21 April 2000
(Chief U.S. delegate seeks, as minimum, consensus on goals) (3070) The Clinton administration's lead official on non-proliferation matters says he hopes that the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference will produce, at the minimum, an agreement on goals for the next five years. Ideally, Ambassador Norman Wulf says, participants in the Conference can reach consensus on both a backward and forward look -- "that is, the review of the last five years and setting the goals for the future." Wulf, who is Special Representative to the President for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, will represent the United States at the month-long multinational conference, opening in New York April 24. He acknowledged, in a recent interview, that U.S. officials "expect this to be a difficult conference." That is true, he said, in light of some unrealistic expectations created at the last conference, in 1995, and "external factors," like the crisis in the Balkans and tensions between India and Pakistan, that have slowed progress toward non-proliferation. Following is the transcript of the interview conducted by Washington File Staff Writer Ralph Dannheisser: (begin transcript) Question: As the Review Conference delegations are preparing to convene in New York, what are the key U.S. goals for the month-long deliberations? Wulf: What we seek out of that Conference is to demonstrate to the world community that the United States continues to implement its obligations under Article Six -- Article Six is the article that deals with nuclear disarmament -- and, if it is possible, to see if we can produce a consensus final document. Q: What advance preparations has the administration made for the Conference toward these ends? Wulf: A number of things. Secretary Albright sent out a cable to all of our embassies in countries that are NPT parties, asking them to make this a priority in their dealings with their host governments; she has published an op-ed piece in the International Herald Tribune; the President on March 6 issued a statement in connection with the 30th anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT; we have conducted extensive bilateral consultations with a whole cross-section of NPT parties, and, lastly, we are in the process of putting together a series of booklets that will explain what the United States has done in the area of nuclear disarmament, what we are doing in the area of technical assistance for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and a generalized pamphlet on the NPT itself. Q: All this having been done in advance, what do you now expect to be the general content of the Conference, and are there areas in which you expect controversies to arise? Wulf: Well, certainly we expect this to be a difficult conference. I think great expectations were created in 1995 about the steady pace of progress toward nuclear disarmament, and many of those expectations were unrealistic and have not been met. Other expectations were realistic, and some of them also have not been met. The result is a fair level of frustration, some aimed at the United States, but certainly not aimed exclusively at the United States. It goes to underscore the basic fact that arms control does not occur in a political vacuum. It is subject to the pressures and political exigencies that exist over time, and this last five-year period has been a time when there have been external factors that have slowed the process of nuclear disarmament. I would cite one external factor -- the crisis in the Balkans, the Kosovo war. Another external factor was the decision by India and Pakistan to conduct nuclear tests. All those issues have an impact on the political environment and in turn have an impact on the arms control process. Q: One issue you mentioned was the developments in India and Pakistan. Do you expect any document coming out of the Conference to address that matter specifically? Wulf: We believe it would be a very big mistake if the NPT parties met as a review Conference for the first time in five years -- in a situation in which the Indian and Pakistani tests occurred -- and said nothing. We think it is important that the Conference address that and we, for our part, will be urging that the final documentation include a call upon India and Pakistan to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1172. That resolution, adopted immediately after the Indian and Pakistani tests, sets forth a series of steps that the Security Council believes India and Pakistan should take to, number one, de-escalate nuclear tensions, and ultimately to become parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states. Q: So clearly the production of fissile materials and ballistic missile development in those two countries is a matter of great concern? Wulf: Continuing great concern. The President has characterized the India-Pakistan region as the most dangerous place in the world, and certainly it's a view, I think, widely shared. The fact that both have demonstrated a nuclear capability, the fact that both have refused thus far to halt production of fissile material, and the fact that both are engaged in testing ballistic missiles is an extremely unstable development and creates real concerns over time. Q: Do you expect any consensus agreements to be achieved on any of the subjects under discussion at the Conference? Wulf: "Expect" versus "hope" is the way I'd have to answer that question. We certainly hope there will be consensus on the two aspects that the Conference will be addressing. Those two are the so-called review of the past five years and the so-called forward look at objectives and the agenda for the future. We hope there can be a consensus on both of those. The history of the NPT is that in the five conferences held to date, only two have succeeded in producing a consensus review and the likelihood of success with 150 countries participating in a process that operates by consensus has to be viewed as small. But certainly