In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range missiles, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, have agreed on the following measures relating to its implementation.

1. The Parties understand the requirements contained in paragraph 2 of Article IX and paragraph 2(a) of Article XIII of the Treaty to mean that all updates of data shall be exchanged through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC).

2. The Parties understand that the updated data required pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article IX of the Treaty shall include data only for those elements of the missile systems and the facilities that have changed since the preceding data exchange or are in the process of being changed.

3. The Parties agree that when the notification required pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of the Treaty is provided, the Party making such a notification shall also provide a site diagram of the new facility to the other Party through diplomatic channels.

4. The Parties understand that each Party shall be permitted to reschedule activities notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty. The Parties agree that such changes shall be made in accordance with the principle of minimizing hardship on the inspecting Party. The Parties understand that if the scheduled date referred to in paragraphs 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) and 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty is delayed for more than five days, then the Party that has provided the notification referred to above shall provide an additional notification specifying the new scheduled date to the other Party within a short period of time. The period of time between the transmission date of the additional notification and the new scheduled date indicated in that notification shall not be less than ten days.

5. The Parties understand that each Party shall be permitted to change information contained in a notification provided pursuant to paragraph 5(b), 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty.

6. The Parties understand that notifications provided by each Party pursuant to paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, specifying the number of missile systems eliminated as well as the date and location of their elimination, shall be provided by each Party after it has completed the process of elimination of all systems declared in a particular notification pursuant to paragraph 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty. Such notifications shall also be provided after completion of the inspection report compiled in accordance, with paragraph 1(d) of Part F of Section III of this Memorandum.

7. The Parties agree that in the case of a delay of an activity notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) or 5(d) of Article IX of the Treaty:

(a) If the delay is five days or less and the inspection team is either en route to the point of entry or has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspected Party shall decide whether the inspection team should be located at the point of entry or at the inspection site for the period of the delay.

(b) If the delay is more than five days and the inspection team has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, then such an inspection team shall leave the territory of the inspected Party unless the Parties agree otherwise.

8. The Parties understand that in the course of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right to weigh and measure each item listed in Section VI of the memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding, to confirm its technical data. A list of specialized equipment and procedures used to conduct these inspections is contained in Annex VI to this memorandum.

9. The Parties understand the term "calendar year" as used in paragraph 5 of Article XI and paragraph 3 of Article XII of the Treaty and paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as ,the Protocol on Inspection, to mean a period of 12 months commencing at entry into force of the Treaty.

10. The Parties understand that the obligation contained in paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, which concerns ensuring that the inspecting Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system within six months after entry into force of the Treaty, does not preclude the installation of agreed equipment for the permanent continuous monitoring system either before or after the end of the sixth month after entry into force of the Treaty, or the replacement of it with new agreed equipment after that time.

11. The Parties agree that in conducting inspections of the former SS-20 missile launcher production facility, one of the features allowing the inspecting Party to distinguish SS-20 missile launchers from launchers of other types of missiles shall be the number of axles of the chassis, with the understanding that the chassis of the SS-20 missile launcher has six axles.

12. The Parties agree that all notifications transmitted through the NRRC shall be made with reference to Greenwich Mean Time.

13. The Parties agree that, unless otherwise specified in this Memorandum, the Parties shall use the NRRC for all notifications referred to in this Memorandum.

1. The Parties, referring to paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Elimination, agree upon different procedures for eliminating the front section and of the SS-20 missile, and the front sections of the BGM-109G missile the SS-4 missile, and the SSC-X-4 missile. Such procedures, while differing from the procedures contained in subparagraph (c) of the BGM-109GV SS-20 and SSC-X-4 missile elimination procedures and subparagraph (d) of the SS-4 missile elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination, achieve the same result as the procedures contained in those subparagraphs.

(a) Different procedures for the elimination of the front sections of the BGM-109G missile and the SSC-X-4 missile are as follows: front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces.

(b) Different procedures for the elimination of the front section and the instrumentation compartment of the SS-20 missile are as follows: front section including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be destroyed by explosion.

(c) Different procedure for the elimination of the front section of the SS-4 missile is as follows: front section, minus nuclear warhead device, shall be destroyed by explosion.

2. The Parties agree that in implementing the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of Section II of the Protocol on Elimination for eliminating the BGM-109G missile and the SSC-X-4 missile, the inspected Party shall be permitted to separate the missile airframe into sections before it is cut longitudinally into two pieces.

3. The Parties understand paragraph 2 of section IV of the Protocol on Elimination to mean that transportable propellant tanks for the SS-4 missile are considered to be eliminated when removed from the SS-4 missile operating bases and the SS-4 missile test range launch site that are indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. The Parties understand that equipment and structures that are located at training sites and are not related to systems covered by the Treaty are not subject to elimination and may stay at these sites after the completion of elimination of the facility.

A. Pre-Inspection Requirements

1. The Parties understand that each of the three lists exchanged pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection may contain fewer than 200 individuals and may be supplemented pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection.

2. The Parties agree that inspection team members shall wear civilian clothes throughout the in-country period and shall wear unique badges while at the inspection site and while at other locations as agreed by the inspection team leader and the in- country escort team leader. The inspecting Party shall provide its inspectors with such badges.

3. The Parties agree that the United States of America shall provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with unique baggage tags and that both Parties shall use such unique tags to identify the baggage of both the inspection team and the aircrew members.

4. The Parties agree that the standing diplomatic clearance numbers for inspection airplanes, which are required pursuant to paragraph 8 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection, shall be those indicated in Annex I to this memorandum.

5. The Parties agree that since, as is indicated in paragraph 8 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection, inspection airplanes shall arrive at and depart from the point of entry along established international airways, representatives of the inspected Party need not be on board such airplanes as escorts. The Parties shall use the airplane routes which are listed in Annex II to this memorandum to and from each of the points of entry. Alternate airfields shall be designated in accordance with International Civil Aviation organization regulations.

6. The Parties agree to have on board their inspection airplanes navigation equipment of the types listed in Annex II to this Memorandum.

7. The Parties agree that-inspection airplanes may include military transport airplanes with standard markings and paint schemes, to include camouflage. The inspection airplanes which may be used are:

(a) for the United States of America, airplanes known as the C-130# C-141, C-9 and T-43; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, airplanes known as the IL-62, TU-134 and TU-154.

8. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that the United States of America shall be permitted to use the airplane known as the C-5 as an inspection airplane and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be permitted to use the airplane known as the AN-124 as an inspection airplane. The Parties agree to use these airplanes only for flights into and out of Moscow and San Francisco points of entry; such flights shall not be routine and shall be used for the delivery or removal of inspection equipment listed in Section I of Annex V to this Memorandum. Whenever either Party deems it necessary, these airplanes shall be permitted, at the same-time that they are delivering or removing inspection equipment, to carry inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. In order to use the C-5 and AN-124 airplanes as inspection airplanes:

(a) Each Party, not later than 20 days prior to the scheduled date of arrival of the airplane at the point of entry, shall notify the other Party of its intention to carry out such a flight and shall provide lists of the aircrew members and inspectors for the scheduled flight.

(b) The Parties agree that the limit on aircrew members set forth in paragraph 1 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights and that the number of aircrew members for each of such flights shall not exceed 25. This number shall include personnel for loading and unloading the cargoes that are being transported.

(c) The Parties agree that the period for conveying agreement to the designation of each aircrew member set forth in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights and that each Party, within 15 days after receipt of the notification of the intention of the other Party to carry out such a flight, shall review the proposed list of aircrew members for this airplane and inform the other Party of its agreement to the designation of each aircrew member proposed.

(d) The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the fulfillment of the provisions of subparagraphs (b) and (c) above, the overall limit on the number of aircrew members, that is 200 individuals, set forth in paragraph 2 of Section III of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights.

(e) The Parties agree that the visa requirements set forth in paragraph S of section III of the Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to such flights and that the inspected Party, within the 15-day period provided for in subparagraph (c) above, shall ensure the granting of a single-entry visa to each aircrew member to whose entry it has agreed on the basis of the submitted list of aircrew members.

(f) The Party carrying out a flight for delivering equipment to a continuous monitoring inspection site shall so notify the other Party in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Part D of this Section.

The Parties agree that, except as provided for above, the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection and this memorandum that apply to inspection airplanes also shall apply to flights of the C-5 and AN-124 airplanes.

9. The Parties understand that they shall be permitted to use regularly scheduled commercial flights to deliver inspectors to those points of entry that are served by airlines. The Protocol on Inspection shall not apply to regularly scheduled commercial flights or to aircrews serving such flights used for delivering inspectors to points of entry.

B. Notifications

1. The Parties understand paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection to require the inspecting Party to file the flight plan for an inspection airplane in accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization procedures and to notify the inspected Party of the content of that flight plan.

2. The Parties agree to assign the call sign "info-XXX" (three digits) to inspection airplanes. Odd hundred call signs shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the United States of America (for example, 1XX, 3XX, 5XX) and even hundred call signs shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (for example, 2XX, 4XX, 6XX).

C. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry

1. The Parties, referring to paragraph 1 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection, understand that the diplomatic aircrew escort shall meet and accompany an inspection team arriving on a regularly scheduled commercial flight. The Parties understand that the diplomatic aircrew escort shall not be permitted to accompany the inspection team beyond the point of entry.

2. The Parties agree that if an inspection team arrives at the San Francisco point of entry on an inspection airplane, it shall land at Travis Air Force Base. The diplomatic aircrew escort, comprised of one or two accredited diplomats assigned to the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet socialist Republics in San Francisco, shall be permitted to travel to and have access to Travis Air Force Base for the purpose of meeting the inspection airplane, aircrew members and inspectors arriving there. In order to gain access to the Base, the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco:

(a) shall contact the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone and report the name or names of the personnel involved and the license plate number of the vehicle involved; and

(b) shall ensure that such information is provided not less than four hours before the estimated time of arrival of the inspection airplane at Travis Air Force Base.

The diplomatic aircrew escort shall not be permitted to leave the free movement zone, as that zone is defined in the Notes of the United States Department of state of March 18, 1983, and of November 16, 1983, en route to Travis Air Force Base more than four hours before the estimated time of arrival of the inspection airplane. If such notification is made in accordance with these procedures, then the diplomatic aircrew escort shall be granted access to Travis Air Force Base not less than 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the inspection airplane at the Base.

3. The Parties agree that if an inspection team arrives at San Francisco International Airport on a regularly scheduled commercial flight, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to Travis Air Force Base. In this case, the diplomatic aircrew escort, comprised of one or two accredited diplomats assigned to the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco, shall be permitted to accompany the inspection team to Travis Air Force Base. In order to gain access to the Base, the Consulate General of the union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco:

(a) shall contact the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone and report the name or names of the personnel involved and the license plate number of the vehicle involved; and

(b) shall ensure that such information is provided not less than two hours before the arrival of the inspection team at San Francisco International Airport.

If such notification is made in accordance with these procedures, then the diplomatic aircrew escort accompanying the inspection team from San Francisco International Airport to Travis Air Force Base shall be granted access to the Base along with the inspection team.

4. If during the course of the examination of inspection equipment pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection the inspection team leader disagrees with the conclusion of the inspected Party that an item of equipment either (a) is not equipment agreed by the Parties pursuant to paragraph 9 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection or (b) can perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty, and thus should not be cleared for use, the inspection team leader shall be permitted to explain to the in-country escort the appropriateness of the item of equipment to the inspection requirements contained in Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The Parties agree that if the in-country escort remains unconvinced, such equipment shall not be taken to an inspection site by the inspection team, both the in-country escort team leader and the inspection team leader shall record their views in writing, and each of them shall transmit both views for review by appropriate authorities.

5. The Parties agree that if the inspected Party establishes that the equipment can perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty and the explanation referred to in paragraph 4 above is not persuasive, then the disputed item or items of equipment shall be returned to the inspection airplane. If no such airplane is available, the equipment shall be impounded and shall be stored in the secure facility provided for storage of inspection equipment at the point of entry.

6. The Parties understand the term "tamper-proof containers" as used in paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection to mean containers used to transport and store inspection equipment that are locked and sealed by means of locks and seals belonging to the inspecting Party. Such seals may be, for example, tamper- indicating tape seals.

7. The Parties understand paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection to mean, with respect to inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, that:

(a) The inspecting Party shall provide routine medical care for inspectors and that the inspected Party shall ensure availability of emergency medical care for inspectors.

(b) If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, the inspected Party shall provide emergency evacuation services for inspectors from the inspection site to a point of entry.

(c) If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, it shall evacuate at its own expense inspectors out of the territory of the inspected Party.

8. The Parties understand that the meals provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection for the inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section VII or VIII of that Protocol, including at the sites where elimination occurs continuously or nearly continuously, shall be paid for by the inspected Party. These meals shall be in the form of prepared meals either in a dining facility or at a location agreed to by the inspection team leader and the in-country escort team leader.

9. The Parties understand that the lodging provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection for the inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section VII or VIII of that Protocol shall be paid for by the inspected Party, and that such lodging can be of various types depending on the location and kind of inspection. The Parties agree that:

(a) The lodging provided for inspectors and aircrew members at the point of entry, and for inspectors conducting inspections of the process of elimination at sites where elimination occurs continuously or nearly continuously, shall be hotel-like accommodations.

(b) The lodging provided for inspectors conducting inspections in accordance with Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, and for inspectors conducting inspections of the process of elimination at elimination sites not subject to subparagraph (a) above, shall be sufficient to permit inspectors to sleep and need not be separate from the work space provided at the inspection site.

10. The Parties agree that the lodging provided for inspectors conducting inspections pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, on a temporary basis, shall be in existing buildings and, on a permanent basis, shall be in buildings that will be built by the inspected Party for the inspecting Party in accordance with paragraph 5 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection. In this regard, the inspected Party shall permit inspectors at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna to remain in their temporary housing until construction of their permanent housing is completed.

11. The Parties understand that the transportation provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection for inspectors conducting inspections in accordance with Section VII or VIII of that Protocol shall be paid for by the inspected Party and shall encompass transportation at the point of entry, to and from the inspection site, and at the inspection site. In this regard, the Parties agree that, at the inspection site, the inspected Party shall provide a sufficient number of vehicles to transport the entire inspection team as well as up to five vehicles, depending on the number of subgroups into which the inspection team leader divides the inspection team.

12. The Parties understand that transportation between the point of entry and the inspection site for inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of that Protocol, shall be provided by the inspected Party at the expense of the inspecting Party. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that the inspected Party shall provide at its own expense transportation at the point of entry and at the continuous monitoring inspection site for inspectors conducting an inspection in accordance with Section IX of that Protocol. In this regard, all expenses associated with the transportation of inspectors at the point of entry and within 50 kilometers of the continuous monitoring inspection sites at Magna and Votkinsk shall be borne by the inspected Party, and the drivers of the vehicles shall be considered to be in-country escorts.

13. The Parties understand that, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection, the inspecting Party shall bear all expenses associated with the construction of the structure for installation and operation of its non-damaging image producing equipment at its continuous monitoring inspection site.

14. The Parties agree to follow the current practices used by their embassies in Moscow and Washington, D.C., both for reimbursing expenses that are incurred by the inspected Party and that are subject to reimbursement pursuant to paragraph 5 or 6 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection, and for reimbursing other expenses as agreed by the Parties.

