21 April 2000
(Dhanapala hopes for final consensus on nuclear issues) (2840) United Nations -- As the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) approaches, the UN's undersecretary general for disarmament affairs expresses hope that the treaty parties will be able to adopt by consensus a final document on goals for the next five years. Undersecretary General Jayantha Dhanapala said that nuclear non-proliferation issues "are being looked at in an atmosphere where there is no confidence that the nuclear disarmament issue has been addressed meaningfully in the last five years." Three preparatory committee sessions were "characterized by a great deal of acrimony and disagreement," he said. Nevertheless, Dhanapala said it is "very likely that, having assessed the treaty's performance over the last five years, we will set ourselves a program of action or have some kind of a blueprint for the next five years. If that can be adopted by consensus then, I think, the conference will have been a success." The Review Conference will be held April 24 - May 19 in New York. Following is the transcript of the interview conducted by Washington File United Nations Correspondent Judy Aita: (begin transcript) Q: How is the NPT Review Conference going to be structured, who is going to be participating, and what are its goals? Dhanapala: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has to be reviewed once every five years in accordance with the provisions of the treaty itself, and the 187 states parties to the treaty are invited to participate in the review. There will be a plenary meeting and three main committees which will examine in depth the different aspects of the treaty. The treaty has ten main articles and it is divided into three components, each of which will be examined by the states parties in a main committee. The conference will run for four weeks and there will also be a general committee and a drafting committee which will assist the president and the chairmen of the three main committees in the organization of the meetings. Q: There is a perception among the general public in North America, and perhaps elsewhere in the world, that with the end of the Cold War nuclear issues are not really as important as they used to be . Do you foresee or hope this conference will dispel that complacency? Dhanapala: It is true that with the end of the Cold War, in the public perception the immediacy of the danger of a global nuclear war has receded and you do not get the same massive demonstrations on nuclear issues, including nuclear testing, that you had during the Cold War. But in real terms the danger remains very much alive. We have not been able to focus the attention of the public on this issue. There have been other issues that have grabbed the attention of the public -- such as world trade, environment, globalization and so on. But we are seeing a situation where the public has been very satisfied with some of the achievements on nuclear issues. For example, we have a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) today. And in fact, even though the treaty has not entered into force, there is a global moratorium on tests. Even India and Pakistan, after their tests of May 1998, have said that they will not be testing any more. So there is a voluntary moratorium. The time when you saw street demonstrations against testing by France in Muroroa, and by other countries in other parts of the world, is all over now. However, as long as there are nuclear weapons, there is still a danger of nuclear war by accident or by design. So the problem continues to surface from time to time, but hasn't yet been as widespread a global issue as it was, of course, in the Cold War. Q: What do you expect to be the greatest challenges at the conference? Dhanapala: The purpose of the conference is to review the implementation of provisions of the treaty. They will be looking particularly at the package of decisions and the resolution that were adopted in 1995. This is the first review conference not only in the 21st Century but in the strengthened review process that was initiated in 1995. So not only are we looking at the original bargain between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states, which was forged in 1968 when the treaty was signed, but we're looking at the new deal that was arranged in 1995 when, in return for the indefinite extension of the treaty, the non-nuclear weapons states obtained a strengthened review process; a set of principles and objectives which really act as benchmarks for the new, enhanced accountability of the parties; and the resolution on the Middle East which gave the Arab States a reason to go along with the indefinite extension. All these issues are being looked at in an atmosphere where there is no confidence that the nuclear disarmament issue has been addressed meaningfully in the last five years. If you look at the actual record there is only the CTBT -- and that treaty has not entered into force and it is well known that its ratification has been rejected by the United States Senate. There are also no negotiations under way for any fresh disarmament agreements, either bilateral or multilateral. These are the main problems that will be addressed, but under every article there are separate sets of issues. For example, with regard to non-nuclear weapons states adhering to the treaty, we still have the concerns over Iraq and concerns over the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. These will be discussed and have to be addressed. Then there are issues with regard to the nuclear-weapon-free zones established by