- The Agreement should contain, in accordance with
Article III.l of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons ), an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards, in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities
within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried
out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of
verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS
- The Agreement should provide for the Agency's right and
obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in
accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or
special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities
within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or
carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose
of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND THE STATE
- The Agreement should provide that the Agency and the
State shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the
safeguards provided for therein
IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS
- The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall be
implemented in a manner designed:
- (a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological
development of the State or international co-operation in the
field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international
exchange nuclear material 2);
- (b) To avoid undue interference in the State's peaceful
nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of
facilities; and
- (c) To be consistent with prudent management practices
required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.
- The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall
take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial
secrets and other confidential information coming to its
knowledge in the implementation of the Agreement. The Agency
shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or
person any information obtained by it in connection with the
implementation of the Agreement, except that specific information
relating to such implementation in the State may be given to the
Board of Governors and to such Agency staff members as require
such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection
with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency
to fulfil its responsibilities in implementing the Agreement.
Summarized information on nuclear material being
safeguarded by the Agency under the Agreement may be published
upon decision of the Board if the States directly concerned
agree.
- The Agreement should provide that in implementing
safeguards pursuant thereto the Agency shall take full account of
technological developments In the field of safeguards, and shall
make every effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the
application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow
of nuclear material subject to safeguards under the
Agreement by
use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic
points to the extent that present or future technology permits.
In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use should be
made, for example, of such means as:
- (a) Containment as a means of defining material balance
areas
for accounting purposes;
- (b) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating
the flow of nuclear material; and
- (c) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages
in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing,
use or storage of n cleat material from which nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and
minimization of verification procedures in respect of other n
clear material, on condition that this does not hamper the Agency
in applying safeguards under the Agreement.
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
MATERIAL
- The Agreement should provide that the State shall establish
and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all
n clear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement, and
that such safeguards shall be applied in such a manner as to
enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been
no diversion of n cleat material from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the
State's system. The Agency s verification shall include, inter
alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the
Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II
below. The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of
the technical effectiveness of the State's system.
PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY
- The Agreement should provide that to ensure the effective
implementation of safeguards thereunder the Agency shall be
provided, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II
below, with information concerning nuclear material
subject to
safeguards under the Agreement and the features of
facilities
relevant to safeguarding such material. The Agency shall
require only the minimum amount of information and data
consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under the
Agreement. Information pertaining to facilities shall be
the
minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material
subject to
safeguards under the Agreement. In examining design information,
the Agency shall, at the request of the State, be prepared to
examine on premises of the State design information which the
State regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such
information would not have to be physically transmitted to the
Agency provided that it remained available for ready further
examination by the Agency on premises of the State.
AGENCY INSPECTORS
- The Agreement should provide that the State shall
take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can
effectively discharge their functions under the Agreement. The
Agency shall secure the consent of the State to the designation
of Agency inspectors to that State. If the State, either upon
proposal of a designation or at any other time after a
designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency
shall propose to the State an alternative designation or
designations. The repeated refusal of a State to accept the
designation of Agency inspectors which would impede the
inspections conducted under the Agreement would be considered
by the Board upon referral by the Director General with a view to
appropriate action. The visits and activities of Agency
inspectors shall be so arranged as to reduce to a minimum the
possible inconvenience and disturbance to the State and to the
peaceful nuclear activities inspected, as well as to ensure
protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential
information coming to the inspectors' knowledge.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
- The Agreement should specify the privileges and
immunities which shall be granted to the Agency and its staff in
respect of their functions under the Agreement. In the case of a
State party to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of
the Agency), the provisions thereof, as in force for such State,
shall apply. In the case of other States, the privileges and
immunities granted should be such as to ensure that:
- (a) The Agency and its staff will be in a position to
discharge their functions under the Agreement effectively; and
- (b) No such State will be placed thereby in a more favourable
position than States party to the Agreement on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Agency.
TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS
Consumption or dilution of nuclear material
- The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall terminate
on n clear material subject to safeguards thereunder upon
determination by the Agency that it has been consumed, or has
been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any
nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards,
or has become practicably irrecoverable.
Transfer of nuclear material out of the
State
- The Agreement should provide, with respect to nuclear
material subject to safeguards thereunder, for notification of
transfers of such material out of the State, in accordance with
the provisions set out in paragraphs 92--94 below. The Agency
shall terminate safeguards under the Agreement on nuclear
material when the recipient State has assumed responsibility
therefor, as provided for in paragraph 91. The Agency shall
maintain records indicating each transfer and, where applicable,
the re-application of safeguards to the transferred nuclear
material.
Provisions relating to nuclear material to be used
in
non-nuclear activities
- The Agreement should provide that if the State wishes to use
nuclear material subject to safeguards thereunder in
non-nuclear
activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, it
shall agree with the Agency on the circumstances under which the
safeguards on such nuclear material may be terminated
NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE
USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES
- The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to
exercise its discretion to use nuclear mater al which is required
to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not
require the application of safeguards under the Agreement, the
following procedures will apply:
- (a) The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making
it clear:
- (i) That the use of the nuclear material in a
non-proscribed
military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the
State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards
apply, that the nuclear material will be used only in a
peaceful nuclear activity; and
- (ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards
the nuclear material will not be used for the production
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- (b) The Agency and the State shall make an arrangement so
that, only while the nuclear material is in such an
activity,
the safeguards provided for in the Agreement will not be applied.
