1. Reaffirmation of commitment to the preamble and the articles of the Treaty.

2. Reaffirmation of commitment to efforts designed to promote the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, as well as reaffirmation of the decisions on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and on strengthening the review process for the Treaty as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

(i) Universality

3. Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty; welcome for the eight new accessions to the Treaty since 1995, bringing the number of States parties to 186. They also urged all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

4. The States parties undertake to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty, at the earliest possible date, of States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Their determined efforts to achieve this goal might include the enhancement of regional security.

(ii) Main Committee I issues

5. Reaffirmation that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

6. Among their commitments to the Treaty in its entirety, the States parties once again emphasize the particular importance they attach to the strict observance of articles I and II.

7. All States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States parties declare their commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and to that end agree to pursue vigorously systematic and progressive efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons globally. All States parties declare their commitment to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. All States parties further declare that general and complete disarmament, especially including nuclear disarmament, necessitates the cooperation of all States.

8. The importance of all States to make every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in accordance with article XIV of that Treaty.

9. They welcome the ratifications that have taken place so far, including those by two nuclear-weapon States, and urge all States, especially those whose ratification in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty ensures its entry into force, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The States parties call on all States, pending the entry into force, to act so as not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. They also call upon all States to contribute to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in particular to its efforts to establish the Treaty's verification regime.

10. Reaffirmation of the need for the immediate commencement and the early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. Such a treaty would be an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as of non-proliferation.

11. Recognition of the progress achieved in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament; as well as the reaffirmation of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons and of the commitment by all States to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

12. Welcome for the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995 and reaffirm the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned enhances global and regional peace and security.

13. The States parties express support for measures taken by States to establish internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones. They also support proposals for these zones in parts of the world where they do not exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States parties welcome the initiative taken by States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

14. Recognition of the importance attached by signatories and States parties to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok to establishing a mechanism for cooperation among their respective Treaty agencies.

15. Reaffirmation of the view that further steps, which could take the form of an international legally binding instrument, should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

(iii) Main Committee II issues

16. Welcome for the conclusion of negotiations on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 93+2 programme to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system and expect that IAEA will endorse that outcome at its special session in May; reaffirm that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its Safeguards Agreements.

17. The States parties support the efforts made to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system and express their support for the Agency's efforts to integrate safeguards measures arising from the Model Protocol Additional to existing Safeguards Agreements.

18. The States parties urge all States parties required by article III of the Treaty which have not yet done so to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement pursuant to article III of the Treaty.

19. The States parties call on all States not parties to the Treaty to accept IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

20. They also urge all States that have Safeguards Agreements with IAEA to conclude as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/540.

21. The States parties urge the nuclear-weapon States to include in Additional Protocols to their voluntary safeguards agreements those measures which they have identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the Model Protocol.

22. The States parties urge all States to implement, to the extent possible, IAEA's recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 and also urge all States parties to examine ways and means to strengthen the current regime.

(iv) Main Committee III issues

23. Reaffirmation of commitment to continue to take further steps for the full realization of the relevant provisions of the Treaty, taking into account the undertakings in the principles and objectives on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

24. Reaffirmation that attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

25. The States parties reaffirm their commitment to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty and reaffirm their commitment to cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty and the Decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. They further reaffirm the importance they attach to the work of IAEA regarding multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and they reiterate their call for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

26. States parties also reaffirm the importance of nuclear safety as an essential prerequisite for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties attach importance to ensuring a successful review process under the Nuclear Safety Convention and note the adoption of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management as another contribution in this area.

27. The States parties express their determination to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and stated their readiness to cooperate with each other, and support multilateral efforts to this end.

1. Reaffirmation of the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

2. Reaffirmation that the integrity of the Treaty is essential to international peace and security.

3. Reaffirmation of the necessity for full compliance with the Treaty.

4. The States parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

5. The States parties undertake to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty and they shall fulfil their commitments on the unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of materials, equipment, scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States parties without exception.

6. The decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons constitute a single integral undertaking. This integrality should be maintained and respected.

7. The States parties will continue their endeavours to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized.

8. The States parties reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty as well as efforts designed to promote the full realization and effective and indiscriminate implementation of all the provisions of the Treaty and the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

9. The States parties once again reaffirm their recognition of the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and their commitment to the full realization and effective implementation of the Preamble and the articles of the Treaty.

1. Recognition of the value of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

2. Recognition of the value of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions and the value of lessons in achieving them for progress towards universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

3. Emphasize the vital importance of all States parties in the region implementing all obligations under the Treaty.

4. Emphasize the importance of renewed progress on the Middle East peace process and recognize that the Arms Control and Regional Security process is a useful forum for the discussion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

5. Call upon States in the region to place all unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards as an important confidence-building measure among all States of the region and as a step towards enhancing peace and security. They recognize that confidence-building measures taken by States in the Middle East could be important steps towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region; examples of confidence-building measures include: mutual visits to safeguarded facilities, information sharing and cooperative technical evaluations of a regional verification regime, regional cooperation on nuclear safety and/or nuclear waste management issues as a step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

6. Encourage the creation of a laboratory for safeguards purposes in the Middle East as a step towards the creation of a regional verification system.

7. The States parties reaffirm the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and strongly urge Israel, the only State in the region which has not accepted any international legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and not accepted full scope safeguards on all its nuclear facilities, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible.

8. The States parties note with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Israel, and strongly urge Israel to accept forthwith the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear facilities.

9. The States parties, and in particular the depositories of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reaffirm their commitment to extend their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone as a step towards a Middle East zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

10. The States parties recommend that, in order to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East or of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, agreement must be reached among the States of the region on an agenda containing various items, including: the study of the nuclear status of the region; the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological; and other items related to arms control and disarmament as well as agreement on the lowest level of armaments.

11. The States parties also recommend that such efforts include, inter alia, workshops, seminars, conferences, etc., which are attended by the States of the region and which deal with relevant political as well as technical issues. These should result in agreement on a process of informal deliberations along the lines of the proposed agenda.

12. The States parties consider that "practical steps ... aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological and their delivery systems" (operative paragraph 5 of the resolution on the Middle East) include the early conclusion of the text of a treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone as a step towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as well as a request for assistance from international organizations such as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such assistance could include, inter alia, the dispatching of a special envoy to the Middle East with the task of assisting the States of the region in their endeavours to reach the objective of a nuclear-weapon free Middle East.

13. The States parties, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, agree to indicate at every Preparatory Committee and at the 2000 Review Conference in what ways they were able "to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems" (operative paragraph 6 of the resolution on the Middle East).

14. The States parties agree to keep under review and make available specific time for discussions on the resolution on the Middle East at upcoming Preparatory Committees as well as at the 2000 Review Conference.

15. The States parties recommend that the 2000 Review Conference decide that future Review Conferences as well as their Preparatory Committees shall, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, continue to allocate specific time for discussion on progress reports on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East and to provide structured deliberations on practical steps for the establishment of the zone.

16. The States parties recall that the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on 11 May 1995 constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome comprising three decisions and a Resolution, and as such they reaffirm their firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that resolution. In this regard, the States parties recognize the special responsibility of the depository States, as cosponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

17. The States parties note that since the adoption of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East all States in the region have become parties to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel. The States parties stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards, in order to enhance the universality of the Treaty and to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

18. The nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in any way to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or to exercise control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.

19. All States parties, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and article IV of the Treaty, hereby declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

20. The States parties reaffirm once again their determination to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

21. All States parties to the Treaty, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, have to shoulder their responsibilities, extend their cooperation and exert their utmost efforts to achieve the full implementation of the said resolution. The role of the three depositary States in fulfilling their primary responsibilities as cosponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East is crucial in implementing faithfully and achieving the goals of the resolution on the Middle East. They are requested to indicate at every Preparatory Committee and the 2000 Review Conference what measures they have taken to ensure the full implementation of the resolution and the realization of its objectives.