15. The Parties agree to use the list of inspection sites and their associated points of entry contained in Annex III to this Memorandum in order to fulfill the requirements in paragraph 7 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection.

16. The Parties agree that in conducting sequential inspections as permitted by paragraph 16 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, they shall inspect only those inspection sites associated with the point of entry from which the inspection team commenced inspection activities.

17. The Parties, referring to paragraph 7 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection, understand that:

(a) Although the inspecting Party shall be permitted to indicate the inspection site prior to the time for specification of the inspection site provided in the notification of the intention to conduct an inspection, the nine-hour period for transporting the inspectors referred to in paragraph 2 of section VII of the Protocol on Inspection shall commence at the time for specification of the inspection site that was provided in the notification.

(b) The indication referred to in subparagraph (a) above shall be transmitted in written form by the inspection team leader to the in-country escort team leader.

(c) If the indication referred to in subparagraph (a) above is made at the time for specification of the inspection site provided in the notification rather than before that time, then it shall be made at the airport associated with the point of entry. If, however, such indication precedes this time, the inspection team leader shall be permitted to indicate it elsewhere.

18. The Parties agree to permit representatives of the mass media to take photographs of inspection teams at the points of entry and to be present at one of the first eliminations of missiles. The Parties agree to organize the presence of representatives of the mass media so that it does not interfere with either the inspection activities or the process of elimination. The United states of America shall permit representatives of the mass media to be present at the entrance of an inspection site in its basing countries during the first inspections, and opportunities for photographs might be provided in such cases. The Parties agree that representatives of the mass media shall not be permitted to accompany inspectors during inspections.

D. General Rules for Conducting Inspections 1. The Parties, referring to the phrase "and other equipment, as agreed by the Parties" contained in paragraph 9 of section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, agree to add to the list of agreed equipment the following: hand-held flashlights and batteries for such flashlights, and hand-held magnetic compasses. A description of the equipment to be used is contained in Annex IV to this Memorandum.

2. The Parties, referring to paragraph 9 of section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, agree to use linear measurement devices, cameras, portable weighing devices and radiation detection devices in accordance with the procedures, set forth in Annex IV to this Memorandum. The list of agreed equipment, including its characteristics, is contained in Annex IV to this memorandum.

3. The Parties agree that during an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspected Party shall provide means of communication between inspection team subgroups. The Parties agree that such means of communication shall be under the control of the inspected Party.

4. The Parties agree that the result of each measurement of the weight or dimensions of a missile, missile stage, launcher, support structure or an item of support equipment subject to the Treaty that deviates, by less than three percent from the relevant technical data provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty shall be considered acceptable.

5. The Parties understand that, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, the inspected Party shall conduct a safety briefing for the inspection team in the inspected Party's language. This briefing shall be translated into the inspecting Party's language.

6. The Parties understand that the pre-inspection movement restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 of Section VII of the Protocol on inspection shall remain in effect until the pre- inspection procedures referred to in paragraph 14 of Section VI of that Protocol are completed.

7. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that in order to facilitate inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, each continuous monitoring inspection team shall be permitted to have up to four deputy team leaders rather than the one deputy team leader provided for in paragraph 15 of Section VI of that Protocol.

8. The Parties agree that for inspections conducted sequentially, as provided for in paragraph 16 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection:

(a) The inspection team, before departing the point of entry to conduct an initial inspection, shall be permitted to declare that it intends to conduct sequential inspections.

(b) In the event that inspection sites are in close proximity to one another, the inspection team shall not normally return to the point of entry before conducting sequential inspections, but the inspection team shall be permitted to return to the point of entry when, in the judgment of the inspection team leader, circumstances require it.

(c) In the event that after returning to the point of entry from an inspection site the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection, the inspection team shall so notify the inspected Party within one hour of its return to the point of entry and shall indicate the time of the specification of the inspection site. The time of the specification of the inspection site shall be not less than four hours and not more than 24 hours after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry.

(d) During sequential inspections, the inspected Party shall provide modest sleeping accommodations for the inspection team at the site where an inspection has been completed, at the sequential inspection site, or at another site that is mutually agreed.

9. The Parties agree that the inspection team shall be permitted to store equipment during the course of its stay at the inspection site in the work space for inspectors at that site. Such equipment shall be under the direct control of the inspection team for the period of inspection.

10. Cargoes of inspection equipment and supplies intended for installation at continuous monitoring inspection sites, or for maintenance or repair of equipment already installed, which are on an airplane indicated in paragraph 7 or 8 of Part A of this Section, shall be subject to examination in accordance with paragraph 11 below. individual items of inspection equipment and supplies intended for installation at continuous monitoring inspection sites or for maintenance or repair of equipment, already installed, which are brought onto the territory of the inspected Party by an inspector and which thus are not part of a shipment, shall be subject to examination only in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of Part C of this Section.

11. In accordance with paragraph 10 above, the Parties agree to use the following procedures for delivering and examining cargoes of equipment and supplies intended for installation at continuous monitoring inspection sites or for maintenance or repair of equipment already installed throughout the entire period during which such inspections are conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty:

(a) Not less than ten days before the delivery of equipment and supplies to the point of entry for a continuous monitoring inspection site, the inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party, through the embassy of the inspecting Party in the capital of the inspected Party, an inventory of the equipment and supplies, with an indication of the following: (i) the weight and dimensions of each separate palletized or oversize unit of cargo, including modular structures;

(ii) whether modular structures are being shipped to the inspection site;

(iii) the contents of each shipping container on a pallet and of each modular structure, by means of the description set forth in section I of Annex V to this memorandum, so that the inspected Party is able to correlate each item to a specific entry in that Annex; and

(iv) the location at the portal or at the exits where each major item on the inventory of equipment and supplies, as set forth in Annex V to this Memorandum, is to be installed or used.

In addition, if it is necessary for facilitating transportation of equipment, of oversize items, or of any other items from the point of entry to a continuous monitoring inspection site, the inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party with black-and-white photographs or clear facsimile copies of photographs of such equipment and items.

(b) Each separate shipping container on a pallet included on the inventory mentioned in subparagraph (a) above shall be marked with the appropriate freight marking and shall have a complete packing list attached. One copy of such a packing list shall be appended also to the inventory mentioned in subparagraph (a) above.

(c) The inspected Party shall examine cargoes containing equipment and supplies delivered to the point of entry. At the discretion of the inspected Party, specific items of equipment and specific supplies may be examined either at the point of entry or at the continuous monitoring inspection site. If the examination is carried out at the point of entry, it shall be carried out in the presence of the aircrew members. Inspectors shall be permitted to be present during all such examinations.

(d) If the examination of the cargoes is carried out at the point of entry, upon completion of the examination procedures the inspecting Party shall repack the equipment and supplies, using the same type of packing material and the same markings referred to in subparagraph (b) above. The inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party, shall assist the inspecting Party in packing the equipment and supplies, in providing for their security during loading and unloading operations, and in fastening the cargoes for shipment. Upon completion of packing procedures, cargoes shall be sealed with seals of both the inspecting and the inspected Parties. At the continuous monitoring inspection site, the seals shall be examined jointly and afterwards the inspectors shall open each shipping container and modular structure in the presence of the in-country escort.

(e) The inspecting Party shall be permitted to observe palletized cargoes and modular structures at the point of entry and at each point where they are transferred from one vehicle to another, including: observation of them being loaded onto the vehicle that will transport them to the inspection site or to an intermediate transfer point, observation of the transfer of them at an intermediate transfer point, and observation of them at the inspection site once the vehicle carrying such cargoes arrives there. In the event of unforeseen delays, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to observe the palletized cargoes and modular structures inside the vehicle while they are in transit.

(f) The contents of each shipping container, including modular structures, shall be checked against the description contained in Section I of Annex V to this memorandum and provided in accordance with subparagraph (a) above. Based on the results of the examination of the contents of all of the shipping containers, including modular structures, a joint inventory shall be drawn up, and if the equipment included on the inventory corresponds to the equipment described in section I of Annex V to this Memorandum, the inventory shall be signed by both Parties. When the inventory is signed, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to begin installing and using the equipment and supplies at the continuous monitoring inspection site. Until the document is signed, the inspected Party shall assist the inspecting Party in providing security for the, cargoes and protecting them from inclement weather.

(g) The inspected Party shall be permitted to observe the equipment during installation, testing and operation at the continuous monitoring inspection site.

(h) If at any time during the examination, installation, testing or operation of inspection equipment at the point of entry or at the continuous monitoring inspection site it is established that the inspection equipment can perform, or does perform, functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty, then either such equipment shall not be installed or its use shall be discontinued, and it shall be removed from the territory of the inspected Party.

12. The Parties agree to use the following procedures for examining radiation detection devices at the point of entry as provided for in paragraph 4 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection:

(a) Prior to the conduct of the benchmark radiation measurements required by paragraph 2 of Part D of Section III of Annex IV to this Memorandum, the inspecting Party shall bring into the territory of the inspected Party three radiation detection devices whose composition is listed in paragraph 1 of Part A of Section II of Annex IV to this Memorandum. The inspected Party shall select one of those devices to purchase. The two other devices intended for use in conducting benchmark radiation measurements shall be stored at the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph (d) below. Thirty days after the inspected Party has received the device it purchased, it shall inform the inspecting Party whether the inspecting Party is permitted to use such devices for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(b) The examination of the two radiation detection devices that are intended for use in taking the benchmark radiation measurements shall commence on a date agreed by the Parties, which shall be not less than 30 days and not more than 90 days after delivery of the devices referred to in subparagraph (a) above to the inspected Party. This examination shall be completed within five days after the date agreed for its initiation.

(c) During the examination referred to in subparagraph (b) above, as well as during subsequent examinations of radiation detection devices, the inspected Party shall be permitted in the presence of the inspecting Party to dismantle partially such devices and examine them using non-damaging methods. Such examination must not impair the capability of the radiation detection devices to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. Prior to departing the point of entry to conduct benchmark radiation measurements or an inspection, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to test the radiation detection devices to be used to establish that their capability to perform functions connected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty has not been impaired by the inspected Party's examination of the radiation detection devices.

(d) Except as specified in subparagraph (f) below, any additional radiation detection device delivered to the point of entry for the purpose of conducting benchmark radiation measurements or inspections shall be subject to examination within five days in accordance with the procedures set forth in subparagraph (c) above and shall be stored at the point of entry for use in conducting benchmark radiation measurements or inspections. These devices shall be stored in tamper-proof containers, provided by the inspecting Party within a dual-key secure facility pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection. The inspection team shall be permitted to bring replacement batteries and a neutron calibration source into the point of entry for use during each inspection and these shall be examined pursuant to paragraph 4 of section V of the Protocol on Inspection.

(e) The inspecting Party shall be permitted to commence the process of conducting benchmark radiation measurements within 48 hours after completion of the examination referred to in subparagraph (b) above.

(f) The radiation detection devices stored at the point of entry, as required by subparagraph (a) above and pursuant to subparagraph (d) above, shall be used for conducting inspections in accordance with section VII of the Protocol on Inspection. The inspecting Party shall store no fewer than two radiation detection devices, the use of which is permitted pursuant to subparagraph (a) above and which have been examined pursuant to subparagraph (b) or (d) above, in the tamper-proof containers referred to in subparagraph (d) above. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry to conduct an inspection pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team shall be permitted to examine, in the presence of the in-country escort, the tamper-proof containers in which the radiation detection devices are stored, and the devices in those containers, for a period not to exceed four hours:

(i) If the inspection team determines that the containers for at least one of the radiation detection devices have not been tampered with, and that this device is functioning properly then this device shall be used for conducting the inspection.

(ii) If either Party determines that the containers for all stored radiation detection devices have been tampered with, then a radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team and examined by the inspected Party according to paragraph 4 of Section V of the Protocol on Inspection shall be used for conducting the inspection.

(iii) If either Party determines that all containers that have not been tampered with contain devices that are not functioning properly, then a radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team and examined by the inspected Party shall be used for conducting the inspection. In this case, the time for specification of the site to be inspected provided pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(iii) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection shall be delayed, if necessary, until the inspected Party completes its examination of the radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team. In no case shall that delay exceed 12 hours or require the inspection team to delay the date and time for specification of the site to be inspected beyond the 24-hour limit set forth in paragraph 2(a) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection. Once the inspected Party completes its examination of the radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team, the inspection team shall provide, within the above-mentioned 24-hour time limit, the inspected Party with a new date and time for specification of the site to be inspected.

(g) If there is no evidence that containers have been tampered with, and the radiation detection device stored in them is not functioning properly, then the inspecting Party shall return this device and its containers to the territory of the inspecting Party and inform the inspected Party of the cause of the malfunction and measures taken to preclude such malfunctions in the future. If a radiation detection device brought into the point of entry by the inspection team is not used for conducting the inspection, then it shall be stored at the point of entry in tamper-proof containers and removed from the territory of the inspected Party by the inspecting Party once the inspection has been completed.

13. In order to ensure that the inspecting Party is able to exercise its right at a continuous monitoring inspection site to install and operate a permanent continuous monitoring system pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that:

(a) During the installation of equipment at a continuous monitoring inspection site, the inspection team shall provide the inspected Party, as soon as they are available to the inspection team at that continuous monitoring inspection site, with installation drawings, installation manuals and other documentation, including any changes to that documentation as they occur, to be used by the inspection team at that site to install or test the equipment there. such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party as the installation work proceeds, but prior to the commencement of the work described by that documentation.

(b) The inspection team shall provide the inspected Party, at that continuous monitoring inspection site, with manuals and any other documents, including any changes to that documentation as they occur, to be used by the inspection team at that site to operate, maintain, repair or perform additional testing of the equipment there. Such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party prior to its use at the site.

E. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The Parties understand that when the pre-inspection movement restrictions referred to in paragraph 1 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection cease to be in force, that is, not later than one hour after the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the inspection team leader shall designate not less than one subgroup from among the members of the inspection team to inspect vehicles that are leaving the inspection site so that, in accordance with paragraph 3 of section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, the operation of the inspected facility shall not be hampered or delayed.

2. The Parties agree that in carrying out their obligations under paragraph 6 of section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, when an inspection team arrives at a missile operating base, the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team of all missiles, missile stages, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at the missile operating base being inspected, as well as the missiles, missile stages, launchers and support equipment associated with that base and located in the deployment area within which that missile operating base is located.

3. The Parties agree that roads joining non-contiguous areas of a missile support facility are part of that facility. In this connection:

(a) movement along such roads of intermediate-range or shorter- range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, does not mean that such systems have left the missile support facility and does not require notification pursuant to paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of the Treaty.

(b) During inspections of the missile support facility, the inspection team shall be permitted to inspect any vehicle on such roads that is capable of containing:

(i) for the United States of America, the second stage of the Pershing II missile, or the BGM-109G cruise missile;

and (ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the first stage of the SS-12 missile, the stage of the SS-23 missile, the SSC-X-4 cruise missile or the launch stand of the SS-4 missile.

(c) Vehicles capable of containing items listed in subparagraph (b) above that cross roads joining non-contiguous areas of a missile support facility, and vehicles that travel on such roads without entering the non-contiguous areas of the missile support facility these roads join shall not be considered to be leaving an inspection site, as is indicated in paragraph 12 of Section VII of the Protocol on inspection, when they exit from such roads.