The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the
period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be
applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in the
Agreement shall again apply as soon as the nuclear
material is
reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The
Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and
composition of such unsafeguarded nuclear material in the
State
and of any exports of such material; and
- (c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the
Agency. The Agency's agreement shall be given as promptly as
possible; it shall only relate to the temporal and procedural
provisions, reporting arrangements, etc., but shall not involve
any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or
relate to the use of the nuclear material therein.
FINANCE
- The Agreement should contain one of the following sets of
provisions:
- (a) An agreement with a Member of the Agency should provide
that each party thereto shall bear the expense it incurs in
implementing its responsibilities thereunder. However, if the
State or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary
expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the
Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed
in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost
of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may
request; or
- (b) An agreement with a party not a Member of the Agency
should in application of the provisions of Article XIV.C of the
Statute, provide that the party shall reimburse fully to the
Agency the safeguards expenses the Agency incurs thereunder.
However, if the party or persons under its jurisdiction incur
extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the
Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it
has agreed in advance to do so.
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE
- The Agreement should provide that the State shall ensure that
any protection against third party liability in respect of
nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial
security, which may be available under its laws or regulations
shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of
the implementation of the Agreement, in the same way as that
protection applies to nationals of the State.
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
- The Agreement should provide that any claim by one party
thereto against the other in respect of any damage, other than
damage arising out of a nuclear incident, resulting from the
implementation of safeguards under the Agreement, shall be
settled in accordance with international law.
MEASURES IN RELATION TO VERIFICATION OF NON-DIVERSION
- The Agreement should provide that if the Board, upon
report of the Director General, decides that an action by the
State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification
that n clear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement
is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take
the required action without delay, irrespective of whether
procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been invoked.
- The Agreement should provide that if the Board upon
examination of relevant information reported to it by the
Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that
there has been no diversion of nuclear material required
to be
safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports
provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may
also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in
that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take
account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards
measures that have been applied and shall afford the
State every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any
necessary reassurance.
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT
OF DISPUTES
- The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto shall,
at the request of either, consult about any question arising
out of the interpretation or application thereof.
- The Agreement should provide that the State shall have the
right to request that any question arising out of the
interpretation or application thereof be considered by the Board;
and that the State shall be invited by the Board to participate
in the discussion of any such question by the Board.
- The Agreement should provide that any dispute arising out of
the interpretation or application thereof except a dispute
with regard to a finding by the Board under paragraph 19 above or
an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding which is
not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the
parties should, on the request of either party, be submitted to
an arbitral tribunal composed as follows: each party would
designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated
would elect a third, who would be the Chairman. If, within 30
days of the request for arbitration, either party has not
designated an arbitrator, either party to the dispute may request
the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an
arbitrator. The same procedure would apply if, within 30 days of
the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the
third arbitrator had not been elected. A majority of the members
of the arbitral tribunal would constitute a quorum, and all
decisions would require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The
arbitral procedure would be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions
of the tribunal would be binding on both parties.
FINAL CLAUSES
Amendment of the Agreement
- The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto shall,
at the request of either of them, consult each other on
amendment of the Agreement. All amendments shall require the
agreement of both parties. It might additionally be provided, if
convenient to the State, that the agreement of the parties on
amendments to Part II of the Agreement could be achieved by
recourse to a simplified procedure. The Director General
shall promptly inform all Member States of any amendment to the
Agreement.
Suspension of application of Agency safeguards under other
agreements
- Where applicable and where the State desires such a provision
to appear, the Agreement should provide that the application of
Agency safeguards in the State under other safeguards agreements
with the Agency shall be suspended while the Agreement is in
force. If the State has received assistance from the Agency for a
project, the State's undertaking in the Project Agreement not to
use items subject thereto in such a way as to further any
military purpose shall continue to apply.
Entry into force and duration
- The Agreement should provide that it shall enter into force
on the date on which the Agency receives from the State written
notification that the statutory and constitutional requirements
for entry into force have been met. The Director General shall
promptly inform all Member States of the entry into force.
- The Agreement should provide for it to remain in
force as long as the State is party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).
PART II
INTRODUCTION
- The Agreement should provide that the purpose of Part II
thereof is to specify the procedures to be applied for the
implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.
OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDS
- The Agreement should provide that the objective of safeguards
is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities
of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to
the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive
devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such
diversion by the risk of early detection.
- To this end the Agreement should provide for the use
of material accountancy as a safeguards measure of fundamental
importance, with containment and surveillance as important
complementary measures.
- The Agreement should provide that the technical
conclusion of the Agency's verification activities shall be a
statement, in respect of each material balance area, of
the
amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period,
giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
MATERIAL
- The Agreement should provide that pursuant to
paragraph 7 above the Agency, in carrying out its verification
activities, shall make full use of the State s system of
accounting for and control of all nuclear mate al subject to
safeguards under the Agreement, and shall avoid unnecessary
duplication of the State's accounting and control activities.
