultative Commission and, for the time being, each party is clinging to its own standard. Furthermore, limits on exports of products and technology in the framework of the Cocom rules seem to have put a subsequent soft pedal on the extent of the co-operation envisaged. Some authorities believe the Cocom rules even place a physical limit on the development of co- operation with the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the Cocom list should have been revised to make it less discriminatory against Russia at the end of 1992, but this was not done. On the other hand, it has been said that problems with the Cocom list will not be very likely since the open skies technical standards for sensors are so low that Western partners were obliged to downgrade their technical means, in particular in the radar areas. Furthermore, all technical sensors means provided by the treaty have to be commercially available to all state parties. A Cocom problem might arise in a later stage, when additional categories and improvements of sensors are introduced in the Open Skies Consultative Commission. Finally, one should recall that the treaty refers several times to the rules established by the International Civil Aviations Organisation (ICAO); as a consequence Belarus, which forms with Russia a group of states party within the open sky regime, should join ICAO, of which it is not yet a member. A fruitful outcome of the efforts to create conditions for satisfactory co-operation between Western European Union and the Russian Federation is no doubt in the interest of all who wish the implementation of the Open Skies Treaty to be successful. Nevertheless, co-operation with the Russian Federation should not be considered exclusive. There are good reasons for developing close co-operation with the other successor states of the Soviet Union, in particular with Ukraine, and for encouraging all the member states of the CIS (Community of the Independent States) to sign the treaty. It appears from the Petersberg Declaration that WEU Ministers envisaged consultations with the eight Central and Eastern European countries regarding the Open Skies Treaty too. But it seems that these discussions have not been very fundamental so far. It is therefore important that these talks should be intensified. VI. Imagery evaluation - a role for the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejon? Whereas each state party has the right to request and receive the raw data collected by sensors during an observation flight, it is up to each state party to use proper means of image interpretation and evaluation. It does not seem that WEU member countries have discussed in depth the possibility of using the WEU Satellite Centre for such imagery interpretation. It would therefore be useful for the Council to pay more attention to this problem. A number of questions have to be studied carefully in this context: have member countries any interest in giving a mandate to the Satellite Centre for open skies imagery interpretation? when the centre is fully operational and executing its interpretation duties drawn from the various satellites and space organisations with which it is to work on contractual basis, will it still have enough capacities to work for open skies purposes? who will be responsabible and what will be the criteria for deciding the kind of open skies imagery which should be submitted for interpetation by the Torrejon Centre? who will have access to the results obtained by the centre? So far experts of Greece, associate members and observer states (with the exception of Iceland) are participating in the work of the WEU open skies group, but their status is not clearly defined. In particular, it is not clear whether these countries have already officially joined the WEU group of states party established by the Vienna declaration. So far Greece and associate members are not involved in the WEU space activities. Before the WEU Satellite Centre is given responsibility for imagery interpretation in the context of the Open Skies Treaty, the procedure for these countries to participate should be agreed. So far the centre has eight double-screen, high-definition image processing works stations in Torrejon. They will be in an experimental phase until 1995. As Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, pointed out at the inauguration of the WEU Satellite Centre on 28th April 1993: "in its initial experimental phase, the centre will train analysts in the interpretation of the satellite imagery. This will be done using data available from commercial sources such as SPOT, LANDSAT and ERS. The aim will be to achieve a certain amount of integration by pooling knowledge and standardising working procedures. The work of the centre will be assessed towards the end of the three-year period and its future development then reviewed." Subsequently, the centre could become more operational particularly for crisis monitoring and verification by using data from satellites with better resolution such as Helios - due to be launched in 1994. In this context, a memorandum of understanding has been drawn up under which the Helios partners (France, Italy and Spain) would make data available to the WEU Satellite Centre. This data could then be analysed by the image-interpreters trained in the centre, and the results passed back to national