National Report on the compiliance by the Russian Federation with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, April 25, 2000

	Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
Postal Address: 136 East 67 Street, New York, N.Y. 10021 Phone: (212) 861-4900; 861-4901; 861-4902 Fax: (212) 628-0252

This report has been prepared for the 2000 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains information on the compliance by the Russian Federation with various provisions of the Treaty. The period reviewed in the report covers essentially the last five years expired since the Fifth NPT Review and Extention Conference which adopted a historical decision to extend the NPT for an indefinite period.

The Russian Federation, as a Party to the Treaty and one of its depositories, views the Treaty as a time-tested document which has become a solid pillar of the international security system. Having weathered through difficult situations, the NPT confirmed its role as a major instrument for containing the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Without stability in the nuclear field brought about by the Treaty it would have been impossible to insure both global and regional stability. The Treaty provided for steady and irreversible movement towards disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and reduced the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war. Above all, it guaranteed the development of a broad international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of a nuclear energy.

The review of the Treaty at the five previous conferences confirmed the intransit value of this major international legal instrument. Thirty years that have expired since its entry into force have convincingly demonstrated the validity of the balanced structure of obligations contained therein. The Treaty is vital for all countries, large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear.

The Treaty should remain fully operational and effective. Therefore, the main task of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty is to comprehensively and objectively review the operation of the Treaty and to produce recommendations aimed at strengthening and making universal the non-proliferation regime. The Russian Federation is convinced that such a prospective approach is exactly what is needed now taking into account the enormous role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the modern interdependent world.

The NPT Review Conference is taking place at the turn of the century, which is quite symbolic in terms of emphasising the fact that the Treaty is one of the most significant multilateral instruments of the last century in the field of arms control which makes it possible to maintain the required level of security and stability in the world.

We believe that this Conference allows us not only to review the operation of the Treaty over the five years, but also to appraise its thirty year history. One of the main achievements of the last five years is, undoubtedly, the indefinite extension of the Treaty. It opens up new prospectives for strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and inspires hope for lasting and stable peace in the new millennium.

In the context of emerging multipolar world and progressive globalization of international relations, security issues acquire increasingly multifaceted nature extending far beyond the scope of purely military aspects. At the same time, the risk of proliferation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery remains a cardinal challenge to the world community. It is important, therefore, to ensure that the NPT remains a major element of the architecture of the world order and an integral part of the states' efforts to promote in the new century a model of the world without violence.

Strengthening the international legal basis of the world order and ensuring the rule of law in international affairs should be viewed as measures to guarantee global and regional stability and security.

Information showing the role of Russia in ensuring compliance with all the provisions and articles of the Treaty in the interests of its effective functioning is provided below.

Russia is committed to the objective of reducing its nuclear forces to a minimal level which would guarantee the prevention of a large-scale war, maintenance of strategic stability and, in perspective, complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

We confirm once again the position of Russia as regards gradual and integral movement of all the five nuclear powers towards the objective of nuclear disarmament not only without artificial delays but also without running too far ahead and setting unrealistic targets and objectives. Taking into account its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Russia is taking successive steps to reach the final objective - complete nuclear disarmament.

Presently, the process of nuclear weapons reduction is taking place mainly in the framework of bilateral agreements between Russia and the USA. The Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) represents a major step towards the reduction of nuclear weapons. Under this Treaty two classes of the land-based missiles with a range from 500 to 5 500 kilometers were completely eliminated and their production and tests were banned.

The Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START 1) which entered into force on 5 December 1994, is another serious step towards the reduction of nuclear weapons.

In the framework of its unilateral initiatives and implementation of the START 1 Russia has undertaken a number of important measures leading to a considerable reduction of its nuclear arsenal. It is to be noted that objectively this reduction has an irreversible character. From the moment of signing the START 1 and till now over 950 ICBM and SLBM launchers, over 2 000 missiles for such launchers, about 30 strategic nuclear submarines and over 85 heavy bombers have been eliminated in Russia. In total, under this Treaty about 40 per cent of the Russian strategic nuclear forces will have been reduced by December 2001.