- The Agreement should provide that the State's system of
accounting for and control of all n clear material subject to
safeguards under the Agreement shall be based on a structure of
material balance areas, and shall make provision as
appropriate
and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements for the
establishment of such measures as:
- (a) A measurement system for the determination of the
quantities of nuclear material received, produced,
shipped, lost
or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on
inventory;
- (b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements
and the estimation of measurement uncertainty;
- (c) Procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating
differences in shipper/receiver measurements;
- (d) Procedures for taking a physical inventory
- (e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of
unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses;
- (f) A system of records and reports showing, for each
material balance area, the inventory of nuclear
material and the
changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers
out of the material balance area;
- (g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and
arrangements are being operated correctly; and
- (h) Procedures for the provisions of reports to the Agency in
accordance with paragraphs 59--69 below.
STARTING POINT OF SAFEGUARDS
- The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall not apply
thereunder to material in mining or ore processing activities.
- The Agreement should provide that:
- (a) When any material containing uranium or thorium
which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle
described in sub-paragraph (c) below is directly or indirectly
exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State, the State shall inform
the Agency of its quantity, composition and destination, unless
the material is exported for specifically non-nuclear purposes;
- (b) When any material containing uranium or thorium
which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle
described in sub-paragraph (c) below is imported, the State shall
inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the
material is imported for specifically non-nuclear purposes; and
- (c) When any nuclear material of a composition and
purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically
enriched leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has
been produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other
nuclear material produced at a later stage in the nuclear
fuel
cycle, is imported into the State, the nuclear material
shall
become subject to the other safeguards procedures
specified in the Agreement.
TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS
- The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall
terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards
thereunder
under the conditions set forth in paragraph 11 above. Where the
conditions of that paragraph are not met, but the State considers
that the recovery of safeguarded nuclear material from
residues
is not for the time being practicable or desirable, the Agency
and the State shall consult on the appropriate safeguards
measures to be applied. It should further be provided that
safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to
safeguards under the Agreement under the conditions set forth in
paragraph 13 above, provided that the State and the
Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably
irrecoverable.
EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS
- The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall,
at the request of the State, exempt nuclear material from
safeguards, as follows:
- (a) Special fissionable material, when it is used in
gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments;
- (b) nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear
activities in accordance with paragraph 13 above, if such nuclear
material is recoverable; and
- (c) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238
exceeding 80%.
- The Agreement should provide that nuclear material
that would
otherwise be subject to safeguards shall be exempted from
safeguards at the request of the State, provided that nuclear
material so exempted in the State may not at any time exceed:
- (a) One kilogram in total of special fissionable material,
which may consist of one of more of the following:
- (i) Plutonium;
- (ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (209 ) and
above,
taken account of by multiplying its weight by its
enrichment; and
- (iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (209 ) and
above
that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its
weight by five times the square of its enrichment;
- (b) Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted
uranium with an enrichment above 0.005 (0.59 );
- (c) Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an
enrichment of 0.005 (0.59 ) or below; and
- (d) Twenty metric tons of thorium; or such greater amounts as
may be specified by the Board of Governors for uniform
application.
- The Agreement should provide that if exempted nuclear
material is to be processed or stored together with safeguarded
nuclear material, provision should be made for the
re-application
of safeguards thereto.
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS
- The Agreement should provide that the Agency and the State
shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify in detail,
to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its
responsibilities under the Agreement in an effective and
efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in the Agreement
are to be applied. Provision should be made for the
possibility of an extension or change of the Subsidiary
Arrangements by agreement between the Agency and the State
without amendment of the Agreement.
- It should be provided that the Subsidiary Arrangements shall
enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible
after, the entry into force of the Agreement. The State and the
Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force
within 90 days of the entry into force of the Agreement, a later
date being acceptable only with the agreement of both parties.
The State shall provide the Agency promptly with the
information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements.
The Agreement should also provide that, upon its entry into
force, the Agency shall be entitled to apply the procedures laid
down therein in respect of the nuclear material listed in
the
inventory provided for in paragraph 41 below.
INVENTORY
- The Agreement should provide that, on the basis of
the initial report referred to in paragraph 62 below, the Agency
shall establish a unified inventory of all nuclear
material in
the State subject to safeguards under the Agreement, irrespective
of its origin, and maintain this inventory on the basis of
subsequent reports and of the results of its verification
activities. Copies of the inventory shall be made available to
the State at agreed intervals.
DESIGN INFORMATION
General
- Pursuant to paragraph 8 above, the Agreement should
stipulate that design information in respect of existing
facilities shall be provided to the Agency during the
discussion
of the Subsidiary Arrangements, and that the time limits for the
provision of such information in respect of new facilities
shall
be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. It should further be
stipulated that such information shall be provided as early
as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a
new
facility.
- The Agreement should specify that the design
information in respect of each facility to be made
available to
the Agency shall include, when applicable:
- (a) The identification of the facility, stating its
general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic
location, and the name and address to be used for routine
business purposes;
- (b) A description of the general arrangement of the
facility
with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location
and flow of nuclear mater al and to the general layout of
important items of equipment which use, produce or process
nuclear material;
- (c) A description of features of the facility relating
to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and
- (d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at
the facility for nuclear material accountancy and
control, with
special reference to material balance areas established by
the
operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical
inventory taking.
- The Agreement should further provide that other information
relevant to the application of safeguards shall be made available
to the Agency in respect of each facility, in particular
on
organizational responsibility for material accountancy and
control. It should also be provided that the State shall make
available to the Agency supplementary information on the
health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and
with which the inspectors shall comply at the facility.
