INF Article-by-Article

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Together with the Memorandum of Understanding and Two Protocols, Signed at Washington on December 8, 1987

The White House, January 25, 1988

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection regarding the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty, together with the MOU and the two Protocols, was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. The Report of the Department of State on the Treaty is provided for the information of the Senate.

In addition, I am transmitting herewith, for the information of the Senate, the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement), which was signed at Brussels on December 11, 1987.

The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. The Report of the Department of State discusses in detail the terms of the Basing Country Agreement. Also attached
for the information of the Senate are the notes exchanged between both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and the United States. The notes acknowledge that these countries agree to the United States' conducting inspections, under the Treaty, on their territory. Identical notes also are being exchanged
between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries.

The Treaty is an unprecedented arms control agreement in several respects. It marks the first time that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate, throughout the world, an entire class of their missile systems. Significantly, the elimination will be achieved from markedly asymmetrical starting points that favored the Soviet Union. The Treaty includes provisions for comprehensive on-site inspections, including the continuous monitoring of certain facilities, to aid in verifying compliance. To a much greater extent than in earlier arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, detailed information has been, and will continue to be, exchanged by the Parties in order to facilitate verification of compliance. Finally, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed on cooperative measures to enhance verification by national technical means.

The missile systems to be eliminated consist of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles having a range capability between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The launchers for such missiles and unique elements of their related support structures and support equipment also will be eliminated. The shorter-range missiles to be eliminated under this Treaty are those with a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers. They must be eliminated within 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Intermediate-range missiles, having a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers, are to be eliminated in two phases within three years after the entry into force of the Treaty. Elimination will take place at designated locations and will be subject to on-site inspection as an aid to verifying compliance.

In the MOU, the United States and the Soviet Union have provided detailed information on the location of all missiles, launchers, and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty. Each Party is required to provide updated information on a routine basis after the Treaty enters into force.

The Treaty provides that on-site inspections are permitted at specified locations in the United States and the Soviet Union as well as in the Basing Countries in Western and Eastern Europe where U.S. or Soviet missiles, launchers, and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty are or have been located. The different types of "short-notice" on-site inspections for which the Treaty provides are designed to contribute to our ability to verify Soviet compliance, while protecting all U.S.

and Allied nuclear and conventional forces not subject to the Treaty as well as other sensitive intelligence and defense facilities.

In addition to "short-notice" on-site inspections, the Treaty provides for other types of on-site inspections, including the continuous presence of U.S. inspectors at the Soviet facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, and a continuous Soviet presence at the identified facility at Hercules Plant #1, located at Magna, Utah, at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced.

The Treaty is the culmination of six years of negotiations with the Soviet Union. To a large extent, the Treaty is the result of Allied solidarity in support of the fundamental objectives established by NATO's "dual-track" decision in 1979. Our Atlantic and our Asian and Pacific Allies have been closely involved throughout the period of negotiation, and they fully support the Treaty. The Treaty enhances our collective security by eliminating an entire class of Soviet missile systems that has been a major concern for over a decade. Our European Allies will continue to be well protected by the significant U.S. nuclear forces remaining in Europe, by the independent British and French nuclear deterrents, and by conventional forces, which include over 300,000 U.S.

troops.

I believe that the Treaty is in the best interests of the United States and represents an important step in achieving arms reductions that strengthen U.S. and Allied security. Therefore, I urge the Senate's advice and consent to its ratification.

Department of State, Washington.

The President, The White House.

The President: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection establishing procedures for the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. I recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

In addition, accompanying this Report is the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement). The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. Also enclosed are the Notes that were exchanged between the United States and both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia regarding inspections that will be carried out on the territory of those two countries. The Basing Country Agreement was signed at Brussels, Belgium, on December 11, 1987, and the Notes were exchanged on December 23, 1987, between the United States and the German Democratic Republic and on January 5, 1988, between the United States and Czechoslovakia. Identical notes are also being exchanged between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries. I recommend that the Basing Country Agreement and the Notes be provided to the Senate for its information.

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate, throughout the world, their shorter-range (500 to 1000 kilometers) and intermediate-range (1000 to 5500 kilometers) ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, along with the launchers for those missiles and unique support equipment and support structures. This marks the first time that the two principal nuclear powers have agreed to the elimination of an entire class of weapon-delivery systems.

The Treaty is the fruit of many years' labor and of this Administration's firm policy regarding the Soviet deployment of SS- 20s threatening our Allies in Europe and Asia. It was negotiated in Geneva and at ministerial meetings in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva. In addition to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all played important roles in its development.

Throughout the negotiating process, we consulted extensively with our NATO and Asian allies, particularly the Western European Basing Countries in which missile systems, support structures, or other equipment subject to the Treaty are located: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Contemporaneously with the negotiation of the Treaty, the United States negotiated the Basing Country Agreement with these countries, providing for their approval and assistance in the implementation of the Treaty's inspection provisions. We also regularly advised Congress, in Washington and during the Congressional Observer Group's meeting in Geneva, on the progress of the negotiations and on the objectives of the United States in negotiating the Treaty.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Treaty had its genesis in the Soviet Deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles beginning in 1977. The SS-20 is an accurate, three-warhead, ground-mobile ballistic missile, whose deployment by the Soviet Union increased an already existing imbalance in favor of Soviet theater nuclear forces. These Soviet deployments not only directly threatened our NATO and Asian Allies, they also raised questions about the ability of the United States and its Allies, to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In December 1979, after thorough consultations among the Allies, NATO reached what became known as the "dual-track" decision. On the one hand, NATO would proceed to deploy a limited number of U.S.

Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe to maintain its deterrent capability. On the other hand, the United States would pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to establishing a balance in intermediate- range nuclear missile forces at a lower and equal level.

Under this Administration, the "dual-track" decision was reaffirmed, and on November 18, 1981, the United States proposed the "zero option" to the Soviet Union. Pursuant to this proposal, the United States would have canceled its planned deployments to Europe of Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles if the Soviet Union would have agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

Today, more than six years later, the U.S. "zero option" proposal constitutes the basis of the Treaty. The six years of negotiations, however, did not produce this result easily. For example, while the United States emphasized for years its preference for the "zero option," the Soviets at first insisted on retaining a residual force of intermediate-range missiles and on counting the independent British and French nuclear deterrents as though they were forces of the United States. The United States rejected that position. Moreover, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations in November 1983 when the United States began deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. It was not until January 1985 that the Soviets agreed to return to the negotiations. They did not agree to the "zero option" until July 1987.

Soviet shorter-range missiles--the SS-12 and SS-23--can fulfill many of the same military missions as the Soviet intermediate-range missiles. Therefore, from the outset, the United States insisted upon concurrent constraints on shorter-range missiles in order to enhance the effectiveness of limits on intermediate-range missiles. In the Summer of 1987, after the Soviets proposed the elimination of shorter-range systems in Europe, the United States proposed that the shorter-range systems of both sides be eliminated on a global basis. In response to the U.S. proposal, the Soviets accepted the "zero option" for shorter- range missiles as well.

For much of the negotiations, the Soviet Union argued that the Treaty should focus only on missile systems located in Europe and that missiles located outside of Europe should be exempt from the Treaty or subject to less stringent restrictions. The United States, however, insisted on a "global" approach in view of the mobility and transportability of the Soviet missile systems. The Soviets eventually agreed to this approach.

During the last months of the negotiations, the Soviet Union insisted that U.S. warheads associated with the Pershing IA missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany be included in the Treaty. The United States had insisted from the beginning of the negotiations that systems belonging to third countries would not be part of, or be affected by, the Treaty. On August 26, 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would dismantle its Pershing IA missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter- range missiles pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the Parties to the Treaty.

Following the Federal Republic's unilateral decision, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they will eliminate their intermediate-range missiles by 15 days prior to the end of the three-year elimination period specified by the Treaty. At that period, the conditions established by the Federal Republic will have been met, and the existing program of cooperation will have therefore ceased. The U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the Federal Republic's Pershing IA missiles will then be withdrawn and returned to U.S. territory. The United States will eliminate them in accordance with the Protocol on Elimination. The Treaty and its associated documents will not affect existing programs of cooperation.

THE TREATY: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

The Treaty obligates the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range ground- launched, weapon-delivery, ballistic and cruise missiles, their launchers, and specified support structures and support equipment.

The Treaty requires periodic data exchanges and gives each Party the right to carry out verification measures, including on-site inspections.

The Treaty consists of four documents, which set forth the basic obligations and the means of implementing those obligations.

These are: The Treaty Articles, which obligate the Parties to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems within three years and 18 months, respectively; not to possess such missile systems after elimination; not to produce or flight-test such missiles in the future; and to carry out provisions to facilitate effective verification of the terms of the Treaty;

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data, which contains the data, including site diagrams and photographs that are integral parts of the MOU, exchanged between the Parties prior to the signing of the Treaty regarding the locations, numbers, and characteristics of each Party's intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems as of November 1, 1987;

The Protocol on Elimination, which sets forth the detailed procedures for eliminating missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment subject to the Treaty; and

The Protocol on Inspection, which sets forth the detailed procedures for conducting on-site inspections, including "short notice" inspections, "baseline" inspections, "close- out" inspections, "elimination" inspections, and continuous portal monitoring.

REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS

The Treaty provides that each Party must eliminate all of its intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. Intermediate-range missiles have a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers; shorter-range missiles have a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers.

The existing types of intermediate-range shorter-range missiles are listed in Article III of the Treaty. For the United States, these are the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile, the BGM-109G intermediate-range cruise missile, and the Pershing IA shorter-range ballistic missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of missiles are the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-12 shorter- range ballistic missile, and SS-23 shorter-range ballistic missile. All intermediate-range missile systems must be eliminated within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. All shorter- range missile systems must be eliminated within 18 months. For ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles not listed in Article III as "existing types," range capability is determined in accordance with criteria set forth in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.

Upon entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may produce or flight-test any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or launchers of such missiles. The Parties are prohibited from conducting any launches of shorter- range missiles. During the first six months following entry into force of the Treaty, however, each Party may launch up to 100 intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of destroying them. Once all intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems have been eliminated, neither Party may thereafter possess any intermediate-range or shorter-range missile systems.

Also, the Treaty takes account of the fact that the first stage of the Soviet SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is not subject to the Treaty, is outwardly similar to the first stage of the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is subject to the Treaty. The Parties are permitted to produce a ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), having a range such that it is not subject to the Treaty, that uses one stage, and only one stage, outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile that is subject to the Treaty. However, to strengthen the ban on missile production, the Parties are prohibited from producing any other stage that is similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of any existing type of intermediate- range ground-launched ballistic missile. In order to help verify compliance with this provision, the United States has the right to establish a portal monitoring system, including resident inspectors, to monitor continuously the portal of each facility at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled. Currently there is one such facility at Votkinsk. For its part, the Soviet Union has the right to establish a continuous portal monitoring system at a former U.S. intermediate-range GLBM production facility at Magna, Utah.

VERIFICATION OBLIGATIONS

The scope and intrusiveness of verification called for in this Treaty are unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Verification obligations fall under five basic categories:

• locational restrictions
• elimination requirements
• national technical means of verification
• data exchanges
• on-site inspections.

LOCATIONAL RESTRICTIONS

In order to facilitate verification, the Treaty imposes a number of restrictions on activities relating to intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems during the elimination periods.

For example, pending elimination:

• All intermediate-range missiles and their launchers must be located in deployment areas or at support facilities, such as storage or repair facilities, or be in notified transit between them. All such areas and facilities must be named and their locations described. An intermediate- range missile or launcher located elsewhere (and not in a notified transit) would thus be in violation of the Treaty.

• Within 90 days after the Treaty enters into force, all deployed shorter-range missiles, as well as deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles, must be moved to elimination facilities. The remaining non-deployed shorter-range missiles must be moved to elimination facilities within one year. Until their removal to elimination facilities, shorter-range missiles and their launchers must be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit.

• Transit of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles between permitted locations must be completed within 25 days and, following the completion of transit, information regarding the transit must be provided within 48 hours.

ELIMINATION REQUIREMENTS

Article X of the Treaty sets forth the basic requirements regarding the elimination of specific items and facilities and obligates the Parties to carry out the required elimination activities in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in the Treaty and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection. The locations at which elimination takes place are specified in the MOU or in subsequent updated data. The Protocol on Elimination sets forth detailed procedures for the elimination of missiles, launchers, launch canisters, shelters, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, launch stands, propellant tanks, and training items, as appropriate, for each Party. Techniques such as burning, demolition, crushing, and flattening are specified for eliminating transportable items at designated elimination facilities. Techniques for eliminating fixed structures in situ are specified, including dismantlement, excavation, and demolition. Provisions governing elimination of missiles through launch, static display, and loss or accidental destruction are also included.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

The Treaty recognizes the utility of national technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance satellites, and each Party agrees not to interfere with such means of verification. With a view to enhancing the utility of national technical means, concealment measures are strictly limited. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is required, up to six times a year during the period of elimination, to open on short notice the roofs of SS-25 garages in order to help U.S. national technical means ensure that SS-20s are not deployed at SS-25 strategic missile bases that are not subject to on-site inspections.

DATA EXCHANGES

The Treaty requires detailed exchanges of data and notifications. Each Party is required to notify the other each time a missile or launcher is moved and of any changes in the data base originally set forth in the MOU. Each Party must advise the other of the scheduled date of elimination activities, the movement of items that are to be eliminated from the area specified in the MOU to elimination facilities, and the completion of elimination activities. Such notifications are required to be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. The notifications are designed to provide a continuously updated data base, which will serve as a baseline against which other observations can be measured.

ON-SITE INSPECTIONS

The Treaty provides for a wide variety of on-site inspections.

The scope of the inspection measures is unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements. The on-site inspections to be carried out include:

• "baseline" inspections, between 30 and 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, to help verify the initial update of data contained in the categories set forth in the MOU;
• "close-out" inspections to verify the elimination of specified facilities;
• "elimination" inspections to observe actual elimination of missiles, launchers, and support equipment at elimination facilities;
• "elimination" inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination with respect to items lost or accidentally destroyed or placed on static display and with respect to training equipment;
• "short-notice" inspections of certain declared and formerly declared facilities, during the three-year elimination period and for a ten-year period thereafter, to aid in verifying that all Treaty-prohibited activity has ceased; and
• "continuous portal monitoring" by the United States at the designated portal and perimeter of the facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, to ensure that stages of the SS-20 are not covertly manufactured as stages of the SS-25 ICBM. The Soviet Union may install continuous portal monitoring at the designated portal and perimeter of the Hercules Plant #1 located in Magna, Utah, at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced. If, at any time after the initial two years of the Treaty, assembly of SS-25s ceases at Votkinsk, continuous portal monitoring would continue for another 12 months and then cease along with the monitoring of the plant at Magna, Utah. The United States could reestablish continuous portal monitoring if the Soviets resumed SS-25 missile assembly at Votkinsk or anywhere else.

The specific procedures for the conduct of these inspections, including provisions governing access for on-site inspections and the infrastructure for a continuous portal monitoring system, are set forth in the Protocol on Inspection.

Inspectors and their supporting aircrews will be designated by each Party in advance by means of lists submitted to the other Party. Specific grounds on which a Party may object to a particular individual are set forth. The Annex to the Protocol on Inspection specifies the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members during the inspection process, including immunity from criminal prosecution and inviolability of their person.

The Protocol on Inspection designates certain "points of entry" for each country in which missile systems subject to the Treaty are located. A Party intending to carry out an inspection must notify the other Party, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, not less than a specified number of hours before the inspection team will reach the point of entry. Within a specified time after arrival at the point of entry, the Inspecting Party must indicate the specific site to be inspected. An inspection team must depart the point of entry for the inspection site within a specified number of hours from its arrival at the point of entry.

The Inspected Party must provide transport for the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site. In the case of "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections, the Inspected Party must ensure that the inspection team arrives at the site within nine hours of its specification of the inspection site.

In general, one hour after notification of a specific inspection site has been provided, the Inspected Party may not remove any Treaty-limited item from that site prior to inspection. Except for continuous portal monitoring and "elimination" inspections, the period of time an inspection team may remain at an inspection site for a given inspection is 24 hours, with one eight hour extension if agreed to by the Inspected Party. There is a limit on the number of inspections that may be conducted simultaneously. Inspection procedures vary depending upon the specific type of inspection involved.

RATIFICATION

The Treaty will enter into force when the constitutional procedures for ratification of the United States and the Soviet Union have been satisfied and the instruments of ratification have been exchanged. The MOU, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty and upon exchange of the instruments of ratification will enter into force as part of the Treaty. The U.S.-GDR and U.S.-Czechoslovak Notes, which are included herewith for the information of the Senate, will also enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty. The Basing Country Agreement will do so as well, following completion of the constitutional procedures of each of the Parties to it and notification thereof to all other Parties.

AMENDMENTS

Amendments to the Treaty are subject to the same ratification procedures as the Treaty itself. However, some of the provisions and procedures contained in the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are highly detailed and technical. It is recognized that it may be necessary to adjust some of them to take into account unforeseen situations. Accordingly, the Protocols provide that the Parties may, in the Special Verification Commission established by the Treaty, agree upon measures necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocols. The Protocols provide that such measures, which would be technical in nature and would not affect the Parties' basic obligations, would not be considered to be amendments and thus would not require ratification.

NON-CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS

The Parties commit themselves not to assume any international obligation or undertaking that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This provision will not in any way affect existing or future patterns of defense cooperation with U.S. Allies in other areas, including strategic forces, short-range nuclear forces (with a range capability below 500 kilometers), or conventional forces.

DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

The Treaty is of unlimited duration. As an exercise of its national sovereignty, a Party may withdraw following six months' notice to the other Party if it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

THE BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT

The Basing Country Agreement is a necessary complement to the Treaty. The Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection provide for on- site inspection to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty not only in U.S. and Soviet territory, but also in the countries in which U.S. and Soviet missile systems are located.

Many of the items that the United States must eliminate are within the territory of our Western European Allies. By means of the Basing Country Agreement, the five Allied Basing Countries, on whose territory U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are located, consent to inspections at facilities subject to the Treaty within their territory by Soviet inspectors conducted in accordance with the Treaty and its Protocols. This formal consent on the part of the Allied Basing Countries provides the legal basis for the United States to make its commitment to the Soviet Union that Soviet inspections can be carried out on the territory of the Allied Basing Countries.