4. The Parties agree that for the purpose of paragraph 7 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, the dimensions of a structure, container, vehicle or covered object shall be deemed to be greater than the dimensions of a missile, missile stage, launcher or item of support equipment subject to the Treaty, if each of its measured linear dimensions (length, width, height, diameter) is determined to be 99 percent or more of the corresponding dimensions of the missile, missile stage, launcher or item of support equipment indicated in Section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding. Such a structure, container, vehicle or covered object shall be subject to the inspection procedures set forth in paragraphs 8 through 14 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection.

5. The Parties understand that if the inspection team is unable to carry out the measuring or weighing procedures set forth in Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection either because it has failed to bring agreed equipment to the inspection site or because through no fault of the inspected Party, that equipment cannot function, then the inspected Party shall not be required to demonstrate through other agreed procedures, including by visual observation of the interior, that a container sufficiently large to contain a missile or missile stage subject to the Treaty does not contain such a missile or missile stage.

6. The Parties agree that for the purpose of paragraphs 8 and 14 of Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection, except in a case when a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty is declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5(a) of Article XI of. the Treaty, the in-country escort shall permit the use of portable weighing devices in those cases where the inspected Party decides not to permit visual observation of the interior of a container declared not to contain a missile or missile stage subject to the Treaty.

(b) A container or covered object that is large enough to contain a missile or missile stage subject to the Treaty that the inspected Party declares not to contain such a missile or missile stage shall be deemed heavy enough to contain such a missile or missile stage,if its weight is determined to be 97 percent or more of the weight of such a missile or missile stage that it is large enough to contain. During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5(a) of Article XI of the Treaty, containers that are deemed to be heavy enough to contain such a missile or missile stage shall be subject to inspection by interior visual observation.

F. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The Parties agree that during inspections conducted in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection, each Party shall be permitted to replace inspectors conducting an inspection of the elimination of missile systems in accordance with a schedule determined by the inspecting Party. In so doing, the Parties shall be guided by the following provisions:

(a) Rotation of inspectors shall be carried out not more than once every three weeks and the number of inspectors subject to rotation in each case shall not be less than 50 percent of inspectors present at the inspection site.

(b) The inspecting Party shall notify the inspected Party of its intention to rotate inspectors not less than seven days in advance of the estimated time of arrival of new inspectors at the point of entry. This notification shall contain the information specified in paragraph 1(b) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection, with an indication of whether the inspection team leader is being rotated. In a case when the inspecting Party cannot provide in that notification the information required by paragraph 1(b)(iv) of Section IV of the Protocol on Inspection, it shall notify the inspected Party not less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of such inspectors at the point of entry of the list of inspectors and aircrew members arriving on that flight.

(c) Rotation of inspectors shall be carried out at the elimination site or, if necessary to ensure that not more than 20 inspectors are present at the site at any one time, at the airport nearest the elimination site.

(d) Before the departure of the outgoing inspection team leader, the Parties shall complete an inspection report covering the period since the arrival of that inspection team leader, with an indication of the number of items of each type for which elimination procedures have been completed. To facilitate the preparation of the inspection report by the outgoing inspection team leader, the specific procedures for eliminating the items undergoing elimination at that site shall be completed before the time the outgoing inspection team leader departs the inspection site.

(e) The inspected Party shall not initiate elimination of items until pre-inspection procedures, referred to in paragraph 14 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, for the newly arrived inspectors have been completed. Any delay in the initiation of elimination procedures for the above-mentioned items caused by the arrival of a new inspection team leader shall not exceed three hours.

2. The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the exercise of the duties of inspectors pursuant to paragraphs 1(c) and 1(d) of Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection, the inspected Party shall provide binoculars to inspectors at those sites where missiles are being eliminated by means of launching, burning or explosive demolition, and agree that visual observation of the indicated processes shall be ensured by means of adequate binoculars. The Parties understand that during such elimination, the inspection team shall observe the elimination procedures from a safe distance indicated by the inspected Party.

G. Inspection Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The Parties understand that:

(a) at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, the portal has one rail line and one road, and there is no other exit; and

(b) at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, the portal has one road, and there are two other exits.

2. The Parties agree that, on the basis of reciprocity, the telephone lines provided pursuant to paragraph 5(e) of Section II of the Protocol on Inspection shall include:

(a) for the United States of America, two dedicated direct telephone lines for communications between the portal at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk and the Embassy of the United States of America in Moscow, and one non-dedicated telephone line for communications between the inspection team's living quarters and the portal at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, two dedicated direct telephone lines for communications between the inspection team's living quarters and the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington, D.C., and one non-dedicated telephone line for communications between the inspection team's living quarters and the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco, the AMTORG Corporation in New York, and the portal at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna.

All expenses associated with the use of the non-dedicated telephone lines shall be borne by the inspecting Party. In order to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree that all expenses associated with the installation and operation of the dedicated direct telephone lines shall be borne by the inspected Party.

3. The Parties, referring to paragraph 6 of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, agree to use the equipment listed in Annexes IV and V to this Memorandum, and agree to use this equipment as indicated in Annex V to this Memorandum.

4. The Parties agree that either Party is permitted, at a later date, to install data authentication devices, as provided for in paragraph 6(f) of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, at the continuous monitoring inspection site on the territory of the other Party. Before installation of such devices, their characteristics and methods of use shall be agreed by the Parties.

5. In accordance with paragraph 9 of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, the Parties agree to the following arrangement for using systems of radio communication to permit inspectors patrolling the perimeter of a continuous monitoring inspection site to communicate with the Data Collection Center:

(a) Inspectors shall, while inspecting the perimeter of the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, use their own systems of radio communication that do not contain components permitting them to operate on other than a single, agreed operating frequency.

(b) Inspectors shall, while inspecting the perimeter of the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, use their own systems of radio communication that do not contain components permitting them to operate on other than a single, agreed operating frequency.

(c) The Parties shall agree upon the frequencies to be used for the systems of radio communication referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above prior to the use of such systems.

(d) The inspected Party shall be permitted to examine the systems of radio communication referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above at any time, including at the points of entry and at the continuous monitoring inspection sites, to ascertain that they are capable of operating only on the single, agreed operating frequency.

(e) Until such time as the inspection teams are provided with the systems of radio communication referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, the inspected Party shall make systems of radio communication available to the inspection team but shall maintain such systems under its own control.

6. The Parties agree that, on the basis of reciprocity, the inspected Party shall provide temporary portal facilities for the inspectors conducting continuous monitoring inspections prior to the completion of construction or installation of the permanent buildings provided for in paragraph 6(a) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection. Such temporary facilities shall be provided at the expense of the inspecting Party.

7. The Parties agree that the building for storage of supplies and equipment referred to in paragraph 6(a) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection shall, on the basis of reciprocity, be constructed by the inspected Party, not the inspecting Party.

8. The Parties agree that:

(a) The inspection team shall notify the inspected Party in advance of its intention to conduct an inspection of the agreed perimeter of a continuous monitoring inspection site.

(b) During such an inspection of the agreed perimeter, the inspection team shall only:

(i) ascertain that the integrity of the agreed perimeter is maintained by the inspected Party and that the inspected Party does not take non-agreed actions to change the agreed perimeter, including repair, of the fence; and

(ii) ascertain that the inspected Party has not moved or attempted to move objects over or through the agreed perimeter.

9. The Parties agree that:

(a) In accordance with paragraph 15 of Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection, there shall be not more than 30 inspectors at a continuous monitoring inspection site at any one time.

(b) The schedule for the rotation of inspectors at a continuous monitoring inspection site shall be decided by the inspecting Party.

(c) The inspecting Party shall notify the inspected Party not less than seven days in advance of its intention to rotate inspectors, with an indication of the number and the names of the inspectors rotating into and out of the continuous monitoring inspection site.

(d) Rotation of inspectors shall be carried out at the airport nearest the continuous monitoring inspection site, in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at Izhevsk and in the United States of America at Salt Lake City.

10. The Parties agree that the inspected Party shall bear the expenses of the construction at a continuous monitoring inspection site on its territory of a temperature-controlled and humidity- controlled inspection building to be used for visual observation conducted pursuant to Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection and this Memorandum.

11. The Parties agree that in order to implement the procedures related to the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna set forth in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of Part G of this section and those contained in Part A of Section II of Annex V to this Memorandum, the inspected Party shall use 3.25 meters, not the length of the longest stage of an intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party as specified in section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding, as the length criterion for making the declaration referred to in paragraph 11 of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection.

12. The Parties agree that at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk:

(a) vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall not be weighed; and

(b) all railcars with a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters and all road vehicles with a cargo section with a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall be opened for visual observation of the interior in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 6(c) of Part B of Section II of Annex V to this Memorandum.

The Parties agree that either Party shall be permitted to terminate this arrangement upon six months' notice. Provided that the Parties have agreed on the characteristics and methods of use of weight sensors, six months after such notice is given, such vehicles shall no longer be opened, except as is provided for in section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, and the Parties shall begin to use weight as a criterion for inspection for vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk.

13. The Parties agree that at the-continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna:

(a) vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall not be weighed; and

(b) all vehicles that can contain cargoes with a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site shall be opened for visual observation of their interior in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraphs 5(e) and 5(f) of Part A of Section II of Annex V to this Memorandum.

The Parties agree that either Party shall be permitted to terminate this arrangement upon six months' notice. Provided that the Parties have agreed on the characteristics and methods of use of weight sensors, six months after such notice is given, such vehicles shall no longer be opened, except as is provided for in section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, and the Parties shall begin to use weight as a criterion for inspection for vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site at magna.

14. The Parties, referring to the declaration required by paragraph 11 of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection that begins the inspection process at the portal of a continuous monitoring inspection site, agree to permit the inspecting Party to measure, using the linear measurement devices listed in Section I of Annex IV to this memorandum, missiles and missile stages not contained in launch canisters or shipping containers, as well as those that are contained in launch canisters or shipping containers opened for visual observation of their contents pursuant to paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section, that leave through the portal of its continuous monitoring inspection site, that are declared by the inspected Party to be missiles or missile stages, and that have the following dimensions:

(a) for the United states of America at its continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, missiles and missile stages that have a length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at its continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, missiles and missile stages that have a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters.

15. The Parties agree that:

(a) the inspecting Party shall be permitted to have access to all missiles and missile stages with a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or greater than 1.02 meters leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna for visual observation and, pursuant to paragraph 14 of Part G of this section, dimensional measurement of them if the vehicle transporting such a missile or missile stage has been declared to contain a missile or missile stage of those dimensions; and

(b) non-damaging image producing equipment shall not be installed at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna.

The Parties agree that either Party shall be permitted to terminate the arrangement set forth in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above. The Parties agree that the provisions contained in subparagraph (a) above shall cease to be in effect either nine months after the Party making the decision to terminate it notifies the other Party of such a decision or after non-damaging image producing equipment installed at the portal of the continuous monitoring inspection site at magna becomes operational, if such equipment becomes operational more than nine months after the aforementioned notification has been provided.

16. The inspecting Party shall use the time period specified in paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section for installation, pursuant to paragraph 6(d) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, of non-damaging image producing equipment having the technical characteristics set forth in paragraph 1(j) of Part B of section I of Annex V to this memorandum at the portal of the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna. The installation of such equipment shall commence as soon as the following requirements are met:

(a) The inspecting Party has provided information on the design features of the non-damaging image producing equipment that permits the inspected Party to ascertain that the imaging equipment to be installed at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty and to ascertain that it meets all applicable safety standards. In particular, such information shall include the following:

(i) a description both of the features incorporated into the design of the equipment and into its operation that preclude it from imaging portions of a missile or missile stage that the Parties have excluded from imaging as well as a description of the system for storing and reviewing the data collected by the equipment; and

(ii) a description of the safety features of the imaging system, including complete descriptions of safety control and interlock systems, personnel protection and warning systems, and shielding design requirements.

(b) The Parties have agreed on the methods of use of the non- damaging image producing equipment referred to above.

(c) The building for the use of the non-damaging image producing equipment has been completed.

17. Not later than nine months after the notification referred to in paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section is provided, the Parties shall agree on the methods of use of the non-damaging image producing equipment to be installed pursuant to paragraph 16 of Part G of this Section. Such agreed methods of use shall be applied to types of missiles and missile stages.the inspecting Party is permitted to image pursuant to paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, unless the Parties agree upon different methods of use.

18. The inspecting Party shall provide the inspected Party with a detailed description of the requirements for the building in which the non-damaging image producing equipment shall be installed at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna. Such a description shall include the documentation needed to design and construct the building in which the proposed non-damaging image producing equipment shall be housed, including information on the distance from the source to the detectors, the geometry and size of the detector array, the overall dimensions of the system, and the requirements for electrical and mechanical connections between the non-damaging image producing equipment of the inspecting Party and systems provided by the inspected Party. Once the notification referred to in paragraph 15 of Part G of this Section is made and the detailed description referred to above of the requirements for the building is provided, the inspected Party shall design and then, after reaching agreement with the inspecting Party on the design, shall construct the aforementioned building.

19. The Parties agree that in order to facilitate inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, the leader or any one of the deputy leaders of each continuous monitoring inspection team shall be permitted to make trips between the continuous monitoring inspection site and the embassy of the inspecting Party and to be accompanied by any other member of the inspection team such trips shall be organized upon request of the inspecting Party and shall be made not more than once a week. The Parties understand that during such trips only the papers of the inspectors shall enjoy inviolability; all personal baggage shall be subject to inspection. The Parties agree that the inspected Party shall bear responsibility for the organization of such trips, and that expenses associated with such trips shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

20. The Parties agree that the delivery of supplies to the continuous monitoring inspection sites shall be carried out without unreasonable delay. 21. The Parties understand that the portal and exit monitoring areas at the continuous monitoring inspection sites shall have sufficient lighting to permit monitoring functions to be carried out at night. At the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, such lighting systems shall be provided by the inspecting Party. At the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, such lighting systems shall be provided by the inspected Party.

1. Annexes I, II, III, IV, V and VI to this Memorandum are an integral part of, and have the same force as, this Memorandum.

2. This Memorandum shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

3. Each Party may propose amendments to this Memorandum. Agreed amendments shall enter into force on the date of their signature.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Agreement.

Done at Geneva on December 21, 1989, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the For the Government of the United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative of the Representative of the United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist to the Special Verification Republics Special Verification Commission Commission

I. For United States of America's Flights to: The Union of Soviet AI 1988 (89 et cetera) Socialist Republics The German Democratic ET 400 Republic The Czechoslovak CZ-444444 Socialist Republic II. For Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' Flights to: The United States INF 88-1, 2, et cetera of America 89-1, 2, et cetera The Kingdom of the INF 89-1 (for 1989) Netherlands The Kingdom of CD 2-16-89 (for 1989) Belgium The United Kingdom USSR/001/100 of Great Britain and Northern Ireland The Federal Republic INF-429-4001 (for 1989) of Germany The Republic of Italy ITFNI-289 (for 1989)

I. Navigation Equipment

The airplanes listed in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Part A of Section III of this Memorandum are equipped with on-board navigation systems of the following types:

A. For the United States of America:

1. ILS--Instrument Landing System;

2. INS--Inertial Navigation System;

3. TACAN--Tactical Air Navigation System (short-range and medium-range radio air navigation system);

4. ADF--Automatic Direction Finder; and

5. VOR--Very High Frequency OMNI Range Station.

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. IL-62 and IL-62M. airplanes:

(a) Navigation set:

(i) Precision heading system, TKS-P2;

(ii) Doppler velocity and drift indicator, DISS-013;

(iii) Air data system, SVS-PN-15;

(iv) Short-range radio-navigation system, RSBN-7s;

(v) Short-range navigation system and localizer, KURS MP-2;

(vi) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67; and

(vii) Navigation computer, NV-PB-Ir series 04.