22. All States parties to the Treaty, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, have to extend their cooperation to achieve the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East. The Preparatory Committee should include in its report a solemn declaration to the 2000 Review Conference urging Israel to accede to the Treaty without delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

(i) Universality

1. The States parties welcome the eight recent accessions to the Treaty. Universal adherence to the Treaty remains an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to it at the earliest date. The States parties will make determined efforts to achieve this objective.

2. The States parties call upon Israel to adhere immediately to the Treaty and to subject all its nuclear facilities to full-scope IAEA safeguards, and also call upon the States of the Middle East to enter into negotiations on the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone as an important step towards the establishment in the same region of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

3. The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasize the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty.

4. The Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conference should consider ways and means to achieve the universality of the Treaty, in particular by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities.

5. The States parties re-emphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities. They will make determined efforts to achieve this goal.

6. It would be useful to promote dialogue and confidence-building among the countries concerned so as to improve their regional security environment.

7. Recognizing that universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent requirement, the States parties recommend that all States parties should make every effort to achieve this objective, and call upon all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date, particularly those States that operate unsafeguarded facilities.

8. The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should redouble their efforts to achieve the universality of the Treaty because the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament are one of the cornerstones of international peace and security.

9. Supporting efforts already made to achieve universality, the States parties call for further measures to enhance opportunities to achieve universality, and insist upon a balance in the treatment of the universality issue.

10. Welcome for Brazil's declared intention to accede to the Treaty.

(ii) Main Committee I issues

1. Any concern related to nuclear proliferation should be resolved according to the procedures spelt out in relevant international legal instruments, including through dialogue and cooperation. No country should impose its own law and interests on any other country or the international community at large.

2. The States parties recognize that articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons allow for no exceptions and that the Treaty is binding on States parties at all times.

3. The States parties are convinced that, in order to safeguard the integrity of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States must work towards decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies and must refrain from any actions which may result in an enhanced role for nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons have no role to play in international relations.

4. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The international community should make all possible efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty.

5. The States parties agree that the strict observance of the terms of article I remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security.

6. The nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this article and to refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon States and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.

7. The States parties remain concerned about the ability of certain States not party to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The States parties call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.

8. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of article II and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements.

9. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital role to play in preserving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. The States parties should pursue and agree upon all possible and necessary measures and efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

10. The States parties should continue to promote the full implementation of the non-proliferation obligations of the nuclear-weapon States and of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

11. The States parties should continue to take active measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the technologies, material and equipment that are used to produce those weapons, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially by developing countries.

12. The States parties stress the importance of effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the misuse for that purpose of technology, materials and equipment, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially by developing countries, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty.

13. The States parties welcome the implementation of the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and support the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions and cooperation from Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

14. The nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI and undertake to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States parties declare unequivocally their commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and to that end agree to pursue vigorously systematic and progressive efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons globally.

15. Reaffirmation of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

16. Reaffirmation of support for progress made in nuclear weapons reductions by the nuclear-weapon States, including those made unilaterally or bilaterally under the START process, as steps towards nuclear disarmament.

17. Confirmation by States parties of their expectation that the START process as currently defined by the United States of America and the Russian Federation will be pursued energetically and diligently, beginning with the earliest possible ratification and entry into force of START II.

18. Recognition of the importance of progress in measures related to tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), including confidence-building and transparency measures, as called for by the United States of America and the Russian Federation in the Helsinki Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces.

19. Affirmation of the necessity for the current bilateral nuclear-weapon reductions process, as it progresses beyond START II, to be expanded to engage the other three nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

20. Recognition of the desirability of actively pursuing steps towards greater transparency in nuclear weapons and weapon-usable material matters.

21. Reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States that the cessation of all nuclear-weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions constrains the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ends the development of advanced new types of weapons, thereby constituting an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.

22. Urging the nuclear-weapon States, as a confidence-building measure, to report individually and on a regular basis to the Conference on Disarmament and the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference on the steps they have taken towards fulfilling their article VI commitments.

23. Affirmation of support for the proposal in the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues with a view to identifying if and when one or more such issues might be negotiated multilaterally.

24. The nuclear-weapon States concerned should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence; the States with large nuclear arsenals should further reduce drastically their nuclear stockpiles, and should destroy the removed nuclear warheads rather than simply transfer them from deployment to storage.

25. All nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and to conclude a legally binding international instrument to that effect.

26. No country should develop and deploy space weapon systems or missile defence systems that undermine strategic security and stability.

27. States with nuclear weapons deployed outside their borders should bring all these weapons home.

28. An international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons under effective international supervision should be concluded through negotiations with the participation of all States.

29. The States parties reaffirm the importance of ongoing unilateral and bilateral efforts in the nuclear field and stress the importance of the early commencement of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament involving all nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States.

30. The States parties:

(a) Underline the vital importance of the announcements by the United States of America and the Russian Federation that they would unilaterally implement reductions in their non-strategic nuclear weapons, and of the follow-on to these announcements, which contributes to a positive international climate and the increased security of all States parties;

(b) Welcome, in this context, the joint statement on parameters on future reductions in nuclear forces issued in Helsinki on 21 March 1997;

(c) Recognize the value of increased openness achieved through the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States in the course of the NPT review process on steps they have taken or are taking in nuclear disarmament;

(d) Support the objective of increased transparency regarding the withdrawal from operational use and dismantlement of short-range nuclear weapons in the context of the Preparatory Committee recommendations on nuclear weapons.

31. The States parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objective.

32. The States parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals.

33. The States parties reaffirm that priority in disarmament negotiations shall be nuclear weapons in accordance with the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament.

34. The States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, in particular those of nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

35. The States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

36. The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

37. The States parties regret the continuing lack of progress on items relevant to nuclear issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

38. Nuclear disarmament is further substantially facilitated by the continued easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference should thus be fulfilled with determination and without further delay. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament as well as their commitment to the principles and objectives adopted by the Conference.

39. The States parties reaffirm their commitment to pursue negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament aimed at the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to continue to identify, negotiate and implement further steps necessary to achieve this objective within the shortest possible framework of time.

40. In the context of the "systematic and progressive efforts" which they have agreed to pursue, the nuclear-weapon States should set out their perspective on the future steps they will take to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

41. Systematic and progressive efforts pursued by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons globally are an important element in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI. The commitment made by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation at the Helsinki summit meeting to further reduce, in the context of the START process, their strategic nuclear arms by the year 2007, is most welcome.

42. Efforts should be made for the early commencement, upon entry into force of the START II agreement, and the early conclusion of negotiations for the START III agreement.

43. In conjunction with the START process, the other nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves, at very least, to not increasing their existing nuclear arsenals and to further intensifying their current efforts in reducing them.

44. Concrete nuclear disarmament steps by each nuclear-weapon State are further encouraged. In the light of General Assembly resolution 51/45 G of 10 December 1996, entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", every nuclear-weapon State is invited to inform the international community of the activities and progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. These efforts would contribute to transparency and confidence-building.

45. The efforts of the international community to promote and assist in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the management and disposal of fissile materials derived from dismantled nuclear weapons should be further encouraged.

46. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to keep the international community informed of practical issues that the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures entails.

47. Nuclear disarmament measures are often costly, both in terms of nuclear weapons dismantlement and disposal, and in terms of ensuring the chain of custody which includes safe and secure transport and storage of fissile material as well as its control and accounting. Nuclear disarmament measures may also pose various technical challenges. For example, the management of surplus weapons plutonium may require the modification of existing technologies and perhaps also the development of new ones. Institutionally, there is a need, for example, for national, regional and international coordination among national authorities to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear material. Furthermore, nuclear disarmament has a social dimension. It is necessary, for example, to accommodate the economic and intellectual needs of displaced scientists and engineers who had worked for nuclear weapons-related industries.

48. Bearing in mind the need to prevent disclosure of sensitive information in relation to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, appropriate measures could be considered that would promote the transparency in fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, with a view to enhancing the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament. As a first step towards that objective, measures should be pursued that would enhance the transparency in surplus fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in parallel with a fissile material cut-off treaty.

49. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to consider further steps such as gradually taking nuclear forces off alert and/or removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles.

50. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to consider possible measures to increase transparency of their non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons.