- The Agreement should stipulate that design information in
respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes shall
be provided for examination sufficiently in advance for the
safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary.
Purposes of examination of design information
- The Agreement should provide that the design
information made available to the Agency shall be used for the
following purposes:
- (a) To identify the features of facilities and nuclear
material relevant to the application of safeguards to nuclear
material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;
- (b) To determine material balance areas to be used for
Agency accounting purposes and to select those strategic
points
which are key measurement points and which will be used to
determine the nuclear material flows and inventories; in
determining such material balance areal the Agency shall,
inter alia, use the following criteria:
- (i) The size of the material balance area should be
related
to the accuracy with which the material balance can be
established;
- (ii) In determining the mater al balance area advantage
should be taken of any opportunity to use containment and
surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements
and thereby simplify the application of safeguards and
concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement points;
- (iii) A number of material balance areal in use at a
facility
or at distinct sites may be combined in one material balance
area to be used for Agency accounting purposes when the Agency
determines that this is consistent with its verification
requirements; and
- (iv) If the State so requests, a special material balance
area around a process step involving commercially sensitive
information may be established;
- (c) To establish the nominal timing and procedures for
taking of physical inventory for Agency accounting
purposes;
- (d) To establish the records and reports requirements
and records evaluation procedures;
- (e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification
of the quantity and location of nuclear material; and
- (f) To select appropriate combinations of containment
and surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic
points
at which they are to be applied.
It should further be provided that the results of the examination
of the design information shall be included in the Subsidiary
Arrangements.
Re-examination of design information
- The Agreement should provide that design information
shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating
conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of
experience in the application o f verification procedures, with a
view to modifying the action the Agency has taken pursuant to
paragraph 46 above.
Verification of design information
- The Agreement should provide that the Agency, in co-operation
with the State, may send inspectors to facilities to
verify
the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to
paragraphs 42--45 above for the purposes stated in paragraph 46.
INFORMATION IN RESPECT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUTSIDE
FACILITIES
- The Agreement should provide that the following information
concerning nuclear material customarily used outside
facilities
shall be provided as applicable to the Agency:
- (a) A general description of the use of the nuclear
material,
its geographic location, and the user's name and address for
routine business purposes;
- (b) A general description of the existing and proposed
procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control,
including organizational responsibility for material accountancy
and control. The Agreement should further provide that the Agency
shall be informed on a timely basis of any change in the
information provided to it under this paragraph.
- The Agreement should provide that the information made
available to the Agency in respect of nuclear material
customarily used outside facilities may be used, to the
extent
relevant, for the purposes set out in subparagraphs 46(b (f)
above.
RECORDS SYSTEM
General
- The Agreement should provide that in establishing a national
system of accounting for and control of nuclear material
as
referred to in paragraph 7 above, the State shall arrange that
records are kept in respect of each material balance area.
Provision should also be made that the Subsidiary Arrangements
shall describe the records to be kept in respect of each
material balance area.
- The Agreement should provide that the State shall make
arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by
inspectors, particularly if the records are not kept in English,
French, Russian or Spanish.
- The Agreement should provide that the records shall be
retained for at least five years.
- The Agreement should provide that the records shall consist,
as appropriate, of:
- (a) Accounting records of all nuclear material subject
to
safeguards under the Agreement; and
- (b) Operating records for facilities containing such
nuclear
material.
- The Agreement should provide that the system of measurements
on which the records used for the preparation of reports
are based shall either conform to the latest international
standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards.
Accounting records
- The Agreement should provide that the accounting records
shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance
area:
- (a) All inventory changes, so as to permit a
determination of
the book inventory at any time;
- (b) All measurement results that are used for determination
of the physical inventory, and
- (c) All adjustments and corrections that have been
made
in respect of inventory changes, book inventories
and physical
inventories.
- The Agreement should provide that for all inventory
changes
and physical inventories the records shall show, in
respect of
each batch of nuclear material: material
identification, batch
data and source data. Provision should further be included
that
records shall account for uranium, thorium and plutonium
separately in each batch of nuclear material.
Furthermore,
the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate,
the
originating material balance area and the receiving
material
balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated for each
inventory change.
Operating records
- 58. The Agreement should provide that the operating records
shall set forth as appropriate in respect of each material
balance area:
- (a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes
in the quantities and composition of nuclear material,
- (b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and
instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to
control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of
random and systematic error;
- (c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in
preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory in
order l;o
ensure that it is correct and complete; and
- (d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain
the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss
that might OCCur.
REPORTS SYSTEM
General
- The Agreement should specify that the State shall provide the
Agency with reports as detailed in paragraphs 60--69 below in
respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards
thereunder.
- The Agreement should provide that reports shall be made in
English, French, Russian or Spanish, except as otherwise
specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
- The Agreement should provide that reports shall be based on
the records kept in accordance with paragraphs 51--58 above
and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and
special reports.
Accounting reports
- The Agreement should stipulate that the Agency shall be
provided with an initial report on all nuclear material
which is
to be subject to safeguards thereunder. It should also be
provided that the initial report shall be dispatched by the State
to the Agency within 30 days of the last day of the calendar
month in which the Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect
the situation as of the last day of that month.
