Chapter 2 - Critical Months, Intense Preparations

Setting Up An Agency

When General Lajoie became OSIA's Director on February 1, he inherited the work of the JCS task force. Lajoie came to Washington from Paris, where he had been serving as the U.S. Defense Attaché. Fluent in French and Russian, he knew first-hand both Europe (the geographical arena for the INF Treaty) and the Soviet Union, its military, and its senior officer corps. His immediate tasks were to organize the new DOD agency, participate in a series of bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations on implementing the treaty, and develop and train a cadre of inspectors and escorts to conduct the on-site inspections.⁶

Acting quickly, General Lajoie made a key decision: he directed that the U.S. INF team chiefs, who would lead the 10-person teams into the USSR and escort Soviet teams in the United States and Western Europe, would be entrusted with extraordinary responsibility. During inspections, especially in the Soviet Union, the teams would be isolated, out of direct communications contact, and responsible for making on-the-spot judgments about treaty inspection issues. "I knew we would not have time," Lajoie recalled, "to come up with a comprehensive training program, well-developed procedures, and comprehensive guidance. If I picked good people, I could just rely on their judgment in the absence of all these other things." He interviewed and personally selected each team chief. "The thing that I keyed on [was that] I wanted someone who was familiar with the Soviet environment...but mostly, I wanted somebody whose judgment I could trust." ⁷

Each of the first 20 inspection team chiefs was an experienced field grade military officer. Most had at least 15 years of service, advanced degrees, Russian language proficiency, and experience in commanding small teams and military units. General Lajoie emphasized that they would be held accountable for establishing a professional, businesslike tone with the Soviets in conducting the U.S. inspection, escort, and portal monitoring missions. They were also responsible for team discipline, professionalism, and, to a degree, team training. They had to know the entire process of the on-site inspections under the treaty, including the treaty protocols and the Memorandum of Understanding. Decisions as to when to begin and terminate the on-site inspection would be, within certain timelines specified in the treaty, made by the team chief. Team chiefs would be responsible for preparing and signing, on site, the official INF Treaty Inspection Report for each inspection.⁸

Initially, team chiefs were instrumental in selecting team members. The treaty specified that on-site inspection teams be limited to 10 members for three types of INF inspections: baseline, closeout, and short-notice. For elimination inspections, the teams could be expanded to 20 members; for continuous portal monitoring inspections, the teams could have up to 30 inspectors. The first cadre of hand-picked team chiefs assisted in testing, interviewing, and selecting linguists, deputy team chiefs, and inspectors.

U.S. inspectors at Saryozek, USSR.

"...mostly, I wanted somebody whose judgment I could trust."

General Lajoie

By mid-March, 200 inspectors including 20 team chiefs (20 teams), 50 escorts (three field offices), two elimination teams, and several members of the Votkinsk and Magna portal monitoring teams had been identified. Most participated in an initial training course taught by INF Treaty negotiators, Soviet specialists, and senior policy officials. After that course, the work of starting up the agency began in earnest. Colonel Robert B. McConnell, director of operations, concentrated on operational planning and managing the staff's multiple activities. Three team chiefs--Army Lt. Colonel Thomas S. Brock, Marine Lt. Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, and Army Major Paul H. Nelson--began working through the operational concepts outlined in the treaty and its protocols. Military linguists--including Richard O. Gibby, Floyd L. Riggin, Daniel L. Fodera, Carol J. Dockham, William R. Leaf, Larry R. Nelson, Richard E. Zinnert, and David G. Lafleur--had completed an intensive Russian course and were preparing for mock inspection and escort team training exercises in early April. Army Colonel Ronald P. Forest and Air Force Colonel Gerald V. West were the senior officers responsible for escorting the Soviet inspection teams. They traveled to each of the treaty sites in the United States and checked the accuracy of the official diagrams of U.S. missile facilities and sites listed in the treaty's Memorandum of Understanding.⁹

Colonel Douglas M. Englund, U.S. Army, headed a separate directorate that concentrated on establishing portal monitoring inspection at Votkinsk, USSR, and escort operations at Magna, Utah. Colonel George M. Connell, USMC, Major Mark L. Dues, USAF, and Lt. Commander Charles N. Myers, U.S. Navy, worked with Colonel Englund on all aspects of the continuous portal monitoring inspections. U.S. Navy Commander John C. Williams took on the task of turning the inspector's equipment authorized for short-notice inspections in the treaty and protocols into standardized, rugged equipment that would operate in the extremes of climate in the Soviet Union. He also tackled the issue of providing the inspectors with standardized procedures for measuring the components of each INF missile system. Eileen K. Giglio became the agency's liaison with the U.S. Congress. U.S. Navy Commander Kendell Pease devised plans and programs for explaining the treaty and the on-site inspection mission to the public and American and European media. U.S. Navy Commander Marjory M. Stevens worked on getting the military services to release more people: Russian experts, Russian linguists, missile specialists, and administrative support personnel. Within a matter of weeks it became apparent that the new agency was seriously understaffed, especially in the support and logistics area. For everyone at OSIA, working 60 to 70 hours a week was the norm rather than the exception in the spring of 1988.¹⁰

In Europe, representatives of the five nations where the American INF missiles were based (Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, West Germany, and the Netherlands) wanted to know the new agency's concept of operations. How would OSIA escort the Soviet inspectors? How would the Soviet inspectors arrive, by commercial airline or military airlift? How intrusive would these on-site inspections be? They wanted answers. In mid-March, General Lajoie went to Belgium and briefed the NATO representatives. Earlier, Colonel Keating and Major Trahan had gone to Europe to meet with American embassy staffs and with representatives of the European nations. In late April, General Lajoie returned to Europe, accompanying Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to NATO Headquarters, where he explained the status of U.S. preparations for carrying out the INF Treaty mission.¹¹

The U.S. military commands that operated INF missile bases and facilities wanted information on OSIA's plans for transporting, housing, and escorting Soviet on-site inspection teams. George Rueckert, the agency's principal deputy director, and Air Force Lt. Colonel Michael J. Hritsik, an INF team chief, traveled to Europe to discuss operations plans with senior officers and planners of the U.S. European Command and with representatives of the NATO nations. In the United States, Congress wanted to know how the inspecting and escorting would be conducted. The press in the United States and Europe had questions about the treaty, inspections, escorts, and the agency responsible for the mission. Journalists and television reporters wanted to know about the people leading and conducting the inspections. The Air Force wanted information about OSIA's San Francisco field office. Where would it be located? How large would it be? How many Soviet INF inspectors would arrive at one time? The Army also had questions about INF eliminations. In the spring of 1988 there were many more questions than answers.¹²