51. These nuclear-weapon States are invited to explain the operational measures they have taken such as de-targeting their nuclear warheads and taking their nuclear forces off alert, including the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles. These measures may enhance confidence, especially among the nuclear-weapon States themselves.

52. The advisory opinion tendered by the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons should be recalled, by which the Court recognized that all members of the international community have an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. All States concerned, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, are urged to engage seriously in meaningful negotiations with a view to achieving early, further significant reductions of nuclear stockpiles as a step towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

53. Constructive engagement with the nuclear Powers towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is therefore needed. All delegations should take note of the significant and encouraging statements coming from the recent Helsinki summit meeting.

54. The need to assess current verification procedures with a view to making them more stringent and effective must be further examined.

55. Negotiations, as a matter of some urgency, on a nuclear-weapons convention should commence. Such a convention would take us closer to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons under international verification and control. This could be assisted through the establishment of an inter-sessional working group.

56. The Decision on Principles and Objectives to be adopted by the 2000 Review Conference should include commitment of all States to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

57. The 2000 Review Conference should call upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate, as a first step, a universal and legally binding instrument committing all States to the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Basically this is the next logical step of putting the above-mentioned commitment into an elaborate form of a treaty or a legal instrument; and should also call upon the Conference on Disarmament to commence without further delay multilateral negotiations on a phased programme of reduction of nuclear weapons and for their total elimination.

58. The nuclear-weapon States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI and undertake to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States parties declare unequivocally their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start immediately on the practical first steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

59. The nuclear-weapon States agree to pursue with determination the elimination of nuclear weapons through all available channels, including in bilateral negotiations and in negotiations among all five nuclear-weapon States.

60. The States parties agree that the Conference on Disarmament, the international community's standing body for disarmament negotiations, is mandated to pursue all items on its agenda, including nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for multilateral dialogue and the negotiation of further steps, as appropriate, which contribute to the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

61. An exchange of views and negotiations should be begun on a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, taking into account the specific nature of their nuclear arsenals and possibly with a certain asymmetry of commitments.

62. The nuclear weapons of all the nuclear-weapon States should be stationed only within their own territories.

63. The nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI and undertake to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States parties declare unequivocally their commitment to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons and to that end agree to pursue vigorously systematic and progressive efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons globally.

64. The States parties express their expectation that the Russian Federation and the United States of America will pursue their current bilateral nuclear weapons reduction progress energetically and diligently and that, to begin with, they will bring START II into force as soon as possible. States parties affirm the need to engage the other three nuclear-weapon States as the bilateral process progresses beyond START III. The States parties also recognize the importance of progress in measures related to tactical nuclear weapons.

65. The nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the Russian Federation and the United States of America, should be called upon to continue in the determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally and to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective control. The other nuclear-weapon States should join in the process of structured and verified nuclear disarmament as soon as possible.

66. The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to deliberate and agree upon the practical steps and negotiations required for a programme of systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate totally nuclear weapons.

67. This Preparatory Committee agrees that at its third session, specific time will be made available for article VI (nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament) issues, so as to provide a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons which were envisaged in the Principles and Objectives decision adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The purpose of these deliberations would be to provide:

(a) The nuclear-weapon States with an opportunity to brief the Treaty parties on the steps which they have undertaken and are undertaking in this regard;

(b) The non-nuclear-weapon States with an opportunity to engage the nuclear-weapon States as to "the practical steps and systematic and progressive efforts" which have been identified and which could be undertaken unilaterally, as a result of bilateral or plurilateral negotiations, or multilaterally;

(c) The opportunity for the international community, as represented by the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to jointly support or assist initiatives undertaken or agreements achieved; and

(d) Thereby to allow each of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States alike to fulfil article VI's provision that its obligations apply to each of the parties to the Treaty.

68. It is recommended that the 2000 Review Conference should decide to establish a subsidiary body to Committee 1 at the 2000 Review Conference for article VI (nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament) issues, so as to provide a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons which were envisaged in the Principles and Objectives decision adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Future Review Conferences should decide to establish the same subsidiary body pending the full realization of article VI of the Treaty. The purpose of these deliberations would be to provide:

(a) The nuclear-weapon States with an opportunity to brief the Treaty parties on the steps which they have undertaken and are undertaking in this regard;

(b) The non-nuclear-weapon States with an opportunity to engage the nuclear-weapon States as to "the practical steps and systematic and progressive efforts" which have been identified and which could be undertaken unilaterally, as a result of bilateral or plurilateral negotiations, or multilaterally;

(c) The opportunity for the international community, as represented by the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to jointly support or assist initiatives undertaken or agreements achieved; and

(d) Thereby to allow each of the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States alike to fulfil article VI's provision that its obligations apply to each of the parties to the Treaty.

69. It is recommended that the 2000 Review Conference should decide that Preparatory Committees for future Review Conferences shall make specific time available for article VI (nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament) issues pending the full realization of article VI, so as to provide a structured opportunity to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons which were envisaged in the Principles and Objectives decision adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The purpose of these deliberations would be to provide:

(a) The nuclear-weapon States with an opportunity to brief the Treaty parties on the steps which they have undertaken and are undertaking in this regard;

(b) The non-nuclear-weapon States with an opportunity to engage the nuclear-weapon States as to "the practical steps and systematic and progressive efforts" which have been identified and which could be undertaken unilaterally, as a result of bilateral or plurilateral negotiations, or multilaterally;

(c) The opportunity for the international community, as represented by the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to jointly support or assist initiatives undertaken or agreements achieved; and

(d) Thereby to allow each of the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States alike to fulfil article VI's provision that its obligations apply to each of the parties to the Treaty.

70. The States parties take note of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 and in particular the unanimous conclusion by the Court that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

71. The States parties welcome the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States in their joint statement of 8 April 1997 to the Preparatory Committee at its first session that they would continue to pursue, with determination, systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. The States parties underline the importance that the specific steps to be taken by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their commitment be identified and fully implemented.

72. The States parties welcome the report of the Canberra Commission, which proposes a series of concrete measures towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, and commend the report for consideration in international disarmament forums with a view to exploring the possibilities of implementing the steps set out in the report.

73. The States parties agree that the nuclear-weapon States should unequivocally reaffirm their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons and agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.

74. The States parties stress the importance of de-alerting and de-activating nuclear weapons. These measures would help prevent inadvertent, accidental or unauthorized launches and create beneficial conditions for continued disarmament efforts.

75. If they are to be truly effective and meaningful, practical measures taken in the field of nuclear disarmament must be irreversible.

76. This means that the reductions, whether embarked upon through unilateral initiatives or under bilateral agreements, should not be restricted to removing warheads from missiles, but should also include destruction of the missiles, destruction of the warheads and the placing of fissile material under IAEA safeguards.

77. The parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should therefore encourage all the States that possess tactical nuclear weapons to ensure that the same transparency prevails and the same confidence-building measures are accepted as in the case of strategic weapons.

78. In our view, there are no compelling reasons for linking the start of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons to ratification of the START II treaty or the initiation of negotiations on START III.

79. Urgency and importance of ratification of START II, and of the immediate opening of negotiations on a START III treaty. Recognition of the value of increased openness through the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States in the course of the review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty on steps they have taken or are taking in nuclear disarmament.

80. Welcome for efforts by the group of seven major industrialized countries and the Russian Federation to address the issue of the management of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

81. Universal adherence to existing Conventions and regimes of non-proliferation would greatly enhance international peace and security and contribute to further progress in the field of disarmament.

82. Urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Urgency for all States not yet party to the Convention to accede at the earliest possible date.

83. Urgency and importance of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction to complete negotiations on a legally binding verification and compliance regime for the Treaty by the end of 1998, and of achieving the universality of the Convention through accession to the Convention by all States not yet party at the earliest possible date.

84. Importance that all regions make major reductions in their levels of conventional arms, as has been done in Europe on the basis of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

85. The States parties recognize that the nuclear arms race between the United States of America and the Russian Federation has ended and that this aspect of article VI has been fulfilled.