our objective, and what we will be working for and seeking, would be a consensus document that does both a forward look and the backward look. Q: In terms of that forward look, what would you like to see in it? Wulf: Among the unfinished business from the 1995 forward look was the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In 1995, the parties called upon the CD (Conference on Disarmament) for negotiations there to be concluded by 1996. That objective was met, but now the objective has to be entry into force of the CTBT. Certainly we would expect that the final document would say something calling upon the states necessary to bring the CTBT into force to ratify as early as possible. Another objective that was set in 1995 was the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. To date the CD has been unable to even start the negotiation because of procedural wrangling. We think it's time that the CD got on with it and put aside this procedural nonsense and got to work. Presumably the Conference will call for that. Lastly, the Conference in 1995 called for systematic and progressive efforts toward nuclear disarmament, and clearly among the steps that the United States can and should be taking is, first, entry into force of START II; secondly, negotiation and rapid conclusion of START III, and third, a number of interim steps that could lead to more nuclear disarmament and fewer nuclear weapons. Q: One of the objectives you mentioned related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Is that going to be more problematical to get accomplished, given the U.S. Senate's own failure to bless the Treaty? Wulf: Certainly the fact that the Senate did not give its consent to ratification will be a subject that we expect to arise, and it was certainly a matter of great disappointment, not only to the administration, but to many countries who expected the advice and consent to be given to ratification. We have pointed out that while we failed in that round, there is no diminishment of the administration's expectation and hope to see CTBT ratified. Very recently we have sought the assistance of General (John) Shalikashvili to work with the Senate to see if we could address Senate concerns. I think the most important fact is that, even though the Senate did not give its consent to the CTBT, no testing is under way and the United States has no plans to conduct nuclear tests. So the purpose of the CTBT is being met. In addition, the United States is continuing to pay its assessment to the CTBT organization that is setting up the network that would verify the CTBT once it enters into force. One of the Senate's criticisms of the CTBT was that the verification network was not complete. The fact that we're able to continue paying our dues will allow the CTBT organization to go forward with the verification network and this, in turn, could make it easier for the Senate to give its consent when it next takes up the issue. Q: To what extent do you believe that the deliberations might be affected by the U.S.-Russian talks on amending the Antiballistic Missile Treaty and, related to that, the upcoming decision by President Clinton on possible deployment of the limited National Missile Defense system? Wulf: Certainly, the question of possible deployment is an issue that is of deep concern both to Russia and China and, I might add, even to a country like France. How the Russian and Chinese governments will bring those differences into the NPT remains unclear. We are discussing with both governments this issue as it relates to the NPT, and trying to see if we can find an approach that would allow us to leave our differences on this issue outside the conference room. This does not mean that they will not publicly criticize the NMD decision that is pending, but certainly we hope that we can find a way to deal with this issue that would not make it, shall we say, a deal buster at the Conference itself. Q: How can the United States best answer other countries who ask why they shouldn't be allowed to develop nuclear weapons when we and the other nuclear powers are permitted to keep ours? Wulf: The reality is that at the time the NPT was negotiated, there were five states that had conducted nuclear tests and therefore were referred to as nuclear weapons states and were not required to foreswear those weapons. Everybody else who signed the NPT -- and at this point there are 182 countries who have signed as non-nuclear weapons states -- foreswore nuclear weapons. They did so, I believe, with the understanding that the others countries in their regions were undertaking a similar obligation, and that their interests were best served by not pursuing nuclear weapons themselves and thereby setting off an arms race with their neighbors. A classic example of this is Brazil and Argentina, both of whom had nascent nuclear weapons programs going into the end of the 1980s. Both concluded that they were not going to be better off at the end of the day with each of them possessing nuclear arms, and doing so with substantially reduced funds available for social costs. Both concluded that if they joined hands and became parties to NPT together that this was a far better way to advance their national security interests than engaging in competition like India and Pakistan. It is quite clear that neither India nor Pakistan is more secure today than it was before they sought nuclear weapons. We believe that the other part of the deal, from the negotiating history, is that the United States, as a nuclear weapons state, has an obligation to continue working toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons, including its own. We are engaged in that process. We don't know how long it's going to take to complete that process, but we certainly believe that the NPT, as a confidence-building device for regional issues, has been extremely successful and will continue to serve the interests of all countries. We know of no country that joined the NPT because of Article 6 -- that