- The Agreement should stipulate that for each material balance
area the State shall provide the Agency with the following
accounting reports:
- (a) inventory change reports showing changes in the
inventory of nuclear material. The reports shall be
dispatched as
soon as possible and in any event within 30 days after the end of
the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were
established; and
- (b) Material balance reports showing the material balance
based on a physical inventory of nuclear material
actually
present in the material balance area. The reports shall be
dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days
after the physical inventory has been taken. The reports
shall be
based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be
corrected at a later date as required.
- The Agreement should provide that inventory change
reports
shall specify identification and batch data for each
batch of nuclear material the date of the inventory
change and, as
appropriate, the originating material balance area and the
receiving material balance area or the recipient. These
reports
shall be accompanied by concise notes:
- (a) Explaining the inventory changes on the basis of
the
operating data contained in the operating records provided for
under subparagraph 58(a) above; and
- (b) Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements,
the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking
of a physical inventory.
- The Agreement should provide that the State shall report each
inventory change adjustment and correction
either periodically in
a consolidated list or individually. The inventory changes
shall
be reported in terms of batches; small amounts, such as
analytical samples, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements,
may be combined and reported as one inventory change.
- The Agreement should stipulate that the Agency shall provide
the State with semi-annual statements of book inventory of
nuclear material subject to safeguards, for each material
balance
area as based on the inventory change reports for the
period
covered by each such statement.
- The Agreement should specify that the material balance
reports shall include the following entries, unless otherwise
agreed by the Agency and the State:
(a) Beginning physscal inventory;
- (b) inventory changes (first increases, then
decreases);
- (c) Ending book inventory;
- (d) Shipper/receiver differences;
- (e) Adjusted ending book inventory
- (f) Ending physical inventory; and
- (g) Material unaccounted for.
A statement of the physical inventory listing all batches
separately and specifying material identification and batch
data
for each batch shall be attached to each material balance
report.
Special reports
- The Agreement should provide that the State shall make
special reports without delay
- (a) If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the State
to believe that there is or may have been loss of nuclear
material that exceeds the limits to be specified for this purpose
in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or
- (b) If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that
specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that
unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become
possible.
Amplification and clarification of reports
- The Agreement should provide that at the Agency's request the
State shall supply amplifications or clarifications of any
report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
INSPECTIONS
General
- The Agreement should stipulate that the Agency shall have the
right to make inspections as provided for in paragraphs 71--82
below.
Purposes of inspections
- The Agreement should provide that the Agency may make ad hoc
inspections in order to:
- (a) Verify the information contained in the initial report on
the nuclear mater al subject to safeguards under the Agreement;
- (b) Identify and verify changes in the situation which
have occurred since the date of the initial report; and
- (c) Identify, and if possible verify the quantity and
composition of, nuclear mater al in accordance with paragraphs 93
and 96 below, before its transfer out of or upon its transfer
into the State.
- The Agreement should provide that the Agency may
make routine inspections in order to:
- (a) Verify that reports are consistent with records;
- (b) Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition
of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the
Agreement; and
- (c) Verify information on the possible causes of material
unaccounted for Shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in
the book inventory.
- The Agreement should provide that the Agency may make special
inspections subject to the procedures laid down in
paragraph 77 below:
- (a) In order to verify the information contained in special
reports; or
- (b) If the Agency considers that information made available
by the State, including explanations from the State and
information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate
for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the
Agreement. An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is
either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for
in paragraphs 78--82 below, or involves access to information or
locations i addition to the access specified in paragraph 76 for
ad hoc and routine inspections, or both.
Scope of inspections
- The Agreement should provide that for the purposes
stated in paragraphs 71--73 above the Agency may:
- (a) Examine the records kept pursuant to paragraphs
51--58;
- (b) Make independent measurements of all nuclear
material
subject to safeguards under the Agreement;
- (c) Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and
other measuring and control equipment;
- (d) Apply and make use of surveillance and containment
measures; and
- (e) Use other objective methods which have been
demonstrated to be technically feasible.
- It should further be provided that within the scope
of paragraph 74 above the Agency shall be enabled:
- (a) To observe that samples at key measurement points
for
material balance accounting are taken in accordance with
procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the
treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of
such samples;
- (b) To observe that the measurements of nuclear
material
at key measurement points for material balance accounting
are
representative, and to observe the calibration of the instruments
and equipment involved;
- (c) To make arrangements with the State that, if necessary:
- (i) Additional measurements are made and additional
samples taken for the Agency's use;
- (ii) The Agency's standard analytical samples are analysed;
- (iii) Appropriate absolute standards are used in
calibrating instruments and other equipment; and
- (iv) Other calibrations are carried out;
- (d) To arrange to use its own equipment for independent
measurement and surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in
the Subsidiary Arrangements, to arrange to install such
equipment;
- (e) To apply its seals and other identifying and
tamper-indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and
specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and
- (f) To make arrangements with the State for the shipping of
samples taken for the Agency's use.