EXCHANGES OF NOTES

Each Basing Country is exchanging diplomatic Notes with the Party that will conduct inspections within its territory. The Notes record the acknowledgement of each Basing Country and the Inspecting Party that the Basing Country has agreed to inspections within its territory conducted in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection, and that the Inspecting Party has obligated itself to comply with the terms of the Treaty and to respect the laws and regulations of the Basing Country during the inspections. The Notes state that they do not in any way affect the reciprocal obligations between the United States and the Soviet Union under the Treaty. The countries that base U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; the Basing Countries for Soviet systems are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

INSPECTIONS OF SS-4 SILOS

In addition to the Treaty documents discussed above, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to an exchange of letters between Ambassadors Glitman and Obukhov, dated December 7, 1987, relating to the U.S. inspections of silo launchers for Soviet SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This agreement gives the United States the right to conduct a total of up to six on-site inspections of former silo launchers of SS-4 missiles. Organizational matters relating to such inspections will be arranged through the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the Treaty.

CONCLUSION

Accompanying this Report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty, including the MOU and the two Protocols. Also, attached is an article-by-article analysis of the Basing Country Agreement.

I believe this Treaty will significantly enhance the security of the United States and our Allies. It will eliminate an entire class of weapon-delivery systems in which the Soviet Union has established a clear advantage. I therefore strongly recommend that the Treaty be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.

Respectfully submitted,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ.

The Treaty consists of a Preamble and 17 Articles. The associated Memorandum of Understanding on Data (the MOU), Protocol on Elimination, and Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty.

THE PREAMBLE

The Preamble identifies the United States and the Soviet Union as the Parties to the treaty and contains four paragraphs that set forth the general goals and objectives that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed are advanced by the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems.

The first paragraph recognizes that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

The second paragraph notes that the Parties are guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability.

The third paragraph states the Parties' conviction that the measures set forth in the Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security.

The fourth paragraph acknowledges the obligations of the Parties set forth in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

ARTICLE I--BASIC OBLIGATIONS

Article I sets forth the basic obligations of the Parties to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in accordance with the Treaty's provisions, not to have such systems after their elimination, and to carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty. This Article also establishes that the MOU and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II--DEFINITIONS

Article II sets forth the definitions of terms used in the Treaty. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) ballistic missile and ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), (2) cruise missile and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), (3) GLBM launcher, (4) GLCM launcher, (5) intermediate-range missile, (6) shorter-range missile, (7) deployment area, (8) missile operating base, (9) missile support facility, (10) transit, (11) deployed missile, (12) non-deployed missile, (13) deployed launcher, (14) non-deployed launcher, and (15) basing country.

Paragraph 1 of Article II defines a "ballistic missile" as a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. In addition, "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" is defined as a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon- delivery vehicle.

There are three factors that determine whether a ballistic missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the ballistic missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the ballistic missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all ballistic missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLBMs are those types of ground-launched ballistic missiles that have been flight-tested or deployed for weapon- delivery, i.e., flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof. The third factor is whether the ballistic missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. Paragraph 4 of Article VII sets forth the criteria for establishing the range capability of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs. The technical data for each existing type of GLBM subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 2 of Article II defines a "cruise missile" as a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. In addition, a "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" is defined as a ground-launched missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

There are three factors that determine whether a cruise missile is subject to the Treaty. The first factor is whether the cruise missile is ground-launched. The second factor is whether the cruise missile is a weapon-delivery vehicle. The counting rule set forth in paragraph 1 of Article VII specifies that all cruise missiles of a type that has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery are considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. Thus, GLCMs are those types of ground-launched cruise missiles that have been flight-tested or deployed for weapon-delivery, i.e., flight-tested or deployed with any type of warhead device or simulation thereof. The third factor is whether the cruise missile has a range equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers. Paragraph 4 of Article VII sets forth the criteria for establishing the range capability for intermediate- range and shorter-range GLCMs. The technical data for each existing type of GLCM subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 3 of Article II defines a "GLBM launcher" as either a fixed launcher (i.e., non-mobile) or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM. Paragraph 7 of Article VII further states that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs. Paragraph 8 of Article VII specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM. The technical data for each type of GLBM launcher subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 4 of Article II defines a "GLCM launcher" as either a fixed launcher (i.e., non-mobile) or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM. Paragraph 7 of Article VII further states that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLCM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLCMs. Paragraph 8 of Article VII specifies that if a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLCM, then all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLCM. The technical data for each type of GLCM launcher subject to the Treaty are listed in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 5 of Article II defines an "intermediate-range missile" as a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers. The existing types of intermediate-range missiles are specified in paragraph 1 of Article III. Their numbers, locations, and characteristics are listed in Sections II, III, and VI, respectively, of the MOU. The criteria for determining the range capability of intermediate-range GLBMs and GLCMs that are not specified as existing types are described in paragraph 4 of Article VIII.

Paragraph 6 of Article II defines a "shorter-range missile" as a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers. The existing types of shorter-range missiles of the Parties are specified in paragraph 2 of Article III. Their numbers, locations, and characteristics are listed in Sections II, IV, and VI, respectively, of the MOU. Criteria for determining the range capability of shorter-range GLBMs and GLCMs that are not specified as existing types are described in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.

Paragraph 7 of Article II defines a "deployment area" as a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, may operate and within which one or more missile operating base are located. All deployment areas of inter-mediate-range missiles contain, by definition, at least one missile operating base. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all deployment areas be specified in the MOU and that their locations or numbers cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 of Article X. Each deployment area is described by name and boundaries in Section III of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article II, an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area is considered to be deployed. An intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area is considered to be a non-deployed missile in accordance with paragraph 12 of Article II. As provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VIII, intermediate-range missiles and their launchers, as well as stages of such missiles, must be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. Thus, an intermediate-range missile, stage of such a missile, or launcher of such a missile in any other location would be a violation of the Treaty. There are no "deployment areas" for shorter-range missiles; rather, such missiles are deployed only at missile operating bases in order to restrict them to much smaller geographical areas and thus further constrain their operational capability. This additional constraint works to the advantage of the United States since the Soviet Union has a monopoly on deployed shorter-range missiles.

Subparagraph 8(a) of Article II defines a "missile operating base," with respect to intermediate-range missiles, as a complex of facilities located within a deployment area: (a) at which intermediate-range missiles and their launchers normally operate, (b) in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located, and (c) in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all missile operating bases be specified in the MOU and that their locations or numbers cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 of Article X. The location of each intermediate-range missile operating base is provided, along with its center coordinates, in Section III of the MOU. A site diagram of each such missile operating base is appended to the MOU. A missile operating base contains the support structures and support equipment necessary to operate intermediate-range missiles. Definitions of the term "support equipment" and "support structure" are provided in paragraphs 10 and 11, respectively, of Section I of the MOU. In addition, since all missile operating bases for intermediate-range missiles located at missile operating bases are counted as deployed missiles in accordance with paragraph 11 of Article II [sic.].

Subparagraph 8(b) of Article II defines a "missile operating base," with respect to shorter-range missiles, as a complex of facilities located at any place: (a) at which shorter-range missiles and their launchers normally operate, and (b) in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located. The location of each shorter-range "missile operating base" is provided, along with its center coordinates, in Section IV of the MOU. A site diagram of each such missile operating base is appended to the MOU. A missile operating base contains the support equipment necessary to operate shorter-range missiles. The definition of the term "support equipment" is provided in paragraph 10 of Section I of the MOU. Since there are no deployment areas for shorter-range missiles, deployed shorter- range missiles are considered to be those shorter-range missiles located at missile operating bases. Paragraph 3 of Article VIII specifies that shorter-range missiles and their launchers may only be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit from such locations to elimination facilities. A shorter-range missile or launcher in any other location would be a violation of the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 of Article II defines a "missile support facility" as a missile production facility, a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility, a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility, a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility. These terms are defined in Section I of the MOU. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII requires that all missile support facilities be specified in the MOU and that their locations, except for elimination facilities, cannot be changed, except as a result of their elimination as provided for in paragraph 8 or Article X. The location of each such facility and its center coordinates are specified in Sections III, IV, and V of the MOU. A site diagram of each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU. Intermediate-range missiles and their launchers, as well as shorter-range missiles and their launchers, located at these facilities are considered to be non-deployed missiles and non-deployed launchers, respectively.

Paragraph 10 of Article II defines "transit," with respect to an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile, as movement between: (a) missile support facilities, (b) a missile support facility and a deployment area, or (c) deployment areas. With respect to a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile, "transit" is defined as a movement from either a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility. Thus, the only permitted movement of shorter-range missiles is to elimination facilities. Restrictions on the transit of shorter-range missiles complement the other measures that are intended to reduce as quickly as possible the Soviet advantage in the numbers of shorter-range missiles. Pursuant to paragraph 5(f) of Article IX, notifications of transits and information relating to the transit must be provided within 48 hours after the transit is completed. Such notifications will assist in determining whether there has been a violation if a missile is detected outside of deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities. All transits must be completed within 25 days in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article VIII. Intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles in transit are counted as non- deployed missiles.

Paragraph 11 of Article II defines a "deployed missile" as an intermediate-range missile that is located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile that is located at a missile operating base. Article IV requires the reduction and elimination of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles. Article V requires the elimination of deployed and non-deployed shorter-range missiles.

Paragraph 12 of Article II defines a "non-deployed missile" as an intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside of a missile operating base. Paragraph 1 of Article VIII requires that an intermediate- range missile may only be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. Thus, an intermediate-range missile located at a missile support facility or in transit is considered to be "non-deployed." An intermediate- range missile that is neither deployed (i.e., in a deployment area) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit) would be a violation of the Treaty. As noted above, paragraph 3 of Article VIII states that, until their removal to elimination facilities, shorter-range missiles may only be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit. A shorter-range missile located at a missile support facility or in transit is considered to be a non- deployed missile. A shorter-range missile that is neither deployed (i.e., at a missile operating base) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit to an elimination facility) would be a violation of the Treaty.

Paragraph 13 of Article II defines a "deployed launcher" as a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base. Deployed intermediate-range missile launchers are subject to the numerical restrictions and elimination requirements specified in Article IV. Deployed shorter-range missile launchers are subject to the elimination requirements specified in Article V.

Paragraph 14 of Article II defines a "non-deployed launcher" as a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside of a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside of a missile operating base. Thus, "non-deployed launcher" is a term based upon the location of a launcher for intermediate- range missiles or shorter-range missiles. Non-deployed intermediate-range missile launchers are those launchers located at missile support facilities or in transit. They are subject to the numerical restrictions and elimination requirements specified in Article IV. An intermediate-range missile launcher that is neither deployed (i.e., in a deployment area) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit) would be a violation of the Treaty. Non-deployed shorter-range missile launchers are those located at missile support facilities or in transit. They are subject to the elimination requirements specified in Article V. A shorter-range missile launcher that is neither deployed (i.e., at a missile operating base) nor non-deployed (i.e., at a missile support facility or in transit to an elimination facility) would be a violation of the Treaty.

Paragraph 15 of Article II defines a "basing country" as a country, other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on whose territory U.S. or Soviet intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, or support structures associated with intermediate- range missiles or their launchers, were located at any time after November 1, 1987. For the purposes of this definition, the term "located" does not include missiles or launchers in transit. The Basing Countries in which U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are located are Belgium, the Federal Republic of German, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The Basing Countries in which Soviet missile systems subject to the Treaty are located are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

ARTICLE III--EXISTING TYPES OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Paragraph 1 of Article III lists the existing types of intermediate-range missiles of both the United States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, the types of intermediate- range missiles listed as existing are the Pershing II ballistic missile and the GBM-109G cruise missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of intermediate-range missiles are the RSD-10 (SS- 20) ballistic missile, the RS-12 (SS-4) ballistic missile, and the RS-14 (SS-5) ballistic missile.

Pursuant to Article IV, all intermediate-range missiles of the Parties, along with their launchers, support equipment, and support structures, must be eliminated within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. In addition, paragraph 6 of Article X stipulates that intermediate-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed and are not listed as existing types in Article III, must be eliminated along with their launchers within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to this provision, the Soviet Union must eliminate all of its RK-55 (SSC-X-4) intermediate-range cruise missiles and associated launchers. The detailed procedures for eliminating intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and their associated support equipment and support structures are specified in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article III lists the existing types of shorter-range missiles of both the United States and the Soviet Union. For the United States, the type of shorter-range missile described as existing is the Pershing IA ballistic missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of shorter-range missiles are the OTR-22 (SS-12) ballistic missile and the OTR-23 (SS-23) ballistic missile. Pursuant to Article V, all of the existing types of shorter-range missiles of the Parties, along with their launchers and support equipment, must be eliminated within 18 months after entry into force of the Treaty. In addition, paragraph 6 of Article X stipulates that shorter-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed and are not listed as existing types in Article III, must be eliminated along with their launchers within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to this provision, the United States must eliminate all of its Pershing IB shorter-range ballistic missiles and associated launchers. The detailed procedures for eliminating shorter-range missiles are specified in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.

ARTICLE IV--REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES

Article IV sets forth the basic obligations for the reduction and eventual elimination of all intermediate-range missile systems.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV requires the Parties to eliminate all intermediate-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. The types of items to be eliminated are listed in Section I of the Protocol on Elimination, while the numbers of such items as of November 1, 1987, are listed in Sections II and III of the MOU. After the three-year elimination period, such missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment may not be possessed by either Party. The procedures by which each type of missile, launcher, support structure, and support equipment must be eliminated are set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article IV provides that both deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, must be reduced and eliminated in two phases. It also provides that such elimination will occur throughout the duration of each phase, thus ensuring that the eliminations will not take place only in the final daysof each elimination phase.

Subparagraph 2(a) provides that by the end of the first phase, which will be no later than 29 months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must have completed reductions so that:

• the number of its deployed launchers of intermediate- range missiles does not exceed the number of such launchers capable of carrying or containing missiles considered to carry a total of 171 warheads. Since this limit only applies to deployed launchers, only those intermediate-range missile launchers located in deployment areas are affected;
• the number of its deployed intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry a total of 180 warheads. Since this limit only applies to deployed intermediate-range missiles, only those missiles located in deployment areas are affected. The reason that 180 warheads on deployed missiles will be allowed, but only 171 warheads on deployed launchers, is so that a small number of extra missiles may be located in deployment areas for use as operational spares or for maintenance;
• the aggregate number of its deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the number that is considered by the Parties to carry a total of 200 warheads. This provision places an aggregate limit on the number of deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range missile launchers that are located in deployment areas, located at missile support facilities, and in transit. Thus, since intermediate- range missile launchers must be either deployed or non- deployed, all intermediate-range missile launchers are subject to reductions in the first phase;
• the aggregate number of its deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry a total of 200 warheads. This provision limits the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles to the number of missiles that are considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads. Thus, there is a limit on the number of intermediate-range missiles that are located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities, and are in transit. Since intermediate-range missiles must be either deployed or non-deployed, all such missiles are thus subject to reductions in the first phase; and
• the ratio of the total number of deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types to the total number of intermediate-range missiles does not exceed the ratio that existed on November 1, 1987. This provision is intended to ensure proportional reductions of the types of intermediate-range missile systems possessed by each Party.

Subparagraph 2(a) of Article IV requires that numerical limits for missiles and launchers be calculated using warhead numbers. To facilitate verification, the number of warheads actually deployed on each missile and launcher is not counted; rather, the number of warheads on missiles and launchers is derived by using the counting rules set forth in Article VII. For missiles, the counting rule in paragraph 6 of Article VII of the Treaty provides that the number of warheads a GLBM or GLCM of an existing type carries is the maximum number of warheads for that type specified in Section VI of the MOU. For launchers, paragraph 9 of Article VII provides that the number of missiles that each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile is capable of carrying or containing is the number specified for launchers of missiles of that type in Section VI of the MOU.

In sum, 29 months after the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must not have more deployed intermediate-range launchers than the number considered to carry 171 warheads, not have more deployed intermediate-range missiles than the number considered to carry 180 warheads, not have more combined deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range launchers than the number considered to carry 200 warheads, and not have more combined deployed and non- deployed intermediate-range missiles than the number considered to carry 200 warheads.

Subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV provides that, by the end of the second phase, which will be no later than three years after the entry into force of the Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, support structures, and support equipment of the categories listed in the MOU must be eliminated by the Parties.

ARTICLE V--ELIMINATION OF SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Paragraph 1 of Article V provides for the elimination of the shorter-range missiles of each Party, along with launchers of such missiles and associated support equipment, within a single period of 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty. Thus, there is only one phase for reductions of shorter-range missiles during which shorter-range missiles, their launchers, and associated support equipment must be eliminated. After elimination, the Parties are not permitted to possess any shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, or associated support equipment.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article V restrict the locations of shorter-range missiles and their launchers during the 18-month elimination period. Paragraph 2 requires that, within 90 days of entry into force of the Treaty, each Party move all of its deployed shorter-range missiles, as well as all of its deployed and non- deployed launchers of shorter-range missiles, to the elimination facilities specified in the MOU (or in subsequent data updates) and retain them there until they are destroyed in accordance with Section II of the Protocol on Elimination. Within 12 months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall move all of its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to the elimination facilities specified in the MOU (or in subsequent data updates) and shall retain them there until they are destroyed, in accordance with Section II of the Protocol on Elimination, during the 18-month elimination period. The requirement to move shorter-range missile systems to elimination facilities early in the elimination period is commonly referred to as the "corral" concept.

Paragraph 3 of Article V provides that shorter-range missiles and launchers of shorter-range missiles must not be located at the same elimination facility. Elimination facilities for shorter- range missiles and elimination facilities for launchers of shorter- range missiles must be separated from each other by at least 1000 kilometers.

The locational restrictions in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article V, together, with those in paragraph 3 of Article VIII, are intended to ensure that shorter-range missiles and their launchers are removed from operational status as soon as possible after entry into force of the Treaty. Given the fact that the Soviet Union has a monopoly on deployed shorter-range missiles, this provision will contribute significantly to NATO's security with respect to the threat posed by shorter-range missiles during the early stages of the implementation of the Treaty.

