International Atomic Energy Agency
Information Circular
(Unofficial electronic edition)
INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 1/Add.1
7 June 1996

Original: ENGLISH,

Communication of 29 April 1996 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Atomic Energy Agency Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology

Nuclear Transfers
  1. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency has received a note verbale of 29 April 1996 from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation providing information on the export policies and practices of the Government of the Russian Federation with respect to nuclear transfers.

  2. In light of the request expressed in the note verbale, the text of the note verbale and its attachment is annexed hereto.


The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna presents its compliments to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has the honour to refer to the letter of the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the International Organizations in Vienna dated 11 January 1978 in which the Government of the USSR stated its resolve to act in accordance with the principles for nuclear exports originally published in the form of document INFCIRC/254, and to the letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation dated 26 December 1991, in which it was stated that the "membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the IAEA and all its organs, as well as that country's participation in all conventions, agreements and other international legal documents concluded within the framework or under aegis of the Agency, are to be continued by the Russian Federation".

The development of nuclear technology has brought about the need for further clarification and amendment of certain sections of the Trigger List contained in Annex A and Annex B to the Guidelines currently published as document INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1, as follows:

-Section 5 of Annex B to document INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1 relating to equipment especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium has been clarified and amended;

-Annex A and Annex B of document INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1 have been amended to include a new note on facilities for uranium conversion and equipment especially designed or prepared therefor;

-Item 1.7 concerning primary coolant pumps has been added to Section 1 of Annex B to document INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1.

The Government of the Russian Federation has decided that the fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls of the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers set out in document INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1, as amended, should apply to technology directly associated with any of the items identified in Annex A and Annex B of the Guidelines.

The Government of the Russian Federation has decided to adopt a general principle that the object of the controls of the items or related technology on the Trigger List should not be defeated by the transfer of component parts and that it will take such actions as it can to achieve this aim and will continue to seek a workable definition for component parts, which could be used by all suppliers.

The Government of the Russian Federation has clarified the definition of nuclear grade graphite under item 2.2 of Section 2 of Annex B of document INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/ Mod.2.

The Government of the Russian Federation has adopted an additional guideline to require government to government assurances for any relevant original transfers in order to ensure the consent rights on the retransfer of Trigger List items and technology as defined under paragraph 10(b) of the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part 1/ Mod.3).

Accordingly, the following amendments were made to the text of the Guidelines and Annexes:

-The Guidelines were revised with amendments to paragraphs 1,2,4(a), 4(d), 10(a), 10(b), 11 and 16, and a new paragraph 10(c);

-Annex A of the Guidelines includes a new general note, technology controls and definitions; amendments to Section 2 of PART A; deletion of paragraphs (1) and (4) of PART B; and the renumbering of subsequent paragraphs of the document;

-Annex B of the Guidelines includes amendments to item 2.2 of Section 2.

In the interest of clarity, the full text of the revised Guidelines together with Annexes A and B is attached.

The Government of the Russian Federation has decided to act in accordance with the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers so revised.

In reaching this decision, the Government of the Russian Federation is fully aware of the need to contribute to economic development while avoiding contributing in any way to the dangers of a proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and of the need to remove non-proliferation assurances from the field of commercial competition.

The Government of the Russian Federation would be grateful if the Director General would circulate the text of this note and its attachment to all Member States of the IAEA.

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency the assurances of its highest esteem.

Vienna, 29 April 1996


  1. The following fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls should apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State and, in the case of controls on retransfer, to transfers to any State. In this connection, suppliers have defined an export trigger list.

    Prohibition on nuclear explosives

  2. Suppliers should authorize transfer of items or related technology identified in the trigger list only upon formal governmental assurances from recipients explicitly excluding uses which would result in any nuclear explosive device.

    Physical protection

  3. (a) All nuclear materials and facilities identified by the agreed trigger list should be placed under effective physical protection to prevent unauthorized use and handling. The levels of physical protection to be ensured in relation to the type of materials, equipment and facilities, have been agreed by the suppliers, taking account of international recommendations.

    (b) The implementation of measures of physical protection in the recipient country is the responsibility of the Government of that country. However, in order to implement the terms agreed upon amongst suppliers, the levels of physical protection on which these measures have to be based should be the subject of an agreement between supplier and recipient.

    (c) In each case special arrangements should be made for a clear definition of responsibilities for the transport of trigger list items.


  4. (a) Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology to a non-nuclear-weapon State only when the receiving State has brought into force an agreement with the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards on all source and special fissionable material in its current and future peaceful activities.

    (b) Transfers covered by paragraph 4 (a) to a non-nuclear-weapon State without such a safeguards agreement should be authorized only in exceptional cases when they are deemed essential for the safe operation of existing facilities and if safeguards are applied to those facilities. Suppliers should inform and, if appropriate, consult in the event that they intend to authorize or to deny such transfers.

    (c) The policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) and 4 (b) does not apply to agreements or contracts drawn up on or prior to April 3, 1992. In case of countries that have adhered or will adhere to INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1/Part 1 later than April 3, 1992, the policy only applies to agreements (to be) drawn up after their date of adherence.

    (d) Under agreements to which the policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) does not apply (see paragraphs 4 (b) and (c)) suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology only when covered by IAEA safeguards with duration and coverage provisions in conformity with IAEA doc. GOV/1621. However, suppliers undertake to strive for the earliest possible implementation of the policy referred to in paragraph 4 (a) under such agreements.