(b) Individual navigation systems and instruments:

(i) Inertial navigation system, I-11;

(ii) Airplane radio reception display, ONS-7;

(iii) Automatic radio compass, ARK-15;

(iv) Radar, GROZA-62;

(v) Radio altimeter, RV-5;

(vi) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67;

(vii) Barometric altimeter, VEM-72 or UVID-30-15; (viii) Barometric altimeter, VM-13 or VD-20;

(ix) Jeger barometric altimeter;

(x) Combined velocity indicator, KUS-730/1100;

(xi) Velocity indicator, US-I;

(xii) Mach number indicator, MS-IK;

(xiii) Magnetic compass, KI-13;

(xiv) Rate-of-climb indicators, VAR-30MK and VAR-75; and

(xv) Outside air temperature indicator, TNV-15.

2. TU-154 airplane:

(a) Navigation set NK-154:

(i) Precision heading system, TKS-P2;

(ii) Doppler velocity and drift indicators, DISS-3P
or DISS-013;

(iii) Air data system, SVS-PN-15-4;

(iv) Short-range radio-navigation system, RSBN-2SA;

(v) Short-range navigation system and localizer,
KURS MP-2; and
(vi) Navigation calculator, NVU-53.

(b) Individual navigation systems and instruments:

(i) Automatic radio compass, ARK-15;

(ii) Radar, GROZA-154;

(iii) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67;

(iv) Radio altimeter, RV-5;

(v) Barometric altimeter, VM-15;

(vi) Altimeter, UVID-15F;

(vii) Velocity indicators, KUS-730/1100 and US-I;and
(viii) Magnetic compass, KI-13.

3. TU-134 airplane:

(a) Navigation equipment:

(i) Heading system, KS-8;

(ii) self-contained navigation system, NAS-lA or
NAS-1A 6K;

(iii) Short-range radio-navigation system, RSBN-2s;

(iv) Automatic radio compass, ARK-11;

(v) Radar, ROZ-1;

(vi) Navigation and localizer equipment, KURS MP;

(vii) Velocity indicator, KUS-1200 or KUS-730/1100;

(viii) Altimeter, VD-20;

(ix) Altimeter, UVID-30-15;
(x) Rate-of-climb indicator, VAR-30M;

(xi) Low-altitude radar altimeter, RV-UM; and
(xii) Magnetic compass, KI-13.

(b) Depending upon the modification of the airplane,
the following additional equipment may be
installed:

(i) Airplane distance measuring equipment, SD-67;

(ii) Self-contained navigation system, NAS-1-134;

(iii) Automatic radio compass, ARK-15; and
(iv) Low-altitude altimeter, RV-5.

4. AN-124 airplane:

(a) Navigation-piloting set, A-820;

(b) Self-contained navigation system (three-channel
inertial, system), A-826M;

(c) Short-range navigation system and localizer,A-827M;

(d) Long-range radio-navigation system, A-723; and
(e) Two on-board radars, A-822-10 and A-822-20.

II. Airplane Routes

A. For United States of America's Inspection Airplane Flights
to:

G.T.LEMUR;

G.T.NALIM, Vitim;

G.T.RAMIS, Kirensk;

G.T.PIKET, Bratsk;

G.T.DOMOR, Osa, Irkutsk,
Bol'shoye Goloustnoye,
Mukhino

The German To Leipzig: Same as inbound
Democratic G.T.SEGAL, TRT, FLD,
Republic ANKER, STENA, FWE,
NUF, RSF, Schkeuditz

The Czechoslovak To Prague: Same as inbound
Socialist Cheb, Rakovnik,
Republic Ruzyne

B. For Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' Inspection
Airplane Flights to:

Missile Operating Bases:

Postavy, Vetrino, Polotsk, Smorgon', Lida, Gezgaly, Slonim,
Ruzhany, Zasimovichi, Mozyr', Petrikov, Zhitkovichi,
Rechitsa, Slutsk, Slutsk, Lutsk, Brody, Chervonograd,
Slavuta, Belokorovichi, Lipniki, Vysokaya Pech', Korosten',
Lebedin, Glukhov, Akhtyrka, Sovetsk, Gusev, Malorita, Pinsk,
Vyru, Aluksne, Ostrov, Karmelava, Ukmerge, Taurage, Kolomyya,
Stryy, Skala-Podol'skaya, Lapichi, Kattakurgan, Stan'kovo,
Tsel', Slobudka, Bayram-Ali.

Missile Support Facilities:

Votkinsk, Volgograd, Postavy, Gezgaly, Mozyr', Lutsk,
Belokorovichi, Lebedin, Kolosovo, Zherebkovo, Sarny, Bataysk,
Kapustin Yar, Serpukhov, Krasnodar, Lesnaya, Kazan', Kamenka,
Petropavlovsk, Stan'kovo, Jelgava, Aral'sk, Sverdlovsk.

B. Inspection sites accessed from point of entry Ulan Ude:

Missile operating Bases:

Novosibirsk, Drovyanaya, Barnaul, Kansk, Pashino, Gornyy,
Novosysoyevka, Semipalatinsk, Saryozek.

Missile Support Facilities:

Novosibirsk, Drovyanaya, Kansk, Barnaul, Chita, Balkhash,
Saryozek.

II. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

A. Inspection sites accessed from point of entry Washington,
D.C.:

Missile Support Facilities:

Martin Marietta, Middle River, Maryland; Redstone Arsenal,
Huntsville, Alabama; Ft. Sill, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma; Complex
16, Cape Canaveral, Florida; Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant,
Marshall, Texas.

B. Inspection sites accessed from point of entry San Francisco,
California:

Missile Support Facilities:

Hercules Plant #1, Magna, Utah; Air Force Plant 19, San
Diego, California; Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah; Ft.

Huachuca, Ft. Huachuca, Arizona; Pueblo Depot Activity,
Pueblo, Colorado; Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arizona.

2. Portable weighing Devices (quantity for each inspection
team):

(a) 4 Heavy-duty portable scales, General
Electrodynamics, Model 500B (9 metric-ton load
capacity);

(b) 1 Readout device; and
(c) 1 Cable set.

3. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack;
(b) 1 Exposure meter, Gossen, Lunasix-3;

(c) 1 Tripod, Susis, Model 520 with carrying case
Model Number 251; and
(d) 1 Assortment of photographic film.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight, Model FKB-2M;

(b) 1 Compass, Azimuth;

(c) 1 Sealing device with a set of tamper-indicating
wire and seals; and
(d) 1 Officer's Ruler.

B. For the United States of America:

1. Linear measurement Devices (quantity for each
inspector):

(a) 1 30 meter measuring tape, Lufkin, Model HY30cm;

(b) 1 3 meter measuring tape, Lufkin, Model RY23cm;

(c) 1 24 ounce (680 gram) plumb bob, Thorpe-Smith;

(d) 1 50 yard (46 meter) plumb-bob cord, Duraplex;

(e) 4 Plumb-bob target, Leitz, model 126-25; and
(f) 1 pi tape, pi Tape Corporation.

2. Portable Weighing Devices (quantity for each inspection
team):

4 Heavy-duty portable scales, General
Electrodynamics, model 500B (9 metric-ton load
capacity).

3. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 1 Camera body, Polaroid, Model 60OSE;

(b) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack;
(c) 1 Lens, Mamiya 75mm/f5.6 with viewfinder;
(d) 1 Flash, Vivitar, 285-HV;

(e) 1 Exposure meter, Pentax, Digital Spotmeter;
(f) 1 Spare 6OOSE film back, Polaroid, 601-008;
(g) 1 Tripod, Stitz Quick Release;

(h) 1 20 inch (51 centimeter) cable release, Velbo,
Model Vel-27-1035;

(i) 8 Eight-pack of photographic film, Polaroid,
Types 665, 667, 669;

(j) 1 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and
exposure meter;

(k) 1 Range rod point, Leitz, Model 8078-42;
(l) 1 Aluminum case, Zero-Halliburton, 110-121;
(m) 1 Package of lens paper, Kodak;

(n) 1 Lens brush;

(o) 1 2.5 meter range rod, Leitz, model 8078-42; and

(p) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight, Kidde Bright Star (safety
approved);
(b) 1 Magnetic compass, U.S. Lensatic; and
(c) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals.

II. Additional equipment for use during inspections conducted
pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty.

The following equipment shall be used only to inspect launch
canisters associated with a type of missile not subject to the
Treaty that are declared by the inspected Party to contain such a
missile.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Radiation detection device for use during inspections
conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI
of the Treaty consisting of:

(a) 2 Neutron detector with signal/power cables;
(b) 2 Electronic counter with instruction manual,
Eberline, model ESP-2 modified,
(c) 10 Plastic bag for weather protection;

(d) 1 Coordinate grid and aluminum frame;

(e) 1 Calibration source;

(f) 1 Tool kit, Jensen Tools, Model JTK-6;

(g) 30 Miscellaneous spare batteries, sizes C and D;

(h) 1 Tripod, Airlift, model BG modified;

(i) 1 Measuring tape;

(j) 1 Plumb bob and line, Thorpe-smith;

(k) 1 9 inch (23 centimeter) level, master mechanic,
model 9MTT-9;

(l) 2 Battery-powered light, Maglight, Model ML-2;

(m) 3 Programmable calculator with instruction
manual, Hewlett-Packard, Model HP-27S; and
(n) 2 Thermometer.

2. Equipment for use during benchmark radiation
measurements conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Part
D of Section III of this Annex:

(a) 2 Radiation detection device, the composition of
which is indicated in paragraph 1 above;
(b) 2 Portable computer (Toshiba, Model T1100 Plus)
with printer (Diconix, Model 150), with
instruction manuals and voltage changers,
Interpower; and
(c) 1 Software package, Golden Software, surfer
(graphics program for contour maps).

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Radiation detection device, SRPS-2, consisting of:

(a) Neutron detector unit;

(b) Electronic unit; and
(c) Voltage changer and charger unit.

2. The SRPS-2 shall have the following basic
characteristics:

(a) Sensitivity to fission spectrum neutrons is not
lower than 100 pulses per neutron per square
centimeter;
(b) Three periods of exposure: 0.5 second, 5 seconds
and 50 seconds;

(c) Error in exposure time: 4 percent;

(d) Time of collection of background pulses for each
period: 8 seconds, 80 seconds and 50 seconds,
respectively; and
(e) Power source: 24-30 volt direct current (battery)
or 220 volt alternating current, 50 hertz.

3. The Parties agree that, prior to use by an inspection
team of the radiation detection device, the Parties
shall agree on additional characteristics of that
device.

III. Methods of Use of Equipment

A. The Parties agree to use linear measurement devices in the
following manner:

1. Linear measurement devices shall be used to determine
length, width and height of objects by measuring the
straight-line distance between the extreme points of
such objects or, if it shall be required, between
tangents drawn perpendicular to the direction of
measurement from the outside points of curved surfaces.

2. The diameter of a missile, a missile stage or any other
cylindrical object shall be determined by measuring the
circumference, by directly measuring the diameter, or by
measuring the distance between parallel lines that are
vertical tangents to the cylindrical surface of the
object and that lie in a plane perpendicular to the
axis of the object. Such measurements shall be taken at
several points along the length of that object.

3. In determining the dimensions of an object, each
dimension shall be measured at least two times. If the
results of the first two measurements are within one
percent of each other, then the results of these two
measurements shall be averaged to determine the
dimension of the object. If the results of the first two
measurements are not within one percent of each other,
additional measurements shall be taken until results
from two measurements are obtained that are within one
percent of each other. The results of these two
measurements shall be averaged to determine the
dimension of the object.

B. The Parties agree to use cameras in the following manner:

1. The Parties understand the phrase "camera systems which
are capable of producing duplicate, instant development
photographic prints contained in paragraph 9 of Section
VI of the Protocol on Inspection, to allow the use of
one camera mounted on a tripod and the taking of two
photographs in sequence with that camera.

2. The Parties agree that before the inspected Party takes
photographs, one copy of which shall be given to each of
the Parties, the inspected Party shall be permitted to
take test photographs that shall be the property of the
inspected Party.

3. The Parties agree that photographs taken during an
inspection shall show a range rod next to the object or
building being photographed.

4. The Parties understand that the procedures agreed upon
with respect to the taking of photographs shall apply at
all inspection sites, including at continuous monitoring
inspection sites.

C. The Parties agree to use portable weighing devices in the
following manner:

1. The inspected Party shall facilitate the inspection
team's use of the portable weighing devices.

2. Before weighing an object during an inspection, the
inspected Party shall be permitted to test and calibrate
the portable weighing devices of the inspecting Party by
using them to weigh its own calibrated reference load.

3. The equipment of the inspected Party shall be used to
lift the object being weighed and to position it on the
portable weighing devices. The inspected Party shall
operate such equipment.

4. In determining the weight of an object first a test
weighing of the object shall be conducted. Then that
object shall be weighed two times. If the results of
these two weight measurements are within two percent of
each other then the results of these two measurements
shall be averaged to determine the weight of the
object. If the results of these two weight measurements
are not within two percent of each other, the portable
weighing devices shall be calibrated and the object
shall be weighed two more times. If after this the
difference between the results of the two weight
measurements still exceeds two percent, then the
portable weighing devices shall be replaced and the
weighing procedures shall be repeated.

5. The inspection team shall be permitted continuous visual
observation of portable weighing devices, calibrated
reference loads and the object weighed throughout all
testing, calibrating and weighing processes.

6. If weighing is done by the compression method using the
portable weighing devices listed in Section I of this
Annex, then the inspected Party shall position the
object being weighed on the portable weighing devices.
Before taking any reading from a portable weighing
device, the inspection team shall ascertain that
the entire weight of the object being weighed is borne
by the platform of the portable weighing device, or in
the case of the use of several devices, that the entire
weight of the object being weighed is borne by the
platforms of those portable weighing devices. If the
object being weighed is a launcher or other vehicle,
then before the inspected Party positions that launcher
or other vehicle on the portable weighing devices, it
shall ensure that the tires are inflated to the maximum
air pressure for which the tires are designed.

7. If while weighing an object by the compression method
using the portable weighing devices listed in Section I
of this Annex more than one portable weighing device is
used, the weight of the object shall be determined by
adding together the readings indicated on all portable
weighing devices. To the extent possible, the readings
of all portable weighing devices shall be taken
simultaneously.

8. If the inspected Party decides that an object must be
weighed on a weight-bearing device, then it shall be
weighed together with the weight-bearing device, and
then removed from it. Then the weight-bearing device
shall be weighed separately. The weight of the object
shall be determined by taking the difference of the
results of these two weight measurements.

