21 September 1998
(Cites key elements of nuclear agenda for next 50 years) (3080) Vienna -- U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, head of the U.S. delegation to the 42nd Session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said September 21 that is a time of "great transition" for the IAEA and the world community. "Over the next five decades, we will be challenged to stay on the path of nuclear peace and prosperity as we close the world's first nuclear century." Richardson called the nuclear nonproliferation regime "an impressive global achievement. It symbolizes our commitment to protect mankind from the horror of nuclear war and to reap the peaceful benefits of nuclear science. This regime has withstood serious shocks, including those created by Iraq and North Korea. I am confident it will also survive the blow of the recent nuclear tests in South Asia." "I join my colleagues at this Conference urging India and Pakistan to adhere at once to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," he said. "Let me also underscore that I will work diligently with President Clinton to gain United States Senate ratification of this crucial instrument that will add to our shared arms control and nonproliferation goals." Richardson read a statement from President Clinton, who said, "The nuclear tests recently conducted on the Asian sub-continent are chilling reminders of a chapter of history many of us had hoped was closed.... The entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, universally applied, is a global priority. We must also achieve a global treaty ending the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. And we must realize the goal of all IAEA member states concluding Additional Protocols to their safeguards agreements by the year 2000. These are all important priorities. "The Agency's efforts to establish globally accepted nuclear safety practices and respond to the challenges of illicit nuclear trafficking underscore the role the IAEA can play to assure a safe and secure nuclear future. The IAEA's role is indispensable." Richardson cited six "legacies" from the first 50 years of the nuclear age and steps being taken to address them: "One: Nuclear arsenals that are still far too large; "Two: Vast amounts of fissile material from nuclear weapon reductions that need to be controlled; "Three: Nuclear weapon production complexes that must be redirected to peaceful ends; "Four: Proliferation concerns in Iraq and North Korea that must be resolved; "Five: The challenge of managing the fuel cycle's back end and assuring the safe use of nuclear power; and "Six: Tapping the reservoir of peaceful, humanitarian applications of the atom." He concluded by pointing out that, "In the coming decades, the Agency will be called on to do even more -- whether verifying nuclear arms reductions, combating illicit nuclear trafficking, helping states make informed choices about nuclear power or applying nuclear techniques to fight disease and starvation. "I am confident that the IAEA will meet these new challenges with the same measure of commitment that it has shown in the past." Following is the text of Secretary Richardson's speech: (begin text) STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL RICHARDSON HEAD OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FORTY SECOND SESSION OF THE GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA, AUSTRIA September 21, 1998 I. Introduction I am very pleased to be here and would like to congratulate Ambassador Lajous, our Conference President on her election. The entire U.S. Delegation looks forward to working with you, the distinguished representatives of the member nations here today, Director General Mohammed ElBaradei, and the IAEA Secretariat. I have the honor of delivering a special message from President Clinton to this General Conference, which I will now read. II. President Clinton's Message On behalf of the people of the United States of America, I extend to you warm greetings and best wishes for a successful meeting. The 1998 General Conference affords us an opportunity to reflect on the important contributions of the IAEA to international peace and security. It gives us an opportunity to welcome Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei to the position of Director General. And it allows us to look ahead to the next millennium and to the role this organization will play. The nuclear tests recently conducted on the Asian sub-continent are chilling reminders of a chapter of history many of us had hoped was closed. They remind us also of the work that remains to be done. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, universally applied, is a global priority. We must also achieve a global treaty ending the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. And we must realize the goal of all IAEA member states concluding Additional Protocols to their safeguards agreements by the year 2000. These are all important priorities. The Agency's efforts to establish globally accepted nuclear safety practices and respond to the challenges of illicit nuclear trafficking underscore the role the IAEA can play to assure a safe and secure nuclear future. The IAEA's role is indispensable. This concludes the President's message. III. The Nuclear Century As President Clinton suggests, this is a time of great challenge and opportunity for the IAEA and the world community. This is also a time of great transition. We convene here a little more than 50 years from the dawn of the nuclear age -- an age marked by nuclear peril and promise. Over the next five decades, we will be challenged to stay on the path of nuclear peace and prosperity as we close the world's first nuclear century. In the past 50 years, we have harnessed nuclear energy's peaceful potential. And we created norms against the acquisition, transfer and control over nuclear weapons and the materials needed to produce them. The nuclear nonproliferation regime that evolved over the years stands as an impressive global achievement. It symbolizes our commitment to protect mankind from the horror of nuclear war and to reap the peaceful benefits of nuclear science. This regime has withstood serious shocks, including those created by Iraq and North Korea. I am confident it will also survive the blow of the recent nuclear tests in South Asia. We stand with those who condemn the Indian and Pakistani tests