On 3 January 1993 the START 2 was signed which provided for an even higher reduction of the Russian and USA nuclear arsenals – to the level of 3 000 – 3 500 pieces. The Treaty provides for the elimination of IBM with MIRV. As a result of the implementation of the agreements reached, the total reduction of the strategic offensive weapons in Russia and the USA will amount approximately to two-thirds as compared with 1990.

The ratification of START 2 in April this year by the Russian Federation is another proof of the consequent foreign policy course of our country aimed at the strengthening of the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, pursuing disarmament goals and the maintaining of the strategic stability in the world.

In March 1997 the Presidents of Russia and the USA agreed on further drastic arms reduction measures to be undertaken within the framework of the START 3. Under the Treaty the nuclear potential of each party will be reduced by the end of 2007 to the level of 2 000 – 2 500 pieces. Moreover, we are prepared to consider the possibility of reducing the nuclear potential of both parties within the framework of this Treaty to 1 500 pieces. In this case we proceed from the idea that the START 3 should serve further strengthening of strategic stability, elaboration of measures that would make deep reductions of the strategic arms irreversible and confidence building.

Concerning the tactical nuclear weapons, we would note that according to the statement of the President of the USSR of 5 October 1991 and that of the President of the Russian Federation of 29 January 1992 Russia fully and consistently implements the unilateral initiatives announced by it. All tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from the ships and multipurpose submarines, as well as the Navy land-based aircraft and placed at the sites of centralized storage. One third of the total number of nuclear ammunition for the tactical sea-based and Navy aircraft missiles have been destroyed. The destruction of the nuclear tactical missile warheads, artillery shells and nuclear mines is coming to its completion. A half of the total number of nuclear anti-aircraft missile warheads and a half of nuclear air bombs have been destroyed.

All nuclear weapons previously deployed outside Russia have been withdrawn into its territory, and their elimination has begun. In this connection we would like once again to attract attention to the Russian suggestion that all nuclear weapons should be withdrawn into the territory of the nuclear States to which they belong.

At the same time it should be stressed that reduction of nuclear armaments requires enormous financial resources and that this very factor will actually impede the acceleration of the process.

Guided by Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Russia consistently seeks to negotiate effective measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Our approach stems from a close interrelation between reductions in strategic offensive arms and the compliance with the limitations on BMD systems. In this respect, the ABM Treaty remains a key element of strategic stability and a prerequisite for reductions in strategic offensive arms.

Russia is committed to the Treaty and to continued efforts to enhance its effectiveness and viability, while opposing its modification to accommodate deployment of a National Missile Defence.

Russia maintains that the US's plans to deploy a NBMD, if realized, would destroy the ABM Treaty. The destruction of the Treaty would result in collapse of the structure of the treaties and agreements in the field of disarmament and would make it impossible to abide by START 1 and START 2 or to continue reductions within the START 3 process. A serious damage would be inflicted on the whole disarmament process, non-proliferation regimes and positions on nuclear disarmament of many States.

As to the ABM Treaty, Russia relies on the international support expressed by the international community to this Treaty at the fifty-fourth session of the UN General Assembly which adopted a resolution on maintenance of, and compliance with the ABM Treaty.

The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has become an important step for promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

The CTBT is an effective contribution to the enhancement of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapon. We declared in 1995 that the indefinite extension of the NPT had opened the way for further steps towards nuclear disarmament. A major step in this respect was made 24 September 1996 when the CTBT was opened for signing and was signed by all the five nuclear powers. It is also true that a comprehensive and non-threshold ban on all the nuclear tests is an effective barrier to qualitative improvements of nuclear explosives.

An important role of the CTBT in safeguarding international peace and stability and national interests of all States, with no exceptions, is confirmed by the fact that to date this Treaty has been signed by 155 States of which 52 countries have already ratified it.