D. Radiation Detection Devices

1. The Parties agree to use the radiation detection devices
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the
following manner:

Prior to the use of radiation detection devices, the Parties
shall agree on the methods of use of the devices.

2. The Parties agree to use the radiation detection devices
of the United States of America in the following manner:

(a) Radiation detection devices shall be used to
measure fast neutron flux intensity emanating from
a launch canister associated with a type of missile
not subject to the Treaty and declared by the
inspected Party to contain such a missile.

(b) Prior to the use of radiation detection devices
during inspections, benchmark radiation
measurements shall be taken. Such measurements
shall be taken on two SS-20 missiles and two SS-25
missiles contained in their respective launch
canisters. Benchmark radiation measurements shall
be taken on launch canisters chosen by the
inspecting Party from nine launch canisters of each
type presented by the inspected Party. These
measurements shall be used to determine that the
fast neutron fluxes associated with these systems
differ significantly in both level and contour
patterns. The results of each benchmark radiation
measurement on the SS-25 missile shall be used as
the basis for comparison with the result of the
corresponding measurement taken during inspections
conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4, 5 of Article
XI of the Treaty.

(c) Before taking benchmark radiation measurements, the
radiation detection devices shall be calibrated
using a standard neutron source. For the SS-20 and
SS-25 missiles contained in their respective launch
canisters, benchmark radiation measurements shall
be taken by the inspected Party on a horizontal
plane located at a distance no greater than 0.5
meter below the launch canister, itself in a
horizontal position. The area of this horizontal
plane for both the SS-20 and the SS-25 missiles
contained in their respective launch canisters
shall be that portion of a four-meter-by-four-meter
plane that can, considering the physical
limitations of the type of launcher involved in the
measurement, be utilized for the taking of such
measurements. The center of this horizontal plane
shall be located below the axis of the launch
canister at a point corresponding to the joint
between the front cover of the launch canister and
its body near the location of maximum neutron flux.

(d) Benchmark radiation measurements for both the SS-20
and the SS-25 missiles contained in their
respective launch canisters shall be taken:

(i) at the 57 points accessible for both the SS-20
and SS-25 missiles contained in their
respective launch canisters at the junctions
of a 0.5-meter grid on the four-meter-by-four-
meter plane described in subparagraph (c)
above, and at up to 24 additional points on
this plane at positions to be agreed by the
Parties during the taking of such
measurements;

(ii) at 0.5-meter intervals along the top of the
cylindrical portion of the launch canister
from the location of the joint of the front
cover of the launch canister and its body to
a point located at a distance of
approximately-six meters from the front of the
launch canister (a total of nine points); and

(iii) along a vertical line located to the left side
of the launch canister in the plane of the
joint between the front cover of the launch
canister and its body, perpendicular to the
horizontal plane on which measurements were
taken, and no more than 0.5 meter from the
launch canister (a total of seven points).

(e) Two readings shall be taken at each point. If the
higher reading differs by more than 30 percent from
the lower reading, then a third reading shall be
taken. If the third reading differs from each of
the two previous readings by more than 30 percent,
then the radiation detection device shall be
recalibrated. The average of two readings that are
within 30 percent of each other and whose values
are closest to each other shall be recorded as the
measurement for that point. The result of the
benchmark radiation measurement for that point
shall be the average of the corresponding
measurements for the two missiles of each type
selected for measuring.

(f) For the entire period during which the benchmark
radiation measurements are being taken, the
inspecting Party shall be permitted to observe the
measurement process to assure itself that the
process corresponds to the agreed procedures.
Recording, processing, and graphic representation
of data shall be carried out jointly by the
Parties.

(g) upon completion of the measurements on two SS-20
missiles and two SS-25 missiles contained in their
respective launch canisters, the inspecting Party
shall select one SS-20 missile launch canister and
one SS-25 missile launch canister to be opened. The
inspecting Party, by visual observation, shall
confirm that the corresponding type of missile is
located in each launch canister.

(h) The results of the benchmark radiation measurements
shall be signed by both Parties and each of the
Parties shall retain one copy. If the results of
the benchmark radiation measurements confirm that
the fast neutron fluxes associated with the SS-20
and the SS-25 missiles contained in their
respective launch canisters differ sufficiently
from each other in both level and contour patterns,
then the result of each benchmark radiation
measurement on the SS-25 missile shall be used as
the basis for comparison with the result of the
corresponding measurement taken during inspections
conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of
Article XI of the Treaty.

(i) Before taking measurements during an inspection
conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of
Article XI of the Treaty, the radiation detection
devices shall be calibrated using a standard
neutron source, and then measurements shall be
taken on a horizontal plane whose location
corresponds to the location of the horizontal
plane described in subparagraph (c) above. Such
measurements shall be taken on that plane at up to
ten points chosen by the inspection team such
points shall be selected from points common to the
benchmark radiation measurements taken on the SS-20
and SS-25 missiles on the four-meter-by-four-meter
horizontal plane. In addition, measurements shall
be taken at up to four points along the top of the
cylindrical portion of the launch canister from the
location of the joint of the front cover of the
launch canister and its body to a point located at
a distance of approximately six meters from the
front of the launch canister.

(j) Two readings shall be taken at each point. If the
higher reading differs by more than 30 percent from
the lower reading, then a third reading shall be
taken. If the third reading differs from each of
the two previous readings by more than 30 percent,
then the radiation detection device shall be
recalibrated. The average of two readings that are
within 30 percent of each other and whose values
are closest to each other shall be recorded as the
measurement for that point.

(k) If during an inspection conducted pursuant to
paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty the
result of each measurement obtained for a
particular launch canister differs by not more than
50 percent from the result of the corresponding
benchmark radiation measurement on the SS-25
missile contained in its launch canister, then the
missile shall not be considered to be a missile
subject to the Treaty.

(l) If during an inspection conducted pursuant to
paragraph 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty the
result of any measurement differs from the result
of the corresponding benchmark radiation
measurement on the SS-25 missile contained in its
launch canister by more than 50 percent, then the
launch canister shall be opened by the inspected
Party in order that the inspecting Party be able to
confirm by visual observation of the interior
portion that the missile inside the launch canister
is not a missile subject to the Treaty. In any
event, after the radiation detection measurements
are taken on all launch canisters subject to
inspection at the inspection site, the inspection
team shall select one launch canister that must be
opened by the inspected Party in order that the
inspecting Party be able to confirm by visual
observation of the interior portion that the
missile inside the launch canister is not a missile
subject to the Treaty. The Parties shall agree on
specific visual observation procedures that permit
this confirmation. Until such time as the Parties
agree to such procedures, they shall, during the
conduct of inspections using radiation detection
devices, use, on all missile launch canisters
opened for visual observation of their interior
portion, both visual observation methods
demonstrated during the taking of benchmark
radiation measurements, that is, the removal of the
front cover of the SS-25 launch canister and the
opening of the portholes in the front section of
the SS-25 launch canister.

1. Portal:

(a) Vehicle dimensional measuring equipment: Infrared
profiler consisting of a horizontal and vertical
array of infrared lights and sensors:

(i) Infrared light and sensor pairs, Pulnix, Model
PH-30, assembled with address boards in
vertical and horizontal arrays;

(ii) Data processing computer, Zenith, Model ZWL
184-02 with external 5 1/4 inch floppy disk
drive (road profiler);

(iii) Data processing computer, Zenith, Model ZWL
0200-04 with external 5 1/4 inch floppy disk
drive (rail profiler);

(iv) Printer, IBM, model Pro Printer II for data of
a parallel type;

(v) Junction box, Hoffman, Model A3OH24DLB with
profiler preprocessor, power supply, heater
and fiber-optic transmitter and receiver; and

(vi) Fiber-optic cable, AT&T Model 3DFX-012
(connecting the junction box to the Data
Collection Center or the inspector's exit
shelter).

(b) weight sensors:

(i) single-axle, weigh-in-motion scales with a
maximum capacity of 91 tons, PAT Equipment,
model DAw 400;

(ii) Data processing computer, Zenith, model ZWL
184-02 with external 5 1/4 inch floppy 'disk
drive;

(iii) Printer, IBM, Model Pro Printer II for data of
a parallel type;

(iv) Portable scales, U.S. Scale, Model 760 RES;
and

(v) Scale transport trailer, U.S. Scale, Model
TLR-7KZ.

(c) Non-damaging image producing equipment:

(i) X-ray imaging system, Bechtel National, Inc.,
CARGOSCAN that includes:

- Imaging system, American Science and
Engineering;

- X-ray source--Varian Associates x-ray
linear accelerator, Linatron, Model 3000; and
- Vehicle transport system, control system,
data processing equipment, data display
system, safety system and radiation
protection structures.

(ii) Technical characteristics of the non-damaging
image producing equipment:

- Nominal radiation energy spectrum of the
CARGOSCAN system:

Photon Energy Relative Number of Photons
Interval (Mev) per Interval

0.0-0.2 30
0.2-0.5 75
0.5-0.9 100
0.9-2.0 60
2.0-3.0 40
3.0-4.0 20
4.0-6.0 8
6.0-8.0 3
8.0-9.0 1

- The nominal number of x-ray pulses per
second shall be:

-- 60 pulses per second for 60 hertz
electrical power; or
-- 50 pulses per second for 50 hertz
electrical power;

- Each pulse shall have a nominal duration
of 4.2 microseconds at 50 percent of peak
power;

- Maximum average x-ray irradiation dose
rate generated by the Linatron
accelerator measured at a distance of 1.0
meter from the anode along the central
axis shall be no more than:

-- 780 rads per minute for 60 hertz
electrical power; or
-- 670 rads per minute for 50 hertz
electrical power;

- For a railcar with a width less than or
equal to 3.1 meters, the distance from
the anode of the accelerator along the
central axis to the near wall of the
railcar shall be no less than 3.0 meters;

- The nominal value of the angle of the x-
ray beam in the vertical plane shall be
28.5 degrees; the width of the maximum
intensity portion of the collimated ray
in front of the near wall of the railcar
shall be less than or equal to 1.0
centimeter, and the full width at half
maximum amplitude of the beam at that
location shall be less than or equal to
1.6 centimeters; the Linatron x-ray
source and sensors of the image producing
system shall be securely fastened in a
fixed position during the exposure
period; the pulse length, amplitude and
energy distribution of any pulse
shall be within 20 percent of their
respective nominal values;

- The nominal resolution of the system,
which corresponds to information depicted
by one pixel, is 7.2 millimeters at the
vertical midplane along the length of the
inspected railcar;

- The beam shall be mechanically controlled
by means of a shutter opaque to x-ray
radiation

- The speed of the railcar past the beam
shall be:

-- 18 centimeters per second plus or
minus 20 percent for 60 hertz
electrical power; or 15 centimeters
per second plus or minus 20 percent
for 50 hertz electrical power, and

- The number of pulses per pixel required
to obtain the image is three.

(d) System for measuring the length and diameter of the
second stage of the SS-25 missile:

The Parties shall agree on equipment for measuring
the length and diameter of the second stage of the
SS-25 missile inside its launch canister.

(e) Surveillance systems:

(i) Character inserter, VCS, Model CI-100;

(ii) Monochrome cameras with a fixed field of view,
Cohu, model 4835-2050/ESO8L (exterior) with
model SS-300 sunshield and model
4815-2050/ESO8 (interior);

(iii) Adjustable mounting heads, Vicon, Model
V24OOAH (exterior) and Pelco, model CM 1400
(interior);

(iv) Camera tower assembly for 7.6 meter camera
mounting height Tri-Ex, model T-15;

(v) Tower junction box assembly;

(vi) Video distribution amplifier, Grass Valley,
model 8501 and rack mount framer model
85OOT2-120;

(vii) 9 inch (23 centimeter) television monitor,
Conrac, Model 2640/C9;

(viii) Time-lapse video recorder, RCAI model TC3930;

(ix) Video foredrop (fixed measuring rods for video
imaging);

(x) Fiber-optic transmitters, American Fibertek,
Model MT-10 (exterior) and Model RT-10
(interior);

(xi) Fiber-optic transmitter power module, American
Fibertek, model PS-24;

(xii) Fiber-optic cable, AT&T, Model 3DFX-012;

(xiii) Fiber-optic receivers, American Fibertek,
Model MR-10 (exterior) and Model RR-10
(interior);

(xiv) Mounting frame for fiber-optic devices,
American Fibertek, Model SR-20/1;

(xv) Exterior lighting mounting poles or towers,
12.2 meter mounting height;

(xvi) Coaxial cable, RG 11;

(xvii) Quartz halogen lighting, Sylvania, Model 500
PAR 56Q/WFL and lampholder, Stanco, model
5600E;

(xviii) Low-pressure sodium lighting, Quality
Lighting, Part Number 210-30F-24OLPs-180-50H;

luminaire support, Quality Lighting, Model
22-6;

(xix) Manual video switcher, Pelco, Model VS 520
B/RKS-20;

(xx) Synchronization generator, Lenco, Model PSG
412; and

(xxi) Video switcher, Grass Valley, Model 20-TEN.

(f) Vehicle sensors and control equipment:

(i) Induction loop sensor:

- Induction loop wire, 14 AWG (American
wire Gauge), Belden, Model 9438; - Lead-
in wire, 14 AWG (American Wire Gauge);

- Rail induction loop sensor assembly,
including 1.0 inch (2.54 centimeter)
conduit;

- Digital control modules and cables
(road), Detector Systems, Model 810A and
model 801A; and

- Analog control modules and cables (rail),
Sarasota, Model 215B and Model SB;

(ii) Traffic lights, Econolite, Model T-26G1AP1A
and Model T-A26B3APA; and

(iii) Semaphore gate, John Green, Model P-5000.

(g) Data Collection Center:

(i) Color graphics display monitor (for the portal
operator's console), Mitsubishi, Model
HJ-6905;

(ii) Plasma display (for the exit operator's
console), Deeco, Model M3-P1-EV;

(iii) Exit traffic control panels;

(iv) Portal traffic control panels;

(v) Video printer (for the data review console),
Tektronix, Model HCO2;

(vi) Printer, IBM, Model Pro Printer II for data of
a serial type;

(vii) Console frame (for the exit operator's
console).