capitals. In its ultimate phase, the centre could be responsible for operating WEU's autonomous satellite observation capability, currently the subject of medium- and long-term studies". Thus, the centre has not so far obtained any mandate in connection with the Open Skies Treaty. Nevertheless, it would be very regrettable if the capabilities of the centre could not be used also for the interpretation of open skies observation imagery. Since the centre is still in its experimental phase, it would be crucial for WEU member countries to elaborate as quickly as possible a concept enabling the centre to act also as an open skies imagery interpretation body. As a first step, the Council should ask the centre to present a study in which it would explain whether its present capabilities will be sufficient to conduct open skies image interpretation as a supplementary task. Thanks to a first contact with the director of the WEU Satellite Centre, the latter has kindly transmitted some first considerations in this respect which are reproduced as follows: "The centre will have the capability to accept information from a wide variety of sources. All the information will be loaded into the centre's computer database in a standard form. In addition to the scenes from a number of different satellites, it will be possible to use imagery from airborne systems, data from normal paper maps, data from digital terrain models and images which are received as high quality photos. High quality photos are converted to computer format using a high resolution laser scanner. Paper maps can also be scanned or the data transferred using a "digitising tablet". The digital terrain models are in various forms. Products which give terrain elevation information will be the first which are used. Where the full digital feature models (i.e. digital maps) exist, they have many advantages over paper maps and will be used by the centre. The method of using airborne imagery (optical, infra-red or radar) will depend on actual sensors used. Arrangements could be made to accept the aircraft tapes. in any event, selected images can be used via the scanner. Geographical linkage A major feature of the facilities of the centre is that all the information mentioned above can be directly compared. Each piece of information can be transformed, scaled, rotated and locked to a geographical reference. Direct comparisons and output which mix information from a number of sources is then possible. Requirement Open skies missions are expensive, subject to quotas and can be difficult to mount. While the data which can be collected is more detailed than that which can currently be obtained from the satellite sources available to the WEUSC, any site being considered for an open skies mission should first be surveyed from space. Such a task would enable a final decision to be made as to whether an open skies mission is necessary. The survey from space would also provide valuable material for planning the open skies mission if it is required. Mission planning Open skies misions need considerable planning to obtain the best possibilities of their effectiveness taking into account political, practical and technical limitations. Material obtained from a prior space survey can be used to plan aircraft approach and fly pass routes taking into account the details of the sites, the particular locations of interest, preferred look angles and directions for the sensors and the surrounding terrain features. Data analysis The full analysis of the data collected during an open skies mission could be a long and complex task. The data collected must be compared with many other sources of information so that the differences can be identified between what can be seen from the mission imagery and what is already known or expected about the sites. It is these differences which will form the main conclusion of the mission. Effective data analysis therefore requires the availability of facilities and databases similar to those which will be available in the WEUSC. Distribution of data Data collected during open skies missions will be the product of a costly and complex collection process. Full use should be made of any such data collected. Even if the WEUSC is not directly involved with the planning or analysis of a particular open skies mission, a copy of all data collected from open skies missions should, if possible, be provided to the WEUSC. This data would then be available for use in any subsequent tasking of the WEUSC by the WEU bodies or member nations." VII. Future prospects for the further development of the open skies regime The Open Skies Treaty has to be considered as a starting point of an evolutionary process for further confidence- and security-building measures and not as the culmination of such a development. The preamble of the treaty indicates areas in which aerial observation could be of help in strengthening peace, stability and co-operative security. It thus notes in particular the possibility of employing such a regime to improve openness and transparency, to facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms control agreements and to strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and in other relevant international institutions, but also the possible extention of the open skies regime into additional fields such as the protection of the