A progressive movement towards a non-nuclear world depends, in many respects, on the universality of the CTBT, accession to it of all the countries with nuclear capabilities and, hence, on its early entry into force followed by strict compliance with its provisions. The recent events have proved once again the validity of this conclusion. We note with satisfaction that out of 44 States on whose ratification the entry of the CTBT into force depends, 41 have already signed and 27 ratified it. The Conference on Article XIV of the CTBT, held in October 1999, significantly contributed to the accelerated ratification process by adopting the final declaration which contained agreed measures to promote the early entry of the Treaty into force.

Commitment to the CTBT represents one of the most important indicators of a responsible approach by nuclear powers to fulfilling their obligations under the NPT in the field of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. Since October 1990 Russia has not made a single nuclear explosion strictly complying, already in the period when the CTBT was being developed, with the obligations it undertook under the Treaty before it came into effect, provided, of course, that other state signatories to the Treaty act similarly.

On April, 21, this year the State Duma of Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation ratified the CTBT.

In general we are satisfied with the work performed by the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization to establish a verification mechanism.

We consider it inopportune and therefore counterproductive to launch negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a nuclear disarmament program within specific time limits. We are convinced that it is not possible today to meaningfully engage in issues that could not be addressed in practical terms even in the first decade of the next century. It would be much better if we focus on such an urgent aspect of nuclear disarmament and non?proliferation as the development of a multilateral agreement on the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

Both all nuclear powers and countries that are potentially capable of producing fissile material for use in nuclear explosive devices and possess appropriate facilities, first of all for enriching uranium and recycling spent fuel, should participate in this agreement.

The future agreement should set up a barrier to further production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons and provide for an adequate control.

We should note that a complete nuclear disarmament could only be possible if adequate guarantees are provided that the nuclear arms race of the past which is being reversed today shall not re-emerge in other parts of the world.

The initiative by Russia, the USA and IAEA to place fissile material of weapons origin released from military programs under international control constitutes an important step demonstrating our commitment to the implementation of the CTBT provisions on nuclear disarmament.

The Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety of 1996 noted that it was very important to provide for a safe management of fissile material of weapons origin and ultimately to convert it into a spent fuel or other forms equally unsuitable for nuclear weapons, as well as to provide for their safe and permanent disposal. It was noted that while the primary responsibility for the safe management of fissile material of weapons origin rested with the nuclear states themselves, assistance on the part of other states and international organizations, where appropriate, was welcome.

It is necessary to underline that reduction of nuclear weapons requires both huge financial expenses and organizational endeavors. At the same time intensification of this process could lead to unpredictable consequences.

Important quantities of fissile material of weapons origin (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) are being released in the process of nuclear disarmament in Russia and the USA. At the 41st IAEA General Conference (October 1997, Vienna) a decision of the Russian Federation was announced "on a step-by-step removal from nuclear military programs up to 500 tons of highly enriched uranium and up to 50 tons of plutonium released in the process of nuclear disarmament".

Russia has undertaken irreversible and large?scale conversion of highly enriched uranium released as a result of nuclear disarmament to reactor fuel or, in other words, low enriched nonweapon-grade uranium. Since 1995 80 tons of highly enriched uranium have been converted into fuel for peaceful nuclear power plants, which is equal to about 3000 nuclear war-heads.

The problem of the weapon-grade plutonium released as a result of the reduction in nuclear arsenals need to be also resolved.

We are convinced that the issue of the weapon-grade plutonium may be best solved through its use as a fuel for fast-breeder reactors. In this case the burning of plutonium not only prevents its use as a weapon but also allows power generation for peaceful purposes.

We believe that the resolution of these problems will directly contribute to the irreversible process of nuclear disarmament.

In September 1998 the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America signed a joint statement of principles for management and disposition of plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes.

