25 June 1998
(Calls fissile material cutoff treaty a "top priority") (1820) Geneva -- Along with a ban on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, "a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) remains the top priority for the United States" in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), says Ambassador Robert Grey. Noting that "all CD members have supported proposals of one kind or another for FMCT negotiations," Grey, who is the U.S. representative to the CD, said the United States hopes that negotiations will begin "on the basis of the agreed mandate, when the CD reconvenes next month." Grey also reviewed the "significant progress" on nuclear disarmament made in recent years by the United States and the other nuclear weapons states. Citing apparent changes in "the dynamic in the CD" following "the regrettable events last month in South Asia," Grey voiced the hope that "we can channel the new energy in this body into a positive force to do substantive work that can produce concrete results." Following is the prepared text of Grey's June 25 statement to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva: (begin text) Mr. President, Allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency, and to state that you have the full support of my delegation as you carry out your important duties. Mr. President, I would like to make a statement today concerning the CD's work in the nuclear area. Along with a ban on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines (APL), a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) remains the top priority for the United States in the CD. We take satisfaction in the knowledge that we are not alone in our support for a cutoff treaty. The parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreed in 1995 at the Review and Extension Conference that a cutoff treaty was the next step in multilateral nuclear arms control after a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). We believed that was the case then, we continue to believe that today, and the NPT parties reaffirmed this commitment in various ways at the recently concluded PrepCom here in Geneva. I would also like to point out that the Canberra Commission report, which has been so often cited in this chamber as a road map to a world free of nuclear weapons, also cites FMCT as the next step in multilateral nuclear arms control. On June 6, the UN Security Council encouraged India and Pakistan to "participate, in a positive spirit" in negotiations for an FMCT on the basis of the agreed mandate, with a view to reaching "early agreement." We note that all CD members have supported proposals of one kind or another for FMCT negotiations. We hope the CD will commence these negotiations, on the basis of the agreed mandate, when the CD reconvenes next month. Following the regrettable events last month in South Asia, the dynamic in the CD seems to have changed. I agree with many of my colleagues from the G-21 that the ill-considered decisions to conduct nuclear tests on the subcontinent should galvanize the Conference into action. But I have to say that I take strong exception to the statement at our last plenary that the recent developments in South Asia were triggered in "large measure" by a lack of substantive progress in nuclear disarmament in recent years. While we can honestly disagree about the scope of the work we should undertake in the Conference, we should at least be able to agree on the facts regarding what has been achieved so far in working toward nuclear disarmament. Let's have a reality check. The United States and the other nuclear weapon states, to varying degrees, have made significant progress both before and since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Recent initiatives cover the gamut of nuclear weapons activities, -- testing, production, and deployment. They also address all aspects of nuclear weapons systems -- the missiles and aircraft equipped to carry nuclear warheads and bombs, the nuclear weapons themselves, and the fissile material needed to make those weapons. These actions speak louder than words. A few examples: -- By September 1996 all of the nuclear weapon states had declared nuclear testing moratoria and signed the CTBT. -- In March 1997 in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to negotiate a START III treaty that, once implemented, would reduce the number of deployed U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by approximately 80 percent from Cold War peak levels. -- In September 1997, the U.S. and Russia signed the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, under which Washington and Moscow will work to convert by the year 2000 Russia's three plutonium production rectors that remain in operation so that they no longer produce weapon-grade plutonium. Both the U.S. and Russia announced a cessation in the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons years ago. The UK and France have publicly announced a cessation of production as well. -- As of January 1998, the U.S. had eliminated more than 900 heavy bombers and missile launchers, which carried over 4,000 accountable warheads. The physical destruction of strategic systems -- blowing up ICBM silos, and slicing apart heavy bombers and ballistic missile submarines -- is real disarmament, not just empty rhetoric. -- As of May 1998, the United States and Russia were both almost two years ahead of schedule in implementing START I. -- And it