environment. It is obvious that any further thoughts along these lines first depend on the ratification, full implementation and satisfactory functioning of the present treaty. Interest in accelerating the implementation process and in joining the Open Skies Treaty might be enhanced by comparing it with existing disarmament and arms control agreements and confidence- and security-building measures in the framework of the CSCE and their verification means24. It appears from this synopsis that the open skies regime could serve or developed as a useful additional verification means for a number of agreements such as the Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty, the INF Treaty and the START I and II Treaties; (information provided by sensors during observation overflight could complete information gained from on-site inspections, national technical means and data exchanges agreed in the abovementioned treaties. In future, the open skies regime could even serve for verifying unilateral renunciation of tactical nuclear weapons, an area where no systematic verification is possible. The possibilities of using the open skies observation means for verification tasks in the framework of the CFE Treaty has already been mentioned in Chapter III25. In NATO, a special verification co- ordinating committee was created in order to monitor the implementation of the CFE Treaty and also the Open Skies Treaty. Whereas so far the interest of the NATO verification co-ordinating committee was concentrated on the CFE Treaty, there seems now to be some interest in debating the question of whether the Open Skies Treaty should serve as the aerial inspection means for the CFE Treaty or whether the CFE Treaty should work out its own aerial inspection procedure. The first solution would have the advantage of avoiding new financial burdens, but so far no decisions have been taken. Taking into account the improved relationships between all partners of the CFE Treaty and other arms control agreements as well as between participants in the CSCE process, all faced with budgetary problems, the interest in expensive verification, inspection and observation procedures will probably decrease. The use of open skies observation means for verifying the CFE Treaty might therefore offer a reasonable solution. If such a way were choosen, the purpose would be to make the open skies regime more intrusive by improving the performances of the sensors, increasing their resolution and authorising overflying at lower altitudes than those now authorised. All this, plus an increase in overflight quotas, would allow more detailed information to be obtained on the basis of which TLE might be accurately identified. This special regime would be limited to the ATTU area and be the subject of a specific protocol added to the original treaty. Such a solution would make verification of the CFE Treaty more effective and probably enable a number of ground inspections to be eliminated. Conversely, it would mean some reduction in the scope of the Open Skies Treaty. It may, moreover, be wondered whether some participating states would be prepared to authorise such an intrusive regime when they have not done so before. The second possible option would be the conclusion of the aerial verification protocol initially intended for the CFE Treaty. This itself might be based on the Open Skies regime by incorporating in it the modifications that was already referred to above and which would be specific to it. An ad hoc Open Skies regime would thus be set up without changing anything at all in the original Open Skies Treaty. There too the consensus problem arise. Moreover, such a regime duplicate the one set up by the Open Skies Treaty. In fact, these two options are equivalent. It would merely be a question of finding the most suitable juridical form. The third possible option is, on the contrary much less binding. It would mean establishing a link, no longer juridical but political, between the two regimes, in the CSCE. This task would be a matter for the Conflict Prevention Centre in particular. The latter is already in close touch with the Open Skies Consultative Commission and with the Joint Consultative Group, a consultative body set up to apply the CFE Treaty26. It would then perhaps be a matter of the two bodies exchanging information through the Conflict Prevention Centre. These exchanges would hence be made official. Whatever the option chosen, it will have to be negotiated among all the parties involved. However, there would then be a risk of reaching compromising solutions that would reduce the effectiveness of the link between CFE and Open Skies that it would thus be possible to establish. Another, more internal option, i.e. a matter for each Government, would be establish link between the two "administrative" type regime. An elaborate system of information and command, specific to each national administration, would then have to be set up to manage inspection operations and the exchange of data, as well as the optimisation of inspection programmes. This would allow the integration and co-ordination of the various aspect of the verification of arms control agreement depending on "national technical means", open skies flights, on-site inspections and those provided for in the various confidence-building measures practised. Such an option is