The Russian Federation has a conducted research into the management of the plutonium released as a result of nuclear disarmament. Conceptual and initial feasibility studies of various technologies to manage the weapon-grade plutonium have been carried out.

Plutonium has a considerable energy potential, and thus Russia plans to solve the problem of its management within the framework of the national strategy of developing its nuclear power sector.

We are actively co-operating with many countries in the field of the management of plutonium released from military nuclear programs.

Thus, Russian and American experts have jointly concluded that the use of the weapon-grade plutonium in the form of the MOX-fuel in power nuclear reactors is economically and technically feasible.

Joint Russian-Canadian feasibility studies have been conducted to produce the uranium-plutonium fuel for the CANDU-reactors using the weapon-grade plutonium. The experiment deals with the parallel irradiation of the experimental MOX-fuel fabricated from the weapon-grade plutonium of American and Russian origins in the CANDU-type reactor to conduct comparative studies of this fuel. The MOX-fuel will be produced in Los-Alamos National laboratory in the United States and in the State Scientific Centre of the Botchvar Institute in Russia and then will be delivered to Canada for experimental irradiation.

Within the framework of trilateral Intergovernmental Agreement between Russia, France and Germany joint research programmes to study the use of a mixed uranium-plutonium fuel in the Russian reactors, as well as to develop installations converting plutonium and producing uranium-plutonium fuel assemblies from the weapon-grade plutonium, have been also conducted.

Together with the United States of America we are conducting the work to shut down and modify the plutonium-produce uranium graphite moderated reactors. The Russian experts have done a lot of scientific work in this direction. We have shut down 10 such reactors out of 13.

However, the financial support for the entire work to modify a plutonium producing reactors is inadequate. The lack of funds impedes the work because we cannot cut of the cities and industries from heat and power.

Moreover, we believe that nuclear arms reductions as a process should be viewed in the light of achieving strategic stability as a whole. In this context we should once again emphasize that the policy pursued by the United States and NATO towards certain sovereign states does not promote the process of nuclear arms reduction. Such policy is undermining the entire disarmament process, including nuclear non?proliferation.

Both the USSR and later on the Russian Federation as a nuclear?weapon state have strictly observed their commitments under Article I of the Treaty, namely, not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons directly, or indirectly. Russia has not in any way assisted or induced any non?nuclear?weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

The Russian Federation proceeded from the assumption that strict observance of Article II of the Treaty constitutes one of the basic means to prevent new nuclear?weapon states from emerging. In its relations with other countries Russia has persistently adhered to its commitments under Article II of the Treaty.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has grown into a solid barrier precluding the nuclear weapons from spreading further, and into a rule of civilized conduct of states in today’s swiftly changing world.

In accordance with its commitments under this Article of the Treaty, the Russian Federation proceeds with exporting nuclear materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon states for peaceful uses under the IAEA safeguards exclusively.

The Russian Federation and other nuclear materials and equipment supplier states conjointly conduct regular updates of the “trigger list” subject to the IAEA safeguards, as required by this Article. Russia strictly adheres in its export policy to the provisions of the above list. Moreover, according to its current legislation, Russia is only entitled to nuclear exports to non?nuclear?weapon states if the entire nuclear activity of the state is subject to the IAEA safeguards.

During period under review the Russian Federation has continuously been improving its export control system, including its legal foundation. On July 18, 1999, Russia adopted the Federal Law On Export Controls regulating legal relations in external economic activity related to goods, information, operations, services, and intellectual property which can be involved in developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, weapon delivery missiles, or other armaments and equipment.

The primary objective of the above law is to secure national interests and implement international commitments of the Russian Federation in the field of the WMD non?proliferation. The law is based on the generally accepted principles and standards of international law, and takes into account all the aspects of Russia’s commitments relating to non?proliferation and export controls, including comprehensive control.

We have been actively working within multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee. These mechanisms would, we believe, allow to establish the procedure for and concerted control over movements of such sensitive goods as nuclear exports without prejudice to international cooperation in promoting peaceful use of atomic energy.

