22 March 2000
(Nonproliferation efforts making slow but steady progress) (2710) Efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons under the Nonproliferation Treaty are making slow, but steady progress, according to John D. Holum, senior adviser for arms control and international security at the Department of State. "Understandably, the far-reaching progress in nuclear disarmament has whetted all our appetites for deeper, irreversible steps. Some countries assert that the pace of progress is unacceptably slow," he said. "The unavoidable reality, however, is that arms control is a process in which painstaking negotiations are often an essential part of achieving an effective and verifiable outcome. Moreover, intermediate steps are the engines of progress," he said. Holum made his remarks at the Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation held in Tokyo March 9, 2000. Holum said he hoped that the review conference for the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) set to be held in New York City in April will offer "a balanced, realistic assessment" of the Treaty and reaffirm the contributions it makes to global security. The three fundamental premises of the NPT are: to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; to promote and facilitate arms control and disarmament efforts, and; to promote cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy so that its benefits are widely available. Since 1995, however, special international attention has been on the commitment in Article VI, which obligates all member states to: "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control," Holum said. "The U.S. recognizes that others are frustrated that more has not been accomplished in the disarmament arena in the way of new, formal agreements to further reduce nuclear arsenals. Indeed, we share the frustration," Holum said. "But it seriously undervalues the NPT to measure its success only by progress on Article VI. Moreover, propositions that the future of the NPT should be risked to achieve more nuclear disarmament are downright dangerous. A sturdy NPT is one of the reasons why we have made as much progress as we have. Undercutting the NPT would jeopardize that progress, as well as the Treaty's broader values for all of its members." Holum also said the NPT helps promote much of the peaceful nuclear cooperation that is taking place today. "Cooperation in peaceful uses is one of the tangible ways that NPT parties benefit from Treaty membership," he said. "We need a successful Review Conference outcome that preserves the integrity and strength of the NPT," Holum said. "Above all we need to make sure that all NPT parties recognize that this Treaty provides fundamental and irreplaceable security benefits -- not only to each party -- but also to the international community. None of us will be better off with a weakened NPT regime. We will all pay the price if we do not do our real job in New York and make sure the NPT stands stronger than ever when the final NPT Review Conference gavel falls." Following is the text of Holum's remarks: (begin text) International Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation" Tokyo March 9, 2000 Remarks of John D. Holum, Senior Adviser for Arms Control and International Security Department of State Promoting and Implementing The 1995 NPT Conference "Principles and Objectives" INTRODUCTION: I am delighted to be back in Tokyo. It is entirely appropriate that I should come here to discuss the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, for the United States and Japan share a deep commitment to this Treaty as the centerpiece of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and achieve their ultimate elimination. I admire Japan's leadership on arms control and disarmament issues, and look forward to a productive discussion of ways we can advance our shared objectives. Japan and the United States both recognize that the NPT is first and foremost an instrument of national and international security. By providing the primary legal barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT serves the fundamental security interests of all its parties. As President Clinton put it a few days ago in his statement marking the Treaty's 30th Anniversary, "adherence to the NPT, together with inspections called for in the Treaty by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), provide assurance to countries that their neighbors' nuclear programs are peaceful." THE LEGACY OF 1995: Five years ago, during the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, NPT states parties agreed, without opposition, to make the Treaty a permanent part of the global security system. This was a momentous occasion, not only for the NPT, but for all those who have labored in support of stronger international nonproliferation norms. The 1995 NPT Conference took another, unprecedented step in agreeing to a separate decision document called "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament." This document was widely viewed as reflecting NPT parties' views on measures that would help realize more fully the objectives of the Treaty. The "Principles and Objectives" were seen as a set of benchmarks against which progress could be measured. And indeed, they have been held up repeatedly by my government and many others as evidence of our commitment to the Treaty and as