Access for inspections
- The Agreement should provide that:
- (a) For the purposes specified in sub-paragraphs 71(a)
and (b) above and until such time as the strategic points
have
been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency's
inspectors shall have access to any location where the initial
report or any inspections carried out in connection with it
indicate that nuclear material is present;
- (b) For the purposes specified in sub-paragraph 71(c) above
the inspectors shall have access to any location of which the
Agency has been notified in accordance with sub-paragraphs 92(c)
or 95(c) below;
- (c) For the purposes specified in paragraph 72 above the
Agency's inspectors shall have access only to the strategic
points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the
records maintained pursuant to paragraphs $1--58; and
- (d) In the event of the State concluding that any unusual
circumstances require extended limitations on access by the
Agency, the State and the Agency shall promptly make arrangements
with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its safeguards
responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director
General shall report each such arrangement to the Board.
- The Agreement should provide that in circumstances which may
lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in
paragraph 73 above the State and the Agency shall consult
forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may make
inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided
for in paragraphs 78--82 below, and may obtain access in
agreement with the State to information or locations in addition
to the access specified in paragraph 76 above for ad hoc and
routine inspections. Any disagreement concerning the need for
additional access shall be resolved in accordance with paragraphs
21 and 22; in case action by the State is essential and urgent,
paragraph 18 above shall apply.
Frequency and intensity of routine inspections
- The Agreement should provide that the number, intensity,
duration and timing of routine inspections shall be kept to the
minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the
safeguards procedures set forth therein, and that the Agency
shall make the optimum and most economical use of available
inspection resources.
- The Agreement should provide that in the case of
facilities
and mater al balance areas outside facilities with a
content or
annual throughput whichever is greater, of nuclear
material not
exceeding five effective /kilograms routine inspections shall not
exceed one per year. For other facilities the number,
intensity,
duration, timing and mode of inspections shall be
determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the
inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary
and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow
and inventory of nuclear mater al.
- The Agreement should provide that the maximum routine
inspection effort in respect of facilities with a content
or
annual throughput of nuclear mater al exceeding five effective
kilograms shall be determined as follows:
- (a) For reactors and sealed stores, the maximum total of
routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one
sixth of a man-year of inspection for each such facility
in the
State;
- (b) For other facilities involving plutonium or
uranium
enriched to more than 5 , the maximum total of routine inspection
per year shall be determined by allowing for each such
facility
30 x \ E man-days of inspection per year, where E is the
inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material
whichever is
greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maxi mum
established for any such facility shall not, however, be
less
than 1. 5 man-years of inspection; and
- (c) For all other facilities the maximum total of
routine
inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such
facility one third of a man-year of inspection plus 0.4 x
E
man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or
annual throughput of nuclear material whichever is
greater,
expressed in effective kilograms. The Agreement should further
provide that the Agency and the State may agree to amend the
maximum figures specified in this paragraph upon determination by
the Board that such amendment is reasonable.
- Subject to paragraphs 78--80 above the criteria to be used
for determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing
and mode of routine inspections of any facility shall
include:
- (a) The form of nuclear material in particular,
whether the
material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate
items; its chemical composition and, in the case of uranium,
whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its
accessibility;
- (b) The effectiveness of the State's accounting and
control system, including the extent to which the operators of
facilities are functionally independent of the State's
accounting
and control system; the extent to which the measures specified in
paragraph 32 above have been implemented by the State; the
promptness of reports submitted to the Agency; their consistency
with the Agency independent verification;
and the amount and accuracy of the material unaccounted
for as verified by the Agency;
- (c) Characteristics of the State s nuclear fuel cycle, in
particular, the number and types of facilities containing
nuclear
material subject to safeguards, the characteristics of such
facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of
containment; the extent to which the design of such
facilities facilitates verification of the flow and
inventory of
nuclear material; and the extent to which information from
different material balance areas can be correlated;
- (d) International interdependence, in particular, the extent
to which nuclear material is received from or sent to
other
States for use or processing; any verification activity by the
Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which the
State's nuclear activities are interrelated with those of other
States; and
- (e) Technical developments in the field of safeguards,
including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling
in evaluating the flow of nuclear material.
- The Agreement should provide for consultation between the
Agency and the State if the latter considers that the inspection
effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular
facilities.
Notice of inspections
- The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall
give advance notice to the State before arrival of inspectors at
facilities or material balance areas outside
facilities, as
follows:
- (a) For ad hoc inspections pursuant to sub-paragraph 71(c)
above, at least 24 hours, for those pursuant to sub-paragraphs
71(a) and (b), as well as the activities provided for in
paragraph 48, at least one week;
- (b) For special inspections pursuant to paragraph 73 above,
as promptly as possible after the Agency and the State have
consulted as provided for in paragraph 77, it being understood
that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the
consultations; and
- (c) For routine inspections pursuant to paragraph 72
above, at least 24 hours in respect of the facilities
referred to
in sub-paragraph 80(b) and sealed stores containing plutonium or
uranium enriched to more than 59 , and one week in ail other
cases. Such notice of inspections shall include the names of
the inspectors and shall indicate the facilities and the
material
balance areal outside facilities to be visited and the
periods
during which they will be visited. If the inspectors are to
arrive from outside the State the Agency shall also give
advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in the
State.
- However, the Agreement should also provide that, as a
supplementary measure, the Agency may carry out without advance
notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to
paragraph 80 above in accordance with the principle of random
sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency
shall fully take into account any operational programme provided
by the State pursuant to paragraph 64(b). Moreover, whenever
practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme, it
shall advise the State periodically of its general programme of
announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general
periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying out any
unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to
minimize any practical difficulties for facility operators
and the State, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of
paragraphs 44 above and 89 below. Similarly the State shall make
every effort to facilitate the task of the inspectors.