(viii) Console frame (for the portal operator's
console);

(ix) Console-frame (for the data review console);

(x) Central processing unit board, Force, Model
SYS68K/CPU-5A;

(xi) Serial input/output board, Force, model
SYS68K/SIO-2;

(xii) Video digitizing board, Imaging Technologies,
model FG-100 1024-3-U-V-O;

(xiii) Dynamic RAM board (2 megabyte), Force, Model
SYS68K/DRAM-2;

(xiv) Static RAM/ROM/EPROM board, Force, Model
SYS68K/RR-1;

(xv) Winchester/floppy disk drive controller,
Force, Model SYS68K/WFC-I;

(xvi) Winchester/floppy disk drive and cable, Force,
Model SYS68K/WFMOD-80;

(xvii) Winchester/floppy disk drive and cable, Force,
Model SYS68K/WFMOD-20;

(xviii) Digital input board, XYCOM, Model XVME-212;

(xix) Digital output board, XYCOM, Model XVME-220;

(xx) System controller unit clock module, Force,
Model SYS68K/ASCU-2;

(xxi) Magnetic-tape controller card and cable, Micro
Computer Technology, Model MCT-6020-02;

(xxii) Computer, IBM, 7532 Industrial model 111 with
512K RAM, 1.2 megabyte floppy drive, 20
megabyte hard disk unit with controller card,
and keyboard;

(xxiii) Chassis, I.M. Systems, Model IMS-88-SNL-05;

(xxiv) Extender cards, Dawn VME Systems, Models
VMEXB-JIS, VMEXV-12D, and VMEXB-J2S;

(xxv) Display adapter, IBM, Model Feature Code 6257;

(xxvi) Expansion memory card, AST, Model ADVP-512
Advantage Premium (with daughter card) with
two megabyte RAM and two serial and one
parallel ports;

(xxvii) Tape controller card, Flagstaff Engineering,
Part Number 8820-T;

(xxviii) Video digitizing board, Matrox, Part Number
PIP-512B;

(xxix) Hard disk unit, Core International, Part
Number.AT 150;

(xxx) Disk controller card, Core International, Part
Number CNT-HCF;

(xxxi) Streaming tape drive with controller, Core
International, Model CT 150-IB;

(xxxii) Magnetic-tape drive, Kennedy, Model 9610;

(xxxiii) Graphics adaptor, Metheus, Model UGA 1104;

(xxxiv) Display monitor, IBM, Model 7544;

(xxxv) Input/output panel assembly including fiber-
optic modems, AT&T, Model ODL-Rs232-2; and

(xxxvi) Fiber-optic transceiver set, Positronix, Model
1132A.

(h) Communications equipment:

(i) Facsimile equipment, Xerox, Model 7010;

(ii) Telephone system, GTE, Starlog SBCS "C"
Package;

(iii) Intercom system, Executone, Model CB800;

(iv) Base station radio, Motorola, Flexar Series
Model L23TRK 3102H (indicates where the
manufacturer's lot number will be included);

(v) Fiber-optic cable for interprocessor
communications, AT&T, Model 3DFXO12;

(vi) Hand-held radio, Motorola, Expo Series Model
H99SP/021H; and

(vii) Antenna, Cushcraft, model ARX-2.

(i) Power equipment:

(i) Back-up power generator (250 kilovolt-ampere,
50 hertz), MBI Services, Model DMT-250C;

(ii) 800 ampere automatic transfer switch, 0NAN,
Model OT III;

(iii) Portal uninterruptible power supply (15
kilovolt-ampere, 50 hertz - 60 hertz), Custom
Power, Series 4-120-15K3NT;

(iv) Exit uninterruptible power supply (6
kilovolt-ampere, 50 hertz - 60 hertz), Custom
Power, Series 4-120-6K3NT;

(v) Generator fuel storage tank, 500 gallons (1890
liters);

(vi) 300 kilovolt-ampere main transformer, MGM,
Model T-30OHA-3;

(vii) 75 kilovolt-ampere transmission line
transformer, Stiles and Associates, Model
T75HA120-4;

(viii) Distribution panel, Stiles and Associates,
Model SRE4-25w; and

(ix) 37.5 kilovolt-ampere remote transformer,
Stiles and Associates, Model T37HA4-120.

(j) Cables, as required.

(k) Office equipment, as required.

2. Exit:

(a) Vehicle dimensional measuring equipment (as
described in paragraph 1 above);

(b) Weight sensors: Weigh-in-motion scale (as described
in paragraph 1 above);

(c) Surveillance systems (as described in paragraph 1
above);

(d) Vehicle sensors and control equipment: Induction
loop sensors, traffic lights and semaphore gates
(as described in paragraph 1 above);

(e) Elements of the inspector's exit shelter: Data
collection equipment and exit operator's console
(as described in paragraph 1 above); and

(f) Cables, as required.

B. Listed below is the equipment, including its characteristics,
to be installed initially at the continuous monitoring inspection
site at Magna. The inspecting Party shall be permitted, as required
for maintenance, repair or replacement of the equipment listed
below, to substitute for specific items of equipment other
equipment that, as agreed at the time of substitution by the
Parties, has a similar purpose and characteristics similar to the
characteristics of the equipment listed below. such substitution
shall not be deemed to be an amendment to this Memorandum.

1. Portal:

(a) Technical surveillance system for remote
measurement of vehicle dimensions:

(i) Television camera with a fixed field of view,
KT-2;

(ii) Camera control unit with controller, BUK YBM
3.558.040;

(iii) Camera switching unit, BKK YBM 3.613.004;

(iv) Control console, PU-I;

(v) Multi-channel power source, MIP-I; and

(vi) Video monitors, models VK5OVlOO and Standard.

Power is supplied by a 220 volt alternating current, 50 hertz
system. Illumination of the monitored object must be between 100
and 10,000 lux.

(b) Kontrol'-1 system for monitoring the passage of
vehicles at the portal:

(i) Small infrared transmitter, MI 6.03.000;
(ii) Small infrared receiver, MP 6.02.000;

(iii) Magnetometric modules for detecting the
presence of vehicles, B1 E1-1106 and B2
E1-1107;

(iv) Data collection console, PI E1-1105.02.000;

(v) Equipment for connecting and processing data
from infrared receivers and magnetometric
modules, BE E1-1105.01.000;

(vi) Metal supports with mountings for installing
sensors;

(vii) Footings for setting up supports;

(viii) Junction box, 6.04.000, for connecting
infrared receivers, infrared transmitters and
magnetometric modules; and

(ix) Lightning protection units BGZ 6.05.000 and
BGZ 6.05.000-02.

Wavelength of the infrared transmission by the infrared
transmitter is 0.9 micrometer; the power of the
transmitted pulse is no greater than 0.1 watt. The
magnetometric modules are passive, non-transmitting sensing
elements.

Power is supplied by a 220 volt alternating current, 50
hertz system, and by a 24 volt direct current system.

(c) Closed-circuit television system:

(i) Television cameras with a fixed field of view,
KTP-63 and KTP-63-1;

(ii) Camera decoder units (units for controlling
the cameras), BKD-2 and BKD-2-1;

(iii) Control console, PU-85;

(iv) Aiming device (device for mounting and
orienting a camera in a fixed position),
UN-18; and

(v) Video monitor, VK50V100.

Power is supplied by a 220 volt alternating current, 50
hertz system. Illumination of the monitored object must be between
50 and 5,000 lux.

(d) Equipment for, indicating gate position and
controlling traffic lights:

(i) Gate position indicating sensor, DKV EA
837.24.000;

(ii) Traffic light, Type 211;

(iii) Central console for indicating gate position
and controlling traffic lights, TsPU EA
837.21.000; and

(iv) Traffic light control unit (unit for switching
the traffic lights), BUS EA 837.23.000.

(e) Data Collection Center: Container-type building
consisting of four interconnected containers:

(i) Personal computer with printer;

(ii) Video recorder, Elektronika, VM 12;

(iii) Fire alarm system equipment, KSP-019-20/60-2;

and

(iv) Portable measuring rod and tape measure.

(f) Power supply system:

(i) Transformer, TSZM-63.74OM5;

(ii) Static converter, 6DK.294.126;

(iii) Uninterrupted power supply unit,
ABP-24-230-2.5-50 UKhL4;

(iv) Power distribution panel, PR11-30552-21TZ,
including automatic cutoff switches, A-3716
FUZ and AP50V-3MG;

(v) Power distribution panel, PR11-3046-2lTZ,
including AYe2O.46-10B-00U3 UKhL4 automatic
cutoff switches;

(vi) Power distribution panel, Shch03l-41 UKhL4;

(vii) Uninterrupted power supply unit, ABP-1-16x5Ox3
UKhL4;

(viii) Master switch, YaV 332;

(ix) Automatic cutoff switch, AYe2Ol6-10NUZ;

(x) Junction boxes, K316 and K3NA16;

(xi) Step-down transformer, YaTP-0.25,220/36 V;

(xii) Rotary switch, PPZ-100/N2-56B;

(xiii) Distribution panel, OPV-6;

(xiv) Storage battery, 6ST190L; and

(xv) Storage battery housing with connector.

(g) Communications equipment:

(i) Internal telephone communication system,
Kaskad-106;

(ii) Base station radio, Angstrom; and

(iii) Hand-held radio, Angstrom.

(h) Cables, as required, and metal cable stands no more
than 140 centimeters high.

(i) Office equipment, as required.

(j) Non-damaging image producing equipment:

(i) Automated system that includes:

- A scanning device (manipulator);

- A radiation source;

- Receiving devices;

- Process control equipment;

- Equipment for processing, viewing and
recording the results of measurements;
and,

- Electrical equipment.

(ii) Two of the basic technical characteristics of
the non-damaging image producing equipment are
as follows:

- Nominal resolution of the system--not
better than 10.0 millimeters;

- Operating modes:

-- Overall two-dimensional imaging of
the object; and

-- Accurate dimensional measurement of
the object.

(iii) The type of a radiation source and other
related technical characteristics of the non-
damaging image producing equipment shall be
agreed by the Parties.

2. Exits:

(a) Devices for measuring linear dimensions of
vehicles:

(i) Fixed measuring rod;

(ii) Portable measuring rod; and

(iii) Measuring tape (tape measure).

(b) Kontrol'-1 system for monitoring the passage of
vehicles at the exits:

(i) Small infrared transmitter, MI 6.03.000;

(ii) Small infrared receiver, MP 6.02.000;

(iii) Magnetometric modules for detecting the
presence of vehicles, B1 E1-1106 and B2
E1-1107;

(iv) Metal supports with mountings for installing
sensors;

(v) Footings for setting up supports; and

(vi) Junction box, 6.04.000, for connecting
infrared receivers, infrared transmitters and
magnetometric modules.

(c) Weight sensors:

(i) Portable scales, RENTON, Model 760 RES (Series
Number A-888);

(ii) Scale transport trailer, RENTON, Model TLR-7;

and

(iii) Heavy-duty portable scales, General
Electrodynamics, model 500B (9 metric-ton load
capacity).

(d) Closed-circuit television equipment:

(i) Television cameras with a fixed field of view,
KTP-63 and KTP-63-1;

(ii) Camera decoder units (units for
controlling the cameras), BKD-2 and
BKD-2-1; and

(iii) Aiming device (device for mounting and
orienting a camera in a fixed position), UN-18.

(e) Equipment for indicating gate position and
controlling traffic lights:

(i) Gate position indicating sensor, DKV EA
837.24.000;

(ii) Traffic light, Type 211;

(iii) Portable console for indicating gate position
and controlling traffic lights, VPK EA
837.22.000; and

(iv) Traffic light control unit (unit for switching
the traffic lights), BUS EA 837.23.000.

(f) Container-type shelters for inspectors, one at each
exit.

(g) Cables, as required, and metal cable stands no more
than 140 centimeters high.

C. The inspecting Party shall be permitted to keep spare parts
at its continuous monitoring inspection site for the agreed
equipment in quantities appropriate to the activities being
conducted at that site.

II. Methods of use of Equipment: General Procedures for
the Operation of the Continuous Monitoring Inspection System

A. The Parties agree to use the following general procedures for
inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the
Treaty at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna. If
the Parties reach preliminary agreement upon different or
additional procedures that achieve the same results as these
procedures, the Parties shall be permitted to use such procedures
on an interim basis, until agreement is reached in the Special
Verification Commission on the different or additional procedures.

1. All vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring
inspection site shall proceed directly to either the portal or exit
monitoring areas for measurement of their dimensions. Traffic
control lights in the monitoring areas shall normally indicate red.
There shall be only one vehicle at any one time in the portal
monitoring area and only one vehicle at any one time in each
of the exit monitoring areas.

2. All personnel operating a vehicle that leaves the
continuous monitoring inspection site shall obey both the traffic
lights and the directions given by the inspection team. Oral
directions by inspectors to stop a vehicle for, inspection
purposes shall be communicated to the vehicle driver through
the in-country escort. The inspection team shall change the
traffic control lights from red to green upon the completion
of the inspection procedures set forth in paragraphs 5 and 7
below. Vehicles shall be permitted to enter the continuous
monitoring inspection site unimpeded. Gates installed by the
inspected Party at the portal and exits shall be opened and
closed by the inspected Party during movement of vehicles
through these locations.

3. All vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring
inspection site shall travel through the portal and exit monitoring
areas at a speed not to exceed ten kilometers per hour.

4. All vehicles that can contain cargoes whose length is
equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and whose diameter is equal to
or greater than 1.02 meters shall leave the continuous monitoring
inspection site only through the portal.

5. Except for vehicles subject to the inspection procedures
in paragraph 8 below, vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring
inspection site through the portal shall be subject to the
following procedures:

(a) The inspected Party shall notify the inspection
team at least 30 minutes before a vehicle indicated in paragraph
4 above arrives at the portal. This notification shall state the
estimated time of arrival of the vehicle at the portal and
information concerning whether the vehicle contains a missile stage
with a length equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and diameter
equal to or greater than 1.02 meters.

(b) After entering the portal monitoring area, a
vehicle shall stop at the stop line when the traffic light is
red.

(c) The vehicle shall be observed and its dimensions
shall be measured remotely or, as necessary, measured manually.

(d) A vehicle that can contain only cargoes with a
length less than 3.25 meters or a diameter less than 1.02 meters
shall leave through the portal without further inspection
after the traffic light turns green.

(e) A vehicle that can contain cargoes with a length
equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or
greater than 1.02 meters, but which is not declared to contain a
missile stage of those dimensions shall remain at the stop line in
an open area or, if requested by the inspected Party, shall proceed
to the inspection building. The inspection team shall be permitted
to observe visually the interior of the cargo area and to
measure the dimensions of the cargo contained therein. If
it can be determined by visual observation and dimensional
measurement that the vehicle does not contain the longest stage of
the Pershing II missile, the vehicle shall leave through the portal
when the traffic light turns green. If, as a result of visual
observation and dimensional measurements of cargoes, the inspection
team is unable to determine that the vehicle does not contain the
longest stage of the Pershing II missile, the inspection team shall
use the procedures set forth in paragraph 13 of Section IX of the
Protocol on Inspection.

(f) Until non-damaging imaging of the contents of
shipping containers is implemented as an inspection procedure, as
indicated in paragraph 15 of Part G of Section III of this
Memorandum, a vehicle leaving the continuous monitoring inspection
site that is declared to contain a missile stage with a length
equal to or greater than 3.25 meters and a diameter equal to or
greater than 1.02 meters shall be presented for visual observation
of the interior of the vehicle and for visual observation and
dimensional measurement of the object or objects declared
to be missile stages and, in accordance with paragraph
14(d) of section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, all
containers and shrouded objects large enough to be or to
contain an item of the above dimensions.

6. Vehicles that do not meet the criteria set forth in
paragraph 4 above shall be permitted to leave the continuous
monitoring inspection site through either the portal or the other
exits.

7. Except for vehicles subject to the inspection procedures
set forth in paragraph 8 below, vehicles leaving the
continuous monitoring inspection site through an exit other than
the portal shall be subject to the following inspection procedures:

(a) After entering the exit monitoring area, a vehicle
shall stop at the stop line when the traffic light is red.

(b) The vehicle shall be observed visually either by
inspectors at the exit or remotely by inspectors in the Data
Collection Center. If necessary, vehicles and cargoes not inside
these vehicles shall be measured automatically or manually. This
procedure shall not apply to passenger cars, passenger minibuses
or, by mutual agreement between the Parties at the inspection Site,
to other vehicles. vehicles shall leave through the exit when the
traffic light is green.