is not just delivery vehicles that we are eliminating. Since 1988, the United States has dismantled more than 12,300 nuclear warheads and bombs, averaging approximately 100 per month. We are continuing to dismantle these weapons at the maximum rate consistent with security, safety and environmental standards. -- Since 1990, the United States has eliminated nuclear warheads for more than a dozen different types of nuclear weapon systems. -- Overall, 90 percent of the U.S. non-strategic nuclear stockpile has been eliminated. All nuclear artillery, short-range tactical missile warheads and nuclear depth bombs have been eliminated or will have been by next year. -- The U.S. also agreed with Russia that START III will include measures relating to transparency of strategic warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. -- Furthermore, the U.S. Government is not just dismantling the warheads but is taking steps to make sure that the fissile material from those warheads is never used again in nuclear weapons. We have declared more than 225 tons of fissile material as excess to our national security requirements and have voluntarily pledged to make this excess fissile material available for IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable. -- Twelve metric tons of this excess material is now under IAEA safeguards to ensure that it is never used again for weapons purposes. -- Twenty-six metric tons has been committed for inspections by the end of 1999 and additional 52 metric tons of excess material is being readied for international inspection. Mr. President, All of this is significant progress. All of these accomplishments are moving in the right direction and constitute a positive trend. And this is hardly an exhaustive list of steps we have taken. Let me point out a significant fact -- none of the nuclear weapons states has tested in the last two years. Two of the states outside the NPT have tested in the last two months. Thus, from the point of view of nuclear disarmament, those two states are moving in the wrong direction, while the nuclear weapons states are moving in the right direction. Mr. President, before moving back to the FMCT, I would like to make four fundamental points about nuclear arms reductions and nuclear disarmament. First, the pace and scope of nuclear arms reductions depend largely on the security environment and the level of international tensions. Since we cannot predict what the security environment and the level of tensions will be twenty years down the road, it is simply not practical or feasible to sign up to a timebound approach or specified time frame. Second, history has shown that the incremental approach to reductions works. The START process has already resulted in the elimination of thousands of nuclear warheads. Sweeping proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons on the other hand, do not have a stellar track record. Third, asymmetries in the number and types of nuclear weapons possessed by the nuclear weapon states make nuclear disarmament far more complex than many would imagine. It would be easier if we could say that each state would eliminate X warheads per year and we would all arrive at zero at the same time. But, among other complexities, the size, composition and structure of nuclear forces are different and do not lend themselves to simple reduction formulas. Fourth, verification of compliance with nuclear arms reduction agreements is technically complicated and politically sensitive. Trying to multilateralize verification of nuclear arms reductions at this point would be a recipe for disaster. I exaggerate only slightly when I tell you that the START I treaty, with its verification provisions making up some 90 percent of its bulk, is the thickness of a New York city telephone book. Thus, for practical reasons, it seems self evident that if such an arcane process required the consensus of 60 or more countries rather than two, it would likely spell the end of progress. Mr. President, In returning to my review of FMCT, I would like to take this opportunity to clarify a point about the cutoff treaty. The FMCT will be a multilateral, non-discriminatory treaty. It will make no distinction between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapon states. All States Parties will undertake a commitment not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The FMCT will not bestow any new status on any state, but rather constrain all parties equally by banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons on a global basis. The same concept holds true for the CTBT. It is a non-discriminatory treaty in which each State Party makes the same legal commitment: not to conduct nuclear explosions. The CTBT does not distinguish between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. Joining the test ban does not mean joining a nuclear club -- it means joining the international community in turning back the nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation. In closing, I would like to say again that I believe that the dynamic in the CD has changed. Let us hope that when we reconvene for the third part of the session in late July, we can channel the new energy in this body into a positive force to do substantive work that can produce concrete results. The time for rhetoric that contributes to divisiveness has passed. Let's get down to business here when we return in July and begin negotiations on an FMCT. Thank you. (end text)