ARTICLE VI--PRODUCTION AND FLIGHT-TEST BANS

Paragraph 1 of Article VI provides that, upon entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, neither Party may produce or flight- test any intermediate-range missile, or produce any stages or launchers of such missiles. Paragraph 1 also provides that neither Party may produce, flight-test, or launch any shorter-range missiles, or produce any stages or launchers of such missiles. The term "produce" in this context means any industrial activity involving the construction of one or more missiles, stages, or launchers subject to the provisions of the Treaty. The obligation not to produce intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their stages and launchers, prohibits the Parties from producing such items for third parties.

A flight-test ban is a natural element in any treaty that eliminates an entire class of missile systems. It serves to strengthen the production ban. Any covertly produced missile could not be adequately flight-tested without likely U.S. detection. Without realistic testing, a Party's confidence in the operational capability of any covertly-produced missile system would be degraded.

The reason launches of shorter-range missiles are prohibited, but allowed for intermediate-range missiles, is that intermediate- range missiles may be launched for the purpose of destroying them. Paragraph 5 of Article X provides that, within the first six months after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party has the right to eliminate by means of such launching up to 100 of its intermediate- range missiles. This right is limited to this six-month period in order to preclude prohibited flight-testing under the guise of launching to destruction. Restrictions and conditions on eliminations by means of launching are provided for in Articles IX and XI of the Treaty and in Section III of the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article VI provides that, notwithstanding the paragraph 1 prohibition against producing stages of intermediate- range GLBMs, each Party has the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by the Treaty even if that missile uses one stage that is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage. Paragraph 2 further provides that a Party may not produce any other stage that is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. This provision takes into account the outward physical similarity between the first stage of the SS-25 ICBM and the first stage of the SS-20, which is an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM. The effect of paragraph 2 is to make clear that the Treaty does not prohibit the Soviets from continuing to produce the SS-25 ICBM, which is not limited by this Treaty, on the basis that it has a first stage outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, the first stage of the SS-20. The United States has a reciprocal right with regard to one stage of its own Pershing missile system should it choose to exercise it. Paragraph 2 prohibits the parties from producing more than one stage that is outwardly similar to any stage of an existing type of intermediate- range GLBM.

ARTICLE VII--COUNTING RULES

Article VII contains counting rules and type rules that are critical to the operation of the Treaty. Counting rules in arms control agreements provide formal and legally binding recognition by the Parties that specified items will be counted in a certain way. Type rules provide formal and legally binding recognition by the Parties that once a specified object is counted in a certain way, then all objects of that type will be counted in that same way. Such rules are important because they provide a mechanism for verifying compliance with the provisions of an agreement.

Paragraph 1 of Article VII provides that if a ballistic missile or cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, then all missiles of that type will be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. When read in conjunction with paragraph 1 of Article II, which defines a ground-launched ballistic missile in terms of a "weapon-delivery vehicle," paragraph 1 of Article VII defines a weapon-delivery vehicle in such a way as to relieve a Party from having to prove that every missile of a particular type has been tested or deployed as a weapon-delivery vehicle; rather, it is sufficient to demonstrate that merely one missile of that type has been flight-tested or deployed as a weapon-delivery vehicle in order to establish for the purpose of the Treaty that all missiles of that type are weapon- delivery vehicles.

Paragraph 2 of Article VII states that if a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, then all GLBM or GLCMs of that type will be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. Similarly, if a GLBM or a GLCM is a shorter-range missile, then all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

Paragraph 2 works in conjunction with all of the other Treaty provisions that refer to intermediate-range missiles or shorter- range missiles; it has the effect of a type rule, making such provisions applicable to all GLBMs and GLCMs if a single GLBM or GLCM of that type is an intermediate-range or shorter-range missile. "Intermediate-range missile" and "shorter-range missile" are defined in paragraphs 5 and 6, respectively, of Article II.

Paragraph 3 of Article VII provides that if a type of GLBM is developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not on the surface of the Earth, then it will not be considered to be a GLBM subject to the Treaty. Paragraph 3 thus provides an explicit exception to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VII, and applies to such ground-launched ballistic missiles as anti-satellite missiles (ASATs), anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs), and air defense or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

Paragraph 4 of Article VII establishes criteria for defining the range capability of GLBMs and GLCMs not specified in Article III. For purposes of the Treaty, the range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III is defined as its maximum tested range.

The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III is defined as the maximum distance it can cover, while flying in its standard design mode, before it runs out of fuel. Distance is calculated by projecting the flight path of the GLCM onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact.

Paragraph 4 also describes intermediate-range missiles and shorter-range missiles in terms of their range capability. A shorter-range GLBM or GLCM is a missile with a range capability equal to or greater than 500 kilometers but not greater than 1000 kilometers. An intermediate-range GLBM or GLCM is defined as a missile with a range capability greater than 1000 kilometers but not greater than 5500 kilometers.

Paragraph 5 of Article VII provides that the maximum number of warheads considered to be carried by an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile is the number of warheads specified for missiles of that type in Section VI of the MOU. The specification of the number of warheads associated with an existing type of intermediate-range missile is necessary in order to calculate compliance with the warhead limits pertaining to intermediate-range missiles provided for in Article IV.

Paragraph 6 of Article VII provides that each GLBM or GLCM will be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads for a missile of that type specified in Section VI of the MOU. Thus, when the Parties apply paragraph 2 of Article IV to determine whether they have sufficiently reduced the warheads on intermediate-range missiles to meet their obligations for the first phase of reductions, they will use the maximum number of warheads associated with that type of intermediate-range missile as specified in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 7 of Article VII provides that if a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs, respectively. This paragraph works in conjunction with the Treaty provisions that refer to the testing of GLBM launchers or GLCM launchers; it has the effect of a type rule, making such provisions applicable to all launchers of a given type if a single launcher of that type has been tested to launch a GLBM or a GLCM, respectively. "GLBM launcher" and "GLCM launcher" are defined in paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively, of Article II.

Paragraph 8 of Article VII provides that if a launcher has contained, or has launched, a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM, respectively. This paragraph has the effect of a type rule. Thus, if one launcher of a type has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, then all launchers of that type will be considered GLBM or GLCM launchers, respectively, and thus will be subject to the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 of Article VII provides that each launcher of an existing type of GLBM or GLCM will be considered capable of carrying or containing the number of missiles specified in Section VI of the MOU for that type of launcher. Thus, when the Parties apply paragraph 2 of Article IV to determine whether they have sufficiently reduced the warheads associated with intermediate- range missile launchers, they will use the number of GLBMs or GLCMs that the launcher of that type is considered capable of carrying, as specified in Section VI of the MOU, and, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article VII which provides the warhead counting rule for GLBMs and GLCMs, multiply that number times the maximum number of warheads associated with that type of GLBM or GLCM, as specified in Section VI of the MOU.

Paragraph 10 of Article VII provides counting rules for GLBMs and GLCMs. These rules define how GLBMs and GLCMs are accounted for under the terms of the Treaty. The purpose of these provisions is to facilitate verification of compliance with the Treaty by identifying those features of the missile systems most easily observable by national technical means of verification.

Subparagraph (a) of paragraph 10 states that, for GLBMs stored or moved in separate stages (such as the Pershing II), the longest stage of an intermediate range or shorter-range GLBM will be counted as a complete missile. This means that each longest stage of such a GLBM will be counted as one complete missile. The Protocol on Elimination requires, however, that all stages of existing types of GLBMs be eliminated.

Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 10 of Article VII provides that, for GLBMs not stored or moved in separate stages (such as the SS- 20), a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate- range GLBM will be counted as a complete missile, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that the canister does not contain such a missile. This means that such a GLBM canister will be counted as one complete GLBM. This canister counting rule serves an important verification purpose. Soviet missiles typically are kept in canisters. By virtue of this rule, if the United States detects a canister subject to the provisions of the Treaty, it will be entitled to consider that canister to contain a missile of the type associated with that canister, unless the Soviet Union can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the United States that the canister does not contain such a missile. Such a demonstration could involve on-site inspection, national technical means of verification, or cooperative measures. Absent such a Soviet demonstration, each Soviet canister counts as one missile for purposes of Treaty limitations. Also, pursuant to the Protocol on Elimination, canisters of prohibited types of intermediate-range and shorter range missiles must be eliminated along with their associated missiles. In addition, subparagraph (b) of Article 10 provides that, for GLBMs not stored or moved in separate stages, an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be considered a completed missile. Subparagraph (c) of paragraph 10 states that, for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM will be counted as a complete missile. This means that the airframe of a GLCM will be counted as if it were a complete missile.

Paragraph 11 of Article VII provides that a ballistic missile not intended for use in a ground-based mode will not be considered to be a GLBM subject to the Treaty if: (a) it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed, land-based launcher that is used solely for test purposes, and (b) its launcher is distinguishable from GLBM launchers subject to the Treaty. Similarly, a cruise missile not intended for use in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM subject to the Treaty if: (a) it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed, land-based launcher that is used solely for test purposes, and (b) its launcher is distinguishable from GLCM launchers subject to the Treaty. These exceptions are necessary to permit the land-based testing of items not subject to the Treaty, such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

Paragraph 12 of Article VII gives each Party the right to produce and use existing booster stages in order to create booster systems with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. This provision permits each Party to produce and use booster stages that otherwise might, because of the range to which the booster system is launched and the payload that is tested, be considered for the purposes of the Treaty to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. In this regard, if a ballistic missile or cruise missile is not a weapon-delivery vehicle, then pursuant to paragraph 1 or 2, respectively, of Article II it is not subject to the provisions of the Treaty. Paragraph 12 is essential to permit the United States to continue on-going research on advanced concepts for strategic reentry vehicles and defensive systems.

Paragraph 12 further provides that launches of such booster systems will not be considered to be flight testing of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles as long as four conditions are met. First, the stages used in such booster systems must be different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III. Second, the booster systems must be used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than themselves. Third, the total number of launchers for such booster systems must not exceed 35 at any one time for either Party. Fourth, the launchers for such booster systems must be fixed and emplaced above ground. Such launchers must be located only at research and development launch sites that are specified in Section VII of the MOU. Such research and development launch sites are not subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty. Paragraph 6 of Article IX, however, provides that each party must notify the other Party, at least ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in this paragraph. The purpose of such a notification is to enhance the verification by national technical means of such launches. ARTICLE VIII--LOCATION AND TRANSIT

Article VIII sets forth locational restrictions both for intermediate-range missiles and their launchers and for shorter- range missiles and their launchers. In addition, Article VIII limits the movement of missiles and launchers subject to the provisions of the Treaty. The ability to verify compliance is enhanced if there are restrictions on the location and movement of Treaty-limited items during the period in which they are being eliminated.

Paragraph 1 of Article VIII provides that all intermediate- range missiles and their launchers must be: (a) located in deployment areas, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or their launchers may not be located elsewhere. The terms "deployment areas," "missile support facility," and "transit" are defined in paragraphs 7, 9, and 10, respectively, of Article II; the locations of deployment areas and missile support facilities of intermediate-range missiles are specified in Section III of the MOU, and notification of missiles and launchers in transit is required pursuant to subparagraph 5(f) of Article IX.

Paragraph 2 of Article VIII requires that stages of intermediate-range missiles must be: (a) located in deployment areas, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities, or between deployment areas and missile support facilities. Paragraph 2 complements paragraph 1 of Article VIII by placing restrictions similar to those for intermediate-range missiles on stages of such missiles. The terms "deployment area" and "missile support facility" are defined in paragraphs 7 and 9, respectively, of Article II; the locations of deployment areas and missile support facilities of intermediate-range missile systems are specified in Section III of the MOU.

Paragraph 3 of Article VIII provides that all shorter-range missiles and their launchers, until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V, must be: (a) located at missile operating bases, (b) located at missile support facilities, or (c) in transit. Paragraph 10 of Article II requires that such transit can only be to elimination facilities. Shorter- range missiles or their launchers may not be located elsewhere. The terms "missile operating base," "missile support facility," and "transit" are defined in paragraphs 8, 9, and 10, respectively, of Article II, and the location of such bases is specified in Section IV of the MOU.

Paragraph 4 of Article VIII provides that the transit of a missile or launcher must be completed within 25 days. To facilitate verification of compliance with this provision, paragraph 5(f) of Article IX provides for notification of such transits within 48 hours after they have been completed. Such notification must include the location of the transiting missile or launcher once every four days during that transit.

Paragraph 5 of Article VIII states that all deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities are specified either in the MOU or in subsequent updates of data provided pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a), or 5(b) of Article IX of the Treaty. Also, paragraph 5 of Article VIII provides that neither Party will increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities from those set forth in the MOU. Elimination facilities are excepted from this prohibition in order to give each Party the flexibility to determine the most appropriate elimination site(s) during the three-year elimination period. Finally, paragraph 5 provides that a missile support facility will not be considered to be part of a deployment area even if it is located within such an area. Missiles, stages, and launchers located at missile support facilities are considered to be non-deployed. If a missile support facility located within a deployment area were considered to be part of the deployment area, then any missiles, stages, or launchers located at that facility would be deployed, rather than non-deployed.

Paragraph 6 of Article VIII provides that, beginning 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may locate: (a) intermediate-range missiles, (b) stages of intermediate-range missiles, (c) launchers of intermediate-range missiles, (d) shorter-range missiles, (e) stages of shorter-range missiles, or (f) launchers of shorter-range missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, or test ranges specified in the MOU. This means that, after the 30-day period, locating a missile, a missile stage, or a launcher at a production facility or test range would be a violation. By providing that missiles, launchers, and stages may not be located in locations at which such items would be produced or tested, paragraph 6 makes compliance with the Treaty prohibitions on production and testing easier to verify.

Paragraph 7 of Article VIII provides that neither Party may locate any intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles at training facilities. The prohibition against locating missiles at training facilities is designed to guard against covert operation of those missiles at such facilities.

Paragraph 8 of Article VIII provides that a non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile may not be carried on, or be contained within, a launcher for such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities. This provision is designed to help ensure that non- deployed missiles are not covertly operational during the elimination period. Paragraph 9 of Article VIII provides that training missiles as well as training launchers for intermediate-range missiles and for shorter-range missiles are subject to the same locational restrictions as for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles that are provided for in paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article VIII. This means that training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range missiles must be located in deployment areas, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit, while training missiles and training launchers for shorter-range missiles must be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit to elimination facilities. Since some training systems are not readily externally distinguishable, particularly by national technical means of verification, from actual missiles and launchers, the requirement that they be located at the same facilities as operational systems helps to ensure that operational systems will not be covertly deployed under the guise of training systems.

ARTICLE IX--DATA EXCHANGES AND NOTIFICATIONS

Article IX sets forth the basic obligations for the data exchanges and notifications associated with the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. These data exchanges and notifications are of unprecedented scope and represent an important verification measure.

Paragraph 1 of Article IX states that the MOU contains categories of data relevant to the Treaty's obligations and that it lists all of the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their launchers, support structures, and support equipment, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Paragraph 1 requires that updates of that data and notifications required by this Article be provided according to the categories contained in the MOU. While the data is updated in each category, the MOU itself, as well as its categories, does not change.

Paragraph 2 of Article IX requires that updates of data and notifications be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. As stated above, the Centers were established pursuant to the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

Paragraph 3 of Article IX provides that, not less than 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party will provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of the entry into force of the Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the MOU. Since paragraph 1 of Article IX requires that the data in the MOU be current as of November 1, 1987, paragraph 3 provides the mechanism by which the information initially provided by the MOU is updated for the period between November 1, 1987, and the date of entry into force of the Treaty. It is this updated data that lists the inventory of items to be eliminated under the Treaty.

Paragraph 4 of Article IX requires that, following the entry into force of the Treaty, each Party must provide updated data for all categories in the MOU at six-month intervals. The updated data must be provided not later than 30 days after each six-month interval. The updates must inform the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, that have occurred during the six-month interval. The updates must also inform the other Party of the "net effect" of those changes.

Paragraph 5 of Article IX sets forth additional notification requirements imposed on each Party. These requirements will apply throughout the life of the Treaty.

Subparagraph 5(a) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base, or missile support facility. Paragraph 8 of Article X calls for the elimination of deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities. Upon elimination, former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities (except missile production facilities) will continue to be subject to "short-notice" on-site inspections, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article XI, until 13 years have elapsed after the entry into force of the Treaty.

Subparagraph 5(b) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and date of a scheduled change. Elimination facilities, being a type of missile support facility, must themselves be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X.

Subparagraph 5(c) requires notification, not less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, stages and launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Such notifications must include the following five items:

• the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;
• the elimination site;
• the location from which intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and support equipment will be moved to the elimination site;
• except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an "elimination" inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI; and
• the estimated time of departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility.

Launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purposes of their elimination do not require notifications in accordance with subparagraph 5(c); rather, notice of such eliminations by launching must be provided in accordance with subparagraph 5(d) below.

Subparagraph 5(d) requires notification, not less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X. Such notifications must include the following information:

• the type of intermediate-range missiles to be eliminated;
• the location of the launch. If the elimination is by a series of launches, the location and number of such launches;
• the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an "elimination" inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty; and
• the estimated time of departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility.

Subparagraph 5(e) requires notification of changes, within 48 hours after they occur, in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their launchers, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, resulting from elimination. Such notifications must include the following information:

• the number and type of items of a missile system that were eliminated; and
• the date and location of the elimination.

Subparagraph 5(f) requires notification of the transit, not more than 48 hours after it has been completed, of intermediate- range missiles or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range missiles. Such notifications must include the following information:

• the number of missiles or launchers that were moved;
• the points, dates, and times of departure and arrival;
• the transport used; and
• the locations, and time at that location, at least once every four days during the period of transit.

Paragraph 6 of Article IX requires notification, not less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII. This provision facilitates monitoring, which helps to ensure that missile systems subject to the Treaty will not be covertly tested under the guise of research and development boosters.

ARTICLE X--ELIMINATION

Article X sets forth the basic obligations for the elimination of items or facilities whose destruction is required by the Treaty. Details concerning the elimination of specific items are provided in the Protocol on Elimination. This elimination regime helps to ensure that all elimination required by the Treaty will, in fact, be performed.