as a threat to global security and stability. We have a unique opportunity to end nuclear testing for all time. We must not let this opportunity slip away. To this end, I join my colleagues at this Conference urging India and Pakistan to adhere at once to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Let me also underscore that I will work diligently with President Clinton to gain United States Senate ratification of this crucial instrument that will add to our shared arms control and nonproliferation goals. IV. The Nuclear Agenda for the Next 50 Years Today, I would like to address key elements of the nuclear agenda for the next fifty years. Specifically, I will address six legacies from the first five decades of the nuclear century and steps we are taking to meet the future challenges they present. The six are: One: Nuclear arsenals that are still far too large; Two: Vast amounts of fissile material from nuclear weapon reductions that need to be controlled; Three: Nuclear weapon production complexes that must be redirected to peaceful ends; Four: Proliferation concerns in Iraq and North Korea that must be resolved; Five: The challenge of managing the fuel cycle's back end and assuring the safe use of nuclear power; and Six: Tapping the reservoir of peaceful, humanitarian applications of the atom. The challenges are large, but I am confident that with vision and perseverance the international community will stay on the right path. 1. Draw Down Nuclear Stockpiles While the past 50 years witnessed the massive build-up of nuclear forces, we have now entered a new phase of drastic and irreversible reductions. The United States and Russia have made significant progress under existing arms control agreements and through unilateral steps. Since 1988, the United States has dismantled more than 12,000 nuclear warheads and bombs; that is an average of more than 100 weapons per month over ten years. We have also eliminated more than 900 missile launchers and heavy bombers, 90 percent of our non-strategic nuclear stockpile, and the warheads for more than a dozen different types of nuclear weapon systems. But more needs to be done. We look forward to discussions with Russia on still deeper cuts in a START III agreement once START II is ratified by the Russian Duma. 2. Control Fissile Materials The second legacy to address is the vast amount of fissile materials created during the nuclear arms race. Together, the United States and Russia have identified approximately 100 metric tons of plutonium and nearly 700 metric tons of highly enriched uranium as excess to defense needs. We have pledged never to return these materials to military use. The United States and Russia have teamed with the International Atomic Energy Agency under the Trilateral Initiative to design appropriate verification arrangements for excess materials. Even as work under the Trilateral Initiative continues, excess materials in the United States are being internationally monitored. Earlier this year, the IAEA verified the dilution of approximately several tons of American highly enriched uranium -- enough material for more than 500 nuclear bombs -- into a form of fuel not usable in nuclear weapons. Of course, all five nuclear weapon states share a commitment to make excess fissile material available for international inspection as soon as practicable. In this regard, I welcome the United Kingdom's recent announcement identifying more than four tons of weapons-usable material as excess to defense needs. We hope all the nuclear weapon states will duplicate this important step. At the Moscow Summit three weeks ago, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin signed a Statement of Principles for long-term cooperation to dispose of our excess plutonium with appropriate transparency and international monitoring. Disposition is an urgent security priority. It can help pave the way for steeper reductions of nuclear forces. It can also help ensure that these dangerous materials are not acquired by terrorists. As we progressively bring nuclear weapons and material under control, we must also end the production of new fissile material for weapons. Last month, the Conference on Disarmament took an essential -- and long overdue -- step. It established an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Let me be clear: this treaty is critically important. It will cap global stockpiles of military nuclear material, extend verification to production facilities that have never been subject to international monitoring, and freeze production in regions of concern. We fully expect the IAEA to verify the Cutoff treaty and welcome the opportunity to work with this Agency and members of the Conference on Disarmament to achieve a rapid conclusion to Cutoff negotiations. As we end fissile material production for weapons, we must also prevent nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. The United States and Russia are working together to secure nuclear materials in Russia. Just three weeks ago, I joined Russian officials at the Sheremetyevo airport in Moscow to dedicate the installation of detection equipment, developed through joint U.S.-Russian cooperation to protect against nuclear smuggling. 3. Redirect Nuclear Weapon Production Complexes A third legacy relates to the changing role of nuclear weapon production complexes in the weapon states. The Department of Energy's national laboratories are today using their scientific and technical expertise to address global challenges such as climate change, pollution prevention, and disease control. Redirecting national laboratories to more diverse missions is not just a priority for the United States, but for others as well. The United States Department of Energy is cooperating with Russia in developing peaceful employment and economic opportunities for former Russian weapon scientists. 