    (e) Suppliers reserve the right to apply additional conditions of supply as a matter of national policy.

  5. Suppliers will jointly reconsider their common safeguards requirements, whenever appropriate.

    Safeguards triggered by the transfer of certain technology

  6. (a) The requirements of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above should also apply to facilities for reprocessing, enrichment, or heavy-water production, utilizing technology directly transferred by the supplier or derived from transferred facilities, or major critical components thereof.

    (b) The transfer of such facilities, or major critical components thereof, or related technology, should require an undertaking (1) that IAEA safeguards apply to any facilities of the same type (i.e. if the design, construction or operating processes are based on the same or similar physical or chemical processes, as defined in the trigger list) constructed during an agreed period in the recipient country and (2) that there should at all times be in effect a safeguards agreement permitting the IAEA to apply Agency safeguards with respect to such facilities identified by the recipient, or by the supplier in consultation with the recipient, as using transferred technology.

    Special controls on sensitive exports

  7. Suppliers should exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials. If enrichment or reprocessing facilities, equipment or technology are to be transferred, suppliers should encourage recipients to accept, as an alternative to national plants, supplier involvement and/or other appropriate multinational participation in resulting facilities. Suppliers should also promote international (including IAEA) activities concerned with multinational regional fuel cycle centres.

    Special controls on export of enrichment facilities, equipment and technology

  8. For a transfer of an enrichment facility, or technology therefor, the recipient nation should agree that neither the transferred facility, nor any facility based on such technology, will be designed or operated for the production of greater than 20% enriched uranium without the consent of the supplier nation, of which the IAEA should be advised.

    Controls on supplied or derived weapons-usable material

  9. Suppliers recognize the importance, in order to advance the objectives of these guidelines and to provide opportunities further to reduce the risks of proliferation, of including in agreements on supply of nuclear materials or of facilities which produce weapons-usable material, provisions calling for mutual agreement between the supplier and the recipient on arrangements for reprocessing, storage, alteration, use, transfer or retransfer of any weapons-usable material involved. Suppliers should endeavour to include such provisions whenever appropriate and practicable.

    Controls on retransfer

  10. (a) Suppliers should transfer trigger list items or related technology, including technology defined under paragraph 6, only upon the recipient's assurance that in the case of:

    (1) retransfer of such items or related technology,


    (2) transfer of trigger list items derived from facilities originally transferred by the supplier, or with the help of equipment or technology originally transferred by the supplier;

    the recipient of the retransfer or transfer will have provided the same assurances as those required by the supplier for the original transfer.

    (b) In addition the supplier's consent should be required for: (1) any retransfer of trigger list items or related technology and any transfer referred to under paragraph 10 (a) (2) from any State which does not require full scope safeguards, in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) of these Guidelines, as a condition of supply; (2) any retransfer of the facilities, major critical components, or technology described in paragraph 6; (3) any transfer of facilities or major critical components derived from those items; (4) any retransfer of heavy water or weapons-usable material.

    (c) To ensure the consent right as defined under paragraph 10(b), government to government assurances will be required for any relevant original transfer.

    Non-proliferation Principle

  11. Notwithstanding other provisions of these Guidelines, suppliers should authorize transfer of items or related technology identified in the trigger list only when they are satisfied that the transfers would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.


    Physical security

  12. Suppliers should promote international co-operation on the exchange of physical security information, protection of nuclear materials in transit, and recovery of stolen nuclear materials and equipment.

    Support for effective IAEA safeguards

  13. Suppliers should make special efforts in support of effective implementation of IAEA safeguards. Suppliers should also support the Agency's efforts to assist Member States in the improvement of their national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material and to increase the technical effectiveness of safeguards.

    Similarly, they should make every effort to support the IAEA in increasing further the adequacy of safeguards in the light of technical developments and the rapidly growing number of nuclear facilities, and to support appropriate initiatives aimed at improving the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards.

    Sensitive plant design features

  14. Suppliers should encourage the designers and makers of sensitive equipment to construct it in such a way as to facilitate the application of safeguards.


  15. (a) Suppliers should maintain contact and consult through regular channels on matters connected with the implementation of these Guidelines.

    (b) Suppliers should consult, as each deems appropriate, with other Governments concerned on specific sensitive cases, to ensure that any transfer does not contribute to risks of conflict or instability.

    (c) In the event that one or more suppliers believe that there has been a violation of supplier/recipient understandings resulting from these Guidelines, particularly in the case of an explosion of a nuclear device, or illegal termination or violation of IAEA safeguards by a recipient, suppliers should consult promptly through diplomatic channels in order to determine and assess the reality and extent of the alleged violation.

    Pending the early outcome of such consultations, suppliers will not act in a manner that could prejudice any measure that may be adopted by other suppliers concerning their current contacts with that recipient.

    Upon the findings of such consultations, the suppliers, bearing in mind Article XII of the IAEA Statute, should agree on an appropriate response and possible action which could include the termination of nuclear transfers to that recipient.

  16. In considering transfers, each supplier should exercise prudence having regard to all the circumstances of each case, including any risk that technology transfers or subsequent retransfers might result in unsafeguarded nuclear materials.

  17. Unanimous consent is required for any changes in these Guidelines, including any which might result from the reconsideration mentioned in paragraph 5.