Paragraph 1 of Article X requires that each Party eliminate its intermediate-range and short-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support structures and support equipment in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article X provides that on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination must take place in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, the Protocol on Inspection, and the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 3 of Article X requires that when intermediate-range missiles, their launchers, and associated support equipment are removed from deployment areas to elimination facilities, they must be removed in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States, such organizational units are batteries of Pershing II ballistic missiles and flights of BGM-109G cruise missiles. For the Soviet Union, such organizational units are SS-20 ballistic missiles regiments composed of two or three battalions. Elimination by complete organizational units will aid in verification of the elimination process.

Paragraph 4 of Article X provides that the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment must be carried out either at the elimination facilities specified in the MOU or at new elimination facilities specified in the MOU or at new elimination facilities identified in accordance with subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX. If such items are eliminated in accordance with Section IV (i.e., elimination in situ) or section V (i.e., elimination through loss, accidental destruction, or static display) of the Protocol on Elimination, then they need not be eliminated at the facilities specified in the MOU or at the facilities as to which notification was made in accordance with subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX. Support structures, associated with Treaty-limited missiles or launchers, that are subject to elimination must be eliminated in situ.

Paragraph 5 of Article X permits each Party to eliminate, within the first six months after the entry into force of the Treaty, up to 100 intermediate-range missiles by means of launching. Section III of the Protocol on Elimination requires that such missiles must be launched from designated launch sites to existing impact areas. The purpose of the six-month time limit is to reduce any potential conflict between this means of elimination and the flight-test ban provided for in paragraph 1 of Article VI.

Paragraph 6 of Article X requires that certain intermediate- range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, must be eliminated within six months after the entry into force of the Treaty, if such missiles meet the following three criteria: (a) they were tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty, (b) they were never deployed, and (c) they are not listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty. Such missiles must be eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. These missiles are, for the United States, the Pershing IB shorter-range ballistic missile, and, for the USSR, the RK-55 (SSC-X-4) intermediate-range cruise missile.

Paragraph 7 of Article X provides that elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support structures and support equipment will be considered to have occurred after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon receipt of the notification required in subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX.

Paragraph 8 of Article X requires that each Party eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities. It is important to understand that all deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities that are listed in the MOU or, in the case of elimination facilities, those identified by means of a subsequent data update, must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8. A Party must notify the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of article IX of the Treaty, of the date of the eliminations, but only after three conditions have been fulfilled. The conditions that must be met before notification can be given are as follows:

• all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment have been removed from such areas, bases, or facilities;
• all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located at such areas, bases, or facilities have been eliminated; and
• all activities related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage, or deployment of such missiles and launchers have ceased at such areas, bases, or facilities.

Paragraph 8 of Article X further provides that such deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities will be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI (i.e., there has been a "close-out" inspection) or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination (for which notification was provided pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article IX). Thus, inspection of eliminated locations is a right available to both Parties, but such inspections are not required by the Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base, or missile support facility that met the three conditions specified above prior to entry into force of the Treaty, and which was not included in the initial data exchange update made in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty, and which was not included in the initial data exchange update made in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty, will be considered to have been eliminated. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI, any such location will be subject to an on-site "baseline" inspection in order to determine whether, in fact, it was eliminated.

Paragraph 9 of Article X provides that if a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the MOU for use as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to the Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted. However, while such a missile base can be converted, such a base must nevertheless be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X above. Conversion is not a substitute for elimination under the Treaty.

ARTICLE XI--ON-SITE INSPECTION

Article XI sets forth the plan for on-site inspections the Parties will conduct to assist in the verification of compliance with the Treaty. This Article provides for several different types of inspections, including "baseline" inspections (paragraph 3), "close-out" inspections (paragraph 4), "short-notice" inspections (paragraph 5), continuous "portal monitoring" inspections (paragraph 6), and "elimination" inspections (paragraphs 7 and 8). "Elimination" inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 are the only on-site inspections that an Inspecting Party is obliged to carry out. All of the other types of inspections specified in this article are at the option of the Inspecting Party. Except for continuous portal monitoring, missile production facilities are not subject to any type of on-site inspection. This decision was made at the insistence of the United States for reasons of national security. Details concerning the procedures for each type of inspection are provided in the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 1 of Article XI provides that, for the purpose of facilitating verification of compliance with the Treaty, each Party has the right to conduct on-site inspections in accordance with this Article and the Protocols on Inspection and Elimination.

Paragraph 2 of Article XI provides that such inspections may take place within the territory of each Party and within the territory of the Basing Countries, i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia. The Basing Country Agreement between the United States and the five Allied Basing Countries (i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom) provides the consent of the Allied Basing Countries to have inspections conducted within their respective territories pursuant to Article XI and the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 3 of Article XI sets forth the parameters of "baseline" inspections. These inspections are for the purpose of helping to verify the updated data exchanged pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX. Beginning 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, these inspections will afford each Party an opportunity to inspect all missile operating bases and missile support facilities (other than missile production facilities) specified in the MOU, as well as an opportunity to inspect all elimination facilities listed in the updated data. These inspections must be completed within 90 days after the entry into force of the Treaty. Thus, within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties will exchange updated data and, within 90 days after entry into force, conduct inspections to help verify the updated data. The procedures for a "baseline" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 4 of Article XI provides for the "close-out" inspection of bases and facilities once they are declared to have been eliminated. It establishes the right to confirm by on-site inspection the elimination of missile operating bases and missile support facilities, except missile production facilities, for which notification of elimination was provided pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article IX. "Close-out" inspections must be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled elimination date in order to confirm that such elimination did in fact take place. Once such bases and facilities are eliminated, they are, as former facilities, subject to the "short-notice" inspections provided for in subparagraph 5(b) of this Article rather than those provided for under subparagraph 5(a) of this Article. If a Party conducts an inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article (i.e., a "baseline" inspection) after the scheduled date of elimination of a particular facility, then no "close-out" inspection will be permitted. The procedures for a "close-out" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 5 of Article XI provides each Party with the right to conduct two types of "short-notice" inspections for a period of 13 years after entry into force of the Treaty. Such inspections are referred to as "short-notice" because, like "baseline" and "close-out" inspections, they require that an inspection team be transported to the inspection site no later than nine hours after the inspection team specifies which particular site it wishes to inspect. The "short-notice" inspection differs from "baseline" and "close-out" inspections because it is based on a quota system and is available to the Parties for 13 years after the Treaty enters into force. The two types of "short-notice" inspections are: (a) beginning 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party has the right to inspect missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities. The purpose of these inspections is to ascertain the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment located at the missile operating base or missile support facility that is being inspected; and

(b) each Party has the right to inspect former missile operating bases and missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of the Treaty, other than former missile production facilities. This inspection right includes former missile operating bases that, in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article X, have been converted for a use not limited by the Treaty after November 1, 1987. This inspection right is extended to such converted bases because they must nevertheless be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X.

The Parties have the right to conduct a total of 20 of the inspections described in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of the Treaty, 15 such inspections per year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per year during the last five years. Thus, each Party will have an opportunity to conduct up to 185 such inspections over the course of 13 years. Neither Party may use more than half of its total number of inspections per year within the territory of any one Basing Country. The procedures for a "short-notice" inspection are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 6 of Article XI provides the Parties with certain continuous monitoring inspection rights for a period of up to 13 years after entry into force of the Treaty. These types of inspection are referred to as "portal monitoring." Each Party has the right to inspect by such portal monitoring: (a) the portal of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of GLBMs that use missile stages, any one of which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of solid- propellant GLBM subject to the Treaty, is accomplished. Subparagraph (a) is necessary because of the close physical similarity between the first stage of the SS-25 ICBM and the first stage of the solid-propellant SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM; or

(b) if a party has no facility of the type described in subparagraph (a) above, the portal of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced. The existing types of GLBMs are specified in Article III.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 6 must ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous portal monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of the Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) above. If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of the Treaty, a Party does not conduct the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party will have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the first Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again.

Finally, paragraph 6 specifies that, upon entry into force of the Treaty, such facilities to be monitored are: for the United States, Hercules Plant #1, at Magna, Utah (as specified in the site diagram in the MOU), and, for the Soviet Union, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Both stages of the Pershing II intermediate-range GLBM were produced at the plant at Magna, Utah, while the SS-25 ICBM and the SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM have been assembled at the plant at Votkinsk. Paragraph 6 further specifies that the plant at Magna, Utah, will be monitored in accordance with subparagraph (b) above, while the plant at Votkinsk will be monitored in accordance with subparagraph (a) above. The procedures for a "portal monitoring" inspection are set forth in Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 7 of Article XI requires the inspection of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment to be carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of the Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Such inspections are required and include the obligation to inspect the elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching.

Inspections made pursuant to this paragraph are for the purpose of determining whether the specified elimination processes have, in fact, been carried out. As stated above, the "elimination" inspections provided for in paragraph 7 are the only required on- site inspections specified in Article XI. Such "elimination" inspections are required in order to help ensure agreement between the Parties concerning the elimination of items and the status of the inventory of items subject to the Treaty. The procedures for an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 are set forth in Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 8 of Article XI establishes the right of the Parties to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of items that are eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination. Section V of the Protocol on Elimination sets forth the procedures for elimination by loss or accidental destruction as well as by static display. Paragraph 8 also establishes the right of the Parties to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers that are eliminated pursuant to Section II, IV, and V of that Protocol. The procedures for an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 are set forth in Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection.

ARTICLE XII--NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

Paragraph 1 of Article XII states that, to help ensure compliance with the treaty, each Party will use the national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

National technical means include a broad range of systemsfor collecting intelligence. Such systems include reconnaissance satellites, ships and aircraft that are used to monitor Soviet missile tests, and ground stations, such as the United States large phased-array radar on Shemya Island in Alaska.

In subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2, the Parties state their commitment not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

In subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2, the Parties are prohibited from using any concealment measures that impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the Treaty. This provision is broader than similar provisions in earlier U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements, which merely prohibited deliberate concealment measures. This prohibition does not apply to cover or concealment practices that both occur within a deployment area and are associated with normal training, maintenance, and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

Paragraph 3 of Article XII provides a unique measure to enhance observation by national technical means of verification. It establishes the right of each Party to request, and the obligation of the other Party to carry out, certain cooperative measures to improve verification by reconnaissance satellites. This right will exist until either a strategic offensive arms reduction and limitation agreement enters into force between the Parties or three years after entry into force of the Treaty, whichever occurs first. The cooperative measures relate to deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs capable of a range in excess of 5500 kilometers (and thus not limited by the Treaty), which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X and subsequently converted pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article X. The Party making a request for cooperative measures must inform the other Party of the deployment base at which such measures shall be implemented. The following measures must be carried out by the Party whose base is to be observed:

• (a) not later than six hours after a request, the Party must have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, must have completely removed all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures, and must have displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and
• (b) the Party must leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until 12 hours after receipt of a request for such an observation.

Paragraph 3 further provides that each Party may make six such requests for cooperative measures per calendar year, and that only one deployment base may be subject to such cooperative measures at any one time. Paragraph 3 is designed to help verify that mobile SS-20 intermediate-range missiles are not covertly deployed at bases for mobile SS-25 ICBMs. Under the terms of the Treaty, SS-25 bases that were not formerly declared SS-20 bases are not subject to on-site inspection. SS-25 bases that were formerly declared SS- 20 bases will be subject to on-site inspection. The United States currently does not have bases that would be affected by this provision. ARTICLE XIII--SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION

Paragraph 1 of Article XIII provides that, in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties have established the Special Verification Commission.

At the request of either Party, the Parties will meet, within the framework of that Commission, to: (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty, and (b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article XIII provides that the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers be used by the Parties to: (a) exchange data and provide notifications (as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Article IX of the Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination); (b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of the Treaty (relating to the conversion of a missile operating base); (c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and (d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV--NO CONFLICTING OBLIGATIONS

Article XIV records the Parties' undertaking to comply with the Treaty and not to assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This provision thus reflects the duty of each Party under customary international law to comply with the Treaty (i.e. pacta sunt servanda). This provision does not impose any additional obligation on the Parties, nor does it broaden the interpretation of other obligations in the Treaty. This provision refers only to the assumption of obligations in the future, and existing agreements are therefore unaffected. Article XIV will not affect existing patterns of defense collaboration or cooperation with our Allies. Nor will this provision preclude cooperation with our Allies in modernization.

ARTICLE XV--DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL

Paragraph 1 of Article XV provides that the Treaty is of unlimited duration. The Treaty is of unlimited duration because it eliminates two entire classes of weapon-delivery systems, rather than merely place limitations on them for a specified period of time.

Paragraph 2 of Article XV contains the "supreme interests" withdrawal clause that is a standard provision in most modern arms control agreements. It establishes the right of a Party to withdraw from the Treaty if it concludes that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Withdrawal under this provision requires a six- month advance notification and a statement of the extraordinary events that the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This right of withdrawal is in addition to any other rights a Party has under customary international law regarding termination or suspension of the Treaty, including its rights in the event of a material breach of the Treaty.

ARTICLE XVI--AMENDMENTS

Article XVI provides that each Party may propose amendments to the Treaty and that any agreed amendments will enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII

governing the entry into force of the Treaty. In this regard, it should be noted that the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection provide that technical changes to those Protocols necessary to improve their viability and effectiveness shall not be considered amendments to the Treaty.

ARTICLE XVII--ENTRY INTO FORCE

Paragraph 1 of Article XVII provides that the Treaty, including the MOU and the two Protocols (which are integral parts of the Treaty), is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Paragraph 2 of Article XVII states that the Treaty will be registered with the United Nations pursuant to Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The final paragraph of the Treaty records that the Treaty was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

The Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) consists of a Preamble and seven Sections.

The MOU provides the detailed data that are required to be exchanged between the Parties pursuant to Article IX of the Treaty. It is arranged by categories, and lists the location of deployment areas, missile operating bases, and missile support facilities, as well as the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment at those locations. The MOU also lists the technical parameters of each missile system, providing information on missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment limited by the Treaty. The data that appear in the MOU reflect the intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems of the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article IX of the Treaty, the initial update of this data will occur within 30 days of the entry into force of the Treaty, and will be subject to "baseline" on-site inspections provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty. Thereafter regular updates will occur at six-month intervals. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article IX of the Treaty, a variety of other notifications will be exchanged as Treaty- regulated events occur.

The data exchange in the MOU surpasses other such exchanges in previous U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. Given its scope and detail, the data exchange reflected in the MOU is itself an achievement.

THE PREAMBLE

The Preamble states that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data, current as of November 1, 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their launchers, as well as on support structures and support equipment associated with those missiles and launchers.

SECTION I--DEFINITIONS

Section I sets forth the definitions of certain terms used in the MOU, the Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection. Section I provides definitions for the following terms: (1) missile production facility, (2) missile repair facility, (3) launcher production facility, (4) launcher repair facility, (5) test range, (6) training facility, (7) missile storage facility, (8) launcher storage facility, (9) elimination facility, (10) support equipment, (11) support structure, and (12) research and development launch site. Each of these terms represents a type of facility, structure, or site that is referred to in the MOU.

Paragraph 1 of Section I defines a "missile production facility" as a facility for the assembly or production of solid- propellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or existing types of GLCMs. Production of missiles subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, missiles subject to the Treaty or stages of such missiles may not be located at missile production facilities 30 days after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile production facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile production facilities are not subject to inspections except--in certain cases--for continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI.

Paragraph 2 of Section I defines a "missile repair facility" as a facility at which repair or maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place, other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base. This definition is necessary because missiles undergoing repair are nevertheless subject to the limitations of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile repair facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile repair facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 3 of Section I defines a "launcher production facility" as a facility for final assembly of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. This paragraph is the corollary of paragraph 1 of this Section, except that it defines production facilities for launchers rather than for missiles. Production of launchers subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, launchers may not be located at launcher production facilities 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a launcher production facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Launcher production facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 4 of Section I defines a "launcher repair facility" as a facility at which repair or maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place. The definition excludes a missile operating base in which inspection and maintenance is conducted. This paragraph is a corollary to paragraph 2 of this Section. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a missile repair facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Launcher repair facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 5 of Section I defines a "test range" as an area at which flight-testing of an intermediate-range or shorter-range missile takes place. Flight-testing of missiles subject to the Treaty is prohibited by paragraph 1 of Article VI of the Treaty. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article VIII, missiles and launchers subject to the Treaty may not be located at test ranges 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, a test range is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Test ranges are subject to "baseline," "close- out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 6 of Section I defines a "training facility" as a facility, not located in a missile operating base, at which personnel are trained in the use of intermediate-range or shorter- range missiles or launchers of such missiles and at which launchers of such missiles are located. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II, a training facility is considered to be a "missile support facility" for purposes of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII of the Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Training facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 7 of Section I defines a "missile storage facility" as a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, or stages of such missiles, are stored. The definition excludes any such facility located at a missile operating base. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, missile storage facilities are considered to be "missile support facilities." All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Missile storage facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 8 of Section I defines a "launcher storage facility" as a facility at which launchers of intermediate-range or shorter- range missiles are stored. The definition excludes any such facility located at a missile operating base. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, launcher storage facilities are considered to be "missile support facilities." All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Launcher storage facilities are subject to "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI.

Paragraph 9 of Section I defines an "elimination facility" as a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, missile stages and launchers of such missiles, or support equipment associated with such missiles or launchers are eliminated. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article II of the Treaty, elimination facilities are considered to be "missile support facilities." Moreover, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Treaty, a Party may increase the number of, or change the location of, its elimination facilities. This is allowed to assist the Parties in the elimination of items within Treaty time frames. Notice of any such change must be given 30 days in advance, pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article IX of the Treaty. All missile support facilities must be eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X. Elimination facilities are subject to "baseline" and "close-out" inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively, of Article XI. Also, former elimination facilities are subject to "short-notice" inspections pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI.