certainly the most pragmatic solution. It could just as well be applied in the context of a group of states parties such as WEU. To a certain extent, it resembles the proposal considered on several occasions by the WEU Assembly and aimed at creating a European verification centre whose nucleus should be WEU27. The Convention on chemical weapons, signed in Paris on 13th January 1993, includes one of the most extensive intrusive verification regimes ever contained in an arms control agreement. It might constitute another area of application for open skies flights. In that case, too, open skies flights would mainly be complementary and might prove particularly useful in the event of a crisis concerning chemical products. Sensors already provided for in the treaty allow information to be obtained about plants producing or stockpiling chemical products. It would suffise to add an air sampling device to those sensors in order to carry out analyses of the air. A more sensitive area is the question to what extent the open skies regime might serve for conflict prevention and crisis management, in the framework of the CSCE process. The Open Skies Consultative Commission would act here mainly on behalf of the competent CSCE institutions and whether the open skies observation means can be used in such cases, will depend on their ability to prevent conflicts and manage crisis. One should take into account that in a concrete crisis situation any state party concerned may use its right to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty (Article XV). It is therefore crucial, first and foremost, for the as yet insufficient capabilities of the CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management to be improved and completed. Carrying out crisis management tasks in the open skies framework would mean increasing the resolution of the sensors. In order to respond to the emergence of tense situations in the most flexible manner, at the negotiations, consideration was given to the possibility of resorting to a special one- or two-flight quota. This proposal, which was backed by France, is known as the "joker". Another proposal sought to assign a quota of overflights to the Conflict Prevention Centre which would be carried out on its own behalf in the event of crises. These proposals were not adopted at the negotiations. The emergence of ethnic conflicts, as is now the case in former Yugoslavia and the increase in the number of areas of tension are nevertheless making political leaders wish to have the widest possible range of means for averting conflicts that may break out. Hence, whatever the option envisaged, it is quite clear from what has been said above that the Open Skies Treaty has considerable development potential. Extending the open skies regime to protection of the environment is considered in the text of the treaty itself. This possibility was indeed considered when the negotiations were resumed in Vienna in January 1992, on the proposal of the Russian Delegation. It is now being discussed in the Consultative Commission which wants a serious study to be made of the possibilities of extending the open skies regime to this area. With this in mind, a seminar on the environment was held in Vienna in December 1992 under the auspices of the CSCE and the Open Skies Consultative Commission. However, for the time being, the project does not seem to have gone beyond the stage of reflection. The open skies regime could be a useful tool for developing the crisis management role of the CSCE, in particular through the Vienna Conflict Prevention Centre. One may therefore consider observation flights being used, for instance, to detect cases of atmospheric pollution and other damage to the environment or to measure radioactivity due to accidents in nuclear reactors. They may also be used to monitor respect for atmospheric pollution commitments or to identify offenders. Alongside the open skies regime, observation aircraft might be used for the purposes of scientific or practical co-operation, for instance to study the subsoil or water pollution. For that purpose, supplementary agreements would have to be concluded providing inter alia for the introduction of sensors specially designed to sample the air and, if appropriate, procedure to be followed in case of suspicion 28. The provisions relating to sensors would, therefore, require major changes. For instance, these might include air samplers, allowing radioactivity and chemical pollution to be measured, multispectral sensors (multifrenquency infrared) and radars with longer wave-lengths allowing information to be obtained concerning humidity or the composition of the soil. VIII. Conclusions The importance of the Open Skies Treaty resides first and foremost in the achievement of a new understanding of security based on openness and transparency in military matters instead of secrecy. This new kind of concrete confidence- and security-building measure based on the spirit initiated and developed in the framework of the CSCE can be successful only if all states parties are prepared to co-operate in order to ensure the full implementation of the treaty. Furthermore, it is crucial for all members of the Community of Independent States (CIS) to accede to the treaty and no member country of the CSCE should be excluded. A successful solution of outstanding problems