1995 Review and Extension Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NPT/CONF.1995/10
28 February 1995
ORIGINAL: SPANISH
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
New York, 17 April-12 May 1995
MEMORANDUM FROM THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE
AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN PREPARED FOR
THE 1995 CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON
THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A. The Treaty of Tlatelolco
1. On 14 February 1967, as a result of long negotiations and a common political will, Latin America and the Caribbean, in accordance with its tradition as a source of innovation in international law, signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.
2. In full accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Treaty of Tlatelolco expresses in its preamble the desire of the Latin American States to end the armaments race, especially in the field of nuclear weapons, and strengthen a world at peace, based on the sovereign equality of States, mutual respect and good-neighbourliness. The international instruments worked out at the world level by the United Nations and represented at the regional level by the Treaty of Tlatelolco may be regarded as an expression of the legal and moral conscience of the international community and a statement of an entirely valid general principle.
3. Before the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco there were international instruments for the denuclearization of certain geographical areas or outer space, such as the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 or the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. There were also some initiatives in the same direction before Tlatelolco. But never until the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco had a large inhabited region of the earth, made up of the territory of a number of independent States, been the object of complete military denuclearization.
4. The preamble to the Treaty of Tlatelolco states clearly that "militarily denuclearized zones are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and complete disarmament at a later stage" and that Latin America must not only "banish from its homelands that scourge of a nuclear war but must also strive to promote the well-being and advancement of its peoples", cooperating "in the consolidation of a permanent peace based on equal rights, economic fairness and social justice for all".
5. On the basis of these considerations, the signatory States, by sovereign decision, agreed to establish a system for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America which would also commit the nuclear Powers to respect the militarily denuclearized status of Latin America and the Caribbean.
6. Article 1 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco confirms the commitment of the Contracting Parties "to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear materials and facilities which are under their jurisdiction" and prohibits "the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition" as well as "the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons" or in any way participating in such activities. The Treaty thus provides for the military denuclearization of Latin America and the Caribbean and establishes its zone of application; it establishes the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), consisting of a General Conference, a Council and a Secretariat; establishes a control system, regulates the relations of OPANAL with other international organizations, determines the action to be taken in the event of violation of the Treaty, establishes a method for the settlement of disputes, prohibits reservations to the Treaty and establishes means for amending the Treaty and the conditions in which it may be denounced.
7. Recognizing that the full application of its principles and obligations requires the participation of extracontinental States and the nuclear Powers, the Treaty of Tlatelolco provides for two additional protocols.
8. Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco imposes on the extracontinental States which have, de jure or de facto, territory under their control in the zone of application of the Treaty the obligation to respect the statute of denuclearization in respect of war-like purposes as defined in articles 1, 3, 5 and 13 of the Treaty. After protracted negotiations and 14 years of waiting, the Government of France ratified this Protocol on 24 August 1992, thus enabling the peoples of the territories of Latin America and the Caribbean for which it is responsible to enjoy the benefit of belonging to the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region (see table, annex B).
9. Additional Protocol II requires the five internationally recognized nuclear Powers to respect the denuclearized zone established by the Treaty in all its express aims and provisions; not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty; and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty. Additional Protocol II may not be the subject of reservations (see table, annex B).
10. On 5 December 1967, the General Assembly in resolution 2286 (XXII) welcomed with satisfaction "the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security" and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin America and Caribbean countries "to use nuclear energy for ... peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples". By the end of 1967, the year in which the Treaty was opened for signature, it had already been signed by 21 States, including the 2 States in the region then most advanced in the nuclear field, namely Argentina and Brazil. At present, 28 States participate fully in this regional instrument. The current status of signatures, ratifications and waivers under article 28 is set out in the table in annex A.
B. Amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco
11. Beginning in 1990, in order to achieve the goal of making the Treaty of Tlatelolco universal in its zone of application, a series of amendments were approved making it possible for third countries to become full members of the Tlatelolco system. For this purpose, it was necessary to make use of articles 6 and 29, which establish the procedure for amending the Treaty. The amendments are as follows: (the text of the amendments is contained in annex C).