Paragraph 10 of Section I defines "support equipment" as unique vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment used to support a deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile. Full-scale inert training missiles, full-scale inert training missile stages, full-scale inert training launcher canisters, and training launchers not capable of launching a missile are also included in this definition. Paragraph 10 notes that a listing of such support equipment associated with each existing type of missile, and launcher thereof, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IV and paragraph 1 of Article V of the Treaty, support equipment must be eliminated during the same period as is set for the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter- range missiles, respectively. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article X, such equipment must be eliminated in accordance with procedures established by the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 11 of Section I defines "support structure" as a unique fixed structure used to support deployed intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles. As in paragraph 10, this paragraph notes that a listing of such support structures is contained in Section VI of the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Treaty, support structures must be eliminated during the same period as is set for the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, which is three years after the entry into force of the Treaty. Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article X of the Treaty, such structures must be eliminated in accordance with procedures established by the Protocol on Elimination.

Paragraph 12 of Section I defines a "research and development launch site" as a facility at which research and development booster systems are launched. Such booster systems are permitted by paragraph 12 of Article VII of the Treaty. Research and development launch sites are listed in Section VII of the MOU.

SECTION II--TOTAL NUMBERS OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER- RANGE MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES

Section II lists, for each Party, the total number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and the launchers of such missiles, that are subject to the Treaty. These data are required to be listed in the MOU pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IX. Paragraph 1 of Section II lists the number of intermediate- range missiles and launchers, while paragraph 2 lists the numbers of shorter-range missiles and launchers. Each paragraph contains the following categories: deployed missiles, non-deployed missiles, aggregate number of second stages of missiles, deployed launchers, non-deployed launchers, and aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers.

SECTION III--INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES, LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS

Section III provides the locations of the intermediate-range missiles, launchers, support equipment, and support structures that the Treaty requires to be destroyed. Because such items are required, unless in transit, to be located in deployment areas, at missile operating bases, or at missile support facilities, the data are organized by such areas, bases, and facilities. Not only have the Parties specified the precise geographical coordinates of such areas, bases, and facilities, but site diagrams of all missile operating bases and agreed missile support facilities have been appended to the MOU. Also, any missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit are listed in the MOU. Section III is, therefore, an example of the unprecedented scope of the data exchange required by the Treaty regime.

Paragraph 1 of Section III contains the numbers and locations, for each Party, of deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles, and the support equipment and support structures associated with such missiles and launchers. The data in paragraph 1 are listed by the deployment areas and missile operating bases at which such items are located. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base is appended to the MOU. The boundaries of deployment areas are indicated in the text of paragraph 1 by geographic coordinates, connected by straight lines or linear landmarks, including national boundaries, rivers, railroads, or highways.

The deployed intermediate-range missiles listed under paragraph 1 include, for the United States, the Pershing II GLBM and the BGM-109G GLCM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SS-20 GLBM and the SS-4 GLBM. In addition to the numbers and locations of deployed missiles and their bases, paragraph 1 contains information concerning: (a) the number of launch pad shelters, training stages, and operational spares for U.S. Pershing II GLBMs; (b) the number of operational spares, training missiles, and training launch canisters for U.S. BGM-109G GLCMs; (c) the number of launch canisters, missile transporter vehicles, training missiles, and fixed structures for launchers of Soviet SS-20 GLBMs; and (d) the number of missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, propellant tanks, and training missiles for Soviet SS-4 GLBMs.

Paragraph 2 of Section III provides information on all non- deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty. The information includes the number of such non-deployed intermediate-range missiles, the number of launchers of such missiles, and the number and types of support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. This information is listed for each missile support facility at which such non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and their associated equipment are located. The location of each missile support facility is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU.

The non-deployed intermediate-range missiles listed under paragraph 2 include, for the United States, the Pershing II GLBM and the BGM-109G GLCM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SS-20 GLBM, the SS-4 GLBM, and the SS-5 GLBM. The types of missile support facilities listed include missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, missile storage facilities, launcher storage facilities, missile repair facilities, launcher repair facilities, test ranges, training facilities, and elimination facilities. The types of missile support equipment and structures listed in paragraph 2 are specified for each Party. They include, as appropriate for each type of missile system, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, propellant tanks, training missiles, launch canisters, fixed structures for launchers, training launch canisters, launch pad shelters, and training missile stages. Paragraph 2 also lists any missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit. Paragraph 3 of Section III lists, for each Party, vehicles used to train drivers of launchers of intermediate-range missiles, and stipulates that such vehicles must be considered to be training launchers for purposes of the Treaty. The number of such vehicles is 29 for the United States and 65 for the Soviet Union. The paragraph requires that such vehicles must be eliminated in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Protocol on Elimination.

SECTION IV--SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES, LAUNCHERS OF SUCH MISSILES AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS

Section IV parallels Section III by providing comparable information with respect to deployed and non-deployed shorter-range missiles, launchers, and associated support equipment.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV provides the numbers, for each Party, of deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, of launchers of such missiles, and of the support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. This information is listed by the missile operating base at which such items are located. The location of such missile operating bases is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base is appended to the MOU. Since the United States has no deployed shorter-range missile systems, only information pertaining to Soviet missile systems, i.e., the SS-12 and SS-23, is included in paragraph 1. Support equipment listed for the SS-12 and SS-23 includes missile transporter vehicles and training missiles. Paragraph 2 of Section IV provides information on all non- deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty. The information includes the number of such non-deployed shorter-range missiles, the number of launchers of such missiles, and the number and types of support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. This information is listed for each missile support facility at which such non-deployed shorter-range missiles and their associated equipment are located. The location of each missile support facility is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, for each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU.

The non-deployed shorter-range missiles listed under paragraph 2 of Section IV include, for the United States, the Pershing IA GLBM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SS-12 GLBM and the SS-23 GLBM. The types of missile support facilities listed include missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, missile storage facilities, launcher storage facilities, missile repair facilities, launcher repair facilities, test ranges, training facilities, and elimination facilities. The kinds of support equipment listed under paragraph 2 include training missile stages, missile transporter vehicles, and training missiles. Paragraph 2 also lists missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit.

SECTION V--MISSILE SYSTEMS TESTED BUT NEVER DEPLOYED

Section V provides information on all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles that have been tested prior to the entry into force of the Treaty but never deployed and that are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty. The information includes the numbers of all such missiles and of all launchers of such missiles. This information is listed by the missile support facility at which such items are located. The location of each missile support facility is also provided. A site diagram, including boundaries and center coordinates, of each agreed missile support facility is appended to the MOU. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article X, these missiles, together with their launchers, must be eliminated within six months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Such missile systems listed under Section V include, for the United States, the Pershing IB shorter-range GLBM, and, for the Soviet Union, the SSC-X-4 intermediate-range GLCM. The types of missile support facilities listed include missile production facilities, launcher production facilities, missile storage facilities, launcher storage facilities, missile repair facilities, launcher repair facilities, test ranges, training facilities, and elimination facilities. Section V also lists missiles, launchers, or support equipment in transit.

SECTION VI--TECHNICAL DATA

Section VI provides the technical data for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, for their launchers, and for their associated support structures and support equipment. Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment listed in this Section are appended to the MOU.

Paragraph 1 of Section VI provides the relevant data for intermediate-range missile systems. Such missiles include the U.S.

Pershing II GLBM, the U.S. BGM-109G GLCM, the Soviet SS-20 GLBM, the Soviet SS-4 GLBM, the Soviet SS-5 GLBM, and the Soviet SSC-X-4 GLCM. Missile characteristics, launcher characteristics, and the characteristics of associated support structures and support equipment are provided for each missile system. The characteristics listed for each missile include: (a) the maximum number of warheads per missile, (b) the length of the missile, (c) the length of the first and second stages of the missile, (d) the maximum diameter of the first and second stages of the missile, and (e) the weight of the missile and its stages. The characteristics listed for each launcher include: (a) its dimensions, (b) the maximum number of missiles it can carry or contain, and (c) its weight. The characteristics listed for associated support structures include: (a) the dimension of fixed structures for a launcher, and (b) the dimensions of the launch pad shelter. The characteristics listed for support equipment include the dimensions of the: (a) launch canister, (b) missile transporter vehicles, (c) missile erector, and (d) propellant tank.

Paragraph 2 of Section VI provides the relevant data for shorter-range missile systems. Such missiles include the U.S.

Pershing IA GLBM, the U.S. Pershing IB GLBM, the Soviet SS-12 GLBM, and the Soviet SS-23 GLBM. Missile characteristics, launcher characteristics, and the characteristics of associated support equipment are provided for each missile system. The characteristics listed for each missile include: (a) the maximum number of warheads per missile, (b) the length of the missile, (c) the length of the first and second stages of the missile, (d) the maximum diameter of the first and second stages of the missile, and (e) the weight of the missile and its stages. The characteristics listed for each launcher include: (a) its dimensions, (b) the maximum number of missiles it can carry or contain, and (c) its weight. The characteristics listed for support equipment include the dimensions of the missile transporter vehicle.

SECTION VII--RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOOSTER SYSTEMS Section VII provides the number and location, for each Party, of launchers of research and development booster systems. Such booster systems are permitted by paragraph 12 of Article VII of the Treaty.

FINAL PROVISIONS

In the first paragraph of the Final Provisions, each Party acknowledges that, in signing the MOU, it is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data and that signing of the MOU constitutes acceptance of the categories of data and inclusion of the data contained in them.

The second paragraph affirms that the MOU is an integral part of the Treaty and that it will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

The third paragraph records that the MOU was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ELIMINATION OF THE MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol on Elimination (the Protocol) consists of a Preamble and five Sections.

The Protocol sets forth the detailed procedures for the elimination of items subject to the Treaty as required by Articles IV, V, and X of the Treaty. The Protocol is notable in that, unlike past arms control agreements, it specifies procedures for eliminating each type of missile system item-by-item (e.g., the SS- 20 GLBM), rather than establishing a single elimination procedure for an entire class of items subject to elimination (e.g., GLBMs). For example, in the case of the class of intermediate-range GLBMs, specific and separate elimination procedures are provided for the Pershing II, SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missile systems. Furthermore, in the case of the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM, for instance, specific and separate procedures are set forth for elimination of the SS-20 missile, its launch canister, its launcher, its missile transporter vehicle, and the fixed structure for its launcher. Each item is required to be eliminated in a specified manner that will help to ensure that it can never again serve the purposes for which it was originally intended.

PREAMBLE

In the Preamble, the Parties state that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, they have agreed upon procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty.

SECTION I--ITEMS OF MISSILE SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO ELIMINATION

Section I lists the specific items for each type of missile system that must be eliminated.

For the United States, the specific items for each missile system to be eliminated are: for the Pershing II intermediate- range GLBM: missile, launcher, and launch pad shelter; for the BGM-109G intermediate-range GLCM: missile, launch canister, and launcher; for the Pershing IA shorter-range GLBM: missile and launcher; and, for the Pershing IB shorter-range GLBM: missile.

For the Soviet Union, the specific items of each missile system to be eliminated are: for the SS-20 intermediate-range GLBM: missile, launch canister, launcher, missile transporter vehicle, and fixed structure for a launcher; for the SS-4 intermediate-range GLBM: missile, missile transporter vehicle, missile erector, launch stand, and propellant tanks; for the SS-5 intermediate-range GLBM: missile; for the SSC-X-4 intermediate- range GLCM: missile, launch canister, and launcher; for the SS-12 shorter-range GLBM: missile, launcher, and missile transporter vehicle; and, for the SS-23 shorter-range GLBM: missile, launcher, and missile transporter vehicle.

Also, for both Parties, all training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers, as well as all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs and all front sections of deployed intermediate-range and shorter- range missiles, must be eliminated.

SECTION II--PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION AT ELIMINATION FACILITIES

This Section, which forms the bulk of the Protocol, establishes the detailed procedures to be followed in eliminating systems at elimination facilities. Subsequent Sections provide for elimination at other locations.

Paragraph 1 of Section II introduces the next several paragraphs of this Section, which establish procedures that the Parties must fulfill in order to ensure reliable determination of the type and number of items being eliminated and to preclude the possibility that such items could be restored for purposes that would violate the Treaty. These items, which are listed in Section I, include missiles, missile stages, front sections of missiles, launch canisters, launchers, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, and launch stands, as well as training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers. Paragraph 2 of Section II provides for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures for the items listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, except for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers.

Such on-site inspections must be conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. With respect to the excepted items related to training, the Parties may conduct on-site inspections to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures described in paragraph 11 of Section II. Not less than 30 days in advance of such an inspection, the Party possessing the training items must provide the other Party with the name and geographic coordinates of the elimination facility at which such an on-site inspection may be conducted and the date on which the inspection may take place.

Paragraph 3 of Section II states that before a missile arrives at the elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed. Nuclear warhead devices and guidance elements are not required to be eliminated because destroying them would be meaningless unless the manufacture of new such items was also prohibited. Also, since warheads are small, verifying compliance with such a prohibition would be extremely difficult. Furthermore, the retention of the fissionable material from the warheads conserves resources necessary to U.S. national security.

Paragraph 4 of Section II gives each Party the right to select the technological means to implement the elimination procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section, and to allow for on-site inspection of those elimination procedures in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol, and the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 5 of Section II provides that the commencement of the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Section will signal the initiation of the elimination of the items of the missile systems.

Paragraph 6 of Section II provides that immediately before the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector, from the Party receiving a notification required by subparagraph 5(c) of Article IX of the Treaty concerning scheduled eliminations, must confirm and record the numbers and the types of missile systems that are to be eliminated. This can include a visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters, if the Inspecting Party deems it necessary.

Paragraph 7 of Section II requires that a missile stage that is being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section must not have instruments for data collection. An inspector must confirm this lack of instrumentation through an inspection before the elimination procedures are set in motion. Continuous observation by the inspector of such missile stages is required until the burning is completed.

Paragraph 8 of Section II requires that the completion of elimination procedures must be confirmed in writing by both the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and the inspection team leader of the other Party. Such a report must include the number and type of items of missile systems for which the procedures have been completed. However, in the case of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers, paragraph 8 stipulates that elimination will be considered completed upon completion of the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section and upon notification as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty; thus, no report is required after the elimination of such training equipment.

Paragraph 9 of Section II records the agreement of the Parties that all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, along with their associated reentry vehicles, must be eliminated not later than 15 days before the end of the overall period of elimination for all such missiles. As specified in Article IV and V of the Treaty, all such missiles shall be eliminated by the end of three years after entry into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 9 also requires that, during the last 15 days of the overall (i.e., three-year) elimination period, a Party must withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles that, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation, and eliminate them during the same time frame.

On August 26, 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would dismantle its Pershing IA missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the Parties to the Treaty. Following the Federal Republic's unilateral decision, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they will eliminate their intermediate-range missiles by 15 days prior to the end of the three-year elimination period specified by the Treaty. At that point, the conditions established by the Federal Republic will have been met, and the existing program of cooperation will have therefore ceased. The U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the Federal Republic's Pershing IA missiles will then be withdrawn and returned to U.S.

territory. The United States will eliminate them in accordance with the Protocol on Elimination. The Treaty and its associated documents will not affect existing programs of cooperation. The important U.S. principle, that systems belonging to third countries will not be subject to bilateral arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, has thus been preserved.

Paragraph 10 of Section II sets forth the specific procedures that must be used to eliminate the items of missile systems listed in Paragraph 1 of this Section, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result. This paragraph addresses all items of missile systems except those related to training, which are addressed in paragraph 11 of this Section. The elimination procedures for specific missile systems set forth in paragraph 10 are as follows: For the U.S. Pershing II GLBM, the elimination procedures provide for destruction of missile stages by demolition or burning. Solid fuel, rocket nozzles, and motor cases not already destroyed in that process must be eliminated by burning, crushing, flattening, or destruction by explosion. Destruction by burning includes static firing of a missile stage, which results in the burning of the fuel, followed by crushing or flattening of the remainder of the stage; this is the method most frequently used in the past by the United States to destroy missiles. The front section of the missile, without the nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, must be crushed or flattened. The procedures for elimination of the Pershing II launchers include the removal of the erector-launcher mechanism from the launcher chassis; cutting all components of erector-launcher mechanisms, at places that are not assembly joints, into two pieces of approximately equal size; removal of missile launch support equipment from the launcher chassis; and cutting the launcher chassis, at a place that is not an assembly joint, into two pieces of approximately equal size. The procedures require the cutting of certain items at places that are not assembly joints in order to make it substantially more difficult to reassemble them.

For the U.S. BGM-109G GLCM, the elimination procedures require that the missile airframe be cut longitudinally into two pieces and that the wings and tail section be severed from the airframe at locations other than assembly joints. The front section of the airframe must be crushed or flattened after removal of the nuclear warhead device and guidance elements. The BGM-109G launch canister must also be destroyed, by crushing, flattening, cutting into two pieces of approximately equal size, or explosion. Elimination procedures for the BGM-109G launcher parallel those for the Pershing II launcher described above.

The elimination procedures for the U.S. Pershing IA missile and launcher are identical to those for the Pershing II missile and launcher described above.

The elimination procedures for the U.S. Pershing IB missile are identical to those for the Pershing II missile described above.

For the Soviet SS-20 missile, the elimination procedures are similar to those described above for the U.S. Pershing II missile, with the exception that the front end of the missile, along with its reentry vehicles, must be crushed or flattened. The elimination procedures for the SS-20 launch canister require that it either be destroyed by explosive demolition along with the missile or be destroyed separately from the missile by explosion, cutting into two pieces of approximately equal size, crushing, or flattening. The elimination procedures for the SS-20 launcher do not require that the launcher chassis be cut into two approximately equal pieces (as the United States proposed for its Pershing II and GLCM launchers), but contain other procedures for rendering it inoperable as a launcher. Finally, the elimination procedures for the SS-20 missile transporter vehicle require that: (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting be removed; (b) all mounting of such mechanisms be cut off the missile transporter vehicle chassis; (c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting be cut into equal pieces at places that are not assembly joints; (d) external instrumentation compartments be removed from the transporter vehicle chassis; (e) transporter vehicle leveling support be cut off the transporter vehicle chassis and be cut, at locations that are not assembly joints, into two pieces of approximately equal size; and (f) a portion of the SS-20 transporter vehicle chassis at least 0.78 meters in length must be cut off from behind its rear axle.