We would like to mention the implementation by the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of the decisions of the 1995 Conference aimed at increasing transparency and developing dialogue with non-members. Two international seminars on export control were successfully arranged under the aegis of the NSG. Documents on the history of the NSG and Zangger Committee have been prepared.

Bilateral and multilateral consultations on export control in which Russia takes an active part contribute to the transparency of such control and to the exchange of experience in this field, and promote dialogue with non-members of the NSG.

It is important, in our opinion, to mention the cooperation with the CIS countries in the field of export control. Member States of the Customs Union agreed to exercise control on the basis of agreements reached in the framework of international export control regimes irrespective of their participation in such regimes.

Russia considers the IAEA control activities as a major instrument to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, therefore, consistently supports the IAEA efforts aimed at increasing effectiveness of the safeguards system.

Compliance by the states with the obligations under Article III of the Agreement is a guarantee that their activities and international cooperation in the nuclear field are in line with the purposes of the Agreement.

It is important, in this context, to increase effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system and to strengthen its ability to determine the nature of nuclear activities of the NPT Member States. Russia consistently supports the IAEA activities in this area, and we commend the efforts of the Agency to establish an integrated safeguards system.

The Statement of the Government of Russia of June 1, 1998, announced the beginning of negotiations with the Agency on the application in the Russia Federation of the Model Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreements between state and the IAEA in respect of certain control measures specified in the Protocol.

On March 22 Russia signed the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the Agency; the text was approved by the 2000 March session of the IAEA Board of Governors. In accordance with the national legislation, it will be submitted to the State Duma for ratification.

The purpose of additional control measures provided for in the Protocol should be, in the first place, to increase effectiveness of the safeguards in non-nuclear states and to reduce their implementation costs.

In this connection, it is important to intensify efforts to establish a new safeguards system. We believe that putting in place of integrated safeguards, now and in the near future, will be the most important area of work of the Agency. Introduction of additional control measures should not become another burden for the states which concluded agreements with the IAEA on the application of the Additional Protocol. They have to be confident that they are not limited in their right to use the atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

We call upon all the NPT Member States which have not signed yet the Additional Protocols to do that as soon as possible.

The Russian Federation cooperates with the CIS countries in the field of application of the IAEA safeguards in these states. In this connection, one should mention the work to remove Russian nuclear materials from the territory of Kazakhstan, participation of a Russian group of experts in taking inventory of nuclear materials in Georgia, solution of some technical issues related to the implementation of the safeguards in Belorussia.

Despite difficult economic situation, Russia continues to contribute to the development of safeguards through the implementation of its national Programme of scientific and technical support to Agency’s safeguards. The Program includes annual international training courses on national accounting and control systems related to nuclear materials, for national personnel, and courses on the application of non-destructive control methods to check spent fuel in “cooling” ponds, for the IAEA inspectors, as well as research work to strengthen the technical basis of the safeguards.

Russian research centers and laboratories render a continuous technical and methodological assistance to the Agency in analyzing environmental and spent fuel samples. Russian experts take part in many of IAEA projects.

Russia, with its huge stock of nuclear and other radioactive materials, and experience in their use, is fully aware of the problem of illicit trafficking of such materials. We provide every possible support for international cooperation, including in IAEA format, to counter the illicit trafficking, and regard the implementation of the Program on the suppression of this dangerous practice adopted at the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security as a vital element of this work.

The national legislation in the field of accounting, control and physical protection is systematically updated and improved. A special program has been developed to design and implement a system of state accounting and control of nuclear materials. Organizational procedures to put in place such a system are established by a regulation issued by the Russian government. Enterprises dealing with the nuclear materials are being reequipped in order to enhance their accounting and control of nuclear materials in order to bring them in line with the international standards. Russia cooperates in this field with the European Union, the United States and Japan.

In compliance with its obligations under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium, Russia annually submits to the IAEA information concerning its stocks of non-irradiated civil plutonium.