of technical co-operation and cost-sharing will be most important for promoting interest among other countries of the world and inciting them to join the regime or to use it as a model for other world regions. This is the first time that WEU member countries have decided to act as group of state parties regarding the practical and technical implementation of a treaty. This a very positive signal and should be followed in the framework of future international agreements wherever this seems appropriate. In a final stage, WEU co-operation should reach a level at which it may be deemed to be a single state party following the Benelux example. At present, however, we are still far from such a goal. The difficulties encountered by the WEU expert group in finding an appropriate solution for a WEU aircraft pool for open skies purposes is a new example of how painful the task of harmonising national interests still is, even between close allies. It is obvious that, even after the Council has reached a decision on the WEU aircraft pool, many questions will remain unsolved and the WEU expert group will still have its work cut out if it is to elucidate all the consequences of WEU's Vienna decisions to act as a group of states parties. Of the remaining questions, only two might be mentioned in particular: first the status of associate members of WEU and observers in this group and, second if and to what extent the Torrejon Satellite Centre will be mandated by the Council to handle the interpretation of information obtained from the open skies sensors. APPENDIX I The CSCE Declaration on the Open Skies Treaty Helsinki, 24th March 1992 The Foreign Ministers of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the occasion of the signature of the Treaty on Open Skies have issued the following declaration: Welcoming the signing of the treaty on open skies regime for the security of states participating in the CSCE process, Assessing the treaty as an important element in the process of enhancing security and confidence between members of the international community, Reiterating the importance of the principle of equal security for all their countries, Noting the interest expressed by a number of states not full participants in the negotiations, and believing that their adherence to the treaty as well as signature by all the newly independent states, as mentioned in Article XVII of the treaty, would enhance the effectiveness of the open skies regime, 1. Recognise the significant contribution of the open skies negotiations made by a number of participants in the CSCE who are not original signatories to the Treaty on Open Skies, 2. Recognise also that these states may participate, on the basis of the active and passive quotas they would hold as state parties, in the implementation of the treaty and that they may take part in discussions regarding practical arrangements for the regime which will continue in Vienna within the framework of the Open Skies Consultative Commission during the period of provisional application, 3. Acknowledge the interest of the states which are participants in the CSCE but not original signatories to the Treaty on Open Skies in information obtained through open skies observation flights, 4. Welcome the interest shown by states which are participants in the CSCE but not original signatories to the Treaty on Open Skies to accede to it as provided for by Article XVII of the treaty, 5. Call upon all parties of the treaty to allow the accession of such interested states as soon as possible and to act, in all matters related to it, in the spirit of co-operation which the treaty commands. APPENDIX II Quotas and maximum flight distances * * * Allocation * First distribution of year 1 * * * of Country * passive * * * flight * Passive * Active * quotas * quotas * quotas * * * * Germany * 12 5 4 United States * 42 4 8.5 Russia/Belarus * 42 28 26 Benelux * 6 2 2 Bulgaria * 4 3 3 Canada * 12 2 4.5 Denmark * 6 2 2 Spain * 4 0 1 France * 12 3 4 United Kingdom/Ireland * 12 3 4 Greece * 4 3 2 Hungary * 4 3 2 Iceland * 4 0 0 Italy * 12 3 3.5 Norway * 7 2 3 Poland * 6 5 3 Portugal * 2 0 0 Romania * 6 4 4 Czechoslovakia * 4 3 2 Turkey * 12 5 4.5 Ukraine * 12 9 6 Source: Annex A, Sections I and II of the treaty (extracts) Section II First distribution of active quotas for observation flights 1. The first distribution of active quotas pursuant to Article III, Section I, paragraph 6 of the treaty shall be such that each state party shall be obliged to accept over its territory a number of observation flights no greater than 75%, rounded down to the nearest whole number, of the individual passive quota allocated as set forth in Section I, paragraph 1 of this annex. On this basis, and for those states parties which have conducted negotiations in the framework of the Open Skies conference in Vienna, the first distribution in respect of each other shall be valid from the date of entry into force of the treaty until 31st December following the year during which the treaty has entered into force and shall be effective only for those states parties having ratified the treaty. This first distribution is set forth as follows: The Federal Republic of Germany shall have the right to conduct three observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine; The United States of America shall have the right to conduct