For the Soviet SS-4 missile, the elimination procedures provide for cutting off propulsion system nozzles; cutting propellant tanks into two pieces of about the same size; cutting instrumentation compartments (after the guidance elements have been removed) into two pieces of about the same size; and destroying the front section of the missile, without the warhead device, by crushing or flattening. The elimination procedures require that the SS-4 launch stand components be cut, at locations that are not assembly joints, into two pieces of approximately equal size. Regarding the SS-4 missile erector, the elimination procedures require that the missile erector jib and missile erector leveling supports be cut into two approximately equal pieces and that they, along with the missile erector mechanism, also be cut off of the missile erector at locations that are not assembly joints. Regarding the SS-4 missile transporter vehicle, the procedures require that the mounting components for a missile and a missile erector mechanism, as well as the supports for erecting a missile onto a launcher, be cut off from the missile transporter vehicle at locations that are not assembly joints.

For the Soviet SS-5 missile, the elimination procedures are similar to those described above for the SS-4 missile, except that the front end of the SS-5 missile is not required to be crushed or flattened.

For the Soviet SSC-X-4 GLCM missile, launch canister, and launcher, the elimination procedures are the same as for the U.S.

BGM-109G GLCM, except that the SSC-X-4 launcher chassis must be severed at a point no more that 0.70 meters behind the rear axle, mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports must be cut off the launcher chassis, and launcher leveling supports must be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size at locations that are not assembly joints.

For the Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missiles, launchers, and missile transporter vehicles, the elimination procedures parallel those for the SS-20, except that the front sections of the SS-12 and SS-23 missiles do not include reentry vehicles, and destruction of their front sections may be done by explosive demolition together with the missile. Also, for the SS-23, the control equipment of the mechanism associated with missile loading must be removed from the transporter vehicle.

Paragraph 11 of Section II provides specific procedures for the elimination of the training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers listed in Section I. All of these items, except for training launchers, must be eliminated by crushing, flattening, cutting into two pieces of about equal size, or destroying by explosion. The procedures require training launchers to be eliminated by cutting the chassis of the training launcher at the same location specified in paragraph 10 above for the launcher of the same type of missile.

SECTION III--ELIMINATION OF MISSILES BY LAUNCHING

Section III sets forth the procedures by which intermediate- range missiles may be eliminated by means of launching them in order to destroy them. In this regard, paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty gives each Party the right to eliminate up to 100 of its intermediate-range missiles in this manner during the first six months after entry into force of the Treaty. Note, however, that subparagraph 1(a) of Article VI of the Treaty prohibits the flight- testing of intermediate-range missiles. The purpose of Section III is to provide procedures that permit elimination by launching, while ensuring that such elimination will not be used effectively as a flight-test, which would provide the launching Party with militarily useful data. Shorter-range missiles may not be eliminated by launching.

Paragraph 1 of Section III provides that the elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching is subject to on- site inspection in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty (which provides for "elimination" inspections) and Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection. Paragraph 1 requires that, immediately prior to each launch conducted for the purpose of elimination, an inspector from the Inspecting Party will confirm by visual observation the type of missile to be launched.

Paragraph 2 of Section III requires that all missiles being eliminated by launching be launched from designated elimination facilities to existing impact areas for such missiles. No such missile may be used as a target for ballistic missile interceptors.

Paragraph 3 of Section III provides that missiles being eliminated by launching must be launched one at a time with at least six hours between each launch.

Paragraph 4 of Section III requires that launches must involve ignition of all missile stages. Also, neither Party is permitted to transmit or recover data from missiles being eliminated by launching, except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes.

Paragraph 5 of Section III provides that the completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, and the type and number of missiles for which those procedures have been completed, must be confirmed in writing by the representative of the launching Party and by the inspection team leader of the Inspecting Party. Paragraph 6 of Section III provides that a missile is considered eliminated by launching: (1) after completion of the procedures set forth in this Section and (2) upon notification required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

SECTION IV--PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION IN SITU

Certain of the items that must be eliminated pursuant to the Treaty are structures that cannot be moved to elimination facilities, or training items that are not required to be moved to elimination facilities. Accordingly, Section IV provides procedures for the elimination, in situ, of support structures, propellant tanks of Soviet SS-4 missiles, and certain training items.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV provides the procedures for the elimination of support structures. Support structures are associated only with intermediate-range missile systems; shorter- range missile systems do not possess such structures. Subparagraph 8(a) of Article II provides that support structures are located at missile operating bases of intermediate-range missiles.

Subparagraph 1(a) of Section IV states that the support structures listed in Section I of this Protocol must be eliminated in situ, i.e., at the sites at which they are presently located.

Subparagraph 1(b) provides that the initiation of the elimination of support structures will be considered to be the commencement of the elimination procedures specified in subparagraph 1(d) below.

Subparagraph 1(c) provides that the elimination of support structures is subject to verification by on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article XI provides for "close-out" inspections at missile operating bases in order to confirm that the elimination has, in fact, occurred. The procedures for "close-out" inspections are set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Subparagraph 1(d) specifies the elimination procedures for support structures. The procedures are as follows:

• the superstructure of the fixed structure or shelter must be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation;
• the base or foundation of the fixed structure or shelter must be destroyed by excavation or by explosion; and
• the destroyed base or foundation of a fixed structure or shelter must remain visible to national technical means of verification for six months or until completion of an on-site inspection conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty.

Upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination procedures will be considered to have been completed.

Paragraph 2 of Section IV requires that the fixed and transportable propellant tanks of the Soviet SS-4 intermediate- range GLBM be removed from launch sites.

Paragraph 3 of Section IV specifies the procedures for the elimination, in situ, of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters, and training launchers.

Subparagraph 3(a) requires that such training equipment that was not eliminated at elimination facilities must be eliminated in situ.

Subparagraph 3(b) requires that such training equipment being eliminated in situ must be eliminated in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Section II of the Protocol. Subparagraph 3(c) provides each Party with the right to conduct an on-site inspection to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures.

Subparagraph 3(d) requires that a Party possessing such training equipment must inform the other Party of the place-name, and coordinates of the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in subparagraph 3(c) above may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information must be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the date of the scheduled on-site inspection.

Subparagraph 3(e) provides that elimination of such training equipment will be considered accomplished upon completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and upon notification as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to subparagraph 3(d) above.

SECTION V--OTHER TYPES OF ELIMINATION

Section V provides for elimination due to loss or accidental destruction, and for elimination by placing items on static display.

Paragraph 1 of Section V provides procedures in the case of elimination resulting from loss or accidental destruction of an item listed in Section I of the Protocol. Notice of such elimination must be given by the possessing Party within 48 hours as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty. Such notice must include a statement of the relevant circumstances surrounding the loss or accident, including its approximate or assumed location and the name or type of item that was eliminated by such loss or accidental destruction. In order to provide confidence that the elimination actually occurred, the other Party has a right to conduct an inspection at the specific site of the accident.

Paragraph 2 of Section V provides the Parties with the right to eliminate certain items that are listed in Section I of the Protocol by placing them on static display. The items that may be eliminated by this procedure are missiles, launch canisters, launchers, training missiles, training launch canisters, and training launchers. Each Party may eliminate a total of 15 missiles, 15 launch canisters, and 15 launchers by placing them on static display. The totals for each of the three categories include both operational and training items. The procedures require that, before being placed on static display, the items be rendered unusable for any purpose inconsistent with the Treaty. Missile propellant must be removed, and erector-launcher mechanisms must be made inoperative. For purposes of verification, the other Party has the right to conduct an on-site inspection of the item or items to be placed on static display within 60 days of receipt of notification by the possessing Party. Such notification is required by paragraph 2, and this notification must include: (a) the place-name and coordinates of the location at which the missile, launch canister, or launcher is to be on static display, and (b) the location at which the on-site inspection may take place. After all of the above procedures have been completed and notification has been given as required by subparagraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, elimination of a missile, launcher, launch canister, training missile, training launch canister, or training launcher by placing it on static display will be deemed to be completed.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The penultimate paragraph of the Protocol specifies that the Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty, that it will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and that it will remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. The paragraph also provides that the Parties may agree upon measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol, through the Special Verification Commission established pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty. Such measures will not be deemed to be amendments to the Treaty. Thus, while substantive obligations cannot be changed absent an agreed amendment to the Treaty, minor matters relating to the detailed elimination procedures may be altered through agreement of the Parties in order to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty regime.

The final paragraph records that the Protocol was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol on Inspection (the Protocol) consists of a Preamble, 11 Sections, and an Annex on privileges and immunities of inspectors and aircrew members.

The Protocol provides the detailed procedures to implement the Treaty's on-site inspection regime, as required by Article XI of the Treaty. These on-site inspection procedures, unprecedented in scope and detail, will work with our national technical means of verification and with the data exchanges required by Article IX of the Treaty to help provide effective verification of Soviet compliance with the Treaty limitations.

PREAMBLE

The Preamble states that, pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty, the Parties have agreed upon procedures governing the conduct of inspections provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

SECTION I--DEFINITIONS

Section I sets forth the definitions of certain terms used in the Protocol, the Treaty, the MOU, and the Protocol on Elimination. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) Inspected Party, (2) Inspecting Party, (3) inspector, (4) inspection team, (5) inspection site, (6) period of inspection, (7) point of entry, (8) in-country period, (9) in-country escort, and (10) aircrew member.

Paragraph 1 of Section I defines the "Inspected Party" as the Party to the Treaty whose sites are subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty. Note that this refers to a "Party," meaning either the United States or the Soviet Union. When an inspection takes place on the territory of a Basing Country, as defined in paragraph 15 of Article II of the Treaty, either the United States or the Soviet Union, as appropriate, will be the "Inspected Party." Paragraph 2 of Section I defines the "Inspecting Party" as the Party carrying out the inspection. As in the case of paragraph 1, the "Inspecting Party" will be either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 3 of Section I defines an "inspector" as an individual who is designated by a Party to carry out inspections and who is included on the Party's list of inspectors, prepared in accordance with the provisions of Section III of the Protocol. Section III sets forth the detailed procedures for designation and acceptance of inspectors. Inspectors are granted privileges and immunities pursuant to the Annex to the Protocol.

Paragraph 4 of Section I defines an "inspection team" as a group of inspectors assigned to carry out a particular inspection. Each person on an "inspection team" is an "inspector." Paragraph 15 of Section VI establishes the number of inspectors per team.

Paragraph 5 of Section I defines an "inspection site" as the area, location, or facility at which an inspection takes place. Site diagrams of missile operating bases and agreed missile support facilities are appended to the MOU.

Paragraph 6 of Section I defines a "period of inspection" as the time from the arrival of the team at the site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of any pre-inspection and post-inspection procedures. Paragraph 14 of Section VI establishes the time limits for certain types of inspections as well as for pre-inspection and post-inspection procedures.

Paragraph 7 of Section I designates the "points of entry": for the United States as Washington, D.C. or San Francisco, California; for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Moscow or Irkutsk; for the Kingdom of Belgium as Brussels (National Airport); for the Federal Republic of Germany as Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase); for the Republic of Italy as Rome (Ciampino); for the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Schiphol; for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as RAF Greenham Common; for the German Democratic Republic as Schkeuditz Airport; and for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as International Airport Ruzyne. Paragraph 5 of Section IV establishes procedures to be followed if these points of entry are to be changed.

Paragraph 8 of Section I defines "in-country period" as the period of time that the inspection team is in the country from the arrival at the point of entry until departure from the country through the point of entry.

Paragraph 9 of Section I defines an "in-country escort" as individuals specified by the Inspected Party to accompany and assist inspection team and aircrew members throughout the in- country period. Paragraph I of Section V and paragraph 5 of Section VI provide detailed procedures concerning the in-country escort. When an inspection takes place in a Basing Country, that country will have the right to representation in the in-country escort.

Paragraph 10 of Section I defines an "aircrew member" as an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on a Party's list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of the Protocol.

Aircrew members are granted privileges and immunities pursuant to the Annex to the Protocol. SECTION II--GENERAL OBLIGATIONS

This section sets forth the basic obligation to facilitate inspections conducted pursuant to the Protocol on Inspection and the Treaty. It also notes that there are other agreements (e.g., the Basing Country Agreement between the United States and the five Allied Basing Countries) pertinent to the conduct of these inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Section II obliges each Party to help ensure verification of compliance with the obligations of the Treaty by facilitating inspections.

Paragraph 2 of Section II states that each Party takes note of the assurances received from the other party regarding understandings reached between the other Party and the Basing Countries to the effect that the Basing Countries have agreed to the conduct of inspections pursuant to the Protocol on their respective territories. The Basing Country agreement provides the legal basis for these assurances by the United States. The five Allied Basing Countries are the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands. The German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia are the two Basing Countries in which Soviet missile systems subject to the Treaty are located.

SECTION III--PRE-INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS

This section sets forth the actions that must take place before inspections may be conducted. Inasmuch as these actions are required within specified periods of time, a Party would be in violation of the Treaty if the Party delayed an inspection by not completing pre-inspection requirements.

Paragraph 1 of Section III provides that inspections are to be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section III.

Paragraph 2 of Section III provides that, within one day after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party will provide the other Party with a list of aircrew members; a list of inspectors to carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article XI; and a list of proposed inspectors to carry out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. No list may include more than 200 individuals.

Paragraph 3 of Section III requires each Party to review the other Party's lists of aircrew members and inspectors; inspectors must be citizens of the Party on whose list they appear. If an inspector proposed for conducting inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty is unacceptable to a Party, that Party has 20 days from the time it receives the proposed list to object to the inclusion of that person on the list, in which case the individual must be deleted from the list. Each Party must inform the other Party of its agreement to the lists of aircrew members and inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty within 20 days of such receipt. While there is no initial right of refusal for aircrew members, or for inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, paragraph 7 of Section III enables a Party to remove under certain conditions, an inspector or aircrew member from the other Party's list before that person ever engages in inspection activities.

Paragraph 4 of Section III provides that each Party has the right to amend its list of inspectors and aircrew members in the same manner as the initial designation. The other Party must respond to the amendments in the same manner as provided for with respect to initial designations in paragraph 3 of Section III.

Paragraph 5 of Section III provides that, within 30 days of receipt of the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members, or of subsequent changes to such lists, the Party receiving such information must provide or ensure the provision of visas and other documents necessary to enable each inspector and aircrew member to enter and remain in the territory of the Party or Basing Country where an inspection site is located for the in-country period. Thus, the United States or the Soviet Union, as appropriate, will ensure that visas and other necessary documents will be provided for inspections in Basing Countries. Visas and documents will be valid for at least 24 months.

Paragraph 6 of Section III provides that inspectors and aircrew members will be accorded privileges and immunities in the country of the inspection site, throughout the in-country period, as set forth in the Annex on privileges and immunities. Thus, these privileges and immunities will apply to all inspections, including those in the Basing Countries.

Paragraph 7 of Section III provides that inspectors and aircrew members must respect the laws and regulations of the State on whose territory the inspection is carried out and must not interfere in the internal affairs of the State. It further provides that, if the Inspected Party determines that an inspector or aircrew member has violated the conditions governing inspection activities, has ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the Inspected Party or a Basing Country, or has ever been expelled by an Inspected Party or a Basing Country, the Inspected Party making such a determination will notify the Inspecting Party, who must immediately delete the individual's name from the list of inspectors or aircrew members and at the same time remove that individual from the territory of the Inspected Party or Basing Country, if such individual is there at that time.

Paragraph 8 of Section III provides that each Party will, within 30 days of entry into force of the Treaty, inform the other Party of the standing diplomatic clearance number for the airplanes of the Party transporting inspectors and equipment into and out of the territory of the Party or Basing Country in which an inspection site is located. Aircraft routings are to be long established international airways agreed upon by the Parties.

SECTION IV--NOTIFICATIONS

Section IV contains detailed provisions concerning the notification that must be given prior to arrival at the inspection site and the specification of the type of inspection that the inspecting Party is planning to conduct.

Paragraph 1 of Section IV provides that notification of an intention to conduct an inspection will be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and that receipt of such a notification will be acknowledged through those centers by the Inspected Party within one hour of its receipt. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers were established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, dated September 15, 1987. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., a "baseline," "Close-out," or "short-notice" inspection, respectively), such notification will be made no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, and shall include: the point of entry, date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; date and time when specification of the inspection site will be provided; and the names of inspectors and aircrew members. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., an "elimination" inspection), such notification will be made no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and will include: the point of entry, date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry; the site to be inspected and the type of inspection; and the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

Paragraph 2 of Section IV states that the date and time of the specification of the inspection site for "close-out" and "short- notice" inspections will be neither less than four hours nor more than 24 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry. In the case of the "baseline" inspections, the date and time of the specification of the inspection site shall be neither less than four nor more than 48 hours after the estimated date and time of arrival at the point of entry.

Paragraph 3 of Section IV provides for the transmittal by the Inspecting Party to the Inspected Party, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, of a flight plan from the last departure airfield outside the country in which the inspection site is located to the point of entry. The plan must be provided not less than six hours before scheduled departure from the last departure airfield, must contain specified information, and must be filed in accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) procedures applicable to civil aircraft.

Paragraph 4 of Section IV provides for approval of the flight plan described in paragraph 3 not less than three hours prior to the scheduled departure from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection is to take place. This is necessary to ensure that the inspection team arrives on time at the point of entry.

Paragraph 5 of Section IV allows the Parties to change the points of entry set forth in Section II of the Protocol for the countries in which their deployment areas, missile operating bases, or missile support facilities are located by notifying the other Party. Such changes become effective five months after receipt of such notice.

SECTION V--ACTIVITIES BEGINNING UPON ARRIVAL AT THE POINT OF ENTRY

Section V contains detailed provisions regulating activities at the point of entry to facilitate the entry of inspectors and their equipment into the country where the inspection will take place.

Paragraph 1 of Section V provides that the in-country escort and a diplomatic aircrew escort will meet the inspection team and aircrew members at the point of entry on arrival. The number of aircrew members for each airplane may not exceed ten. The in- country escort will expedite the entry of the inspection team and aircrew members, as well as the entry of their baggage, equipment, and supplies, into the country in which the inspection is to take place. The diplomatic aircrew escort will have the right to accompany and assist aircrew members throughout the in-country period. In-country escorts in a Basing Country may include representatives of that Basing Country.