A lot of work has been done by Russian, US and IAEA experts in the framework of the so-called “trilateral initiative” in order to solve technical, legal and organizational issues related to placing nuclear materials of weapon origin released from Russian and US military programs under the IAEA control. The task is new both for the two countries and the IAEA. It is necessary, on the one hand, to develop control methods and technical means to determine the weapon origin of tested materials, and, on the other hand, to create conditions preventing disclosure of secret information. By now, methods to control nuclear materials of weapon origin without disclosure of sensitive information have been almost fully developed and tested, and both countries are closely cooperating with the IAEA in designing prototypes of production equipment for the use during IAEA inspections in the United States and Russia. Also, technical characteristics have been determined for systems to control inventories of such nuclear materials. Considerable progress has been made in preparing a model agreement which Russia and the United States could use as a basis for their bilateral agreements with the IAEA to place their excessive nuclear materials of weapon origin under the Agency’s control. Later on, this document could serve as a model for other nuclear states.

Russia pays special attention to the strictest possible compliance with its obligations under Article IV of the Treaty. We stand for an equitable international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for the provision of assistance to developing countries and regions to meet their needs, provided such needs are legitimate and do not run counter to the Treaty. We are in favour of more countries getting access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and support cooperation in this field on both bilateral and multilateral levels, including in the framework of the IAEA.

The use of nuclear energy, in our view, is now the only alternative to the large-scale use of organic fuel energy, which is harmful to the environment. The burning of organic fuel to generate power leads to rapid depletion of its deposits and to the loss of valuable resources for chemical and pharmaceutical industries.

To our view there is an evident economic expediency to develop atomic power engineering in Russia. Thus, electric energy produced by this industry saves more than 50 bln. cubic metres of natural gas.

Today, 29 energy units of total capacity 21,9 GW operate in Russia. Another three units are expected to be commissioned after 2000. In 1999 a share of electric energy produced by Russian nuclear power stations in its total national volume amounted to more than 13%.

Since the Rio de Janeiro Forum the capability of an industrial technology to contribute to sustainable development has served as a criterion of its long-term development and social utility.

Measures for limitation and reduction of greenhouse gas emission were proposed during the third Conference of Parties to the UN Framework convention on climate change (Kyoto, 1997). The states which participated in this forum undertook to prevent further environmental degradation.

We believe that the use of nuclear energy can provide a basis for building an energy system ensuring sustainable, environmentally safe, economically sound and socially acceptable development and improvement of all spheres of human activities in the 21^st century.

Increased world demands for fuel and energy at a time when traditional power engineering is experiencing environmental limitations makes it urgent to develop a new energy technology capable of meeting an essential part of the increased energy demands.

Research work carried out in Russia reveals a possibility of creating a nuclear radiation-equal fuel cycle of “natural safety”, devoid of the faults of today’s nuclear power engineering.

The “natural safety” principle represents a generalized intrinsic safety principle being extended to the fuel cycle as a whole with due account of the radioactive waste problem and non-proliferation regime. This principle includes:

- radiation-equal disposal of radioactive waste with its provisional regional concentration;

Many countries carry out research aimed at developing and studying promising reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technologies.

We believe that an international project worked out under the IAEA aegis with the participation of interested developing and developed countries and designed to develop promising nuclear technologies, would help to pool efforts of participating states in fulfilling major tasks of the use of nuclear energy.

We attach great importance to the program of technical assistance and co-operation in the Agency’s activities. One of the main elements of technical assistance is contributing to training national specialists and conducting scientific research. Since the IAEA establishment Russia has always been actively engaged in the Agency’s technical assistance programs by delivering Russian equipment, instruments and materials, organizing interregional and regional training courses on the basis of its institutes and enterprises, and sharing its wide experience.

In the framework of the IAEA technical cooperation program annual probations and research visits of specialists from developing IAEA member states are carried out at the scientific and technological institutes and enterprises of the Russian Federation.