eight observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties, and one observation flight, shared with Canada, over the territory of Ukraine; The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties shall have the right to conduct two observation flights over the territory of Benelux, as referred to in Article XIV of the treaty, two observation flights over the territory of Canada, two observation flights over the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, three observation flights over the territory of the French Republic, three observation flights over the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, one observation flight over the territory of the Hellenic Republic, two observation flights over the territory of the Italian Republic, two observation flights over the territory of the the Kingdom of Norway, two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Turkey, three observation flights over the territory of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and four observation flights over the territory of the United States of America; The Kingdom of Belgium, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, referred to as the Benelux, shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties, and one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Poland; The Republic of Bulgaria shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Hellenic Republic, one observation flight over the territory of the Italian Republic, and one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Turkey; Canada shall have the right to conduct two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties, one observation flight over the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Poland, and one observation flight, shared with the United States of America, over the territory of Ukraine; The Kingdom of Denmark shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties, and one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Poland; The Kingdom of Spain shall have the right to conduct three observation flights over the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic; The French Republic shall have the right to conduct three observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties, and one observation flight over the territory of Romania; The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland shall have the right to conduct three observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine; The Hellenic Republic shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, and one observation flight over the territory of Romania; The Republic of Hungary shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of Romania, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine; The Italian Republic shall have the right to conduct two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Hungary, and one observation flight, shared with the Republic of Turkey, over the territory of Ukraine; The Kingdom of Norway shall have the right to conduct two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties and one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Poland; The Republic of Poland shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine; Romania shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, one observation flight over the territory of the Hellenic Republic, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Hungary, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine; The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, and one observation flight over the territory of Ukraine; The Republic of Turkey shall have the right to conduct two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria and two observation flights, one of which is shared with the Italian Republic, over the territory of Ukraine; Ukraine shall have the right to conduct one observation flight over the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Hungary, one observation flight over the territory of the Republic of Poland, one observation flight over the territory of Romania, and two observation flights over the territory of the Republic of Turkey. 2. Following this first distribution and until the date of the full implementation of the treaty specified in Article XVIII to that effect for the use of active quotas, annual distributions shall be based on the 75% rule established in paragraph 1 of this section in relation to the allocation of individual passive quotas. 3. From the date of full implementation of the treaty each state party shall accept during subsequent distributions of active quotas over its territory, if so requested, a number of observation flights up to the full amount of its individual passive quota. Whenever possible or requested and unless otherwise agreed, those distributions shall be based on a proportionate increase of the active quotas distributed in the first distribution. 