86. The States parties endorse the effectiveness of the step-by-step process of nuclear disarmament and recognize that nuclear disarmament can only take place in a stable international security environment.

87. Welcoming the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones, States parties support the regional or nuclear-weapon-free-zone approach to the provision of legally binding security assurances, as opposed to a global convention.

88. It is the responsibility and obligation of all States to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the strengthening of international peace and security. The nuclear-weapon States underscore the important and tangible progress achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament and reaffirm our determination to continue the pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

89. In this context we welcome the recent understanding reached by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America at Helsinki on further reductions of nuclear weapons, building on progress already achieved.

90. In connection with our determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, we welcome:

(a) The agreements reached in New York in September 1997 between the Russian Federation and the United States of America with a view to facilitating the entry into force of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the subsequent negotiation of a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty;

(b) Related steps to place under IAEA verification as soon as practicable fissile material withdrawn from weapons programmes by the nuclear-weapon States concerned in the process of nuclear weapons reductions and designated by those States as no longer required for their defence purposes and to identify appropriate strategies for the management of such material, with a view to making the process of nuclear reduction irreversible; and, in this context, the trilateral initiative involving the Russian Federation, the United States and IAEA, to address technical, financial and legal aspects of the application of IAEA verification to weapons-origin fissile material;

(c) The other steps being taken by us in this area.

91. We also welcome the removal of all nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

92. We also welcome and encourage overall progress towards general and complete disarmament, as provided for in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for which all States parties share responsibility.

93. All States parties to the Treaty agree that the achievement of the following measures are important practical and immediate steps towards the achievement of the goal of the full realization and effective implementation of article VI:

94. Reaffirmation of the vital importance of all States signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible.

95. The States that have not yet signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty are urged to do so at an early date, and all signatory States should strive to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty.

96. The States parties call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. They also call upon nuclear-weapon States to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concerns.

97. The States parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the States parties called upon the nuclear-weapon States to comply with the letter and spirit of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

98. The States parties emphasize the importance of making every effort to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, in accordance with article XIV of the Treaty, despite its shortcomings and to prepare the Treaty for implementation in a manner that prevents, to the maximum extent possible, further qualitative development of nuclear weapons.

99. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a major step in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, especially as a means of constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of preventing the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. It is thus necessary for all States signatories, by contributing to the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization, to make steady efforts to establish the Treaty regime, including verification systems. All signatories should strive to achieve the early entry into force of the Treaty. Those States which have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty are urged to do so at the earliest possible date.

100. The States parties welcome the adoption and signature by more than 140 countries of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and underline their commitment to strictly observe its provisions pending entry into force. The States parties not yet party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to join this Treaty. The States parties further agree to pursue all possible measures consistent with international law to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty.

101. The adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be recorded as one of the goals of the States parties that has been accomplished. Paragraph 4 (a) of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should be replaced by a call on the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and for its signature and ratification by all the members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

102. The States parties reaffirm the importance that all States exercise utmost restraint regarding any activity that could undermine the fundamental objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

103. States parties agree that the conclusion of a non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator and taking into account views relating to the scope of the treaty, would be an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as of non-proliferation. States parties express the hope that the Conference on Disarmament will take the steps necessary for negotiations on a Treaty to start as soon as possible, in accordance with paragraph 4 (b) of the programme of action in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

104. Meanwhile, States parties agree that nuclear-weapon States should adopt means to provide greater transparency of fissile material stockpiles dedicated to military use, and reduce these stockpiles progressively.

105. The nuclear-weapon States should reaffirm that the ending of all nuclear-weapon explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as provided for under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, restricts the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, thus putting a stop to the development of new types of arms and constituting an effective measure of disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.

106. Importance of signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by all States, in particular those States upon whose adherence entry into force of the Treaty depends.

107. The importance of all States to support efforts to establish the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty's verification regime in a timely and effective manner.

108. We strongly support the earliest ratification of the Treaty by all States, in particular by those whose ratification ensures its entry into force. To this end France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have already ratified the Treaty. In addition, we are all fully supporting the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. We call upon all States to contribute to the success of this Treaty.

109. All States parties to the Treaty agree that the achievement of the following measures are important practical and immediate steps towards the achievement of the goal of the full realization and effective implementation of article VI:

110. The conclusion of a first treaty codifying a ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons should be followed by a second agreement providing for greater transparency over fissile material inventories and gradually bringing material stocks under strict and effective international control.

111. Recognition of the fissile material cut-off treaty obligation in the Principles and Objectives document.

112. Affirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons on other nuclear explosive devices, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

113. Recognition by the nuclear-weapon States that greater transparency of, and continuing steps to reduce, their nuclear-weapons-usable fissile material stockpiles should be pursued energetically.

114. Welcoming any steps which could move the fissile material cut-off treaty negotiation forward, including the establishment of a committee to discuss technical questions related to such a treaty, including, but not limited to, verification, implementation and existing stocks.

115. Urging the nuclear-weapon States to take further steps to increase transparency of activities related to military stockpiles of fissile materials. We urge the nuclear-weapon States to take the following steps:

(a) Increase the amount of military fissile material declared excess, and put this material under permanent safeguards;

(b) Declare the amount of fissile material dedicated to military (weapon or naval propulsion) use, and the amount declared excess;

(c) Declare the forms in which military fissile materials are held, and their manner of storage; and

(d) Provide information about status and location of facilities involved in HEU production and Pu separation.

116. Urging the nuclear-weapon States to ascertain their total holdings of fissile material for nuclear explosive and naval propulsion purposes.

117. Affirmation that all production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes has ceased, and commitment to declare all facilities related to fissile material production for nuclear-weapon purposes.

118. All States should work for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

119. The States parties agree that:

(a) A ban on the production of weapons-usable fissile materials represents an important measure within the overall scope of efforts aimed at achieving nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament;

(b) Any negotiations on an effective ban on the production of weapons-usable fissile materials must take into account both the non-proliferation and the disarmament dimension of the issue or, stated otherwise, future production and existing stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile materials;

(c) A ban on future production of weapons-usable fissile materials represents only one step towards achieving the total elimination of all such materials, or their conversion to non-military purposes, and cannot be divorced or seen in isolation from this objective;

(d) For a ban on future production of weapons-usable fissile materials to be effective, it must be verifiable. Verification of such a ban necessarily entails the drawing up of a global inventory detailing existing amounts of weapons-usable fissile materials;

(e) Universal adherence to a fissile material ban is essential for its success;

(f) The Conference on Disarmament is the sole appropriate forum for negotiations on an international instrument to ban fissile materials;

(g) The expertise available at IAEA must be made use of in any negotiations on this issue.

120. The States parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a Treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measure of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.

121. The States parties emphasize the need to pursue negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

122. Now that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been concluded, a fissile material cut-off treaty is the next step in nuclear disarmament. It is regrettable that negotiations on such a treaty have not yet commenced in the Conference on Disarmament. All means should be explored to realize the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

123. Accelerated work on a cut-off treaty on fissile materials is required.

124. The States parties continue to attach high priority to negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein. The States parties agree to consider what further steps might be taken to enable these negotiations to begin promptly.

125. There would be merit in voluntary measures to increase transparency on holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU). Transparency as a confidence-building measure should apply to all States with a nuclear capability, but for obvious reasons the primary burden would fall on the nuclear-weapon States.

126. A fundamental prerequisite for transparency would be the application of consistent and strict standards of accounting and secure handling and storage procedures for fissile material at the national level.

127. Voluntary transparency measures of this character would facilitate negotiations on a "cut-off" treaty as well as any future talks on nuclear disarmament.

128. The following measures could be considered for successive implementation:

(a) All nuclear-capable States would submit information on their stocks, if any, of weapons-grade fissile material;

(b) Cooperative international measures would be put into place in order to clarify and confirm these declarations;

(c) The nuclear-weapon States, or any State that submits information on holdings of weapons-grade fissile material, could permit inspection of such holdings. The aim would be to ensure that the inventory in storage can only be withdrawn for non-weapons purposes;

(d) Agreed monitored net reductions from stockpiles could be envisaged.