(c) If the inspection team determines that the vehicle
meets the criteria set forth in paragraph 4 above, it shall be
permitted to direct such a vehicle to the portal.

8. The following vehicles shall be subject to the
procedures set forth below when leaving the continuous monitoring
inspection site either through the portal or through the other
exits:

(a) For specially equipped vehicles which contain
explosive cargoes, including nitroglycerin
transporters:

(i) The inspecting Party shall be given one
opportunity to measure each type of vehicle;

(ii) The inspected Party shall notify the
inspection team of the arrival of one of these
vehicles at the portal or an exit not less
than 30 minutes in advance of its arrival;

(iii) The vehicle shall be identified at the portal
or an exit on the basis of information that
has been provided to the inspection team; and

(iv) The vehicle shall proceed through the portal
or the exit without stopping.

(b) For forklifts carrying cargoes: The inspected Party
shall notify the inspection team of the arrival of
one of these vehicles at the portal or an exit not
less than 30 minutes in advance of its arrival.

9. Until the inspecting Party installs equipment for the
permanent continuous monitoring system in the portal and exit
monitoring areas, or should the dimensional measuring
equipment at the portal or exits fail to operate properly, all
dimensional measurements of vehicles shall be performed manually at
that location. For this purpose, as required by the inspection
team, each vehicle leaving the continuous monitoring inspection
site shall stop in the portal monitoring area or in an exit
monitoring area.

10. In the course of inspection of vehicles and cargoes, the
Parties shall observe all safety regulations, including those
related to the handling of explosive cargoes.

11. All recorded data intended for use in the monthly
inspection report shall be signed by an inspector and an in-country
escort.

B. The Parties agree to use the following general procedures for
inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the
Treaty at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk. If
the inspected Party reopens the previously existing exit or opens
another exit at the continuous monitoring inspection site at
Votkinsk, then the procedures set forth below shall be used for
monitoring such exits. If the Parties reach preliminary agreement
upon different or additional procedures that achieve the same
results as these procedures, the Parties shall be permitted to use
such procedures on an interim basis, until agreement is reached in
the special Verification Commission on the different or additional
procedures.

1. All vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring
inspection site shall proceed directly to either the portal or exit
monitoring area. There shall be only one road vehicle at any one
time in the portal monitoring area and only one road vehicle at any
one time in the exit monitoring area.

2. All railcars with a length equal to or greater than
14.00 meters and all road vehicles with a cargo section with a
length equal to or greater than 14.00 meters shall leave the
continuous monitoring inspection site through the portal.

3. The inspected Party shall notify the inspection team at
least 30 minutes before a Vehicle, indicated in paragraph 2 above,
arrives at the portal. This notification shall state the estimated
time of arrival of the vehicle at the portal and information
concerning whether the vehicle contains a missile as large or
larger than and as heavy or heavier than an SS-20 missile.

4. All personnel operating a vehicle that enters or leaves
the continuous monitoring inspection site shall obey the traffic
lights, the semaphore gates and the directions given by the
inspection team. Oral directions by inspectors, including
directions for a vehicle to stop for inspection purposes, shall be
communicated to the vehicle driver through the in-country escort.

(a) At the portal, the semaphore gate immediately in
front of the main gate normally shall be in the closed position
and the corresponding traffic light shall normally be red. All
other semaphore gates normally shall be open and all other traffic
lights normally shall be green. Whenever a vehicle leaves through
the portal, the inspection team shall ensure that the area enclosed
by the semaphore gates is clear of other vehicles. Then the
semaphore gates that are open shall be closed, and the semaphore
gate at the main gate shall be opened. Similarly, the traffic
lights that are normally green will turn red, and the traffic light
at the main gate will turn green. It shall be the responsibility of
the inspection team to return the semaphore gates and traffic
lights to their normal positions at the completion of the
inspection procedures set forth in paragraph 6 below.

(b) At the exit, the semaphore gates normally shall, be
in a closed position and the traffic lights normally shall be red.

It shall be the responsibility of the inspection team to control
the semaphore gates and switch the traffic lights to allow a
vehicle to enter and leave the exit monitoring area and to return
the semaphore gates and traffic lights to their normal position at
the completion of the inspection procedures described in
paragraph 6 below.

5. All vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring
inspection site shall travel through the portal monitoring area or
the exit monitoring area at a speed not to exceed ten kilometers
per hour.

6. Inspection procedures for vehicles:

(a) The dimensions of all vehicles leaving the
continuous monitoring inspection site shall be
measured as they pass through the portal monitoring
area or the exit monitoring area.

(b) All railcars whose length is less than 14.00 meters
and all road vehicles with a cargo section whose
length is less than 14.00 meters leaving the
continuous monitoring inspection site shall be
allowed unimpeded passage through the semaphore
gates.

(c) All railcars whose length is equal to or greater
than 14.00 meters and all road vehicles with a
cargo section whose length is equal to or greater
than 14.00 meters that leave the continuous
monitoring inspection site and that are not
declared by the inspected Party to contain a
missile as large or larger than and as heavy or
heavier than an SS-20 missile shall be subject to
inspection of their interior in accordance with
paragraph 13 of Section IX of the Protocol on
Inspection and in accordance with the Agreed
Statement of December 8, 1988. At the discretion of
the inspected Party, the inspection team
shall be permitted to carry out the inspection in
the inspection building.

(d) A vehicle leaving the continuous monitoring
inspection site that is declared by the inspected
Party to contain a missile as large or larger than
and as heavy or heavier than an SS-20 missile shall
proceed to the portal monitoring area, where the
inspection team shall be permitted to observe
visually the interior of the vehicle, measure the
dimensions of the launch canister or shipping
container contained therein, and image the contents
of the launch canister or shipping container in
accordance with paragraph 3 of Part A of Section
III of this Annex. In this same area, the
inspected Party shall open the front end of the
launch canister or cover of the shipping container
at the request of the inspection team, as provided
for in paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of the
Protocol on Inspection, so that the inspectors may
observe visually the missile contained therein and
measure the length and diameter of its second stage
in accordance with paragraph 4 of Part A of Section
III of this Annex.

(e) If the inspection team determines that a vehicle at
the exit meets the criteria set forth in paragraph
2 above, then it shall be permitted to direct such
a vehicle to the portal.

7. Until the inspecting Party installs infrared vehicle
dimensional measuring equipment in the portal monitoring
area or the exit monitoring area, all dimensional
measurements of vehicles shall be performed manually at
that monitoring area. As required by the inspection
team, all vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring
inspection site shall stop in the portal monitoring area
or in the exit monitoring area for this purpose.

8. Should automatic dimensional measuring equipment at the
portal or exit fail to operate properly, all dimensional
measurements of vehicles shall be performed manually at
that location.

9. All recorded data intended for use in the monthly
inspection report shall be signed by an inspector and an
in-country escort.

10. The Parties agree that railcars that would be subject to
inspection shall be permitted to leave the continuous
monitoring inspection site for the purpose of reversing
direction, provided that the following procedures are
used:

(a) The inspected Party notifies the inspection team
leader of its intent to move a railcar out through
the portal for the purpose of reversing its
direction no less than 30 minutes before the
railcar arrives at the portal.

(b) Two inspectors accompany the railcar from the time
it arrives at the portal until it returns through
the portal after having reversed direction and such
inspectors are permitted to observe this railcar
throughout the entire procedure.

(c) No cargo is removed from the railcar between the
time it leaves through the portal until it returns
through the portal.

Provided that the entire procedure for reversing direction is
completed without delay, such railcars shall not be subject to
inspection pursuant to Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection
during the conduct of this procedure.

III. Methods of Use of Equipment: General Procedures for the
Operation of the Equipment

A. General procedures for the United States of America for the
operation of the equipment at the portal and at other exits, if
opened, at the continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk:

1. Vehicle dimensional measuring equipment:

Infrared profiler equipment shall be installed along both
sides of the rail and roadway at the portal and along both sides of
the roadway at the exit. Vehicles shall travel on the rail or
roadway along gin infrared profiler at a speed not to exceed ten
kilometers per hour. The infrared profiler shall make dimensional
measurements of the vehicle, which shall be transmitted to the Data
Collection Center for recording.

2. Weight sensors:

If weight is used as an inspection criterion pursuant to
paragraph 12 of Part G of Section III of this Memorandum, then
weighing devices shall be installed in accordance with the
following requirements and the following procedures shall be used:

(a) Road vehicle single-axle, weigh-in-motion scales
shall be installed in the roadway at the portal
monitoring area and at the exit monitoring area.

(b) Road vehicle leaving the continuous monitoring
inspection site shall cross the scale platform at
a speed not to exceed ten kilometers per hour.
Measurement of vehicle weight shall be made
automatically and transmitted to the Data
Collection Center for analysis and recording.

(c) Portable scales shall be used on the roadway in the
event that the primary weighing devices, that is,
single-axle weigh-in-motion scales, are
inoperative. The inspectors shall place these
scales on the roadway in front of the vehicle to be
weighed, and the vehicle shall be driven onto the
scales. Vehicle weight shall be determined by
adding the reading of all portable scales. Data
shall be recorded by entering it manually into the
Data Collection Center system.

(d) The inspecting Party shall be permitted to install
fixed scales for weighing railcars on the rail
spur. The rail scales to be installed and operating
procedures for them shall be agreed upon by the
Parties.

3. Non-damaging image producing equipment:

(a) The non-damaging image producing equipment shall be
installed along a rail spur and shall be used to
image the contents of launch canisters declared to
contain a missile as large or larger than and as
heavy or heavier than an SS-20 missile. The
inspection team shall be permitted to calibrate the
non-damaging image producing equipment daily.

(b) Imaging procedures:

(i) The inspected Party, having implemented the
procedures contained in subparagraphs (c)(ii)
and (c)(iii) below, shall ensure that the
inspecting party receives an image of the top
and bottom of the missile along the entire
cylindrical length of the second stage of an
SS-25 missile (307 centimeters), plus 25
centimeters on the side where the imaging
begins and 7 centimeters on the opposite side.
The image obtained shall be limited to the
areas between the top and bottom of the outer
surface of the launch canister and lines 69.5
centimeters on either side of the missile
center line. The inspected Party assures the
inspecting Party that the image described
above meets the following conditions:

- The image obtained shall show the four
points where the curvatures of the end
sections of the Ss-25 missile second
stage motor casing intersect with the
lines 69.5 centimeters on either side of
the missile center line.

- The end points of the cylindrical portion
of the second stage of the SS-25 missile
and the points of intersection referred
to above shall not appear at the extreme
edges of the image obtained, where the
quality of the image may be poor. The
image obtained shall be sufficient to
compensate for uncertainties in the
position of the missile inside the
railcar.

(ii) The boundaries of the zone irradiated by the
non-damaging image producing equipment shall
be monitored by both the inspected Party and
the inspecting Party. Within three months
after installation of the non-damaging image
producing equipment at the continuous
monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, the
Parties shall complete testing of ionization
chambers and thermoluminescent sensors as
potential detector systems for monitoring the
boundaries of the zone irradiated by the non-
damaging image producing equipment installed
at the site. If the Parties do not agree on
one or the other of these two detector systems
for monitoring the boundaries of the zone
irradiated by the non-damaging image producing
equipment, the Parties shall be permitted to
use both detector systems. The inspected Party
shall be permitted to use a shielding device
to exclude from irradiation those portions of
the missile which are not referred to above.
If the imaged zone exceeds the zone described
in subparagraph (b)(i) above, the inspection
team, under the observation of the inspected
Party, shall erase from the memory of the
non-damaging image producing equipment the
information received and shall repeat the
procedures for imaging the contents of the
launch canister. Such cases shall be explained
and documented in the monthly inspection
report. The Parties agree to the following
procedures for the use of the detection
system:

- The detectors shall normally be kept in
a tamper-resistant container under the
control of both Parties at the portal
monitoring area.

- Prior to the use of detectors during the
imaging of the contents of a launch
canister, all detectors shall be set to
a zero reading, and an inspector and an
in-country escort shall confirm that the
readings are zero. In addition, two
detectors shall be selected at random,
exposed to a predetermined radiation
level, and read by both Parties to ensure
the calibration of the detectors.

- The inspected Party shall place detectors
on the railcar in the presence of the
inspection team immediately prior to each
imaging of the contents of a launch
canister. The identifying number of each
detector and its location on the railcar
shall be recorded.

- The inspected Party shall place the
detectors on the exterior of the railcar
on the side closest to the x-ray source
at locations inside and outside of the
area to be imaged. Some detectors shall
be placed on the railcar in positions
where background radiation levels can be
determined during the imaging process.

- After each imaging of the contents of a
launch canister, the inspected Party
shall remove the detectors from the
railcar and shall move them to the
reading area.

- Both Parties then shall read all
thermoluminescent detectors jointly.
Ionization chamber readings shall be done
sequentially, first by the inspected
Party, then by the inspection team.

- Readings shall be included in the monthly
inspection report only in cases where
detector readings necessitate repeating
the procedures for imaging the contents
of a launch canister.

(iii) The non-damaging image producing equipment
shall not be switched on, either in an
operational or test mode, without prior
notification of the inspected Party. The
inspected Party shall be permitted to measure
by an independent method, using its own
equipment, the power characteristics, of the
x-ray irradiation, and shall be permitted to
confirm the times when the irradiation device
is turned on and off. The inspected Party
shall be permitted to conduct such
measurements during installation, testing,
calibration and imaging of the contents of a
launch canister, provided that these
measurements do not interfere with the quality
of the image, as specified above.

(c) Preparations for use of non-damaging image
producing equipment:

(i) Prior to imaging the contents of a launch
canister, the inspection team, in the presence
of the inspected Party, shall calibrate the
equipment. If the equipment is faulty, the
inspection team shall make appropriate
adjustments and repairs, as necessary. If the
equipment cannot be repaired within four
hours, then the vehicle shall be permitted to
leave through the portal without imaging
procedures being conducted, unless the
malfunction is due to force majeure or to
actions of the inspected Party. in such cases,
the vehicle shall not be permitted to leave
the continuous monitoring inspection site
until the equipment is repaired.

(ii) The inspected Party shall affix markers to
points on the outside of the railcar to
designate the vertical boundaries of the area
to be irradiated. These markers shall be used
to determine where the x-ray beam is turned on
and off.

(iii) The inspected Party shall provide data to the
inspection team for adjusting the x-ray
detector array. Based on the data provided by
the inspected Party, the inspection team, in
the presence of the inspected Party, shall
adjust the height of the x-ray detector array
so that it will image only the area permitted
pursuant to subparagraph (b)(i) above. The
inspected Party shall confirm that the
proper adjustments have been made.

(d) Procedures for use of non-damaging image producing
equipment:

(i) The inspected Party shall open the railcar,
containing the launch canister whose contents
are to be imaged, for inspection of the
interior of the railcar. Before opening the
railcar, the inspected Party, at its
discretion, shall be permitted to move the
railcar into the inspection building. The
inspection team shall observe visually the
interior of this railcar, and measure the
length and diameter of the launch canister
contained therein. Then the inspected Party
shall close the railcar.