4. In the event that an additional state ratifies or accedes to the treaty in accordance with Article XVII, the distribution of active quotas to such state shall be considered during the regular session of the Open Skies Consultative Commission following the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession, subject to the following provisions: (a) the ratifying or acceding state shall have the right to request observation flights over the territories of states parties within the passive quota allocated to that state in accordance with the provisions of Section I, paragraph 3 of this annex, and within the passive quotas of the states parties requested for observation flights, unless otherwise agreed by the states parties involved; and (b) all states parties shall have at the same time the right to request observation flights over the territory of that signing or acceding state within their active quotas and within the passive quotas allocated to that state. Section III Maximum flight distances of observation flights The maximum flight distances of observation flights over the territories of observed parties commencing from each Open Skies airfield are as follows: kilometres The Federal Republic of Germany Wunstorf 1 200 Landsberg-Lech 1 200 The United States of America Washington-Dulles 4 900 Travis AFB 4 000 Elmendorf AFB 3 000 Lincoln-Municipal 4 800 The Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation group of states parties Kubinka 5 000 Ulan Ude 5 000 Vorkuta 6 500 Magadan 6 500 Benelux Zaventem/Melsbroek 945 The Republic of Bulgaria Sofia 660 Burgas 660 Canada Ottawa 5 000 Iqaluit 6 000 Yellowknife 5 000 The Kingdom of Denmark Metropolitan 800 Faroe Islands 250 Greenland 5 600 The Kingdom of Spain Getafe 1 300 Gando 750 Valencia 1 300 Valladolid 1 300 Moron 1 300 The French Republic Orleans-Bricy 1 400 Nice-Cote d'Azur 800 Toulouse-Blagnac 700 The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Brize Norton 1 150 Scampton 1 150 Leuchars 1 150 with Scilly Islands 1 500 with Shetland Islands 1 500 The Hellenic Republic Thessaloniki 900 Elefsis 900 with Crete, Karpathos, Rhodes, Kos Islands 1 100 The Republic of Hungary Budapest-Ferihegy 860 The Republic of Iceland 1 500 The Italian Republic Milano-Malpensa 1 130 Palermo-Punta Raisi 1 400 The Kingdom of Norway Oslo-Gardermoen 1 700 Tromsoe-Langnes 1 700 The Republic of Poland Warszawa-Okecie 1 400 The Portuguese Republic Lisboa 1 200 Sta Maria 1 700 Porto Santo 1 030 Romania Bucharest-Otopeni 900 Timisoara 900 Bacau 900 The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Praha 600 Bratislava 700 Kosice 400 The Republic of Turkey Eskisehir 1 500 Diyarbakir 1 500 Ukraine Borispol 2 100 APPENDIX III Information transmitted by the Executive Secretariat CSCE Vienna, CFE, JCG, OSCC Technical questions that could not be solved when the Open Skies Treaty was signed were handled in the Open Skies Consultative Committee. All questions that have already been solved were adopted in the form of "Decisions relating to the Open Skies Treaty": cost-sharing resulting from the application of the Open Skies Treaty (Decision 1 of 29th June 1992 with specifications of 10th December 1992); additional measures for non-destructive tests (Decision 2 of 29th June 1992); method of calculating the maximum height above the ground at which each optical camera on board an observation aircraft may be used during an observation flight (Decision 3 of 29th June 1992); minimum specifications applicable to cameras on board an observation aircraft of an observed party exercising its right to provide an obsesrvation aircraft for an observation flight (Decision 4 of 29th June 1992); responsibility for processing films used during an observation flight (Decision 5 of 29th June 1992); internal regulations and working methods of the Open Skies Consultative Committee (Decision 6 of 29th June 1992); methods to be used to determine the ground resolution of synthetic aperture radars (Decision 7 of 10th December 1992). APPENDIX IV: drawing APPENDIX IVa: drawing APPENDIX V 1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 2. Members of the committee: Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Borderas (Alternate for Mr. Palacios) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Atkinson, Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Boehm, Bosco, Curto, Davis, De Paoli, Dimmer, Gonzalez-Laxe, Gottardo, Guzzetti, Lagorce, Le Grand, Litherland, Menzel, Pocas Santos, Sarens, Sir Donald Thompson (Alternate: Sir udley Smith), MM. Tummers, Valleix, Verbeek, N.... N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 1. Canada, Denmark, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary. 2. Document 1158. 3. Appendix I. 4. Europa-Archiv, 10th September 1992, page 486. 5. Appendix II. 6. Appendix II. 7. Peter Jones, Arms Control Today, May 1992, page 14. 8. Arms Control Today, May 1992, page 15. 9. Appendix III. 10. In an article in the New York Times of the 5th June 1989, quoted by Ralph J. Lysyshyn in "Open Skies ahead" in Nato Review No. 1, February 1992, page 23 11. Peter Jones, Arms Open Skies: A New Era of Transparency, Arms Control Today, May 1992, page 10. 12. CFE Treaty Article XIV.6. 13. CFE Treaty, Protocol on Inspection. 14. Europa Archiv, 10th September 1992, page 489. 15. See the French Government's answer on 23rd July 1992 to a question put by Mr. Jeambrun. 16. Document 1282. 17. Document 1322. 18. Document 1323. 19. Document 1345. 20. Document 1352. 21. Document 1361. 22. Appendix IV. 23. Appendix IVa. 24. Synopsis in Appendix V. 25. Paragraphs 43-51. 26. cf. CFE Treaty, Article XIV, and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group. 27. Recommendation 481, Document 1223. 28. Ruediger Hartmann, Europa Archiv, 10th September 1992,page 489. © 1998, WEU Assembly