09 June 2000
(Stresses importance of permanent disposal of arms material) (2120) Senior Arms Control Adviser John Holum says the United States is "working closely with Russia" to help remove excess material from weapons programs to ensure that it is "never again used, by anyone, for military purposes" and "to prevent leakage to terrorists and proliferant states." Holum, just back from the Clinton-Putin summit in Moscow, has negotiated with the Russians for years on critical arms control issues. He characterized the nature of recent U.S.-Russian engagements as "more a meeting of partners, seeking to reconcile differing perspectives" as well as looking "to proceed with the business of arms control and non-proliferation." Speaking June 8 at a State Department "Open Forum" on managing nuclear weapons and materials in the 21st century, Holum said the United States has consolidated a number of its non-proliferation efforts throughout the Newly Independent States (NIS) because "it is the best way to prevent the proliferation of weapons materials, technology and expertise." So far, he said, $4.5 billion ($4,500 million) has been proposed by the Clinton administration for the Enhanced Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) which funds cooperative efforts with Russia, Ukraine, and other NIS states to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the materials to make them. (See "http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/00060409.htm".) During the Moscow summit, the U.S. and Russian presidents announced a Plutonium Disposition Agreement that commits each nation to dispose of at least 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium by irradiating it as fuel in reactors or by immobilizing it with high-level radioactive waste. (See "http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/00060408.htm".) As the two countries pursue additional strategic arms reductions in the future, Holum said, even more plutonium in excess of military requirements will be created. The administration has allocated $200 million for plutonium disposition and expects to add another $200 million to that amount, Holum said, adding that the United States is encouraging other nations to join in the effort. The United States is working hard, he said, "to secure additional commitments in the context of the G-8 Summit" in Okinawa, Japan, in July. Following is the text of Holum's remarks: (begin text) I've just returned from the Moscow summit and I can assure you, the timing for this open forum is most appropriate. We were heavily engaged in addressing just the issues we're discussing today. At the summit, and indeed in the numerous arms control engagements we've held over the past few years with our Russian counterparts, I'm struck by the nature of the discussions. Certainly we have differences. But the ideological tone of the Cold War is long over -- it's now more a meeting of partners, seeking to reconcile differing perspectives and to proceed with the business of arms control and non-proliferation. I mention this, because it confirms that the gravest security risk we faced during the Cold War -- the prospect of a massive nuclear exchange -- is not the greatest security risk we face today. Many weapons remain, but they are coming down -- fast -- and a conflict that could inspire their use is less and less imaginable. Today's main security risk from the former Soviet Union has a different face. It arises from what may be called the "residue" of the Cold War - the possibility that nuclear technology, materials, and expertise may fall into the wrong hands. Think about it. You're Iran, or Iraq, or a terrorist group, and you want a nuclear weapon. If you had access, you might be tempted to steal one. But it would be hard to conceal and transport, dangerous to handle, and protected by codes so you probably couldn't make it work anyway. Or you could make your own weapon, drawing on widely available technical information. The hardest part would be to get the special nuclear material, but then a small quantity -- the volume of a soda can of plutonium, or a football sized piece of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) -- could be enough. Indeed, if you did attain a weapon, you'd probably take it apart, to "mine" it for the HEU or Plutonium and forget about figuring out how to operate the weapon itself. In the wake of the Cold War, the former Soviet Union and other New Independent States represent potential opportunities for terrorists or rogue nations to acquire nuclear materials and expertise on the cheap. Deteriorating economies and a shrinking weapons establishment have created hardships for weapons scientists. Temptations for illicit trafficking in these materials are growing. And the good news of weapons dismantlement is accompanied by the bad news of more and potentially more accessible weapons grade material. So as we address an arms control problem by reducing strategic weapons through START, we're also confronting a mounting challenge to our non-proliferation efforts. We're working closely with Russia to address these challenges. We're removing excess material from weapons programs; and we're trying to make sure that such material is never again used, by anyone, for military purposes. And we're helping to secure nuclear materials and assets, to prevent leakage to terrorists and proliferant states; Irreversibility We first want to make sure that fissile material is withdrawn from military stockpiles and never again used in nuclear weapons. -- We have established fissile material transparency regimes for HEU and plutonium. -- We're building confidence that the HEU we're dealing with is from dismantled nuclear weapons, and that the plutonium is weapon-grade and newly produced. -- We're close to completing negotiations with Russia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on a model legal agreement to make sure that, once fissile material is removed from nuclear weapons programs, it will come under IAEA verification. Transparency regimes have a dual challenge: to be sure that the subject material is of the declared quantity and quality, while protecting information sensitive to national security. One can see the sensitivities this raises -- the first objective calls for more intrusiveness; the second for less. Somewhere in between, we have to strike a workable balance. Removing Excess Material From Weapons Programs Once we are confident what we're dealing with, the ultimate answer, of course, is permanent disposal of the material. As a start, combining non-proliferation goals with commercial activities, we're buying 500 tons of Russian HEU from weapons, blended down for use as civilian