(ii) The inspected Party shall move the railcar
into position for attachment to the transport
system associated with the non-damaging image
producing equipment.

(iii) The inspection team shall attach the railcar
to the transport system and shall thereafter
control its movement during the imaging
process.

(iv) During the movement of the railcar past the
non-damaging image producing equipment, the
inspection team shall turn on the x-ray beam
when the first marker affixed pursuant to
subparagraph (c)(ii) above moves into the
field of view of the sensing device and shall
turn off the x-ray beam when the second marker
moves into the field of view of the sensing
device.

(v) If the agreed area of the SS-25 missile is not
contained in the image obtained, the
inspection team shall move the railcar back to
the starting point and repeat the steps set
forth above. If the inspection team determines
that the image obtained is too poor to
ascertain whether an SS-20 missile is inside
the launch canister, the inspection team shall
be permitted to check to ensure that the
equipment is operating properly. This shall be
done on the basis of objective criteria that
shall be established jointly by the Parties
upon installation of the non-damaging image
producing equipment. If the equipment is
working properly, the inspection team shall
move the railcar to the starting position and
repeat the steps set forth above. If the
equipment is not working properly and
cannot be repaired in four hours, the railcar
shall be permitted to leave the continuous
monitoring inspection site without repeating
the procedures for imaging. Such cases shall
be explained and documented in the monthly
inspection report.

(vi) Images shall be displayed on a video screen
and permanently stored at the portal. Two
paper copies of each image shall be made. Each
copy shall be assigned by an inspector and an
in-country escort and included in the monthly
inspection report.

(vii) All images taken and the results of all
measurements shall be included in the monthly
inspection report.

4. System for measuring the length and diameter of the
second stage of the SS-25 missile:

The Parties shall agree on-the methods of use for the
equipment referred to in paragraph 1(d) of Part A of Section I of
this Annex for measuring the length and diameter of the second
stage of the SS-25 missile inside its launch canister. Such
equipment shall be used when such launch canisters are opened for
inspection pursuant to paragraph 14 of section IX of the Protocol
on Inspection.

5. Surveillance systems:

Surveillance equipment shall be installed at the portal and
exit of the continuous monitoring inspection site to provide
surveillance and documentation of vehicles leaving that inspection
site, and the surveillance and documentation of activities in the
portal monitoring area, including the area where the non-damaging
image producing equipment is installed, and in the exit monitoring
area. Camera outputs shall be displayed on the video monitors in
the operator's consoles at the portal, and at the exit. The
equipment shall be operated by the inspection team. The field of
view of the cameras shall be agreed by the Parties. The design of
the surveillance system shall ensure that individual frames of
automated and operator-requested video data may be stored. A data
review console operator shall select from the stored video images
those to be made into paper copies.

Paper copies of the video images to be used in the monthly
inspection report shall be signed by both Parties. Area lighting is
included as an integral element of the video surveillance system.
If is designed to provide the uniform illumination required by the
cameras.

6. Vehicle sensors:

This equipment shall be installed along or in the rail and
roadways at the portal and along,or in the roadway at the exit.

Traffic lights shall signal and direct road and rail vehicles as
they enter and leave the continuous monitoring inspection site.

Semaphore gates shall provide an additional indication to vehicle
operators that they have or have not been cleared to enter or leave
the portal monitoring area and exit monitoring area. Semaphore gate
actions and activation of traffic lights shall be controlled from
the portal operator's console and exit operator's console.
Induction loop sensors shall be used to sense vehicle presence and
direction of their motion and to alert inspectors of vehicular
activity. Traffic lights and semaphore gates shall permit only one
road vehicle in the portal monitoring area and one road vehicle in
the exit monitoring area at any one time.

7. Data Collection Center:

The portal operator's console and the data review console
shall be located in the Data Collection Center. The portal
operator's console shall be used to monitor the activities at the
rail and road portions of the portal and at the exit. The color
graphics display monitor shall display the data about vehicles
leaving through the portal and the exit. The color graphics display
monitor also shall display system status data and system messages.

Traffic control panels in the portal operator's console shall be
used to control operations along the road and rail segments of the
portal and the exit. The data review console shall be used to
review data and make paper copies of data selected by the data
review console operator.

8. Exit:

The exit operator's console shall be located in the
inspector's exit shelter and shall be used to monitor the
activities at the exit. Exit sensor data, vehicle data and video
images shall be presented on the exit operator's console and on the
portal operator's console in the Data Collection Center. Operations
at the exit shall be controlled from the exit operator's console,
or remotely from the portal operator's console.

9. Communications:

The intercom system shall provide primary voice
communications between the Data Collection Center,
inspector's exit shelter, structure for the installation and
operation of non-damaging image producing equipment,
warehouse, inspection team headquarters and inspection team's
living quarters. The systems of radio communications shall provide
primary voice communications between the inspectors at the Data
Collection Center and the roving perimeter inspectors as well as
back-up communications between the inspectors at the Data
Collection Center and at the inspector's exit shelter. The base
station radio shall be located in the Data Collection Center. Hand-
held radios shall be located at the inspector's exit shelter and
with each roving perimeter inspector. The inspected Party shall
provide two dedicated telephone lines and terminal equipment.

Facsimile equipment shall be used on one of these telephone lines.

The inspection team's telephone system shall use the two dedicated
telephone lines and the non-dedicated telephone line and shall
provide for voice communications with locations outside the
boundaries of the continuous monitoring inspection site and shall
provide a second voice communication system between the Data
Collection Center, inspector's exit shelters structure for
installation and operation of the non-damaging image producing
equipment, warehouse, sauna, inspection team headquarters and
inspection team's living quarters within the boundaries of the
continuous monitoring inspection site, and quarters for the in-
country escort.

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the continuous
monitoring inspection site at Magna:

1. Vehicle dimensional measuring equipment:

(a) After entering the portal monitoring area, vehicles
shall stop at the stop line. The length and height of vehicles
and cargoes leaving through the portal shall be measured remotely
using the technical surveillance system installed in the Data
Collection Center and controlled from it or, as necessary, measured
manually.

(b) At each exit, Kontrol'-1 infrared sensors shall be
placed in fixed positions along both sides of the road. The
length and height of an exiting vehicle, shall be automatically
compared with benchmark values using the Kontrol'-1 infrared sensor
system. A signal shall be transmitted to the Data Collection Center
if the length or height of the vehicle exceeds the benchmark value.
After the vehicle has stopped at the stop line, its length and
height shall be measured remotely, using a fixed measuring rod
observed from the Data Collection center by means of a closed-
circuit television system or, as necessary, measured manually. The
measuring rod shall be placed at the side of the road.

2. Devices for measuring the linear dimensions of vehicles
and cargoes: A portable measuring rod and a tape measure shall, as
necessary, be used to measure the length, height and width of
vehicles and cargoes. These devices shall be used in accordance
with the methods set forth in Part A of Section III of Annex IV to
this Memorandum.

3. Weight sensors: If weight is used as an inspection
criterion pursuant to paragraph 13 of Part G of Section III of this
Memorandum, then the Parties shall agree upon the characteristics
and methods of use of weight scales.

4. Non-damaging image producing equipment: If non-damaging
imaging is implemented as an inspection procedure pursuant to
paragraph 15 of Part G of Section III of this Memorandum then,
pursuant to paragraphs 16 and 17 of Part G of that Section the
Parties shall agree upon the methods of use of non-damaging image
producing equipment and its characteristics as required by
paragraph 1(j) of Part B of Section I of this Annex.

5. Surveillance systems: Closed-circuit television cameras
shall be installed at the portal and at each of the two exits for
surveying the portal area and exits and for remote inspection of
vehicles leaving the continuous monitoring inspection site. Camera
outputs shall be transmitted to the Data Collection Center and
displayed on video monitors. The field of view of the cameras shall
be agreed by the Parties.

6. Vehicle sensors:

(a) Sensors indicating the position of the gates shall
be installed on the gates of the inspected Party at the portal and
the exits, and Kontrol'-1 sensors shall be installed on both sides
of the roads in the portal monitoring area and in the two exit
monitoring areas. If a vehicle leaves the continuous monitoring
inspection site, the sensors shall transmit, in sequence, signals
to the Data Collection Center that the gates have been opened, that
a vehicle has entered the portal or exit, that the vehicle is on
the portion of the road designated for vehicle inspection, and that
the vehicle has left through the portal or exit.

(b) Vehicle drivers shall obey the signals from the
traffic lights. An inspector at the portal or an inspector at the
exit shall control the operation of the traffic lights.

7. Data Collection Center and inspector's exit shelters:

(a) The Data Collection Center shall be installed in
the portal monitoring area. Information received from the
technical monitoring systems at the portal and exits shall be
collected and displayed there. Traffic control of vehicles leaving
the continuous monitoring inspection site shall be carried out from
the Data Collection Center or at the exits. Should the external
power be interrupted, the Data Collection Center shall supply
reliable battery power to the inspecting Party's equipment at the
continuous monitoring inspection site for up to 30 minutes.

(b) Two identical inspector's exit shelters, one at
each exit, shall be installed. Sensors indicating the position
of the gates shall transmit information to the inspector's exit
shelters. The traffic lights can be operated from the inspector's
exit shelter by an inspector.

8. Communications:

The internal telephone communication system shall provide
primary voice communications between the Data Collection Center,
the inspector's exit shelters and the warehouse. The radio
communications equipment shall provide primary voice communications
between the inspectors at the portal and the roving perimeter
inspectors. This equipment shall also serve as backup
communications between inspectors at the portal and exits. The base
station radio shall be located in the Data Collection Center.
Hand-held radios shall be located at the inspector's exit shelters
and with each roving perimeter inspector. Communications between
the Data Collection Center and the inspection team's living
quarters shall be by means of the local telephone system.

(a) 3 Measuring tape clamp, CST, Model 040710;

(b) 2 0-30 pound (0-14 kilogram) tape tensioning
scales, Lufkin, Model 586;

(c) 2 Magnifying glass, Charvoz;

(d) 2 Hand level, TOPCON, Model 56210;

(e) 2 String line level, Stanley;

(f) 2 200 millimeter calipers with micrometer screw,
MSC, model 624777; and

(g) 2 18 inch (46 centimeter) combination square,
MSC, Model 8640068.

2. Portable Weighing Devices (quantity for each inspection
team):

(a) 1 45 metric-ton capacity tension load cell,
Dillon, Model SGMT;

(b) 1 Load cell readout device with associated 15
meter cable, Sensotec, Model NK;

(c) 2 45 metric-ton load capacity shackle/hook; and

(d) 12 Heavy-duty portable scales, General
Electrodynamics, Model 500B (9 metric-ton load
capacity).

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Equipment listed in Annex IV to this Memorandum shall be
used.

II. Methods of Use of Equipment

In order to verify technical data pursuant to paragraph 3 of
Article XI of the Treaty, the Parties shall check the data at the
sites designated by the inspected Party and shall use the equipment
listed in Annex IV and this Annex. The Parties shall use the
equipment in accordance with the procedures set forth in Parts A
and C of Section III of Annex IV as well as in accordance with the
following procedures.

A. Additional Procedures:

1. The inspection team shall deliver to an inspection site
a sufficient quantity of weighing devices of the appropriate type
capable of weighing any missile or launcher of the inspected Party
subject to the Treaty.

2. If the inspected Party chooses to weigh a missile or
missile stage by the suspension method, then the inspected Party
shall connect the tension load cell to the lifting device and to
the fixture attached to the missile or missile stage to be weighed.

The inspected Party shall be permitted to connect its own tension
load cell in series with the tension load cell of the inspecting
Party so that both tension load cells measure the weight of the
object simultaneously. Before a reading is taken, the inspection
team shall ascertain that its tension load cell is bearing that
object's entire weight.

3. During the process of weighing or determining the
dimensions of a missile, stage of a missile, launcher, support
structure or support equipment, it is permissible for the result of
each measurement to deviate by not more than three percent from the
relevant technical data provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article
IX of the Treaty.

4. The inspection team shall be permitted continuous visual
observation of its weighing,devices and the object weighed
throughout all the testing, calibrating and weighing processes.

5. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection
site where technical data is to be checked the in-country escort
shall indicate the specific places on each missile, stage of a
missile, launcher, support structure or support equipment where
measurements were taken to obtain the technical data provided
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty. If necessary,
the in-country escort shall be permitted to use diagrams or
sketches to indicate such places.

6. In order to check technical data with respect to the
SS-20 missile:

(a) The inspected Party shall deliver a missile
selected by the inspection team, contained in its
launch canister, to a special enclosed area where
the missile shall be removed from its launch
canister and disassembled into stages.

(b) This enclosed area shall be located near the site
where the inspection team selects the missile. The
inspection team shall accompany the missile from
the selection site to the enclosed area.

(c) The inspection team shall measure the length and
diameter of the launch canister.

(d) The inspection team shall weigh the vehicle while
it is carrying the SS-20 missile contained in its
launch canister, and subsequently the inspection
team shall weigh the vehicle without the missile
and its launch canister. The weight of the SS-20
missile in the launch canister shall be calculated
by taking the difference of the results of these
two weight measurements. To check the result of
weighing the SS-20 missile in the launch canister,
the weight of the launch canister and the weights
of the first and second stages obtained by means of
the procedures set forth in subparagraph (f) below
shall be added. The difference between the result
of this addition and the result obtained from
weighing the SS-20 missile in the launch canister
must not exceed two metric tons. Otherwise, the
inspection team shall be permitted to require
repetition of the weighing process with a different
SS-20 missile contained in its launch canister.

(e) After the removal of the SS-20 missile from its
launch canister, the inspection team shall measure
the length of the missile and the length of the
missile's front section located at the measuring
site.

(f) The inspected Party shall disassemble the SS-20
missile into stages, after which, along with the
inspection team, it shall weigh the first and
second stages of the missile as well as the launch
canister. The inspection team shall measure the
length and diameter of the first and second stages
of the missile.

(g) The inspection team shall not observe directly the
removal of the launch canister from the vehicle,
the removal of the missile from its launch
canister, or the disassembly of the missile into
stages.

(h) Prior to each of the operations indicated in
subparagraph (g) above, the inspection team shall
inspect the enclosed area to ascertain that nothing
is present in the enclosed area, including other
missiles, stages of missiles, launch canisters or
missile transporter vehicles, that could be used to
distort the results of the weight and linear
measurements.

(i) During each of the operations indicated in
subparagraph (g) above, the inspection team shall
observe continuously the fence enclosing the area
in order to ascertain that nothing is brought into
or removed from the enclosed area while these
operations are taking place there.

B. Purpose Of Linear Measurement Devices:

1. Tape tensioning scales adjusted to a standard 5-kilogram
load shall be used to place the measuring tape under tension.

2. Measuring tape clamps shall be used to hold the
measuring tape firmly under tension.

3. String line levels and hand levels shall be used to
establish necessary references to check that the measuring tape and
the axis of the object are parallel.

4. Combination squares shall be used to establish
perpendicular lines and to measure the height of small protrusions
that could affect the results of diameter measurements.

5. Magnifying glasses shall be used to facilitate the
precise determination of the data at the intersection of the
measuring tape markings with the plumb bob's target points.

6. A three-section range rod shall be used to assist in
measuring the height of an object.

7. Calipers with a micrometer screw shall be used to
measure the width of small protrusions that could affect the
results of diameter measurements.