I. On 3 July 1990, it was decided in resolution 267 (E-V) of the Fifth Special General Conference to add to the official title of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America the words "and the Caribbean" and accordingly to amend the official title established in article 7 of the Treaty, thus incorporating the English-speaking States of the Caribbean into the zone of application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
II. On 10 May 1991, by resolution 268 (XII) of the Twelfth General Conference, it was decided to replace paragraph 2 of article 25 of the Treaty with wording similar to that of article 8 of the amended Charter of the Organization of American States, so that all the independent States of the region would be able to join the regime of military denuclearization.
III. Although their territories were always included in the zone of application established by article 4, on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Belize and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines signed the Treaty on 14 February 1992 in accordance with these amendments; on 25 August 1992, Saint Lucia signed the Treaty; on 25 August 1993 Dominica deposited the waiver under article 28, joining the Tlatelolco system, and on 18 February 1994 Saint Kitts and Nevis signed the Treaty; Guyana signed and ratified the Treaty on 16 January 1995.
IV. On 26 August 1992, by resolution 290 (E-VII) of the Seventh Special General Conference, amendments to articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 20 of the Treaty, relating to the verification system established by the Treaty, were approved.
- The first paragraph of article 14 provides for the submission to the Agency of semi-annual reports on the absence of activity prohibited under the Treaty. This declaration is of a political nature. The amendments to paragraphs 2 and 3 are of a different nature, as they deal with the technical aspect which may create problems for the State submitting the special reports requested in those paragraphs. The reference to the application of safeguards was deleted and it was provided instead that the content of these special reports "shall be relevant to the work of the Agency". Paragraph 3 was replaced in its entirety by another providing that the information submitted could not be divulged or transmitted in whole or in part by the recipients of the reports to third parties, except with the express consent of the submitting Parties, thus safeguarding the "strategic secrets" of the Parties. It was understood that for the Agency the phrase "third parties" meant countries not parties to the Treaty.
- Article 15 was retained practically unchanged except for the phrase "any extraordinary event or circumstance", in view of the fact that the information to be requested by the General Secretary with the authorization of the Council referred to a special event or circumstance requiring the submission of a special report. Otherwise, the wording remains unchanged.
- Article 16 was amended in view of the fact that the only organization capable of carrying out a special inspection at the request of a Party is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This made it possible to solve the problem of financing and the need to establish an inspectorate, which would have been expensive for OPANAL. However, the power of OPANAL to request the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out a special inspection was retained when, in the opinion of the OPANAL Council, such an inspection was necessary. In other words, the Council and the General Secretary will continue to be responsible for supervising the application of the Treaty's control system. Of course, any member country of IAEA may submit a complaint directly to that Agency, but it is equally clear that the force of the complaint will be greater if it is endorsed by the Council and the General Secretary of OPANAL. In view of the fact that the international safeguards agreements signed by the States members of OPANAL include the commitment to allow free access to the inspectors to carry out a special inspection, paragraph 4 of article 16 was not considered necessary, and it was therefore deleted. Paragraph 3 of the same article gives the Director-General of IAEA discretionary authority to consult with the Board of Governors when an inspection is carried out. This paragraph is intended rather to allow the Director-General to report to the Board of Governors if he considers that necessary when an inspection has been carried out. Prior consultation with the Board of Governors is something the Director-General himself can decide on according to his best judgement.
- Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of former article 16 were deleted because article 21 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco provides that "None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of States Members of the Organization of American States, under existing regional treaties".
- Lastly, the first paragraph of former article 19 remains as new article 19 and the second and third paragraphs of former article 19 become article 20. The remaining articles of the Treaty are renumbered accordingly.
12. These amendments enabled Argentina and Chile to join the Tlatelolco system on 18 January 1994 and Brazil to do so on 30 May 1994.
13. Most of the Member States have signed the amendments and are completing the process of ratification. Mexico ratified all the amendments to the Treaty on 1 September 1993. At present the Treaty of Tlatelolco is in full effect for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Suriname.
14. Although the latest amendments approved modify the verification system, none of the changes alter either the basic principles or the essence of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
15. Under these circumstances, and in view of the lack of precise definition of the conditions for the entry into force of the amendments, the Government of Mexico, as depositary, considers the amendments in force for those States which have ratified them and made the declaration of waiver referred to in article 28, paragraph 2.