is, the article in the Treaty that says nuclear weapons states shall work toward nuclear disarmament. They joined for the security benefits offered by the Treaty. This does not mean nuclear weapons states can ignore Article 6, but it does mean that the Treaty has intrinsic value for the security of individual countries and individual regions. Q: And what can be done to persuade additional countries to join the regime? Wulf: At this point we have only four countries that remain outside the regime. I'll start with the easiest one: Cuba. Cuba, unlike the other three, has no unsafeguarded nuclear facilities nor, to our knowledge, are we concerned about Cuba having a nuclear weapons program. Cuba is staying out primarily, they claim, as a protest against the presence of the United States Navy at Guantanamo Bay. What the real reason is, we're not totally sure, but that's their stated reason. The remaining three countries are much more difficult: Israel, India, and Pakistan. Israel has unsafeguarded nuclear facilities; India and Pakistan have a demonstrated nuclear potential. Israel has stated that it is prepared to surrender its nuclear weapons in the context of a just, stable, and enduring Middle East peace. The United States is making every effort we can to bring about just such a peace, and we believe once that is achieved, that Israel can and should join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. The situation in South Asia obviously is much more difficult; neither is going to be prepared to give up unless both give up their nuclear weapons programs. Theoretically, one ought to be able to replicate the experience of Brazil and Argentina, but China adds a complicating factor. India claims, and indeed stated immediately after its nuclear test, that the reason they needed nuclear weapons was the Chinese threat. Whatever the reality is, that ends up making the problem a three-cornered shot, as opposed to just a two-party process, and that in turn makes it much more difficult to see how one can get these two countries to surrender their weapons. What we will be working for, and what the President's trip to South Asia and Strobe Talbott's diplomacy has been designed to do, has been, number one, to get the parties to stop where they are and not continue expanding their capabilities and, number two, to begin addressing the problems that they have so that India and Pakistan no longer have the reason to feel threatened. Our objective is to see India view its Pakistani neighbor in the same way that we view our Canadian neighbor, and to have a border that is no more armed than the U.S.-Canadian border is. If that were to come about, one could clearly envisage a situation in which Pakistan would be prepared to surrender its nuclear weapons. Similarly, if India and China were to resolve whatever differences India believes may exist, one at least should be able to envisage a situation in which India is prepared to surrender its nuclear weapons. So those are the issues we see at this point: we will have to address the question of trying to get these three countries with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities as parties to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. Q: For both the countries that are in the regime and those you were talking about that you would like to get into it, is there any sort of enforcement mechanism needed that doesn't exist and, if so, what might that be? Wulf: One of the questions that has been raised occasionally is whether the NPT, like the Chemical Weapons Convention, should have its own institutional body that works with the parties and deals with questions of noncompliance. For our part, we're not persuaded that there is a need. First and foremost, the International Atomic Energy Agency has the job of ensuring that any non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT has all its facilities under international inspection. If, for any reason, the IAEA is unsure or has doubts about whether a country is complying with its obligations, it can and has referred the matter to the Security Council. The North Korean situation back in 1993 and 1994 is a classic example. The IAEA became convinced, and the Board of Governors agreed, that North Korea was not complying with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The matter was referred to the Security Council, which found North Korea to be violating its NPT obligations, and called upon it to comply. We think this mechanism is quite adequate for dealing with compliance questions and see no need for a new international institution to add to the multiplicity of international organizations that already exist. Q: Do you expect the United States, at some point during the Conference, to make a public reconfirmation of its strong commitment to nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament as a concept? Wulf: Absolutely. At this point, it looks like Secretary Albright will be delivering the U.S. plenary statement, and we would expect in that statement there to be such a commitment. Also I would note the President's March 6 statement on the 30th anniversary of the NPT's entry into force did contain such a public reaffirmation of our commitment to nuclear disarmament. Q: Summing up, what is your realistic assessment of what can be achieved during these month-long deliberations? Wulf: We hope that the Conference can do both the backward look and the forward look -- that is, the review of the last five years and setting the goals for the future. If it is unable to do both, we think it extremely important that it at least try to set the goals for the future. That is certainly what happened, in large part, in 1995, where the Conference had to make a decision about the Treaty's future duration. It was unable to reach agreement on the five-year review, but it did reach agreement on the goals for the next five years. We would hope, at a minimum, the Conference can agree to that. (end transcript) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)