Soviet portal monitoring inspections at Magna began as planned on July 5 and proceeded continuously from that day. Colonel Samarin explained to a New York Times reporter that the Soviet inspectors worked in 24-hour shifts at 3-day intervals. They observed or inspected every vehicle leaving the fenced facility through the portal or through one of the two plant exits. They carried out random perimeter patrols, usually walking around the two-mile-long fence encompassing the 185-acre plant.²⁶ Hercules Plant No. 1 was a working plant, with an average of 400 to 500 vehicles entering and leaving each week. All exiting vehicles were subject to monitoring. Because the Soviet Union's portal monitoring equipment would not be in place and operational for more than a year, initial monitoring was done visually.

Under the treaty, the United States had to declare when a vehicle leaving the plant was large enough to contain a missile or a missile stage as large as or larger than the first stage of a Pershing II missile. Those vehicles had to leave the plant along the specially built portal road to the Soviet inspection area. Using a measuring tape and a fixed measuring rod, the Soviet inspectors determined if the missile stage or cargo being transported exceeded 3.68 meters in length and 1.02 meters in diameter, which were the dimensions of the Pershing II missile's first stage.*

In Utah there was genuine community interest in the Soviet INF inspectors. Requests for speaking engagements, participation in local events, personal home visits, and media interviews flowed into OSIA's Magna office. The Soviet team chief was informed of each request; he decided which ones to accept. For all events, Soviet inspectors were transported and escorted by OSIA personnel. Private home visits were not allowed. In July and August, the Soviet team participated in many events, speaking at service clubs, community groups, and business organizations. Sports events were especially popular.²⁷

^{* In the Memorandum of Agreement of December 21, 1989, this measurement was changed from 3.68 meters to 3.25 meters.}

During the first treaty year at Votkinsk, Englund and Connell focused the American inspectors on two tasks. First, they established the U.S. standards and procedures, based on the treaty, for conducting the inspections. Second, they oversaw the installation and operation of the monitoring equipment. As noted above, the INF Treaty gave the inspecting party the right to make perimeter patrols, install and operate monitoring equipment, make continuous, direct observation of the plant's portal and exits, and inspect those railcars leaving the plant. Colonel Connell explained to a reporter from the Boston Globe that he was "paid to be skeptical.... Everything is suspect," he said. "It's up to the Soviets to prove otherwise."²⁸

In the fall, winter, and spring months of 1988-89, the portal monitoring inspections continued, but another task emerged as significant. The American inspectors had to install, with the assistance of Soviet engineers, the treaty-authorized inspection equipment. Following site preparation by Soviet engineers, U.S. inspectors installed the following equipment: traffic lights, power conduits, a closed-circuit television system, semaphore traffic gates, computers, and infrared profilers for both road and rail traffic. Thousands of hours were spent digging conduits, pouring concrete foundations, laying telephone and power cables, and installing components of the monitoring equipment. By June 1989, the American inspectors were using the equipment.

In a significant accomplishment that first year, Soviet construction engineers completed all of the work on the U.S. permanent housing and offices at Votkinsk. Three large dormitories and an office building were constructed in the U.S. compound next to the plant. The three two-story residences had rooms for each of the INF inspectors, while the office building contained space for dining, community activities, offices, and recreation. A warehouse and sauna were also constructed on the compound. All of the furnishings and equipment needed for the American inspectors residence and offices were acquired in the United States, transported to the Soviet Union, and installed at Votkinsk. In January 1989, for instance, the U.S. Air Force flew ten C-141 cargo flights to Izhevsk, the nearest large city to Votkinsk. It was 38 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, with three to four feet of snow. Soviet crews helped the Americans unload the cargo and transport it to the American compound.²⁹

U.S. portal monitoring inspections had begun in July 1988; they had gone on continuously, 24 hours a day, throughout the year. Contractor personnel had been hired, trained, and were on site performing their duties. Some of the treaty-authorized monitoring equipment--traffic lights, induction loops, closed-circuit television, semaphore traffic gates--had been shipped to Votkinsk and was being used. Other more critical equipment--specifically the large, nondamaging imaging system known commercially as CargoScan--was not operational by the end of the first treaty year. The United States had negotiated, signed, and ratified the INF Treaty with the intention of using the imaging system to scan railcars leaving the portal to determine categorically that no banned SS-20 missiles were exiting the Votkinsk plant. Until that system was installed, approved, and was in use at Votkinsk, the U.S. government would not consider its INF portal monitoring inspection regime fully operational.