21 September 1998
(John Ritch statement on IAEA safeguards and verification) (1520) Vienna -- John Ritch, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in Vienna, addressed the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) September 16, saying, "The question that looms before the Director General -- and before us as Member-States -- is whether and how we will equip the Agency with the relatively modest additional resources necessary to fulfill functions that we all should regard as indispensable to our common welfare." Ritch noted that the issue "is considerably broader than how to obtain the resources needed to verify fissile material being released from nuclear weapons programs, as important as that single task is. Rather, the DG [Director General] is looking ahead into a 21st century in which the verification demands on this Agency will steadily and substantially expand, far outstripping the resources available to it under the established Zero-Real Growth (ZRG) tradition, which major UN Donors have enforced steadfastly for many years." He outlined two strategies for achieving the necessary increase in available resources, and called on the Director General to produce a paper "in which he fleshes out the needs he foresees on his planning horizon and the options by which Member-States might provide the resources to meet those needs." "This options paper would, as I envisage it, be produced by the DG and his staff in consultation with Member-States, would be presented to the Board in November or March, and would be aimed at providing the initial analysis to start us thinking about -- and discussing -- just what options are realistic. The DG's paper can serve as a catalyst." Following is the text of Ambassador Ritch's statement: (Begin text) EXPANDED IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND VERIFICATION: A GLOBAL SECURITY -- AND FINANCIAL -- IMPERATIVE Statement by Ambassador John Ritch The IAEA Board of Governors September 16, 1998 During the Director General's opening statement, in the context of discussing the Agency's anticipated role of verifying the irreversible deposit of nuclear material coming out of the world's military sector, he proffered the idea of establishing a nuclear arms control verification fund. This is not the first time the DG has mentioned such an idea, and I believe it warrants the board's attention. The Director General's concern, as I understand it, is considerably broader than how to obtain the resources needed to verify fissile material being released from nuclear weapons programs, as important as that single task is. Rather, the DG is looking ahead into a 21st century in which the verification demands on this Agency will steadily and substantially expand, far outstripping the resources available to it under the established Zero-Real Growth (ZRG) tradition, which major UN Donors have enforced steadfastly for many years. These demands will include: (1) the need to verify nuclear material coming out of the weapons programs of Russia, the United States, and other weapons-states in such a way that the Agency's resources for verification are not solely dependent on voluntary contributions from the very countries being monitored; (2) the need to perform a complex and extensive verification function under a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the negotiation of which is now gathering momentum in Geneva; (3) the need to free the Agency's existing Safeguards budget from an excessive dependency on non-budgetary contributions; and, not least, (4) the need to implement the Agency's expanded authorities and responsibilities under the new safeguards-strengthening Protocol, an effort that may conceivably yield cost-neutrality in the long-run but that will definitely involve additional expenditures in the near and medium term. Mr. Chairman, all of these activities represent the Agency's involvement, on behalf of the global community, in fulfilling responsibilities that contribute immensely to international peace and security. All of these activities reflect remarkable, indeed historic progress by the global community in stepping back from the nuclear abyss -- so that mankind can proceed to exploit the valuable potential of nuclear energy without fear of catastrophic danger. The question that looms before the Director General -- and before us as Member-States -- is whether and how we will equip the Agency with the relatively modest additional resources necessary to fulfill functions that we all should regard as indispensable to our common welfare. The need to address ourselves to this question cannot be ignored much longer. Certainly it is true that the discipline of ZRG has proven valuable in Vienna and elsewhere in the world of international organizations. But it is also true that we now must begin to contemplate global realities -- and global responsibilities for this Agency -- which do not fit within the convenient ZRG formula. Soon something will have to give, Mr. Chairman; and what must give -- what must change -- is the straight-lining of this Agency's available resources. As we contemplate this looming reality, there appear to be two general concepts by which we might achieve the necessary increase in available resources: -- One is an increase in the Agency's assessed budget. This option might or might not place the additional verification functions under a special assessment formula such as that now used for Safeguards financing. -- The second option, to which the DG has alluded, is the creation of a separate and special fund, based on an agreed scheme of assessed contributions. Both options are designed to meet the same need and are, in practical economic effect, quite similar. But they involve different nuances. The first option is the more straightforward but involves overcoming an understandable reluctance in our capitals to depart -- even in this instance of a well-justified exception -- from the principle of ZRG. This option would also raise, once again, the question of balance among Agency functions -- although concerns about imbalance might be alleviated by the use of a special financing formula. The second option would bypass the ZRG and balance problems but would face the challenge of winning acceptance in capitals of an entirely new funding item to which Member-States would be asked to make a long-term obligation -- perhaps through some new type of assessment formula like the Safeguards financing formula or through the established mechanism of indicative planning figures. Although it is quite clear, as a matter of diplomatic and bureaucratic reality, that neither of these options would be easy to implement, it is equally clear that some variation of one or the other will become an absolute necessity if this Agency is to perform the crucial verification responsibilities facing it. The time is upon us to begin the process of facing up to this logic. As a first step, I believe that the Director General should produce a paper -- a paper in which he fleshes out the needs he foresees on his planning horizon and the options by which Member-States might provide the resources to meet those needs. This options paper would, as I envisage it, be produced by the DG and his staff in consultation with Member-States, would be presented to the Board in November or March, and would be aimed at providing the initial analysis to start us thinking about -- and discussing -- just what options are realistic. The DG's paper can serve as a catalyst. Mr. Chairman, I hope I will find support in offering this suggestion. Ultimately, of course, questions of funding can only be answered by Member-States. But the DG is uniquely positioned to project the Agency's future needs and to match those needs against techniques for funding which he can identify on the basis of his own considerable experience and his continuing dialogue with Member-States. I believe that the DG would like to take on this task, and I believe we should urge him to do so. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that when we talk about money -- particularly increases in funding for international organizations -- we are conditioned to find the subject distasteful. We are all trained and instructed to press for fiscal austerity. In the matter we are now discussing, I believe those habits are not conducive -- and are indeed inimical -- to facing the imperatives before us. The world is now making extraordinary and long-sought progress in bringing the nuclear genie under control. In making the world safer, we are also creating a context in which Mankind can proceed to draw benefit from the atom with much reduced worry over its destructive potential. But the function of verifying our achievements is integral to the achievements themselves; and that verification function has a real, even if relatively modest, cost. In sum, Mr. Chairman, attached to our large progress is a small price-tag. The deal is a bargain, but we must, together, pay the modest price on which the deal depends. What I am recommending, Mr. Chairman, is that the DG take the lead in helping us to identify the most feasible and effective means by which we can accomplish the task of paying that small price -- a task which, in light of the historic advances we are gaining in return, we should regard as a welcome responsibility. (End text)