Paragraph 2 of Section V provides that an inspector will be considered to have begun his duties at the point of entry and to have ended his duties when he has left the territory of the Inspected Party or Basing Country. Pursuant to the Annex on privileges and immunities, the inspector's privileges and immunities apply during this entire period, and thereafter with respect to acts performed in the exercise of his official functions during that period.

Paragraph 3 of Section V requires each Party to ensure that the equipment and supplies necessary for inspection are exempt from all customs duties. However, such equipment will be subject to examination pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section V.

Paragraph 4 of Section V provides that the equipment and supplies the Inspecting Party brings into the country in which the inspection site is located are subject to examination at the point of entry each time they are brought in. This examination will be conducted by the in-country escort in the presence of the inspection team members before departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site. It shall be for the purpose of ascertaining that any such equipment or supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. Equipment or supplies found unacceptable to the Inspected Party will be impounded at the point of entry until departure of the inspection team. Storage of the Inspecting Party's equipment and supplies at each point of entry will be within tamper-proof containers in a "dual-key" secure facility.

Paragraph 5 of Section V requires the Inspected Party to furnish inspection teams and aircrews with meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and necessary medical care during the in- country period. While the Inspected Party furnishes or provides for such services for inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, all costs connected with their stay will be borne by the Inspecting Party.

Paragraph 6 of Section V requires the Inspected Party to provide, at the point of entry, parking, security protection, servicing, and fuel for the aircraft of the Inspecting Party. The fuel and servicing shall be at the Inspecting Party's expense.

Paragraph 7 of Section V states that, for inspections on the territory of a Party, the point of entry used must be that which is closest to the inspection site. The inspection team leader for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty will inform the in-country escort at the point of entry of the type of inspection and the inspection site no later than the time specified according to subparagraph 1(a) of Section IV of the Protocol.

SECTION VI--GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS

The general rules governing the conduct of inspections are set forth in Section VI. These rules are diverse, governing what inspectors may and may not do, what may be brought into a country where an inspection is to take place, and include safety procedures and procedures for the completion of an inspection.

Paragraph 1 of Section VI states that inspectors will discharge their functions in accordance with the Protocol.

Paragraph 2 of Section VI forbids inspectors to disclose information they receive during an inspection except as authorized by the Inspecting Party. It also states that this obligation applies even after their assignment as inspectors has ended.

Paragraph 3 of Section VI requires inspectors not to interfere directly with any ongoing activities at the inspection site and to avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of the facility or taking actions affecting its safety. While inspectors may, as required to conduct the inspection, request their escorts to undertake actions that would interfere with normal activities at a site, this provision is designed to prevent inspectors from undertaking such actions themselves.

Paragraph 4 of Section VI requires that inspections be conducted in accordance with the objectives set forth in Article XI of the Treaty as applicable for the type of inspection specified.

Thus, if a Party specifies that it is going to conduct a particular type of inspection (e.g., a "close-out" inspection), it must then conduct the inspection in accordance with the objectives specified in Article XI for that type of inspection.

Paragraph 5 of Section VI states that the in-country escort has the right to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members during the in-country period. Movement and travel of inspectors and aircrew members will be at the discretion of the in- country escort, except as otherwise provided in the Protocol.

Paragraph 6 of Section VI states that inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty may, with the permission of the in-country escort, undertake local leisure travel within 50 kilometers of the inspection site. The distance of 50 kilometers is calculated on the basis of a 50 kilometer radius extending from the inspection site. At the discretion of the Inspected Party, such inspectors undertaking local leisure travel may be accompanied by the in-country escort.

Paragraph 7 of Section VI ensures the right of inspectors to be in communication by telephone with their embassy within the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located, using the telephone communications provided by the Inspected Party.

Paragraph 8 of Section VI states that representatives of the inspected facility will be included among the in-country escort at the inspection site.

Paragraph 9 of Section VI provides that inspectors may bring to the inspection site documents, linear measurement devices, cameras, portable weighing devices, radiation detection devices, and other equipment that has been agreed upon. The characteristics and method of use of this equipment will be agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5(a), 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors may use any of the above listed equipment, other than cameras which will be operated only by the Inspected Party upon the request of the Inspecting Party. Upon the request of inspectors, the in-country escort will take duplicate, instant development photographs of inspected facilities with the Inspecting Party's cameras. Each Party will then receive one copy of every photograph. Thus, for all inspections, cameras will be operated only by the Inspected Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all measurements, including photographs, will be made by the Inspected Party at the Inspecting Party's request.

Paragraph 10 of Section VI provides that, for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors will permit the in-country escort to observe the equipment used during the inspection.

Paragraph 11 of Section VI provides that the measurements recorded during inspections must be certified by a member of the inspection team and a member of the in-country escort at the time of measurement. Such certified data will be included in the inspection report. Thus, measurements taken by either Party shall be observed by the other Party in order to certify the accuracy of that information.

Paragraph 12 of Section VI provides that inspectors may request (through the in-country escort) clarifications of ambiguities arising during an inspection. The in-country escort will provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarification as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. In the event questions about buildings or objects remain, the Inspected Party will photograph the object or building as requested by the Inspecting Party. If questions still remain, a description of them, any clarification provided, and a copy of any photographs taken will be included in the inspection report. Unresolved issues may be discussed within the framework of the Special Verification Commission established by Article XIII of the Treaty.

Paragraph 13 of Section VI requires inspectors to observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, including regulations relating to the protection of controlled environments within a facility and regulations relating to personal safety. The Inspected Party is required to provide any protective gear that is needed.

Paragraph 14 of Section VI provides that, for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, all pre-inspection procedures must be completed within one hour of arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site. Thus, this provision applies to all inspections except for continuous portal monitoring activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. Inspections are to begin immediately upon completion of pre-inspection procedures and may not exceed 24 hours except for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 6, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The 24-hour limit may be extended for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, with the agreement of the in-country escort, by no more than eight hours. Post-inspection procedures, including completion of the inspection report, are to be completed at the site within four hours after completion of the inspection.

Paragraph 15 of Section VI limits the number of inspectors on inspection teams. Inspection teams may include no more than ten inspectors, except for an inspection team carrying out an "elimination" inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, which may include no more than 20 inspectors, and except for inspection teams conducting inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, which may include no more than 30 inspectors. At least two inspectors on each team must speak the language of the Inspected Party. An inspection team will operate under the direction of a team leader and a deputy team leader. At the inspection site, the inspection team may divide itself into subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each, and only one inspection team will be allowed at a particular site at any one time.

Paragraph 16 of Section VI provides that, except in the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, an inspection team will, upon completion of post-inspection procedures, return promptly to the point of entry from which it commenced inspection activities, and then leave the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located within 24 hours. A party may conduct sequential "baseline," "close-out," and "elimination" inspections with the same inspection team. In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, if the inspection team intends to conduct another inspection it will notify the Inspected Party of its intent either upon return to the point of entry (using the procedures specified in paragraph 7 of Section V and paragraph 1 and 2 of Section VII of the Protocol) or upon completion of post-inspection procedures at the previous inspection site. The Inspecting Party will be transported to the new inspection site by the Inspected Party, without unjustified delay, by means and routes chosen by the Inspected Party.

SECTION VII--INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 3, 4 OR 5 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section VII sets forth the detailed procedures for "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, respectively, of Article XI of the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Section VII provides for the Inspected Party to implement pre-inspection movement restrictions at the inspection site within one hour of specification of the inspection site by the Inspecting Party. During this period of restrictions, no missile, stage of a missile, launcher, or support equipment subject to the Treaty may be removed from the site.

Paragraph 2 of Section VII provides that the Inspected Party will transport the inspection team from the point of entry so as to ensure the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site within nine hours of specification of the site to be inspected.

Paragraph 3 of Section VII provides that, for inspections in Basing Countries, the aircrew of the Inspected Party may include representatives of the Basing Country.

Paragraph 4 of Section VII provides that neither Party may conduct more than one "short-notice" inspection pursuant to subparagraph 5(a) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, more than one "short-notice" inspection pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, or more than ten "baseline" inspections pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time.

Paragraph 5 of Section VII provides that the boundaries of inspection sites will be the boundaries set forth in the MOU.

Paragraph 6 of Section VII provides that, in the case of a "baseline" inspection or "short-notice" inspection of a declared facility, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site the in-country escort will inform the inspection team leader of the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment subject to the Treaty at the inspection site and provide a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of such items.

Paragraph 7 of Section VII provides that the inspection team may, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8 through 14 of Section VII, inspect the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers, and vehicles with dimensions equal to or greater than the dimensions specified in Section VI of the MOU for the missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party.

Paragraph 8 of Section VII sets forth the procedures for physical on-site inspections: (i) external visual observation only (including measurement of dimensions) of missiles, stages of such missiles, or launchers subject to the Treaty, and of containers that the Inspected Party declares to contain a missile or stage of such missile of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty and that are not large enough to contain more than one such missile or missile stage of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty; (ii) inspection only by weighing or visual observation of a container's interior, for containers large enough to contain missiles or stages of such missiles subject to the Treaty that the Inspected Party declares do not contain a missile or missile stage of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty (except as provided in subparagraph (iii) below, or during "short-notice" inspections of formerly declared facilities); (iii) external inspection only (including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation, and linear measurements of the dimensions of the canister) of launch canisters associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty and declared by the Inspected Party to contain such a missile.

Paragraph 9 of Section VII provides that structures or containers not large enough to contain a missile, stage of such missile, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty are subject to external visual inspection only (including measurement of dimensions) to confirm that they are not large enough to contain a missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty.

Paragraph 10 of Section VII states that if the Inspected Party satisfies an inspection team that an interior space within a structure is not accessible by the smallest missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty, that space may not be inspected further. Moreover, if an inspector can ascertain by means of visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrances that the space does not contain any missiles, missile stages, or launchers of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty, that space may not be inspected further.

Paragraph 11 of Section VII provides that an inspection team may patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and may station inspectors at the exits for the duration of the inspection.

Paragraph 12 of Section VII provides that the inspection team may, during inspections, inspect any vehicles capable of carrying missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty and that no such vehicle will leave the site during the inspection until it has been inspected.

Paragraph 13 of Section VII provides that, prior to inspection of a building, the inspection team may station subgroups at the exits that are large enough to permit passage of missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty. During the period of the building inspection, no vehicles or objects capable of containing missiles, missile stages, launchers, or support equipment of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty may leave the building until inspected.

Paragraph 14 of Section VII provides that during a "short- notice" inspection of a formerly declared facility conducted pursuant to subparagraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it will be the responsibility of the Inspected Party to demonstrate that a shrouded or environmentally protected item that is equal to or larger in size than the smallest missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty is not, in fact, such an item. This may be accomplished by partial removal of a shroud or environmental protection cover, by measuring or weighing the covered item, or by other methods. There may be no further inspection of the object if the Inspected Party satisfies the inspection team that the object is not a missile, missile stage, or launcher of the Inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If the container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty (and so declared by the Inspected Party), it is subject to external inspection only (including the use of radiation detection devices, visual observation, and linear measurement).

SECTION VIII--INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 7 OR 8 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section VIII provides detailed procedures for inspections of elimination of missiles, launchers, and support equipment subject to the Treaty. The precise actions that must be undertaken in order to accomplish such elimination are set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. As required by paragraph 7 of Article XI, inspectors are required to be present during the process of elimination.

Paragraph 1 of Section VIII states that inspections of the elimination process carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty will be conducted according to procedures in this paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination.

Subparagraph 1(a) states that inspectors will be provided with a schedule of elimination activities upon arrival at the elimination facility.

Subparagraph 1(b) provides that inspectors will compare the data provided by the Inspected Party, in its notification of elimination required in subparagraphs 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty, with the actual number and types of missile systems to be eliminated at the elimination site, prior to the initiation of elimination.

Subparagraph 1(c) states that (subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI of the Protocol) inspectors will observe the execution of elimination procedures as provided for in the Protocol on Elimination and will have the right to call to the attention of the in-country escort the need for strict compliance with such procedures. The completion of such procedures will be confirmed in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 8 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination.

Subparagraph 1(d) states that inspectors may ascertain visually that a missile to be eliminated by launching is a missile of a type subject to elimination and may observe such a missile (from a safe location specified by the Inspected Party) until completion of its launch. During the inspection of a series of launches, the Inspected Party will determine the means and route for the transportation of the inspection team between inspection sites. Paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty stipulates that each Party may eliminate up to 100 of its intermediate-range missiles by launching, provided that it does so within the first six months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Section VIII states that inspections of the elimination of items carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., elimination in situ, or by loss or accidental destruction, for training items, or by static display) will be conducted in accordance with the appropriate procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

SECTION IX--INSPECTION MONITORING CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

Section IX contains the procedures to be followed by the Parties for the establishment and operation of continuous portal monitoring systems on each other's territory. Upon entry into force, such systems shall be established in the Soviet Union at the SS-25 final assembly facility in Votkinsk, and in the United States at those parts of the Hercules Plant Number 1 in Magna, Utah, as specified in the MOU.

Paragraph 1 of Section IX provides that the Inspected Party will maintain an agreed upon perimeter around the periphery of an inspection site and will designate one portal for each site through which not more than one rail line and one road will pass, and through which all vehicles that can contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM must exit. Note that only this single exit from a facility is referred to as a "portal." Paragraph 2 of Section IX states that, for the purposes of this Section, the provisions of paragraph 10 of Article VII of the Treaty will be applied to intermediate-range GLBMs of the Inspected Party and to the longest stage of such GLBMs. Subparagraph 10(a) of Article VII stipulates that, for GLBMs that are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range missile will be counted as a complete missile. Subparagraph 10(b) provides that, for GLBMs that are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used to launch an intermediate-range GLBM will be counted as a complete GLBM, unless the Inspected Party proves otherwise to the satisfaction of the Inspecting Party. Thus, throughout Section IX, wherever the phrase "intermediate-range GLBMs of the Inspected Party and the longest stage of such GLBMs" appears, the last part of that phrase applies to GLBMs that are stored and moved in separate stages, and the first part applies to other GLBMs.

Paragraph 3 of Section IX states that inspection site exits other than the portal designated pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section IX will be monitored by appropriate sensors and that there will be no more than two such exits at each site. The perimeter and the inspection site exits may be monitored in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VII of the Protocol. Thus, all exits may be monitored with sensors and inspectors.

Paragraph 4 of Section IX provides that the Inspecting Party may establish continuous portal monitoring systems at the portal specified in paragraph 1 above, and may establish appropriate sensors at the exits specified in paragraph 3 above. It may also carry out necessary engineering surveys, construction, repair, and replacement of monitoring systems.

Paragraph 5 of Section IX states that, with respect to the monitoring systems, the Inspected Party will provide, upon the request and at the expense of the Inspecting Party: all necessary utilities for their construction and operation; basic construction materials; site preparation; transportation of necessary installation tools, materials, and equipment from the point of entry; and telephone lines and high frequency radio equipment for in-country communication with the embassy of the Inspecting Party. Thus, although the Inspecting Party pays the costs, the Inspected Party is required to provide necessary support for the monitoring systems.

Paragraph 6 of Section IX states that the Inspecting Party may, outside of the inspection site perimeter, construct up to three buildings of a specified size for a data center and inspection team headquarters and one additional building for supply and equipment storage; install systems to monitor exits (including sensors and measuring equipment); install measuring equipment at the portal; install power sources; and use agreed-upon data authentication devices.

Paragraph 7 of Section IX provides that, during installation or operation of monitoring systems, the Inspecting Party will not deny the Inspected Party access to any existing structures or security systems or take any other actions with respect to such structures without the consent of the Inspected Party. The Inspecting Party will compensate the Inspected Party for any agreed upon rebuilding or demolition of such structures.

Paragraph 8 of Section IX provides that the Inspected Party will not interfere with the installed equipment or restrict inspecting team access thereto.

Paragraph 9 of Section IX states that, subject to the Inspected Party's radio power and frequency restrictions, the Inspecting Party may use its own radio systems for communications between inspectors and data collection centers.

Paragraph 10 of Section IX states that aircraft may not land within the perimeter of a monitored site except for emergencies and with prior notification to the inspection team.

Paragraph 11 of Section IX provides that the Inspected Party must make a declaration with respect to any shipment large and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or the longest stage of such a GLBM of the Inspected Party. Such shipments must pass through the portal specified in paragraph 1 above. The declaration will specify whether the shipment contains a missile or missile stage as large or larger than, and as heavy or heavier than, an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM.

The declaration will be made prior to the arrival of the shipment at the portal.

Paragraph 12 of Section IX provides that an inspection team may weigh and measure the dimensions of any vehicle, including railcars, exiting the site. If such a vehicle is not large or heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or the longest stage of such a GLBM, then that vehicle will not be subject to further inspection.

Paragraph 13 of Section IX provides that vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 above that are large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM, but are declared by the Inspected Party not to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM, will be subject to inspection. The Inspecting Party will have the right to inspect the interior of all such vehicles. If the vehicle has no container or shrouded object large enough to be or contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM, there will be no further inspection; if the vehicle does contain such a container or object, the Inspected Party must demonstrate that the container or object is not and does not contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM.

Paragraph 14 of Section IX states that vehicles, exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 above, that are declared to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than, and as heavy or heavier than, an intermediate-range GLBM or the longest stage of such a GLBM are subject to the following inspection procedures:

• (i) the integrity of the inspected missile or stage shall be preserved by the Inspecting Party;
• (ii) measurements will be made by the Inspecting Party using approved equipment, which will be placed only outside the launch canister or shipping container, and the measurements will be observed and certified by the in-country escort;
• (iii) launch canisters and shipping containers declared to contain such a missile or missile stage may be weighed and measured, and their contents imaged by the Inspecting Party in the presence of the in-country escort. The Inspecting Party may view the interior of launch canisters or shipping containers brought out from the inspection site eight times per calendar year. During such viewing, the front end of the launch canister or the cover of the shipping container will be opened, the missile or missile stage will not be removed from its canister or container, and the length and diameter of the stages of the missile will be measured in accordance with agreed methods so as to ascertain that the missile or missile stage is not an intermediate-range GLBM, or the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the missile has no more than one stage that is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM; and (iv) the Inspecting Party may inspect any other containers or shrouded objects inside a vehicle containing such a missile or missile stage pursuant to paragraph 13 above.