Designation of inspectors
- The Agreement should provide that:
- (a) The Director General shall inform the State in writing of
the name, qualifications, nationality, grade and such other
particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency official he
proposes for designation as an inspector for the State;
- (b) The State shall inform the Director General within 30
days of the receipt of such a proposal whether it accepts the
proposal;
- (c) The Director General may designate each official who has
been accepted by the State as one of the inspectors for the
State, and shall inform the State of such designations; and
- (d) The Director General, acting in response to a request by
the State or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform
the State of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as
an inspector for the State. The Agreement should also provide,
however, that in respect of inspectors needed for the purposes
stated in paragraph 48 above and to carry out ad hoc inspections
pursuant to sub-paragraphs 71(a) and (b) the designation
procedures shall be completed if possible within 30 days
after the entry into force of the Agreement. If such designation
appears impossible within this time limit, inspectors for such
purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis.
- The Agreement should provide that the State shall
grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where
required for each inspector designated for the State.
Conduct and visits of inspectors
- The Agreement should provide that inspectors, in exercising
their functions under paragraphs 48 and 71--75 above, shall carry
out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or
delaying the construction, commissioning or operation of
facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular
inspectors
shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the
staff of
a facility to carry out any operation. If inspectors
consider
that in pursuance of paragraphs 74 and 75, particular operations
in a facility should be carried out by the operator, they
shall
make a request therefor.
- When inspectors require services available in the State,
including the use of equipment, in connection with the
performance of inspections, the State shall facilitate the
procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by
inspectors.
- The Agreement should provide that the State shall
have the right to have inspectors accompanied during their
inspections by representatives of the State, provided that
inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in
the exercise of their functions.
STATEMENTS ON THE AGENCY'S VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
- The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall inform the
State of:
- (a) The results of inspections, at intervals to be specified
in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and
- (b) The conclusions it has drawn from its verification
activities in the State, in particular by means of statements in
respect of each material balance area which shall be made
as soon
as possible after a phys cal inventory has been taken and
verified by the Agency and a material balance has been struck.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS
General
- The Agreement should provide that nuclear material
subject or
required to be subject to safeguards thereunder which is
transferred internationally shall, for purposes of the Agreement,
be regarded as being the responsibility of the State:
- (a) In the case of import, from the time that such
responsibility
ceases to lie with the exporting State, and no later than the
time at which the nuclear material reaches its
destination; and
- (b) In the case of export, up to the time at which the
recipient State assumes such responsibility, and no later than
the time at which the nuclear material reaches its
destination.
The Agreement should provide that the States concerned shall make
suitable arrangements to determine the point at which the
transfer of responsibility will take place. No State shall be
deemed to have such responsibility for nuclear material
merely by
reason of the fact that the nuclear material is in transit
on or
over its territory or territorial waters, or that it is being
transported under its flag or in its aircraft.
Transfers out of the State
- The Agreement should provide that any intended transfer out
of the State of safeguarded nuclear material in an amount
exceeding one effective kilogram or by successive shipments to
the same State within a period of three months each of less than
one effective kilogram but exceeding in total one effective
kilogram shall be notified to the Agency after the conclusion of
the contractual arrangements leading to the transfer and normally
at least two weeks before the nuclear material is to be
prepared
for shipping. The Agency and the State may agree on different
procedures for advance notification. The notification shall
specify:
- (a) The identification and, if possible, the expected
quantity and composition of the nuclear material to be
transferred, and the material balance area from which it
will
come;
- (b) The State for which the nuclear material is
destined;
- (c) The dates on and locations at which the nuclear
material
is to be prepared for shipping;
- (d) The approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the
nuclear material; and
- (e) At what point of the transfer the recipient State will
assume responsibility for the nuclear material and the
probable
date on which this point will be reached.
- The Agreement should further provide that the purpose of this
notification shall be to enable the Agency if necessary to
identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of,
nuclear mater al subject to safeguards under the Agreement before
it is transferred out of the State and, if the Agency so wishes
or the State so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear
material
when it has been prepared for shipping. However, the transfer
of the nuclear material shall not be delayed in any way by
any
action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to this
notification.
- The Agreement should provide that, if the nuclear
material
will not be subject to Agency safeguards in the recipient State,
the exporting State shall make arrangements for the Agency to
receive, within three months of the time when the recipient State
accepts responsibility for the nuclear material from the
exporting State, confirmation by the recipient State of the
transfer.
Transfers into the State
- The Agreement should provide that the expected transfer into
the State of nuclear material required to be subject to
safeguards in an amount greater than one effective kilogram or by
successive shipments from the same State within a period of three
months each of less than one effective kilogram but exceeding in
total one effective kilogram shall be notified to the Agency as
much in advance as possible of the expected arrival of the
nuclear material and in any case not later than the date
on which
the recipient State assumes responsibility therefor. The Agency
and the State may agree on different procedures for advance
notification. The notification shall specify:
- (a) The identification and, if possible, the expected
quantity and composition of the nuclear material;
- (b) At what point of the transfer responsibility for the
nuclear mater al will be assumed by the State for the purposes of
the Agreement, and the probable date on which this point will be
reached; and
- (c) The expected date of arrival, the location to which the
nuclear mater al is to be delivered and the date on which it is
intended that the nuclear material should be unpacked.