treaties signed in regions like Africa and Southeast Asia. But in the case of Africa, the treaty has not entered into force because we do not have the number of ratifications required. In the case of Southeast Asia, the protocols required to be signed by the nuclear weapons states have not been signed. Then there is the question of Article 3 -- the safeguards agreement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signs with state parties to the treaty to ensure that they are adhering to the treaty. The new protocol that the Atomic Energy Agency has adopted gives greater intrusiveness in terms of verification of the treaty parties' obligations. We need to get all treaty parties to sign that. So far only 48 have signed. Those are examples of the kinds of issues that will be discussed. Q: Are there one or two issues that will generate the most heated debate? Dhanapala: In my consultations with the states parties -- and having observed the three sessions of the preparatory committee (Prepcom) -- I would identify two main issues. One is a widespread perception that inadequate progress has been made on nuclear disarmament. We have an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice which says that negotiations must not only take place in good faith, but also must be brought to a conclusion. There is a strong desire on the part of many member states to see the pace of nuclear disarmament increase until we reach the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The other issue is the Middle East. The Arab countries feel very strongly about the fact that while all Arab states have signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Israel remains the only state in the region which is outside the NPT. And this gives them an understandable sense of unease and insecurity. So they will want to call on Israel to sign the treaty and to have its unsafeguarded facilities subjected to IAEA safeguards. This will be a controversial issue because in the past other countries have been reluctant to name Israel specifically on this issue. Q: There has been concern in Russia, for example, about the adequate safeguarding of the existing nuclear weapons and fears that such weapons may fall into terrorists' hands. Is the safeguarding of existing weaponry a conference concern? Dhanapala: I use safeguards in the technical sense of the International Atomic Energy Agency having certain procedures, under the agreements that they signed with states parties, that include inspections where they check on material. The nuclear weapons states, including the Russian Federation, do not have safeguards agreements because they already have nuclear weapons. So we are only talking about IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear weapons states to ensure that there is no diversion to non-peaceful purposes of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the case of the Russian Federation, with the decline in the economic situation in that country there has been great concern about the safety of their nuclear installations, the way in which nuclear material is protected, and whether or not the technology can leak to other countries. There are a number of international agreements; for example, there is a Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material which the IAEA has and which is being implemented. There are also bilateral arrangements, and I think the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program under the Nunn-Lugar legislation of the United States has helped enormously in promoting the safety of Russian nuclear installations. This program is an excellent example of the cooperative way in which we can ensure our common security. Q: Will such problems be part of the discussions at the conference? Dhanapala: It will certainly come up because this is an issue of global concern and the conference will perhaps note that there are these arrangements and will probably endorse them. It's not an arrangement which comes strictly within the scope of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it is naturally of concern. Q: What would you consider a successful outcome for the conference? Dhanapala: Traditionally NPT review conferences have taken decisions by consensus. Although the rules of procedure permit voting, that has never been resorted to. Resorting to voting would be an indication of a weakening of the treaty and some kind of division in the ranks of the treaty parties. That should be avoided as far as possible. Traditionally also, review conferences have concluded with a consensus document, a final document which reflects the views of all the states on the state of the treaty and looks forward. It has been particularly necessary after the strengthened review process was initiated in 1995 that we not only look backwards at the performance in the last five years but we also look forward to the next five years. It is very likely that, having assessed the treaty's performance over the last five years, we will set ourselves a program of action or have some kind of a blueprint for the next five years. If that can be adopted by consensus then, I think, the conference will have been a success. Q: Has a draft agreement been prepared in the preparatory committee meetings, or will the committees take that up when the conference begins? Dhanapala: The problem with this review conference is that we start with a tabula rasa because the Prepcoms were unable to agree on any substantive recommendations. In fact, the Prepcom sessions were characterized by a great deal of acrimony and disagreement. They were only able to agree on procedural issues