129. (a) The States parties should welcome progress made in the negotiation of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein.

OR

(b) The States parties should renew the call contained in the Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament for the Conference on Disarmament to commence immediately negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein. All States parties that are members of the Conference should work actively to achieve that goal.

130. For a fissile material cut-off treaty to be a genuine disarmament measure, and not purely one of non-proliferation, it is necessary that the treaty should include provisions on existing stockpiles of fissile material. While we would commend the Russian Federation and the United States of America for the progress and accomplishments of their trilateral discussions with IAEA, in terms of which they are seeking to reach agreement on placing surplus nuclear-weapon fissile material under IAEA supervision, South Africa would also call upon:

(a) The other nuclear-weapon States (China, France, United Kingdom) to as soon as possible reach agreements with IAEA on this issue in accordance with their undertakings under paragraph 13 of the Principles and Objectives;

(b) All of the nuclear-weapon States (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States) to unequivocally commit themselves to the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty as a genuine nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure which would as a minimum include provisions on fissile material which are not components of nuclear weapons.

131. The States parties support the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty as an important step for multilateral action and recognize both the disarmament and the non-proliferation aspects of a fissile material cut-off convention.

132. We also reaffirm our readiness for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, universal and internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a goal contained in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and as its second step, following the completion of the negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

133. We encourage all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to fulfil this shared commitment set forth in the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We also stress the importance for the States which are not yet parties to the Treaty to join the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in accordance with the 1995 statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

134. Reaffirmation that the provisions of article V of the Treaty with regard to peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and in particular of article VII of that Treaty.

135. All existing zones should come into force as soon as possible, and the process of ratification of their Protocols by relevant States completed.

136. The States of the regions concerned, and in particular those in regions of tension, should engage in discussions on possible arrangements for additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by 2000. This includes the Central Asian region, for which there is now a proposal on the table under the Almaty Declaration.

137. Work on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be intensified as a contribution to peace and stability in the region and internationally.

138. Cooperation and coordination between States parties and signatories of existing zones under the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should be actively pursued to promote the common goals of those treaties.

139. The States parties are encouraged by the historic events of the past few years that enhanced the atmosphere of trust, mutual respect and partnership among European States as well as the prerequisites for practical implementation of the idea to free the world of nuclear weapons, in particular the withdrawal of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and thus from the entire Central and Eastern European region, ranging from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

140. The States parties acknowledge the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their effective efforts in nuclear disarmament and consistent fulfilment of their obligations under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles, and note with satisfaction the significant contribution of those States to the strengthening of the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security.

141. Thus, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe could reaffirm the intention of the European States to move towards the final goal of the achievement of general and complete nuclear disarmament under effective international control.

142. All States should support the efforts of the non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at and in the light of the actual conditions of the regions concerned. All nuclear-weapon States should pledge their support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, respect their status and undertake corresponding obligations.

143. The States parties express support on measures taken by a State party or group of States parties to conclude nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. They also support proposals to these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regimes and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. States parties welcome the initiative taken by States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

144. The States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas.

145. The States parties and signatory to the Treaty express their desire to see the Protocol to the South-East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty accepted and ratified by the nuclear-weapon States and its entry into force at the earliest possible date. To this end, the States parties and signatory to the Treaty urge the nuclear-weapon States to show firm resolve and maximum flexibility and to work together with them in a spirit of amity and cooperation with a view to finding solutions to the remaining issues in the shortest possible time.

146. The States parties reaffirm their conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security.

147. The States parties welcome the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties since 1995 and express their support for the establishment of a mechanism for cooperation among the agencies of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Bangkok, Rarotonga and Pelindaba. The States parties decide to follow all actions required for the early establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

148. All nuclear States express their commitment to respect and support the relevant protocols necessary for the maximum effectiveness of the established nuclear-weapon-free zones.

149. In the light of recent encouraging developments, it is important to reaffirm that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear- weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security.

150. Significant progress has been made since 1995 in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia and in the growth of support for nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions.

151. In realization of the recommendations contained in the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are especially pleased to note that on 28 February 1997 they formally endorsed, in the Almaty Declaration, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. This joint action, following earlier initiatives by several countries of the region, is indicative of the importance the States of Central Asia attach to article VII of the Treaty and paragraphs V to VII of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

152. As the States parties to the Treaty prepare for the next Review Conference in the year 2000, the Preparatory Committee takes positive note of this development.

153. Creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones within the boundaries of individual States complements the obligations undertaken by the States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, by prohibiting within such zones deployment of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, the dumping of radioactive wastes, etc., they expand the geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

154. Mongolia's declaration of its territory as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992, which has been welcomed and supported by all nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, has demonstrated that the creation of such zones within the boundaries of single States (single-State zones) is, in general, politically acceptable. For nuclear-weapon-free zones to be effective, irrespective of their geographical scope, they should be based on international agreement(s), have clearly defined rights and obligations of parties to such agreement(s), a system of verification and control to guarantee compliance with the obligations derived from such status, the assurances from parties to the agreements, etc. Therefore, in order for single-State zones to have equal legal basis with other zones, the objectives, purposes and principles, as well as the status of the zones, should be clearly defined in international agreement(s), taking duly into account the experience of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the specifics of single-State zones. The interests of neighbouring States should also be duly taken into account.

155. Bearing in mind the important role that single-State zones could play as concrete disarmament and confidence-building measures in widening the geographical scope of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and thus contributing to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mongolia believes that the Preparatory Committee should focus specifically on this question and contribute to developing practical procedures in institutionalizing such forms of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States concerned with their neighbours as well as the nuclear-weapon States.

156. Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia strongly believe that the establishment of nuclear-free zones must not interfere with existing - or evolving - security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security, or otherwise adversely affect the inalienable right to individual or collective self-defence guaranteed under the Charter of the United Nations. In this connection, we consider that, while interesting in itself, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe promoted by Belarus is incompatible with our sovereign resolve to contribute to, and benefit from, the new European security architecture, one that is based, inter alia, upon the principles of democracy, civilian control over the military, good-neighbourly relations as well as cooperation with and accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). For our respective peoples and Governments their efforts to promote European security and stability are inherently associated with the ongoing, complex and lengthy process of political and military integration with these structures. In view of the foregoing and pending the achievement of this process, we do not consider the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone/space in Central and Eastern Europe timely and deem its practical consideration premature. Without prejudice to the possible future relevance of the proposal, we consider that the most appropriate way to enhance stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe at the close of the twentieth century is to build a new security architecture based on cooperation and shared values and without creating new dividing lines.

157. The States parties welcome the considerable progress in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones since the 1995 Conference, and especially the establishment of the zones created by the treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok. The States parties furthermore renew their call for the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the regions concerned, especially in regions where they do not exist, such as the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia.

158. The States parties reaffirm their conviction that nuclear-weapon-free zones are important disarmament measures which enhance regional and global peace and security, greatly strengthen the international non-proliferation regime in all its aspects and contribute to the objective of securing a world entirely free of nuclear weapons.

159. The States parties welcome the conclusion since 1995 of two further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties (the treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok).

160. The States parties reaffirm the importance of the cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon States and their support for the relevant protocols to the treaties. In this context they welcome the signature by all nuclear-weapon States of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga and the fact that the Protocols have now been ratified by four nuclear-weapon States. The States parties look forward to the timely ratification of these Protocols by the fifth nuclear-weapon State.

161. The States parties welcome the consultation which is currently under way between the nuclear-weapon States and the South-East Asian States in relation to the Protocols to the Treaty of Bangkok and urge those States to make every effort to resolve the remaining differences in order to facilitate adherence to the Protocols.

162. The States parties welcome the intention of States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, and to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation.

163. The States parties support initiatives being taken by States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, in order to promote the common goals of those treaties.

164. Importance of establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East involving all States in the region. Importance that all States in the Middle East which have not yet done so should accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions.