4. Finish the Nonproliferation Job in Iraq and North Korea The responsibility for a safe nuclear future rests not solely with the nuclear weapon states, but with all states. Preventing further nuclear proliferation is the fourth nuclear legacy to be addressed. Two cases -- Iraq and North Korea -- merit our special attention. In Iraq, we seek nothing less than full compliance with the governing United Nations Security Council resolutions. Although the IAEA has uncovered most facts of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, crucial questions linger. More work remains to be done before the book on Iraq's past nuclear weapons activities can be closed. Nor is the nonproliferation job finished in North Korea. Maintaining a total freeze on, and achieving full disclosure of, North Korea's past nuclear activity remains our immediate and overriding goal. I am pleased to announce that the U.S. Department of Energy will soon resume canning of the spent fuel from North Korea's closed nuclear reactor -- fuel that might otherwise be available for weapons. We also continue to work with our KEDO partners in fulfilling all the terms of the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework. The nuclear programs of Iraq and North Korea have demonstrated the importance of effective safeguards. The new Strengthened Safeguards Protocol will provide the Agency with stronger tools to verify compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States is proud to have been the first nuclear weapon state to sign this protocol. I call on all other states represented here today to join us to reach Director General ElBaradei's goal of having all member states conclude their Additional Protocols by the year 2000. 5. Manage the Nuclear Fuel-Cycle's Back-End and Assure the Safe Use of Nuclear Power The fifth legacy results from growing stocks of separated civilian plutonium, vast inventories of spent fuel, and the challenge of assuring nuclear reactor safety. In addition, the absence of strategies for the disposal of nuclear materials is threatening the very viability of nuclear power. Our task for the future is to develop internationally accepted principles, practices and technologies for the safe, secure and transparent disposition of civilian nuclear materials. Existing arrangements -- such as the International Plutonium Management Guidelines, the Convention on the Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material -- point us in the right direction. But more can be done. Let us start by expanding the Convention on Physical Protection to create an international, legally binding obligation to protect nuclear material in domestic use. All nuclear states face spent fuel and radioactive waste problems. In the United States, we are moving forward with geological disposal of these materials. Today, I announce that the Department of Energy will convene a conference next year on global efforts to dispose of nuclear material in geological repositories. We will share the results of our own experience and progress and welcome the input of others. I invite all IAEA member states to join us at this conference. Agreement on strategies for managing the disposal of nuclear materials is essential for the future of nuclear power. I will soon launch the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative, which will promote research and development on advanced nuclear power systems to meet our nonproliferation, economic and environmental goals. This initiative will also promote the safe operation of nuclear reactors. The IAEA continues to play a crucial role in this area. We welcome the Agency's efforts to assist governments in implementing strong safety standards. We also applaud the work of the Advisory Commission on Safety Standards in developing guidelines for nuclear radiation, transportation and waste safety. Finally, we urge the Agency to continue its work with Member States in the areas of operational safety and regulatory infrastructure. The Agency's leadership in this area is further demonstrated by its efforts to address nuclear safety risks associated with the Year 2000 computer problem. I am pleased to announce that the United States will provide a cost-free expert to the IAEA to help assess these risks and coordinate appropriate responses. I urge all Member States to support the Year 2000 Resolution that we are sponsoring at this General Conference. 6. Expand Nuclear Technical Cooperation The benefits of atomic energy are not limited solely to energy production, but also include improvements to human health and welfare. This sixth nuclear legacy is an integral part of atomic energy's promise. Forty years ago, the IAEA initiated a program of technical assistance with a modest $125,000. Today, the Agency spends more than $60 million to assist developing nations reap the benefits of nuclear science while meeting internationally-accepted radiation safety standards. The United States seeks to advance collaboration among nations to help increase the availability of radioisotopes for medical purposes. By applying the energy of the atom to the medical sciences, we are able to reduce the cost and intrusiveness of treatments. Today I am pleased to announce that the Department of Energy, working with Belgium and Finland, will supply the IAEA with surplus radioisotopes for the production of isotope generators. This effort will be part of the Agency's Coordinated Research Program involving experts from 14 nations working on the treatment of heart disease, cancer and the relief of bone pain. But we must also ensure that radiation-producing devices used for peaceful purposes are handled and disposed of safely. The United States supports the IAEA's vital work in this area and will lend our assistance to reduce the risk of exposing children and people everywhere to dangerous radiation. The United States remains fully committed to assisting the IAEA to exploit nuclear energy's peaceful potential. In 1998, we paid our full share to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund and contributed millions of additional dollars and cost-free support for this and other Agency activities. We will continue to support the IAEA to our fullest ability. V. Conclusion The priorities and challenges before us are real and exciting Throughout its history, the IAEA has worked to ensure that atomic energy is used safely and peacefully, while administering the international safeguards system with skill and competence. In the coming decades, the Agency will be called on to do even more -- whether verifying nuclear arms reductions, combating illicit nuclear trafficking, helping states make informed choices about nuclear power, or applying nuclear techniques to fight disease and starvation. I am confident that the IAEA will meet these new challenges with the same measure of commitment that it has shown in the past. The United States looks forward to joining the IAEA and its members in meeting these new challenges. (End text)