- The Agreement should provide that the purpose of
this notification shall be to enable the Agency if necessary to
identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of,
nuclear material subject to safeguards which has been
transferred
into the State, by means of inspection of the consignment at the
time it is unpacked. However, unpacking shall not be delayed by
any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to
this notification.
Special reports
- The Agreement should provide that in the case of
international transfers a special report as envisaged in
paragraph 68 above shall be made if any unusual incident or
circumstances lead the State to believe that there is or
may have been loss of nuclear material including the
occurrence of significant delay during the transfer.
DEFINITIONS
- "Adjustment" means an entry into an accounting record or a
report showing a shipper/ receiver difference or material
unaccounted for.
- Annual throughput means, for the purposes of paragraphs 79
and 80 above, the amount of nuclear material transferred
annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity.
- "Batch" means a portion of nuclear material handled as
a
unit for accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for
which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of
specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may
be in
bulk form or contained in a number of separate items.
- "Batch data means the total weight of each element of
nuclear material and, in the case of plutonium and
uranium, the
isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of account shall
be as follows:
- (a) Grams of contained plutonium;
- (b) Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235
plus uranium-233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes;
and
- (c) Kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or
depleted uranium.
For reporting purposes the weights of individual items
in the batch shall be added together before rounding to
the
nearest unit.
- "Book inventory of a material balance area means
the algebraic sum of the most recent physical inventory of
that
material balance area and of all inventory changes
that
have
occurred since that physical inventory was taken.
- "Correction" means an entry into an accounting record or a
report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved
measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or
report. Each correction must identify the entry to which
it
pertains.
- Effective kilogram" means a special unit used in
safeguarding nuclear material. The quantity in "effective
kilograms" is obtained by taking:
- (a) For plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
- (b) For uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (19 ;)and
above,
its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its
enrichment;
- (c) For uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 ( 1 ; )
and above 0.005 (0.5 ; ), its weight in kilograms multiplied by
0.0001; and
- (d) For depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005
(0.59 )
or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by
0.00005.
- "Enrichment" means the ratio of the combined weight of the
isotopes uranium-233 and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium
in question.
- "Facility" means:
- (a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion
plant,
a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation
plant or a separate storage installation; or
- (b) Any location where nuclear material in amounts
greater
than one effective kilogram is customarily used.
- Inventory change" means an increase or decrease, in terms
of batches, of nuclear material in a material balance
area; such
a change shall involve one of the following:
- (a) Increases:
- (i) Import;
- (ii) Domestic receipt: receipts from other material
balance areas, receipts from a non-safeguarded (non-peaceful)
activity or receipts at the starting point of safeguards;
- (iii) Nuclear production: production of special fissionable
material in a reactor; and
- (iv) De-exemption: reapplication of safeguards on nuclear
material previously exempted therefrom on account of its use or
quantity.
- (b) Decreases:
- (i) Export;
- (ii) Domestic shipment: shipments to other material balance
areas or shipments for a non-safeguarded (non-peaceful) activity;
- (iii) Nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to
its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a
result of nuclear reactions;
- (iv) Measured discard: nuclear material which has been
measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed
of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear
use;
- (v) Retained waste: nuclear material generated from
processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be
unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored;
- (vi) Exemption: exemption of nuclear material from
safeguards
on account of its use or quantity; and
- (vii) Other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is,
irretrievable and inadvertent loss of nuclear mater al as the
result of an operational accident) or theft.
- "Key measurement point" means a location where nuclear mater
al appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine
material flow or inventory. "Key measurement points" thus
include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs
(including measured discards) and storages in material balance
areas.
- "Man-year of inspection" means, for the purposes of
paragraph 80 above, 300 man-days of inspection, a man-day being a
day during which a single inspector has access to a
facility at
any time for a total of not more than eight hours.
- Material balance area" means an area in or outside of a
facility such that:
- (a) The quantity of nuclear material in each transfer
into or
out of each "material balance area" can be determined; and
- (b) The physical inventory of nuclear material
in each
material balance area" can be determined when necessary,
in
accordance with specified procedures, in order that the material
balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established .
- "Material unaccounted for" means the difference between book
inventory and physical inventory.
- "nuclear material means any source or any special
fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The
term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore
or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX
of the Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which
adds to the materials considered to be source material or special
fissionable material shall have effect under this Agreement
only upon acceptance by the State.
- "Physical inventory" means the sum of all the measured or
derived estimates of batch quantities of nuclear
material on hand
at a given time within a material balance area obtained in
accordance with specified procedures.
- "Shipper/receiver difference means the difference between
the quantity of nuclear material in a batch as
stated by the
shipping material balance area and as measured at the
receiving
material balance area.
- "Source data" means those data, recorded during measurement
or calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which
identify nuclear mater al and provide batch data. Source
data
may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors
to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element
concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and
manometer readings and relationship between plutonium
produced and power generated.
- "Strategic point" means a location selected during
examination of design information where, under normal conditions
and when combined with the information from all "strategic
points" taken together, the information necessary and sufficient
for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and
verified; a "strategic point" may include any location
where key measurements related to material balance accountancy
are made and where containment and surveillance measures are
executed.