illustrations of steps to be pursued sincerely and consistently. THE NPT - FIVE YEARS LATER: Five years later, we are fast approaching the opening of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in April - the first NPT conference since the end of the Cold War devoted solely to a review of the NPT. It is an opportunity to assess where we have been and where we are headed. The 2000 RevCon promises to be an active meeting which -- I strongly hope -- will offer a balanced, realistic assessment of the Treaty and reaffirms the contributions it makes to global security. The United States expects the Conference will allow for consideration of all aspects of the Treaty, to reinforce the importance of each of its three fundamental premises: * to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons * to promote and facilitate arms control and disarmament efforts; * to promote cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy so that its benefits are widely available. All aspects of the NPT are equally important to the Treaty's success. Nonetheless, since 1995 the most focused international attention has been on the commitment in Article VI, obligating all states to: "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Given the momentous international events of the last ten years, the strong international focus on disarmament is not surprising. The end of the Cold War and disappearance of the Soviet Union have allowed us to outpace even the most ambitious earlier predictions for arms reductions. * The START I and II Treaties, when fully in force and implemented, will eliminate two-thirds of U.S. and former Soviet deployed nuclear weapons. Both countries are ahead of schedule in carrying out the START I reductions. * President Clinton and Yeltsin's agreed in principle in 1997 to take us to 80 percent below Cold War peaks. * In addition to the delivery vehicles, we are destroying the weapons themselves --the United States has dismantled more than 13,300 warheads and bombs, and is continuing that work at the rate of about 100 a month. About 60 percent of all warheads, including about 80 percent of all non-strategic warheads, have been eliminated. * We are cementing the reductions even more by arranging to dispose of the special nuclear material - the plutonium and highly-enriched uranium - that are the key ingredients for nuclear arms. Understandably, the far-reaching progress in nuclear disarmament has whetted all our appetites for deeper, irreversible steps. Some countries assert that the pace of progress is unacceptably slow. The unavoidable reality, however, is that arms control is a process in which painstaking negotiations are often an essential part of achieving an effective and verifiable outcome. Moreover, intermediate steps are the engines of progress. Successful implementation of START I and II will pave the way for START III. The 1995 decision to make the NPT permanent and negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty opened the way for the deeper reductions outlined at Helsinki. That is why, in this area, I consider myself a "raging incrementalist." We have demonstrated that the best way to move forward is through a series of attainable steps, each building on the last and opening the door to the next. The U.S. recognizes that others are frustrated that more has not been accomplished in the disarmament arena in the way of new, formal agreements to further reduce nuclear arsenals. Indeed, we share the frustration. But it seriously undervalues the NPT to measure its success only by progress on Article VI. Moreover, propositions that the future of the NPT should be risked to achieve more nuclear disarmament are downright dangerous. A sturdy NPT is one of the reasons why we have made as much progress as we have. Undercutting the NPT would jeopardize that progress, as well as the Treaty's broader values for all of its members. Good faith negotiations toward nuclear disarmament remain an essential part of the NPT bargain, and progress will continue. But to decide that, because we are not satisfied with progress, the NPT should pay the price undercuts our shared disarmament goals. It is with this in mind that the United States continues to promote a balanced review of the NPT and to urge others not to allow frustration to weaken this important Treaty. PROMOTING AND IMPLEMENTING THE "PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES": During the three years of preparations for the 2000 NPT RevCon, there has been much discussion about whether the 1995 NPT "Principles and Objectives" are being realized, whether the 2000 NPT Conference should seek a similar "forward looking" result from its work, and if so, how should it be structured. Considering the twenty separate items addressing seven main areas that make up the 1995 decision, it is clear that a number of them -- the principles -- are "timeless." When reviewing the objectives agreed in 1995, it is clear that progress has been made on many, but is still pending on some. For example, we have made important progress to strengthen IAEA safeguards, to promote peaceful nuclear cooperation, and to enhance export controls. We have also made good progress in establishing additional nuclear weapon free zone treaties. While universal adherence remains to be achieved, Treaty membership has increased by nine countries since 1995 - leaving only four states outside the Treaty. And