C. Safeguards
16. On 1 July 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature, and on 5 March 1970 it entered into force. The application of some provisions established already in the Treaty of Tlatelolco differs from the application of similar provisions of the NPT, for example, article 13 of the former and article III of the latter with respect to the safeguards agreements to be negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). For this reason, a number of relevant observations should be made.
17. The function of IAEA within the control system provided for under article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco is set forth in articles 13, 14, 16 and 18 of that Treaty. Article 13 of the Treaty provides that each Contracting Party shall negotiate multilateral or bilateral agreements with IAEA for the application of the Agency's safeguards to its nuclear activities. States which have ratified Additional Protocol I of the Treaty are also bound, under article 1 of the Protocol, to negotiate the agreements referred to in article 13 in order to ensure that they may be applied in territories for which, de jure or de facto, they are internationally responsible and which lie within the limits of the geographical zone established in that Treaty.
18. In 1961, IAEA set out to establish a system of safeguards to be applied to projects carried out with the assistance of the Agency and to bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning the supply or unilateral delivery of nuclear facilities, equipment or technology reported to IAEA under the safeguards agreement in question. These agreements were elaborated in accordance with the guidelines set forth in document INFCIRC/66 and its subsequent revisions. This model continues to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with States which are not parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco or the NPT and which have not requested comprehensive safeguards agreements.
19. The first safeguards agreement based on the Treaty of Tlatelolco was concluded with Mexico in 1968. Its purpose was to verify that Mexico was abiding by its commitment that no nuclear material, equipment or facility to be reported to IAEA would be used for military purposes. The overall format and the commitment were based on the model set forth in document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. In 1973, after Mexico became a party to the NPT, a new safeguards agreement was concluded replacing the previous one, and based on both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. The overall format of and the commitment in this joint agreement was based on document INFCIRC/153 ("Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons") with modifications which included: a change in the title, references to the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the preamble, deletion of the reference to the NPT in the basic commitment, and an amendment to the duration clause in order to include a reference to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
20. To date, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved 24 such safeguards agreements, including 3 concluded in accordance with Additional Protocol I to the Treaty. Colombia and Panama concluded agreements based on document INFCIRC/153 with some additional changes based on the Treaty of Tlatelolco alone. In addition, a new article was inserted and another was deleted, both concerning the transfer of nuclear material outside the country, because the Treaty of Tlatelolco does not contain any provision corresponding to article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT on nuclear explosions. Such transfers are possible under the safeguards agreement only if the nuclear material is subject to safeguards in the receiving State. The comprehensive safeguards agreements negotiated to date under article 13 prohibit the use of nuclear material for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device (see table in annex D).
21. Both Argentina and Brazil, before becoming parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, signed a joint safeguards agreement with IAEA which took into account their status as parties to the Treaty on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (SCCC), which established a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). As the ABACC was authorized by its Statute to conclude safeguards agreements at the request of its member States, a quadripartite agreement was concluded between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards.
22. In this new model agreement, ABACC undertook to apply its safeguards to nuclear materials in all nuclear activities carried out in the territory of the States parties, and to cooperate with the Agency in order to ensure that those nuclear materials were not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. IAEA has the right and obligation to ensure that the safeguards are applied, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement, in a verifiable manner, so as to guarantee that there has been no diversion of any kind of nuclear materials to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This verification by the Agency is to include, among other things, independent measurements and observation, due account being taken of the technical effectiveness of SCCC with respect to verification.
23. The agreement also includes the procedures to be followed if a State party intends to exercise its optional right to use nuclear materials subject to safeguards under the agreement for the nuclear propulsion or operation of any vehicle, including submarines and prototypes or any other non-prohibited nuclear activity. Lastly, it increases the number of arbitrators who are to decide on any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of the agreement, and renumbers the articles of the model agreement.
D. Current status of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT
24. As noted earlier, the signatory States of the Treaty of Tlatelolco have made use of article 6 of the Treaty to amend it in the light of experience and international developments. It has so far not been possible to achieve universality for the NPT because of the specific objections of a number of States. Perhaps consideration might be given to the example of Tlatelolco.