nuclear reactor fuel. About 30 tons will be blended down this year -- in essence, transforming material for weapons into electric power for consumers. Plutonium is harder. The first step is to keep the problem from getting worse. Several Russian plutonium-producing reactors also produce needed electricity. We concluded in 1997 the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA), designed to convert those reactors and stop all production of weapon-grade plutonium. For disposal, burning plutonium requires special fuel fabrication and specially designed or modified reactors. As a matter of policy, the U.S. does not favor a plutonium fuel cycle, because there is very little difference between the plutonium used in weapons and the plutonium used in bombs. But there is a big difference between making new plutonium and designing reactors to burn it, on the one hand, and using existing reactors to get rid of plutonium on the other. In Moscow last weekend, President's Clinton and Putin announced a plutonium disposition agreement, under which each country must dispose of at least 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium by irradiating it as fuel in reactors or by immobilizing it with high level radioactive waste, rendering it suitable for geological disposal. Further arms reductions will likely make more plutonium excess to defense needs. So additional plutonium declared excess in the future will also be disposed of under this agreement. Securing Fissile Material But these are long term solutions. The HEU agreement is for 20 years, and Russia has additional HEU beyond the first 500 tons. Plutonium disposition will start out at two to three tons a year, and then move up to four tons, so, again, it's a multi-year effort, even to dispose of 34 tons on each side. So in the meantime, the key to our efforts is improving the security of weapon-usable material to prevent its theft, loss or unauthorized use. The security of these materials is the first line of defense against nuclear smuggling that could lead to nuclear proliferation or nuclear terrorism. -- To prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material, we're providing Russia with radiation monitors; modern access control devices; perimeter alarm systems; and tamper-indicating devices. -- We're providing super containers, to ensure the safety and security of nuclear weapons during transport, and we're helping to improve the security of nuclear weapon storage. -- We're helping Russia consolidate material in fewer, more secure sites and to install effective accounting and security systems. The fewer sites we need to worry about, the less is the risk of diversion, and the more efficient the use of U.S. funds. -- We're helping to design and construct a facility at Mayak to store fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons. The facility, which we expect to be completed by February, 2002, will provide for the safe, secure storage of up to 25,000 containers of former weapons material. -- And we're taking steps to strengthen border controls, including radiation detection technologies, to make it harder to take nuclear materials across borders. Together, these steps help make sure that Russia's nuclear material does not leak out, while awaiting ultimate disposition. Conclusion This is a broad overview focused specifically on materials. Other programs address other aspects of the problem, for example, the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev that employ literally thousands of former weapons scientists who might otherwise be tempted by job offers from unsavory regimes. All of this adds up to a broad, and expensive, agenda that will require not only U.S., but international, leadership and determination. We've consolidated a number of our non-proliferation efforts throughout the NIS. We think this is the best way to prevent the proliferation of weapons materials, technology and expertise. The President's Enhanced Threat Reduction Initiative proposes over $4.5 billion over five years for these efforts. We're encouraging other nations to join in as well. Plutonium disposition, for example, is estimated as a $1.75 billion program. Thanks to Senator (Pete) Domenici's (Republican, New Mexico)leadership, the U.S. has already put $200 million on the table, and expects to add at least another $200 million. Now that agreement is in hand, we are working hard to secure additional commitments in the context of the G-8 Summit in Okinawa. We have a great opportunity to turn nuclear swords into plowshares, but we need to act while the international consensus for action remains. To its credit, Congress has largely supported these efforts although right now there are holds that are actually stopping work on such activities as border security, NIS export control, and the Science Centers, and we're looking at cuts for 2001. The Secretary has been working very hard to get the holds lifted and the cuts reversed. I might add here that these programs add another reason to pursue the formal strategic arms reduction process under START. With the Russian economy a mess and their forces headed downward anyway, some question why we shouldn't just let it happen, and set our own force levels as we see fit. Aside from issues of force structure, verification, and long-term stability, another very good purpose to negotiate on strategic arms is to foster the cooperative climate that is indispensable to our joint non-proliferation efforts. START gives Russia confidence that we're pursuing non-proliferation and arms control objectives in ways that are reciprocal, stabilizing, transparent, and legally binding. And the relationship isn't simply procedural. It's easy to foresee, for example, that proposed START III warhead transparency measures and ongoing programs to assist with the dismantlement and safe and secure transport of Russian warheads could be mutually reinforcing. Similarly, whether Russia will close or convert some of its nuclear facilities may depend on programs that are providing jobs for displaced Russian weapon scientists and engineers -- programs that let us deal with the expertise that went into making Russia's nuclear weapons, even as we do something about the materials and components coming out. So I think we're going about this business the right way, but let me leave you with one thought: we've got to continue to pursue our nuclear objectives on a number of fronts. We can't let progress in one area obscure the need for sustained efforts in another. In the end, all our efforts have one common objective -- enhancing U.S. security. That's what all this is really all about. Thank you. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)