165. We emphasize the importance of the faithful adherence of all States parties to their respective non-proliferation obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. We reaffirm our conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned, enhances global and regional peace and security. We recall the security assurances we have provided to the parties to these treaties, which now number nearly 100 countries. Moreover, we are working with the signatories to the South-East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty to remove those obstacles currently preventing the nuclear-weapon States from signing the Protocol to that Treaty. We supported the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" in the Conference on Disarmament, as part of the decision adopted by the Conference on 26 March 1998.

166. All nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude, at an early date, legally binding international instruments to that effect.

167. The States parties reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a legally binding negative security assurances regime which will ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. Hence, the States parties should agree to negotiate, in the meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to be finally adopted by the 2000 Review Conference as a protocol annexed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They note the Ad hoc Committee on nuclear security assurances established by the Conference on Disarmament in 1998 to conclude an international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

168. The States parties agree to commence negotiations and conclude in the shortest possible time a treaty banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances pursuant to the successful conclusion of the legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

169. The importance of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regime is fully recognized. Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 as well as the declarations by the nuclear-weapon States concerning both negative and positive security assurances, further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the principles and objectives.

170. These States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe that international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should cover both negative and positive security assurances.

171. They consider that, by renouncing voluntarily their nuclear option, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have a legitimate right to receive legally binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

172. In this context, these States parties consider that the unilateral declarations made by the four nuclear-weapon States, and Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 and 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 on security assurances have not fulfilled the requirements of non-nuclear-weapon States.

173. Accordingly, the delegations of Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan consider that the time is now opportune to negotiate and conclude a protocol to the Treaty, providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

174. These States parties, therefore, propose a draft protocol to the Treaty on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The text of the protocol is annexed hereto.

175. These States parties are of the view that all States parties to the Treaty must take effective measures for nuclear disarmament, a ban on fissile materials, conclusion of an international legally binding instrument providing comprehensive and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and universal adherence to the Treaty. With regard to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, these States parties urge the Preparatory Committee to address this issue in a substantive manner with a view to concluding a protocol to the Treaty, no later than the time of the convening of the 2000 Review Conference. The draft protocol, proposed by the States parties, will provide a basis for negotiations at the Conference or at the Preparatory Committee meetings.

176. These States parties firmly believe that conclusion of such a protocol on security assurances constitutes an essential element of an effective regime of the Treaty, will strengthen the Treaty and will contribute to the success of the 2000 Review Conference.

177. The need for an international legally binding, comprehensive and unconditional arrangement to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has remained primordial and must be pursued. Nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty-based security assurances, some of which precede the Treaty, and which are regional, cannot take the place of a global one because being party to a nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty does not relieve a State from fulfilling the obligations that it has undertaken by its accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Indeed, the status makes it imperative for a State to comply with the Treaty, and thereby strengthen the Treaty - which is the main axis of the global non-proliferation regime. This should also be the relationship between a global legal instrument on security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty-based security assurances.

178. It is necessary therefore for the instrument to be negotiated multilaterally. It needs to have as its starting point the obligation of "no use, no first use" of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In other words, there must be a clear commitment by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. For just as the non-nuclear-weapon States accepted treaty provisions not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, they should equally be assured in treaty form that they would not be victims of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The comprehensive assurances to be given must be such that States would be unable to withdraw from fulfilling them, especially during hostilities, because of what may be claimed to be national interest, and the assurances should not be vulnerable to the veto. It is also necessary for it to be noted somewhere in the instrument that the best assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of those weapons, and that measures to that effect are highly desirable.

179. The Preparatory Committee recommends that time be allocated at its second session for further debate and consideration of proposals that have been made on the issue of security assurances.

180. The States parties recommend that the 2000 Review Conference endorse an instrument on legally binding security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty for signature and ratification.

181. An internationally legally binding instrument would, inter alia, need to include the following elements:

(a) A general statement of the security assurances which are the subject of the instrument;

(b) The identification of the States providing the security assurances;

(c) The identification of the States beneficiary of the security assurances;

(d) Any qualifications to the security assurances provided for in the instrument;

(e) Provisions on the mandatory actions to be undertaken by the Security Council where a beneficiary of the security assurances is the subject of a threat of use or use of nuclear weapons;

(f) Provisions for assistance to be provided to a beneficiary of the security assurances attacked or threatened by the use of nuclear weapons.

182. The States parties agree that legally binding security assurances within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Pending the achievement of an international legally binding agreement on negative security assurances, it is imperative that the nuclear-weapon States scrupulously observe their unilateral commitments in this field.

183. Recognition that treaty-based security assurances are available to parties to nuclear-weapon-free zones through the signature of the relevant protocols to such zones by the nuclear-weapon States. Importance of concerned States that have not yet signed and ratified these treaties doing so as soon as possible, thus bringing into effect those security assurances.

184. Importance of the recent decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to consider effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

(iii) Main Committee II issues

1. The conclusion of negotiations on the "93+2" Model Protocol and its expected adoption by the special meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in May is welcomed as a significant contribution to strengthening safeguards. Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should conclude and ratify agreements with IAEA and implement the 93+2 package of safeguards as soon as possible to help ensure that safeguards are effectively strengthened and in a cost-efficient manner. These strengthened safeguards should become the new norm for comprehensive safeguards to maximize the potential of the Treaty to provide solid non-proliferation assurances.

2. All States that do not have comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in place, and especially the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, should adopt the maximum number of measures identified in the Model Protocol that would help contribute to the effectiveness and the efficiency of safeguards. The undertakings by a number of such States to work towards that goal is welcomed.

3. All non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should now ensure that their commitment to the full-scope safeguards standard for new supply through practical trading arrangements is fully observed.

4. States not parties to the Treaty that continue to have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities should enter into comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with IAEA without delay.

5. Nuclear-weapon States should place permanently under IAEA safeguards all of the nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities.

6. The Safeguards Agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with IAEA, which remains binding and in force, should be implemented without delay. The full implementation of the Agreed Framework between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America will be an important contribution to international peace and security.

7. Urge every State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which has not already done so to bring into force a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant to article III of the Treaty. Also urge States not party to the Treaty to enter into comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with IAEA.

8. States strongly support the development and implementation of the Safeguards System so as to strengthen the safeguards regime by improving its effectiveness and efficiency and also strongly support ongoing efforts to meaningfully integrate the new safeguards measures arising from Part I of Programme 93+2 and the Model Protocol with elements of the existing system.

9. Applaud the May 1997 decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to approve the text of the Model Protocol to existing Safeguards Agreements (93+2 Programme, part II).

10. Urge all States with Safeguards Agreements with IAEA to conclude as quickly as possible an Additional Protocol to their respective Safeguards Agreement(s), pursuant to INFCIRC/540.

11. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements within the framework of the voluntary Safeguards Agreements to place permanently under IAEA safeguards nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities.

12. In order to facilitate the Treaty's function in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation, the States parties should continue to support the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

13. All States parties should support the IAEA programme for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Safeguards System. The nuclear-weapon States should apply those measures provided for in the Model Protocol that each of them identifies as capable of contributing to the nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

14. The States parties stress the importance of applying IAEA's enhanced safeguards regime both to full-scope as well as to partial Safeguards Agreements concluded with the Agency.

15. The States parties also urge those States which have only partial Safeguards Agreements with IAEA to expeditiously conclude full-scope Safeguards Agreements with the Agency.

16. The States parties believe that the International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent authority to verify the compliance of the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with their article III undertakings. In this regard, all States parties which have not yet done so should sign without delay the Safeguards Agreements required by article III of the Treaty.

17. The States parties call upon the nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of IAEA.

18. The States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreements of the Treaty by any State party should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all State parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by IAEA.

19. The States parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States parties of full-scope safeguards; and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

20. Every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

21. The International Atomic Energy Agency is the competent responsible body to verify compliance of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreements of the Treaty by other States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of these rights based on allegations of non-compliance which are not verified by IAEA.

22. All States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without further delay.

23. A report should be furnished by the Secretariat on the fulfilment of requirements related to the transfer of nuclear material to non-nuclear States for evaluation of the issue by the States parties (principles and objectives, para. 13).

24. Information needs to be provided by the Secretariat on actual placing under Agency safeguards of material transferred from military to peaceful uses for evaluation by the States parties.