25. It is useful to provide a summary of the current situation of Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) as compared with the NPT:
- Of the total of 33 States belonging to this regional group, only 1 has not signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco;
- Of the 32 signatory States, only 2 have not yet ratified it and are therefore not full members of OPANAL;
- In other words, at the present time 29 States of the region are full members of the Tlatelolco system;
- On the other hand, of the 33 States of the region, 29 are parties to the NPT;
- Two States which have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco but not yet ratified it are full members of the NPT.
E. Final considerations
26. The Tlatelolco system was born at perhaps the most difficult moment in international relations, when the world arms race seemed to be the chief goal of humanity. In 1967, at the height of the Cold War, Latin America brought into being, not only for the region but for the world community, an international instrument which is now in full force.
27. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was not only an invaluable contribution by Latin America and the Caribbean to international law but a visionary creation of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a large inhabited region of the planet, which includes a system ensuring the total absence of nuclear weapons from the region, guarantees its security through compliance by the great Powers with the provisions of the Treaty and explicitly commits the Parties to the use of the nuclear materials and installations under their jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes.
28. The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which is completely consonant with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, recognizes and defines a general principle of international law, makes it operative and indisputable, provides rules and regulations enabling it to be implemented and adapted to new international circumstances and enables it to be applied and respected in an important region of the world, Latin America and the Caribbean. That it remains in force after more than 27 years and has achieved almost complete universality in its region is the proof of this.
29. For these reasons, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the system of peace, security and development it creates and promotes give the Latin American and Caribbean region an increasingly important role in the multilateral disarmament agenda, reinforcing its conviction that the problem of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction at the regional and global levels must be approached on a comprehensive, integrated, balanced and non-discriminatory basis, so that it does not impede access to the full development of advanced dual-purpose technologies exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Mexico City, 25 January 1995
Annex A
STATUS OF SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS OF THE TREATY FOR THE
PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN AND ITS ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS I AND II, OPENED FOR
SIGNATURE AT MEXICO CITY ON 14 FEBRUARY 1967
|
Country |
Signature |
Ratification |
Waiver |
Antigua and Barbuda 11 October 1983 11 October 1983 11 October 1983
Argentina 27 September 1967 18 January 1994 18 January 1994
Bahamas 29 November 1976 26 April 1977 26 April 1977
Barbados 18 October 1968 25 April 1969 25 April 1969
Belize 14 February 1992
Bolivia 14 February 1967 18 February 1969 18 February 1969
Brazil 9 May 1967 29 January 1968 30 May 1994
Colombia 14 February 1967 4 August 1972 6 September 1972
Costa Rica 14 February 1967 25 August 1969 25 August 1969
Chile 14 February 1967 9 October 1974 18 January 1994
Cuba
Dominica 2 May 1989 4 June 1993 25 August 1993
Dominican Republic 28 July 1967 14 June 1968 14 June 1968
Ecuador 14 February 1967 11 February 1969 11 February 1969
El Salvador 14 February 1967 22 April 1968 22 April 1968
Grenada 29 April 1975 20 June 1975 20 June 1975
Guatemala 14 February 1967 6 February 1970 6 February 1970
Guyana 16 January 1995 16 January 1995
Haiti 14 February 1967 23 May 1969 23 May 1969
Honduras 14 February 1967 23 September 1968 23 September 1968
Jamaica 26 October 1967 26 June 1969 26 June 1969
Mexico 14 February 1967 20 September 1967 20 September 1967
Nicaragua 15 February 1967 24 October 1968 24 October 1968
Panama 14 February 1967 11 June 1971 11 June 1971
Paraguay 26 April 1967 19 March 1969 19 March 1969
Peru 14 February 1967 4 March 1969 4 March 1969
Saint Kitts and Nevis 18 February 1992
Saint Lucia 25 August 1992
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines 14 February 1992 14 February 1992 11 May 1992
Suriname 13 February 1976 10 June 1977 10 June 1977
Trinidad and Tobago 27 June 1967 3 December 1970 27 June 1975
Uruguay 14 February 1967 20 August 1968 20 August 1968
Venezuela 14 February 1967 23 March 1970 23 March 1970
Annex B
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I
|
Country |
Signature |
Ratification |
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II
China 21 August 1973 12 June 1974
France 18 July 1973 22 March 1974
USSR 18 May 1978 8 January 1979
United Kingdom 20 December 1967 11 December 1969
United States of America 1 April 1968 12 May 1971
Annex C
AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO
(Changes shown in boldface)
I. By resolution 267 (E-V) of 3 July 1990 it was decided to add to the official title of the Treaty of Tlatelolco the words "and the Caribbean".