Despite its complicated economic situation Russia continues rendering assistance to the developing IAEA member states.

Russia assists in building accelerators, neutron generators, supplies installations for neutron radiography, gamma-therapy instruments, isotopic products, installations for liquid nitrogen production, ionizing irradiation sources as well as other equipment and materials. Training of specialists represent another sphere of co-operation.

In March 1999, the delivery of a cyclotron from Russia to Egypt was completed. The cyclotron should become a basis for establishing a regional research and medical centre and hospital in Egypt. The Agency rendered all-round assistance in this respect.

We attach special significance to the co-operation with the CIS countries. It is based on the Framework Agreement of 1992 between the CIS Countries on the Main Principles Governing the Co-operation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

To develop it further, the CIS Council of Heads of Government adopted, in January 1997, a long-term plan of development of co-operation between the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and enhancing of nuclear plant safety. The plan includes legal, regulatory, organizational, economic, scientific, technical, environmental and social aspects of co-operation between the CIS member states, sets out its key areas and tasks. The CIS Council of Heads of Government decided to establish a Commission of the CIS countries on co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The third meeting of the Commission was held in November 1999.

As for nuclear energy, the Russian Federation co-operates with a wide range of countries parties to the NPT in construction and safe operation of NPPs.

On the basis of Russian projects 51 power blocks were constructed altogether outside Russia, 42 of which are in operation with total electric power of approximately 30.000 MW (in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, Armenia, the Czech Republic, Finland and Lithuania).

New blocks are being constructed in Slovakia, Iran and the People’s Republic of China.

A research centre is to be established in Syria. Co-operation with South Africa in development of a high-temperature gas-cooled reactor is underway.

Reconstruction of the water supply system at the Nuclear Research Centre and strengthening of co-operation in modernization of engineering and technological systems in Libya are envisaged.

The IAEA safeguards applicable to nuclear materials supplied by Russia have never revealed their use for undeclared purposes.

Development of an experimental thermonuclear reactor (ITER) project provides an example of successful international cooperation opening up perspectives for solving difficult problems of legal, international, environmental, economic and political character. In May 1998, the project was highly appreciated by the Birmingham Summit. It noted that the development of the ITER engineering project gave reason to believe that its tasks related to physics could be fulfilled and proved that the concept as a whole was technically feasible.

In July 2001, the technical project will be finalized, and its practical implementation will come to the forefront. It will be a decisive step towards mastering a new and in every respect acceptable source of energy in the interests of all countries.

Cooperation in small energy sector, including sea water-fresheners, deserves special attention. Russia is going to take part in preparation and organization, within an IAEA program, of an international demonstration nuclear water-freshener project. A joint Russian-Canadian floating water-freshener project was prepared, and work related to a Russian-Indonesian project of development of a floating nuclear water-freshening complex is underway.

The International Scientific and Technological Centre designed to reorient the scientific knowledge and experience in the sphere of development and production of weapons of mass distruction to peaceful purposes continues its work providing resources for civil projects and sponsoring various seminars and training courses.

At present Russia participates in implementation of a number of international programs of radioactive waste management. For instance, within a Russian-US-Norwegian project, a project named "Recycling of low-level radioactive waste of the North Fleet" is being implemented. An agreement on cooperation in ensuring environmental safety in the process of utilization of Russia's nuclear submarines in the North region signed by Russia and Norway is being carried out through specific projects. A similar agreement is being implemented in the Pacific region in cooperation with Japan on a bilateral basis.

An adequate level of nuclear safety continues to be the main priority in developing the nuclear power sector and nuclear technologies. We would like to note the success of the 1st National Reports Review Meeting held within the framework of the IAEA in accordance with the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The constructive atmosphere of the forum allowed to impartially assess the present state of virtually all reactors of operating nuclear power plants. The forum managed to discard the artificial political differentiation and focused exclusively on the technical aspects of the issues.