25. The Preparatory Committee may also wish to welcome the adoption at the special session of the Agency's Board meeting in May last year of the additional Model Protocol of the Programme 93+2. The next step should be to ensure the universal implementation of the Protocol.

26. The States parties reaffirm that the Safeguards Agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with IAEA remains binding and in force, and should be fully implemented without delay.

27. They also [stress the importance of] [support] the full implementation of the Agreed Framework between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

28. We recommend that, as soon as the Board of Governors of IAEA has approved the text, all States parties should be encouraged to begin negotiating their individual agreements with IAEA as soon as practicable; this will enable early implementation of the strengthened safeguards on a global basis.

29. At the same time, we would sincerely welcome an indication on the part of the States that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with limited Safeguards Agreements, some of which are observing the Preparatory Committee (and, of course, we welcome their interest very much) that they too were considering the possible application of the Model Protocol to their own situations.

30. An important element of the strengthened safeguards is that they should not place an undue burden on members; it is therefore encouraging that the IAEA secretariat has assured members that in the medium to long term the process will be cost-neutral.

31. Reaffirmation that all States parties required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay.

32. Welcome for the adoption by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency of a Model Protocol containing measures which, when implemented, will strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system.

33. Importance of early conclusions of Additional Protocols to relevant Safeguards Agreements as soon as possible, including by States with voluntary offer Safeguards Agreements and with INFCIRC/66-type Safeguards Agreements.

34. Importance of cost-effective and efficient implementation of integrated safeguards system by IAEA as a matter of highest priority.

35. Importance for all States to comply fully with their Safeguards Agreements, and with relevant obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions.

36. Reaffirmation that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its Safeguards Agreements.

37. Welcome for the commitment by nuclear-weapon States that fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under IAEA safeguards in the framework of the voluntary Safeguards Agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States.

38. The States parties urge all States that have not done so to conclude and bring into force the Safeguards Agreements required by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

39. The States parties further urge those with comprehensive Safeguards Agreements to implement those safeguards-strengthening measures already approved by the Board of Governors of IAEA, and conclude and bring into force a protocol to their Safeguards Agreements incorporating 93+2 safeguards-strengthening measures at an early time.

40. The States parties reiterate that IAEA should take full advantage of its rights under special inspections.

41. Taking note of the United States of America/Russian Federation/IAEA trilateral fissile material initiative, the States parties welcome unilateral decisions to accept safeguards on nuclear material no longer needed for defence purposes, and endorse plans for the safe and effective disposition of plutonium and highly enriched uranium no longer needed for defence requirements in a manner that renders it unavailable for use in nuclear explosives.

42. The States parties call upon parties to provide political, technical and financial support so that IAEA can meet all of its obligations.

43. States parties call upon the nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements within the framework of the voluntary Safeguards Agreements to place permanently under IAEA safeguards nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities.

44. We welcome the adoption on 15 May 1997 by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency of a Model Additional Protocol containing measures which, when implemented, will strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

45. We urge all States which have not yet done so to start early negotiations with IAEA and to conclude their Additional Protocol negotiations in accordance with this model as soon as possible. We also note that at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in May 1997 all of us made commitments to negotiate Additional Protocols or other legally binding agreements incorporating those measures provided for in the Model Protocol that each of us has identified as capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and efficiency aims of the protocol and as consistent with our obligations under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

46. Urge all States to adopt IAEA's recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material, currently set forth in INFCIRC.225/Rev.3.

47. Urge all States parties that are parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials to undertake a review of the Convention at the earliest possible time, with the goal of determining the adequacy of the current regime and extending the Convention if required.

48. Welcome proposals for the international community, through IAEA, to review international standards for the physical protection of nuclear material, both during international transit and while under national jurisdiction.

49. The States parties urge all States with nuclear materials on its territory to adopt strict physical protection arrangements and adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

50. All States should work for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a new internationally legally binding instrument controlling the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. Such an instrument would commit the parties to ensure the control and security of nuclear materials and radiation sources and to report any loss or theft of such materials to IAEA or to other international organizations.

51. Importance that each State party with nuclear materials on its territory maintain and improve its own arrangements for nuclear materials accountancy, safety and physical protection, applying the appropriate internationally agreed standards.

52. Welcome steps taken by G8 to increase cooperation on and implementation of the Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material. Importance of expanded participation in the Programme.

53. Nuclear supplier regimes should not restrict access for developing countries to advanced technology. This would be contrary to the range of undertakings on peaceful nuclear cooperation reaffirmed most recently at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

54. The fulfilment of nuclear supplier obligations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is facilitated by an effective non-proliferation regime, of which strict and transparent nuclear supply policies are an integral part.

55. The international Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation, to be held at Vienna on 6 and 7 October 1997 following the forty-first session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, is welcomed as a first step to improve further transparency in the operation of nuclear export control regimes. All States are encouraged to attend and participate actively in this seminar.

56. Adherence by all States to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group Guidelines would be consistent with the Treaty and nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty objectives of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Non-member States should receive assistance and advice about the practical and legal aspects of implementing the Guidelines from members of nuclear supplier regimes.

57. Recognition that national nuclear export controls are an essential element of an effective national nuclear non-proliferation regime and are a means for States parties to seek to ensure that their nuclear exports do not contribute to nuclear proliferation and thereby fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. By so doing, they contribute to a climate of confidence in the trade in nuclear items that encourages and facilitates international nuclear cooperation in pursuit of economic and technological development.

58. Urge transparency in nuclear-related export controls within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among interested States party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The 7-8 October 1997 International Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Vienna was a positive step in this regard. Express support for the development of other initiatives aimed at furthering this objective.

59. The States parties note with concern that application of the unilaterally enforced export control regime has hampered access of the developing countries to nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. They fully recognize the right of all States parties, particularly the developing countries, to enjoy unrestricted access to nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes.

60. The States parties recognize that effective transfer guidelines should be developed through multilateral negotiations, which could take place in IAEA, with the participation of all concerned States, suppliers and recipients. In the meantime they reaffirm that transparency in the proceedings and decision-making of the nuclear-related export control regimes should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty. The States parties therefore call upon countries members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to take practical steps to fulfil this task.

61. Efforts should be strengthened to increase the effectiveness and transparency of export control systems through the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Zangger Committee.

62. States parties recognize that nuclear supplier States consider national controls on their nuclear exports as an essential element of an effective national nuclear non-proliferation regime and a means for States to ensure that their nuclear exports do not contribute to nuclear proliferation. They urge greater transparency in the adoption and implementation of such controls through dialogue and cooperation among all interested States party to the Treaty. The International Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation that was held in October 1997 was seen as a first useful step in this regard, which should be followed up by other initiatives to further transparency.

63. Importance that exporting States take measures to ensure that exports of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies are subject to an appropriate system of surveillance and control, facilitating cooperative technological development by providing confidence of suppliers that goods, technology and materials will only be used for peaceful purposes.

64. Importance of all parties that have not yet done so to adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group Guidelines.

65. Importance of transparency in export control regimes. Welcome for transparency activities of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group.

66. Recognizing the right and obligation of States not to transfer nuclear-related items and technology if they believe such transfer will contribute to proliferation, the States parties call for continued efforts to improve nuclear-related export controls so that such controls can continue to promote the objectives of the Treaty by reducing the risks of proliferation and by contributing to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

67. The States parties urge all States to ensure that nuclear material is subject to a system of accountancy and control at the State and facility level that meets the latest international standards.

68. The States parties reaffirm the view, expressed in the principles and objectives decision, that new supply arrangements of nuclear material and equipment controlled pursuant to article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards.

(iv) Main Committee III issues

1. The States parties reaffirm the importance they attach to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable rights of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

2. The States parties also reaffirm the importance they attach to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency as the principal agent for multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and reiterate their call for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

3. The States parties welcome the progress made since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in developing and strengthening the international legal and institutional framework within which the development of research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes takes place.

4. Recognition that nuclear energy can be a safe, environmentally sound and cost-effective source of energy for those States that choose to include it in their mix of energy sources.

5. Recognition that bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements can be effective instruments for facilitating the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

6. Continued support for the International Atomic Energy Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund and strong support for broadening the bases of contributors.