II. By resolution 268 (XII) of 10 May 1991 it was decided to replace paragraph 2 of former article 25 of the Treaty by the following wording, now renumbered paragraph 26:
"SIGNATURE
Article 26
1. This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by:
(a) All the Latin American and Caribbean Republics, and
(b) All other sovereign states situated in their entirety south of latitude 35 north in the western hemisphere; and, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this article, all such states which become sovereign, when they have been admitted by the General Conference.
2. The status of State Party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco shall be limited to the independent States included in the zone of application of the Treaty under article 4 and paragraph 1 of this article of the Treaty which on 10 December 1985 were members of the United Nations and to the non-self-governing territories referred to in document OEA/CER.P, AG/Doc.1939/85 of 5 November 1985 when they attain independence".
III. By resolution 290 (E-VII) of 26 August 1992, the following amendments to the Treaty were approved and opened for signature:
"REPORTS OF THE PARTIES
Article 14
1. The Contracting Parties shall submit to the Agency and to the International Atomic Energy Agency, for their information, semi-annual reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty has occurred in their respective territories.
2. The Contracting Parties shall simultaneously transmit to the Agency a copy of any report they may submit to the International Atomic Energy Agency which relates to matters that are the subject of this Treaty and are relevant to the work of the Agency.
3. The information provided by the Contracting Parties shall not be divulged or transmitted to third parties, in whole or in part, by the recipients of the reports, except with their express consent."
"SPECIAL REPORTS REQUESTED BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY
Article 15
1. At the request of any of the Parties and with the authorization of the Council, the General Secretary may request any of the Contracting Parties to provide the Agency with complementary or supplementary information regarding any extraordinary event or circumstance connected with compliance with this Treaty, explaining his reasons. The Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate promptly and fully with the General Secretary.
2. The General Secretary shall inform the Council and the Contracting Parties forthwith of such requests and of the respective replies."
Text replacing former article 16:
"SPECIAL INSPECTIONS
Article 16
1. The International Atomic Energy Agency has the power to carry out special inspections, in conformity with article 12 and with the agreements referred to in article 13 of this Treaty.
2. On the demand of any Party and in accordance with the procedures established in article 15 of this Treaty, the Council may transmit to the International Atomic Energy Agency for its consideration a request that it set in motion the procedures necessary to carry out a special inspection.
3. The General Secretary shall request the Director-General of IAEA to transmit to him in good time the information sent to the Board of Governors of IAEA for its information with respect to the completion of the special inspection. The General Secretary shall inform the Council forthwith of such information.
4. The Council, through the General Secretary, shall transmit that information to all the Contracting Parties."
"RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
Article 19
The Agency may conclude such agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency as are authorized by the General Conference and as it considers likely to facilitate the efficient operation of the control system established by this Treaty."
A new article 20 was inserted, consisting of paragraphs 2 and 3 of former article 19.
"RELATIONS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Article 20
1. The Agency may also enter into relations with any international organization or body, especially any which may be established in the future to supervise disarmament or measures for the control of armaments in any part of the world.
2. The Contracting Parties may, if they see fit, request the advice of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission on all technical matters connected with the application of this Treaty with which the Commission is competent to deal under its Statute."
The remaining articles of the Treaty have been renumbered accordingly.
Annex C-1
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE TREATY
|
Country |
Signature |
Ratification |
Annex C-2
SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE TREATY
|
Country |
Signature |
Ratification |
Annex C-3
THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE TREATY
|
Country |
Signature |
Ratification |
Annex D
COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 13 OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO
|
Country |
Negotiation |
Concluded |
a/ The Safeguards Agreement refers to the NPT and to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
b/ The Safeguards Agreement refers to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
c/ The Safeguards Agreement does not refer to either the NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
* On 14 September 1973 the Government of Mexico signed a new agreement replacing that of 6 September 1968.
** Agreement concluded on the basis of article 1 of Additional Protocol I.
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