In 1999 Russia signed a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Convention is supposed to collect the required number of participants to come into force in the year 2000; thus one of the key provisions of the Moscow G 8 summit Declaration of 1996 will be implemented.

Russia participates in the IAEA program designed to establish an international network of regional training and demonstration centers for reprocessing and storage of radioactive waste originated from nuclear methods in medical and research institutions and in industry. In April 1999, within the framework of this program an IAEA regional demonstration center was opened in Russia meeting the needs of the CIS and, partly, of Eastern Europe.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty has created a unique structure of constantly growing international cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic power for a decade to come.

Russia is ready for further cooperation with the states that are parties to the Treaty taking into account their specific features and needs.

We think that this article is irrelevant because the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty has been drawn up and opened for signing.

The Russian Federation continues to advocate the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world believing that this process is contributing to narrowing the geographic scope of nuclear preparations and thus strengthening the regime of nuclear non-proliferation.

Russia views the nuclear-free zones as an important element in strengthening international peace and security, which promotes disarmament on the global and regional levels.

The nuclear-free zones are positive regional complements to the NPT regime, and in some cases (the Latin American countries) they create prerequisites for the states to join the Treaty. We think that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is a positive process which has gained momentum over the recent years. Over 30 years that passed since the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the first zone of this kind, the number of states covered by the nuclear-weapon-free zone regime increased significantly and now their number exceeds 100 countries.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is an important disarmament measure. By creating such zone the states seek to strengthen international and regional security, mutual trust and concord. At the same time they fulfill another task which is no less important - by acting in the spirit of Article VII of NPT they make a significant contribution to the development and consolidation of the regime of nuclear non-proliferation. Such organic combination of complementary factors determines the collective and individual significance of the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The international community has gained substantial experience in creating nuclear-free zones, which suggests that a nuclear-free zone wins recognition and obtains relevant guarantees if only the process of its establishment complies with the prevalent principles and standards and does not contradict the norms of international law. And, conversely, non-observance of these conditions impedes the process of zone recognition, as it happened in the Southeast Asia. We hope that the dialogue between the countries of the Southeast Asia and the nuclear powers will contribute to overcoming the existing difficulties.

A draft treaty on nuclear weapon-free zone in the Central Asia is in the making. Meanwhile, all the efforts to create such a zone in the Middle East have not brought any definite results yet, and this causes deep concern, especially taking into account the difficult strategic and military situation in the region.

It is well known that the issue of negative guarantees has long been considered at the Conference on Disarmament. Recently the Conference, within the respective committee and with the same mandate, has resumed work in this area. We welcome it and reaffirm our stance. We think that the Conference on Disarmament, as a unique international forum in the field of disarmament, is the most appropriate mechanism to address “negative guarantees”. When it comes to the problem of nuclear weapons transit through the territory of the nuclear-free zones, Russia, naturally, proceeds from the idea that relevant agreements should be concluded in strict conformity with the generally recognized norms of international law and particularly with the principle of freedom of navigation. The agreement shall be ineffective outside the territory of the States Parties, including airspace and territorial waters established under the international law.

The Russian Federation has provided the utmost assistance to the Treaty review conferences, as well as to the implementation of the provisions of their Declarations.

Considering it crucial to strengthen the Treaty by pursuing the accession to the Treaty of a number of other States, the Russian Federation, in cooperation with other depositories, has pressed ahead with the task of bringing new states into the Treaty, especially in the regions of special importance in the context of nuclear weapons non-proliferation. Russia notes with satisfaction that there are 187 States Parties to the Treaty, and it is a signal of its almost universal nature.

The Russian Federation is strongly convinced that the Treaty is a fundamental international legal document of the nuclear era, which provides an optimum balance between containment of the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and cooperation in the field of nuclear energy peaceful use. The Conference resolutions on further strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and its basis - the NPT - must lay the foundations for advancing in the 21 century towards the future nuclear-free world.