7. Support for the technical cooperation efforts undertaken by IAEA and its member States and, in particular, support for the new IAEA strategic goal to promote tangible socio-economic impact by contributing directly in a cost-effective manner to the achievement of the major sustainable development objectives of each country.

8. Urges all Member States to contribute to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund as a means of ensuring that resources are available for those IAEA technical cooperation activities financed through the Fund.

9. All States parties should make every effort to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States that are in a position to do so should assist the developing countries in mastering technologies for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

10. All States parties should ensure that measures taken by them to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation would facilitate rather than hamper the exercise of the legitimate rights of the developing countries for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those restrictions on the transfer of technologies for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are beyond safeguards required under the Treaty should be removed.

11. The States parties recognize the important role of the Technical Cooperation Fund of the International Atomic Energy Agency in fulfilling obligations set forth in article IV of the Treaty. The States parties emphasize that every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA has necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation. The States parties express their concern about the decrease of the pledges and contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund and urge the States parties that are also IAEA members to make full and timely payments to the Fund.

12. The States parties recognize the important role of IAEA in assisting the development of nuclear power, as well as in assisting the applications of nuclear technology in developing countries, especially in the field of agriculture, human health and environmental protection. The States parties encourage IAEA to further strengthen technical cooperation in the area of nuclear power and nuclear technology applications.

13. The States parties reaffirm their inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; and that the free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties should be fully ensured.

14. The States parties reaffirm that beyond safeguards required under the Treaty, unilaterally enforced restrictive measures which prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.

15. The States parties reaffirm the responsibility of nuclear supplier States parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate needs of nuclear energy of the States parties to the Treaty, with preferential treatment rendered to developing ones, by allowing the latter to participate to the fullest in the possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.

16. The States parties reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities emanating from the international norms prohibiting the use of force in international relations, and in particular Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations in considering that any attacks or threat of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would entail highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications particularly on the civilian inhabitants; and believe that they bear a solemn responsibility to continue to play a leading role towards the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and standards specifically prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks, on nuclear facilities devoted to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

17. The States parties encourage the adoption of appropriate measures to regulate the international maritime transportation of radioactive waste and spent fuel to the highest standards in international security and support current efforts within IAEA to adopt and improve international regulations in that regard.

18. The States parties recognize the shortcomings in the realization of the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty and those of the principles and objectives decision related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and decide to take further steps to ensure full, unrestricted and indiscriminate implementation of all these provisions.

19. Particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

20. Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.

21. In all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty, taking into account particularly the needs of developing countries.

22. Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. All States parties remain committed to pursue such actions, particularly in relation to facilities that are under IAEA safeguards.

23. In the area of the conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses, increased attention should be paid to problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear-weapon programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas. In this regard, a special responsibility exists towards the people of former United Nations Trust Territories who have been adversely affected as a result of the nuclear-weapon tests conducted during the period of trusteeship. Furthermore, consideration should be given by all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to providing appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes in adversely affected areas. This decision was endorsed by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.

24. Welcome for the decision by a number of States to adopt a set of Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities as published in INFCIRC.549.

25. Importance of ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

26. Reaffirmation that new supply arrangements should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA's full-scope safeguards and international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

27. Importance that IAEA continues to have financial and human resources necessary to carry out its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. Importance of improved delivery of technical cooperation by IAEA.

28. We welcome the development and emphasize the importance of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which is used increasingly in many sectors of the economy, not just for the production of electricity but also for the improvement of the health and welfare of mankind.

29. Nuclear security is a fundamental issue. The acceptance by States of safeguards under article III, paragraph 1, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a key requirement. The work of the Zangger Committee in setting guidelines for the implementation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is also important. Moreover, both support the peaceful development of nuclear energy.

30. We attach importance to the full implementation of article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this context we reaffirm our commitment towards cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty and following up the Decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

31. Every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.

32. The States parties stress the importance they attach to efforts at the national, regional and global levels to promote and maintain the highest standards of nuclear safety, waste management and radiation protection. They welcome the initiatives that have been taken to this end since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security held in Moscow on 19 and 20 April 1996, and the Tokyo Conference on Nuclear Safety in Asia, held at Tokyo in 1996.

33. The States parties note that it is in the interests of all States that the transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level waste be conducted in accordance with strict international standards of safety and security. They note that the transportation of such materials by sea is a matter of particular concern to small island developing States and other coastal States. A number of States in this category call upon those directly engaged in the maritime transportation of radioactive materials to continue to provide information, consistent with safety and security requirements, about the timing, route and liability arrangements to States in the vicinity of such shipments.

34. In this context, the States parties welcome the entry into force in 1996 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and call upon countries that have not already done so, particularly those with nuclear installations that fall within the scope of the Convention, to sign and ratify the Convention. States parties also welcome the conclusion of the negotiations on the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. States parties note the progress that has been made towards the development of a comprehensive international nuclear liability regime and express the hope for an early conclusion to these negotiations.

35. Recognition of the importance of signing, ratifying and implementing the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Call upon all States to participate actively in the implementation of the Convention. States also look forward to the first meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties in 1999, and the peer review of National Reports, as an essential element of that process.

36. Recognition of the importance of working actively to implement the provisions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Code for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Flasks on Board Ships (the INF Code).

37. Welcome the adoption by IAEA of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and call upon States to ratify the Convention in the near future.

38. All States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in waste management, and should observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials.

39. Every effort should be made to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial and human resources necessary to meet its responsibilities effectively in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding ways and means for funding technical assistance through predictable and assured resources.

40. The entry into force, in October 1996, of the Convention on Nuclear Safety is a welcome development. The Group of Experts is to be commended for its tireless efforts to finalize the draft text of a Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Group's recommendation that a diplomatic conference be convened with a view to adopting the Convention is also worthy of support.

41. It is important that the transport of nuclear materials should be conducted in a safe and secure manner and in compliance with the safety standards of IAEA and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), while navigational rights and freedoms as provided for in the applicable rules of international law should not be impaired.

42. As noted in the report of Main Committee III of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was adopted by consensus, there have been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences have resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. The Preparatory Committee reiterates the 1995 Conference's call upon all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving appropriate assistance as may be requested for remedial purposes in those affected areas.

43. The disarmament process requires strict procedures for safe handling, storage and disposal of sensitive nuclear materials as well as safe management of radioactive contaminants in compliance with high standards of environmental protection and nuclear safety.

44. Continued international attention needs to be directed at the problems of safety and contamination related to former nuclear operations, inter alia, associated with discontinued nuclear weapons programmes.

45. We would reiterate the call made in an agreed draft document of Main Committee III of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference addressed to all Governments and international organizations that have expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving assistance as may be requested in affected areas, taking into account efforts that have been made or that are planned to be implemented at the regional and national levels in this regard.

46. Importance that States that have not yet done so sign and ratify the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety at the earliest possible date.

47. Importance of continuing commitment worldwide to improvements in nuclear safety, including in the fields of radiation protection and waste management. Welcome for conclusion of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Call on all States to sign and ratify it as soon as possible.

48. The States parties note that radioactive material has been successfully transported by sea for more than 30 years in accordance with internationally agreed standards of safety and security.

49. The States parties also note that it is in the interests of all States that the transport of radioactive material should continue to be conducted in a safe and secure manner in accordance with relevant INF and IAEA codes. We urge early conclusion of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which provides the basis for a possible future framework for the transboundary movement of such material.

50. The States parties conclude that, while navigational rights and freedoms as provided for by the applicable rules of international law should not be impaired, the States concerned should maintain a dialogue on the transport by sea of the material in question.

51. We reaffirm the absolute necessity of nuclear safety and the need to pursue research to ensure ever greater safety in the future, including in the field of waste management, in order to ensure that nuclear waste does not become a burden for future generations.

52. We emphasize the importance of transparency in the development of nuclear energy, particularly regarding safety.

53. We remain determined to increase nuclear security and reinforce our joint efforts to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. In this regard, we evaluate positively the implementation of the relevant decisions of the 1996 Moscow Summit.