and they left to the review conference itself the task of finding agreement on issues of substance. This is why a major burden is being placed on this review conference. Within the four weeks allotted to them, the states parties have to come to agreement. Q: How important is the relationship of the major nuclear powers to the conference? Dhanapala: It is absolutely crucial because they are in the driver's seat. It is they who set the pace on nuclear disarmament and what these five countries will do together will certainly influence the course of the review conference. Q: Is there anything that can be done to persuade India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba to join the NPT? Dhanapala: It is a matter of satisfaction that it is only four countries. The NPT is the most widely subscribed disarmament treaty we have. In the case of Cuba, it has already signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which is a nuclear weapons free zone. To that extent Cuba has renounced its nuclear option. The only reason why Cuba has not subscribed is because the treaty is regarded by Cuba as discriminatory between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. It doesn't really mean that Cuba wants to go nuclear. In the case of India and Pakistan, they have demonstrated in May 1998 their desire to go nuclear. Although the world has adopted Security Council Resolution 1172, and other statements have been made urging India and Pakistan to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, that prospect seems to be distant. We can hope now for India to join the CTBT and for Pakistan as well to join the CTBT to renounce future tests and then take it from there. Also, if both those countries agree to halt production and deal with their stockpiles of fissile materials that go into the manufacture of nuclear weapons, then again that will be a very important step forward. With regard to Israel, as you know, they have maintained the policy of ambiguity as to precisely what their status is. But we would hope that they would also join the NPT at a future date. They have stated that they would do so as part and parcel of the Middle East peace process, and at least they do not rule it out that at some time in the future they will join the NPT. Q: Does a conference such as this help in any way to convince those states to join the NPT? Does a review conference have that kind of effect? Dhanapala: The fact is that we have over the years seen a steady enlargement of the number of countries who are subscribing to the treaty. Take, for example, South Africa: It actually destroyed six devices which it had in order to enter the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. Argentina and Brazil at one stage were regarded as being potential nuclear weapons states with an arms race between them, but they also have joined the NPT. So we have seen a number of countries being converted and deciding that ultimately it is in their national interest to sign the treaty. One can only hope that the same will be true of the others. But it is a mistake to believe that we can achieve nuclear non-proliferation by itself. It has to be achieved in combination with the nuclear disarmament of the nuclear weapon states. In other words, there has to be a parallel movement on both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. That is the only thing that makes the treaty credible. Q: What are the prospects in this review process for another part of the treaty which encourages peaceful use of nuclear energy? Dhanapala: Article 4 guarantees the non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT access to nuclear material and nuclear technology. This is being done through IAEA, which has projects to encourage the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. You will hear allegations that the non-nuclear states are being discriminated against and that they have not yet had the unimpeded access that they would like to have. But, by and large, the IAEA is responsible for fostering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Q: Do you expect large demonstrations, or celebrities to be part of the conference? Dhanapala: Around the margins of the conference there will be a number of NGO (non-governmental organization) events, and I believe that some of those will attract high profile participants. I don't know exactly who will come, but for the conference itself we expect 20 foreign ministers and six deputy foreign ministers. That in itself will give the conference additional stature. Q: Do you find the activities of the NGO community in connection with this conference helpful? Dhanapala: There is no question that the NGO participation in disarmament conferences is very significant. We have some NGOs that have done a prodigious amount of research and that publish materials that are of great value to delegations. They also will have display material at the conference. In this review conference special provision is being made for them to address the conference during a certain part of the plenary. That is a fresh departure and a healthy departure from the past. In addition to that, the NGOs will have access to delegations. They will naturally invite delegates to briefing sessions, ensure that their material is made available to delegations. Another very interesting development is the number of delegations that will actually include NGO representatives. Canada, for example, will be one of them. This is an indication that governments see the value of NGO participation within their delegations. (end transcript) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)