legally-binding security assurances have been made available to more than half of NPT parties through establishment of additional NWFZs. We have negotiated, though not yet fully realized, a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. On other objectives progress has been wanting. Iraq's continued thwarting of international inspections and ongoing concerns about North Korea's nuclear program remain worrisome. The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan dealt serious blows to the objective of preventing nuclear proliferation. And in the area of disarmament, though there have been some "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally," we do not have the CTBT in force and we still have no FMCT negotiations underway. The START process remains promising, but new negotiations have been slow in starting. So, the international record in implementing the 1995 decision is mixed. I hasten to add, however, that the U.S. remains unequivocally committed to its Article VI obligations. As I have outlined, the United States has made solid progress, and is committed to do more, toward the goal of nuclear disarmament. Should the 2000 NPT Review Conference focus on "principles and objectives?" The U.S. has long held that the Treaty is the source of its obligations and that the review process is for the Treaty itself. For us, this will remain paramount. That said, we agree with many other countries that the 2000 NPT RevCon should, consistent with the 1995 decision on Strengthening the Review Process, undertake a forward as well as a backward look. This means acknowledging where progress has been made, identifying where progress is still needed, and perhaps identifying additional measures to reach goals still not attained. Over the past few years, we have seen a number of proposals for how to structure the work for the 2000 NPT RevCon. Japan's ideas, which have been put forth at the UN General Assembly and the Tokyo Forum meeting, are among those that have provoked thought and discussion. The U.S., however, believes that the 2000 NPT RevCon is the master of its own fate and we have not wanted to prejudge the form the RevCon work might take. It may well be that the 2000 RevCon will decide to proceed along the same lines as did the 1995 NPT Conference. But there may be another, better course to be charted. Our bottom line is that we will be working vigorously with others to ensure that there is a forward look, whatever that document is finally called. One thing we must avoid is any suggestion that the 1995 decision can be amended or reopened. The 1995 decision is part of the NPT record, and we must be clear that any future "forward look" does not undermine that decision. It is also important to approach the forward look with a healthy sense of realism of what the NPT Review process can achieve. Attaching unrealistic expectations to this process risks undermining the very regime we seek to strengthen. COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY: Let me say a few words about the overarching subject of this symposium, cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Articles III and IV of the NPT undergird much of the peaceful nuclear cooperation that is taking place today. Together, they ensure that cooperation takes place with assurances that it will be for peaceful, civil uses, consistent with a strong nonproliferation standard. Cooperation in peaceful uses is one of the tangible ways that NPT parties benefit from Treaty membership. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines reinforce the NPT by allowing significant, new nuclear supply only to non-nuclear-weapon states that accept NPT-type comprehensive safeguards. Paragraph 12 of the 1995 "Principles and Objectives" decision endorses this requirement, which places such nuclear cooperation off-limits for non-NPT parties. Peaceful nuclear cooperation is not only about nuclear energy, though as Japan knows, this remains one of the driving areas of interest. Cooperation also enhances countries' abilities in the medical and agricultural arena, and improves science. The United States remains the largest contributor to the technical assistance programs run by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and also provides large amounts of financial and in-kind support through bilateral arrangements, grants, and educational and scientific fellowships. Nuclear cooperation has presented us with many technological and scientific challenges over the years and I am sure there are more to come. But it is a too often-neglected yet essential part of the NPT, and I hope we can make sure it is given its rightful due at the RevCon. CONCLUSION: As we enter the final weeks before the 2000 RevCon, I urge all of us who are friends of the NPT to keep our eye on the ball: we need a successful Review Conference outcome that preserves the integrity and strength of the NPT. Above all we need to make sure that all NPT parties recognize that this Treaty provides fundamental and irreplaceable security benefits - not only to each party - but also to the international community. None of us will be better off with a weakened NPT regime. We will all pay the price if we do not do our real job in New York and make sure the NPT stands stronger than ever when the final NPT Review Conference gavel falls. Thank you very much. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)