SECTION X--CANCELLATION OF INSPECTIONS

Section X provides that inspections shall be canceled if they cannot be carried out by reason of force majeure (i.e., a "superior or irresistible force" outside the control of the Parties that could not be avoided by the exercise of due care). In addition, if the inspection team performing a "baseline," "close-out," or "short-notice" inspection pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, or 5, respectively, of Article XI of the Treaty is delayed and fails to arrive by the specified time, the inspection may be canceled or carried out at the Inspecting Party's option. Inspections canceled by reason of force majeure or delay will not reduce the number of inspections to which the Inspecting Party is entitled. Thus, this provision gives only the Inspecting Party the option to cancel or carry out an inspection.

SECTION XI--INSPECTION REPORT

Section XI specifies the procedures the Parties will follow in filing reports concerning inspections made pursuant to the Treaty. These reports will provide a written record of the inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Section XI states that, with respect to inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7, or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., all types of inspections except inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring), the inspection team leader will provide the in-country escort with a copy of the inspection report no later than two hours after an inspection is completed. The report will include the type of inspection; the inspection site; the number of missiles, missile stages, launchers, and support equipment observed during the inspection; and any measurements recorded during inspections. All photographs taken during the inspection and the inspection site diagram will be attached to the report, and the report will be written in both English and Russian.

Paragraph 2 of Section XI states that, with respect to inspections carried out pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty (i.e., inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring), a report similar to that called for in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be provided within three days of the end of each month.

Paragraph 3 of Section XI provides that the Inspected Party may make written comments with respect to inspection reports required by this Section.

Paragraph 4 of Section XI states that the Parties will resolve, to the extent possible, ambiguities regarding factual information in inspection reports, and record any relevant clarifications in the report. Reports are to be signed by the inspection team leader and by one in-country escort. Each Party will retain a copy of the report.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The penultimate paragraph of the Protocol specifies that the Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty, that it will enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and that it will remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. The paragraph also provides that the Parties may agree upon measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol, through the Special Verification Commission established pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty. Such measures will not be deemed to be amendments to the Treaty. Thus, while substantive obligations cannot be changed absent an agreed amendment to the Treaty, minor matters relating to the detailed inspection procedures may be altered through agreement of the Parties in order to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty regime.

The final paragraph records that the Protocol was done at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian language, both texts being equally authentic.

ANNEX ON PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF INSPECTORS AND AIRCREW MEMBERS

Much as diplomats everywhere are generally granted diplomatic privileges and immunities in order that they can carry out their duties without interference, the Parties have agreed in this Annex that inspectors and aircrew members acting pursuant to the Treaty shall also be entitled to appropriate privileges and immunities. The privileges and immunities set forth in the Annex apply to inspectors and aircrew members during the in-country period, and thereafter with respect to acts performed during the course of their official functions as inspectors or aircrew members. The Annex draws upon the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961 (the Vienna Convention), which is the primary international agreement governing such privileges and immunities.

Paragraph 1 of the Annex provides that inspectors and aircrew members will enjoy the inviolability accorded diplomatic agents under Article 29 of the Vienna Convention. Article 29 of the Vienna Convention provides: "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity." Paragraph 2 of the Annex provides that the living quarters and office premises of inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous portal monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty will be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the premises of diplomatic agents under Article 30 of the Vienna Convention. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention provides, in pertinent part: "1. The private residence of a diplomatic agency shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission." Paragraph 3 of the Annex provides that the papers and correspondence of inspectors and aircrew members will enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, and that the aircraft of the inspection team will be inviolable. Article 30 of the Vienna Convention provides, in pertinent part: "2. His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 31, his property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability." Paragraph 4 of the Annex provides that inspectors and aircrew members will be accorded the immunities of diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, but that these immunities may be waived by the Inspecting Party if that Party believes that immunity would impede the course of justice and if it believes that the waiver would not prejudice implementation of the Treaty. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provide:

• 1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: (a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission; (b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State; (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.

• 2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.

• 3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplomatic agent except in the cases coming under sub- paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, and provided that the measures concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence.

Paragraph 5 of the Annex provides that inspectors carrying out inspection activities by means of continuous monitoring pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty will have the same exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention. Article 34 of the Vienna Convention provides that:

• A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or municipal, except: (a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated in the price of goods and services; (b) dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission; (c) estate, succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiving State, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 39 [of the Vienna Convention]; (d) dues and taxes on private income having its source in the receiving State and capital taxes on investments made in commercial undertakings in the receiving State; (e) charges levied for specific services rendered; (f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp duty, with respect to immovable property, subject to the provisions of Article 23 [of the Vienna Convention].

Paragraph 6 of the Annex states that inspectors and aircrew members may import, without payment of customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, except for articles that are prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

Paragraph 7 of the Annex states that inspectors and aircrew members may not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the Inspected Party or that of a Basing Country.

Paragraph 8 of the Annex states that the Parties will consult in the event that the Inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of the privileges and immunities specified in the Annex.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND REGARDING INSPECTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT

The Basing Country Agreement (the Agreement) consists of seven Articles and an Annex on the privileges and immunities of inspectors and aircrew members.

The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles confers the right to conduct inspections not only in the United States and the Soviet Union, but also within the territory of other countries within which U.S. and Soviet missile systems subject to the Treaty are located. In order for the United States to guarantee Soviet access to the territory of its Western European Allies for the purpose of conducting inspections, the authorization of the Allies had to be obtained. In the Basing Country Agreement, the Basing Countries agree to permit inspections on their territory and to facilitate on their territory the implementation by the United States of its obligations under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The undertakings of the Basing Countries in the Basing Country Agreement correspond to the underlying undertakings of the United States in the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection.

ARTICLE I--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article I sets forth the general provisions of the Agreement, including authorization of Soviet inspections in the Basing Countries, facilitation by the Basing Countries of U.S.

obligations under the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection, various reservations of rights by the Basing Countries, and the undertaking by the United States to remain responsible for its obligations and to protect and preserve the rights of the Basing Countries under the Agreement.

Paragraph 1 of Article I constitutes the basic agreement of the Basing Countries that the inspection activities provided for in Article XI of the Treaty may take place on their territories. Paragraph 1 also stipulates such inspections must be carried out in accordance with requirements, procedures, and arrangements set forth in the Protocol on Inspection. Article XI of the Treaty describes the various types of inspections which each Party may conduct, including "baseline" initial inspections to verify the updated data provided immediately following entry into force of the Treaty (paragraph 3), "close-out" inspections to verify the elimination of specified facilities (paragraph 4), "short-notice" inspections of specified facilities (paragraph 5), inspection of the process of elimination (paragraph 7), and inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination (paragraph 8). The Protocol on Inspection specifies the procedures that govern the conduct of each type of inspection.

Paragraph 2 of Article I constitutes the Basing Countries' undertaking to facilitate implementation by the United States of its obligations under the Treaty with respect to inspection activities taking place on their territories.

Paragraph 3 of Article I confirms the principle that, except as otherwise agreed, the Basing Countries reserve their sovereign authority to enforce their laws and regulations with respect to persons entering, and activities taking place within, their jurisdiction.

Paragraph 4 of Article I sets forth the understanding that the Basing Countries assume no obligations and grant no rights deriving from the Treaty or the Protocol on Inspection other than those expressly undertaken or granted in the Agreement.

Paragraph 5 of Article I confirms that the United States remains fully responsible to the Soviet Union for the fulfillment of its obligations under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection with respect to U.S. facilities located in the Basing Countries. Paragraph 5 also sets forth the commitment of the United States to the Basing Countries to take such action, in exercising its rights under the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection, as may be required to protect the rights of the Basing Countries under the Agreement.

ARTICLE II--DEFINITIONS

Article II sets forth the definitions of the terms used in the Agreement. Definitions are provided for the following terms: (1) Treaty, (2) Inspection Protocol, (3) Inspected Party, (4) Inspecting Party, (5) Inspection Team, (6) inspector, (7) diplomatic aircrew escort, (8) inspection site, (9) period of inspection, (10) point of entry, (11) in-country period, (12) in- country escort, and (13) aircrew member.

Paragraph 1 of Article II defines "Treaty" as the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Paragraph 2 of Article II defines "Inspection Protocol" as the Protocol Regarding Inspection Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

Paragraph 3 of Article II defines "Inspected Party" as the United States.

Paragraph 4 of Article II defines "Inspecting Party" as the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 5 of Article II defines "inspection team" as those inspectors designated by the Inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection activity. Paragraph 6 of Article II defines "inspector" as an individual who is proposed by the Soviet Union to carry out inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty, and who is included on its list of inspectors in accordance with section III of the Protocol on Inspection. Section III of the Protocol provides for the naming of proposed inspectors and aircrew members by each Party to the Treaty and specifies the grounds on which the other Party may object to an individual.

Paragraph 7 of Article II defines "diplomatic aircrew escort" as that individual who is accredited to the government of the Basing Country in which the inspection site is located and who is designated by the Inspecting Party to assist the aircrew of the Inspecting Party.

Paragraph 8 of Article II defines "inspection site" as the area, facility, or location in a Basing Country at which an inspection provided for in Article XI of the Treaty is carried out.

Paragraph 9 of Article II defines "period of inspection" as the period from initiation of the inspection at the inspection site until completion of the inspection at the inspection site, exclusive of the time spent on any pre-inspection and post- inspection procedures.

Paragraph 10 of Article II defines "point of entry" as: Brussels (National) for Belgium; Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase) for the Federal Republic of Germany; Rome (Ciampino) for the Republic of Italy; Schiphol for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and RAF Greenham Common for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Paragraph 11 of Article II defines "in-country period" as the period from the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry until departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to depart the country.

Paragraph 12 of Article II defines "in-country escort" as the official or officials specified by the Inspected Party, one or more of whom may be nominated by the Basing Country within whose territory the inspection site is located, who shall accompany an inspection team throughout the in-country period and provide appropriate assistance to an inspection team in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection, throughout the in-country period.

Paragraph 13 of Article II defines "aircrew member" as an individual, other than members of an inspection team, diplomatic aircrew escort, and in-country escort, on the aircraft of the Inspecting Party. The paragraph also stipulates that the number of aircrew members per aircraft shall not exceed ten.

ARTICLE III--NOTIFICATIONS

Article III sets forth the commitment of the United States to provide each Basing Country with advance notice of any inspections to be conducted by the Soviet Union in that Basing Country. The notifications to be provided by the United States to the Basing Countries will replicate the relevant information which the Soviet Union must provide to the United States under the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Article III provides that, upon entry into force of the Agreement, the United States and the Basing Countries will establish a method of communication (described as "channels") to receive and acknowledge receipt of notifications on an around- the-clock basis.

Paragraph 2 of Article III provides that the United States will notify the Basing Country concerned, immediately upon receipt of notice from the Soviet Union, of a pending Soviet inspection in that Basing Country, including the date and estimated time for the Soviet inspection team's arrival at the point of entry, the date and estimated time of its departure to the inspection site, the names of aircrew and inspection team members, the flight plan filed by the Soviet Union, and any other relevant information provided by the Soviet Union.

Paragraph 3 of Article III establishes that the United States will inform the Basing Country concerned of the precise location of the inspection site not less than one hour prior to the estimated departure time of the Soviet inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site (or, in the case of successive inspections, from one inspection site to another inspection site).

ARTICLE IV--PRE-INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS

Article IV sets forth various pre-inspection arrangements, including mechanisms for the Basing Countries to object to Soviet inspectors or aircrew members, the provision of visas and other documentation to Soviet inspectors and aircrew members, and the furnishing by the Basing Countries of standing diplomatic clearance numbers and established routes for Soviet aircraft conveying inspection teams. Article IV also addresses the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members, the waiver of customs duties, expedited customs processing, the provision of food and lodging for inspectors and aircrew members, and examination of equipment used in conducting inspections.

Paragraph 1 of Article IV provides that upon receipt of the initial list of proposed Soviet inspectors and aircrew members (or subsequent changes thereto) the United States will provide the lists to each of the Basing Countries, which must in turn notify the United States, within 15 days, of any objection to a person on the list based upon that person's having previously committed, or having been sentenced for committing, a criminal offense in, or having been expelled from, the United States or the Basing Country making the objection. If such an objection is made by a Basing Country, the United States is committed to exercise its right under the Protocol on Inspection to prevent such a person from serving as an inspector or aircrew member.

Paragraph 2 of Article IV sets forth the Basing Countries' commitment to furnish all necessary visas and related documents, within 25 days of receiving the initial list of inspectors and aircrew members (or subsequent changes thereto), to enable such personnel to carry out their inspections. Visas and documentation are to be valid for a least 24 months. The United States will immediately notify the Basing Countries of the removal of an individual's name from the list of inspectors and aircrew members, whereupon the Basing Countries may cancel such individual's visas and related documentation.

Paragraph 3 of Article IV provides that each Basing Country will notify the United States, within 25 days of entry into force of the Agreement, of the standing diplomatic clearance numbers and established international airways for the Soviet aircraft that will be transporting inspectors and equipment into its territory.

Paragraph 4 of Article IV sets forth the Basing Countries' commitment to extend to Soviet inspectors and aircrew members the privileges and immunities set forth in the Annex on privileges and immunities to the Basing Country Agreement. The Basing Countries may withdraw such extension of privileges and immunities in the event the Soviet Union fails to remove, in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection, any inspector or aircrew member who violates the conditions governing inspections. Paragraph 7 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection states that inspectors and aircrew members are obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the country on whose territory an inspection is carried out and not to interfere in that country's internal affairs. It specifies the circumstances under which they may be removed from the lists of inspectors and aircrew members.

Paragraph 5 of Article IV provides that the Basing Countries will waive customs duties and will expedite customs processing for inspection equipment at the point of entry.

Paragraph 6 of Article IV constitutes the Basing Countries' agreement to provide, upon request, food and lodging for inspectors and aircrew at the point of entry.

Paragraph 7 of Article IV provides that the Basing Country concerned and the United States have the right to examine jointly each item of Soviet equipment to confirm that it cannot be used to perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. Any equipment unconnected with such inspection requirements will be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the Basing Country concerned.

ARTICLE V--CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS

Article V describes the role of the Basing Countries in the conduct of inspections on their territories including facilitation of movement, granting of clearances, establishment of communication capability, and the furnishing of aircraft servicing as well as housing, food, and services for inspectors and aircrew members. It also discusses extensions of inspection periods.

Paragraph 1 of Article V sets forth the Basing Countries' agreement to grant approval to the United States for Soviet aircraft to fly to the point of entry via the filed routing (or, if necessary, an amended routing) within 90 minutes of receipt of notice from the United States that a flight plan conforming to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements has been filed for the pending Soviet inspection.

Paragraph 2 of Article V states that the Basing Country concerned will facilitate entry into its territory and expedite customs processing for Soviet inspectors and aircrew members and their baggage and equipment.

Paragraph 3 of Article V provides that upon notification by the United States of the inspection site, the Basing Country concerned will expedite Soviet travel to the inspection site for arrival within nine hours of Soviet notification to the United States of the site to be inspected. The Basing Country and the United States will consult on the appropriate mode of transportation to the site, and the Basing Country may designate the routing to the site.

Paragraph 4 of Article V provides that each Basing Country will assist the United States in establishing two-way voice communication capability for a Soviet inspection team between the inspection site and the Soviet Embassy within its territory. Paragraph 5 of Article V provides that the Basing Country concerned will consult with the United States on aircraft servicing and on meals, lodging, and services at the point of entry and at the inspection site for Soviet inspectors and aircrew members, and that the United States will pay the costs of any such services it requests.

Paragraph 6 of Article V states that the United States will immediately notify the Basing Country concerned of any extension of the original 24-hour period of inspection, said extension not to exceed eight hours.

ARTICLE VI--CONSULTATIONS

Article VI describes means of consultation between the United States and the Basing Countries on implementation of inspection activities and other matters. It also describes disqualifications of inspectors and aircrew members, changes in points of entry, required notification and briefing of Basing Countries by the United States upon completion of inspections, and the requirement for the Basing Countries' assent to certain amendments to Article XI of the Treaty and to the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 1 of Article VI provides that the United States and the Basing Countries will meet within five days of entry into force of the Basing Country Agreement to coordinate implementation of inspection activities.

Paragraph 2 of Article VI states that a meeting between the United States and any Basing Country to discuss implementation of the Basing Country Agreement will be held within five days of a request therefor by the United States or a Basing Country.

Paragraph 3 of Article VI establishes that a Basing Country may, if it deems it necessary, contact directly the U.S.

inspection notification authority on urgent questions. The United States will immediately acknowledge receipt of any such inquiry or question and will give the question or problem its urgent attention.

Paragraph 4 of Article VI provides that if a Basing Country determines that a Soviet inspector or aircrew member has violated the conditions governing inspection within its territory, it may so notify the United States, and the United States will then notify the Soviet Union of the disqualification of such an inspector or aircrew member and require the individual's removal from the list of inspectors or aircrew members.

Paragraph 5 of Article VI provides that a Basing Country may change its point of entry upon six-months' prior notice to the United States.

Paragraph 6 of Article VI states that the United States will advise the Basing Country concerned upon completion of an inspection and will, upon request, brief the Basing Country on the inspection.

Paragraph 7 of Article VI establishes that the United States will not propose or accept an amendment to Article XI of the Treaty or to the Protocol on Inspection that directly affects the Basing Countries without prior consent of the Basing Countries.

ARTICLE VII--DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT

Article VII provides that the Agreement is subject to approval by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. Upon required notification by each Party to each of the other Parties of such approval, the Agreement will enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the Treaty. The Agreement will remain in force for 13 years.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The penultimate paragraph of the Basing Country Agreement records that a single original of the Agreement was signed at Brussels, Belgium, on December 11, 1987. The paragraph also provides that the single original will be deposited in the archives of the United States Government and that the United States will transmit a duly certified copy of the Agreement to the other signatory Governments (i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).

[Note: The Agreement has an Annex entitled "Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Aircrew Members," which is substantially the same as the identically titled Annex to the Protocol on Inspection, discussed at pages 108-111 of the Report, with conforming changes to reflect its status as part of the Basing Country Agreement rather than the Protocol on Inspection.]