Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of:
Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa
and Sweden
1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden have considered
the continued threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the
indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states,
as well as by those three nuclear-weapons-capable states that have not
acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the attendant possibility
of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The seriousness of this
predicament has been further underscored by the recent nuclear tests
conducted by India and Pakistan.
2. We fully share the conclusion expressed by the commissioners of the
Canberra Commission in their Statement that "the proposition that
nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used -
accidentally or by decision - defies credibility. The only complete
defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they
will never be produced again."
3. We recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations already
in January 1946 - in its very first resolution - unanimously called
for a commission to make proposals for "the elimination from national
armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to
mass destruction." While we can rejoice at the achievement of the
international community in concluding total and global prohibitions on
chemical and biological weapons by the Conventions of 1972 and 1993,
we equally deplore the fact that the countless resolutions and
initiatives which have been guided by similar objectives in respect of
nuclear weapons in the past half century remain unfulfilled.
4. We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the
nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to
take that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to
the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.
5. The vast majority of the membership of the United Nations has
entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. These undertakings have been made in the context of the
corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon states
to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We are deeply concerned at the
persistant reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to approach their
Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of
their nuclear weapons.
6. In this connection we recall the unanimous conclusion of the
International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under
strict and effective international control.
7. The international community must not enter the third millennium
with the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be
considered legitimate for the indefinite future, when the present
juncture provides a unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them
for all time. We therefore call on the governments of each of the
nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to
commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start
work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for
its achievement.
8. We agree that the measures resulting from such undertakings leading
to the total elimination of nuclear weapons will begin with those
states that have the largest arsenals. But we also stress the
importance that they be joined in a seamless process by those with
lesser arsenals at the appropriate juncture. The nuclear-weapon states
should immediately begin to consider steps to be taken to this effect.
9. In this connection we welcome both the achievements to date and the
future promise of the START process as an appropriate bilateral, and
subsequently plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon
states, for the practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear
armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. The actual elimination of nuclear arsenals, and the development of
requisite verification regimes, will of necessity require time. But
there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon states
can, and should, take immediately. We call on them to abandon present
hair-trigger postures by proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating
their weapons. They should also remove non-strategic nuclear weapons
from deployed sites. Such measures will create beneficial conditions
for continued disarmament efforts and help prevent inadvertent,
accidental or unauthorized launches.
11. In order for the nuclear disarmament process to proceed, the three
nuclear-weapons-capable states must clearly and urgently reverse the
pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons development or deployment
and refrain from any actions which could undermine the efforts of the
international community towards nuclear disarmament. We call upon
them, and all other states that have not yet done so, to adhere to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and take the necessary measures which flow
from adherence to this instrument. We likewise call upon them to sign
and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without delay and
without conditions.
12. An international ban on the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Cut-off) would
further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear
weapons. As agreed in 1995 by the States Parties to the NPT,
negotiations on such a convention should commence immediately.
13. Disarmament measures alone will not bring about a world free from
nuclear weapons. Effective international cooperation to prevent the
proliferation of these weapons is vital and must be enhanced through,
inter alia, the extension of controls over all fissile material and
other relevant components of nuclear weapons. The emergence of any new
nuclear-weapon state, as well as any non-state entity in a position to
produce or otherwise acquire such weapons, seriously jeopardises the
process of eliminating nuclear weapons.
14. Other measures must also be taken pending the total elimination of
nuclear arsenals. Legally binding instruments should be developed with
respect to a joint no-first-use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon
states and as regards non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon states, so called negative security
assurances.
15. The conclusion of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok
and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as well as the
Antarctic Treaty have steadily excluded nuclear weapons from entire
regions of the world. The further pursuit, extension and establishment
of such zones, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle
East and South Asia, represents a significant contribution to the goal
of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
16. These measures all constitute essential elements which can and
should be pursued in parallel: by the nuclear-weapon states among
themselves; and by the nuclear-weapon states together with the
non-nuclear-weapon states, thus providing a road map towards a
nuclear-weapon-free world.
17. The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons will require
the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally
binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing
set of instruments.
18. We, on our part, will spare no efforts to pursue the objectives
outlined above. We are jointly resolved to achieve the goal of a world
free from nuclear weapons. We firmly hold that the determined and
rapid preparation for the post-nuclear era must start now.
.