26 March 1998
(Says time is "ripe for negotiations" on both issues) (1810) Geneva -- A multilateral agreement to cut off the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices would have "clear benefits from a nuclear disarmament perspective," says Ambassador Robert Grey, U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In a March 26 speech Grey pointed out that the international community is still waiting for the CD "to take the next step, to begin negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT), consistent with the decision taken in 1995 to establish an FMCT ad hoc committee." Grey said the United States "strongly supports the Austrian proposal," which, if adopted, would allow the CD to start FMCT negotiations. "The United States agrees with many other countries that cutoff is one of the cornerstones in building a solid foundation for global nuclear disarmament," he added. The ambassador also urged the CD to establish an ad hoc committee to conduct negotiations to further restrict anti-personnel landmines (APL). This is another important responsibility of the CD, Grey explained, because a number of APL producers and stockpilers "have not adhered to existing agreements, citing national security concerns and other significant factors." CD members can "act in a tangible way that will further diminish the damage and loss of life that APL cause," he emphasized, noting that an ad hoc committee should be formed and a special coordinator appointed. Following is the text of Grey's remarks, as prepared for delivery: (begin text) Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency at this critical juncture in the 1998 Session of the Conference on Disarmament. You can rest assured that you will have the full cooperation of my Delegation as you strive to guide the Conference into substantive work. Mr. President, I would like to focus on two issues on the Agenda of the Conference which are of critical importance to the United States -- and to the international community -- FMCT and APL. Initiating substantive work on these two subjects -- one nuclear and the other conventional, and both ripe for negotiation -- would once again demonstrate to the world community that the Conference on Disarmament is a serious negotiating forum in which meaningful disarmament agreements can be reached. FMCT Mr. President, three years ago this month the Conference agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a treaty that would prohibit the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. This was a key step toward substantive work. Unfortunately, since then we have been unable to re-establish this consensus to get negotiations started. This three years of delay is hardly a legacy that the CD can be proud of. We now have before us a proposal by Austria (CD 1492, dated February 3, 1998) that, if adopted, would enable the Conference to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. The United States strongly supports the Austrian proposal, and I urge all of my colleagues to do the same. Mr. President, in recent years the international community has made substantial progress in seeking to address nuclear dangers. The NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) was extended indefinitely, and the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) was signed and is now being ratified. Nuclear weapon free zones are increasing, not the level of nuclear weapons. These treaties now provide assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons to nearly 100 non-nuclear-weapon states. The U.S. and Russia agreed last March in Helsinki that once START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) II is ratified, they will negotiate still deeper reductions under START III, as well as measures to promote their irreversibility. Once these reductions are in place, the nuclear weapons of the U.S. and Russia will be reduced by about 80 percent from peak Cold War levels. A year and one-half have passed since the CD completed work on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) -- the most recent multilateral treaty associated with the long-term process of nuclear disarmament. The international community is still waiting for this forum to take the next step, to begin negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, consistent with the decision taken in 1995 to establish an FMCT ad hoc committee. Mr. President, it would be incorrect to allege that a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is "only" a non-proliferation measure. To be sure, it will have important non-proliferation benefits. But by its very nature, a cutoff treaty will also have important benefits which relate to the process of nuclear disarmament. This is important, so I will elaborate and put these benefits in context. The United States agrees with many other countries that cutoff is one of the cornerstones in building a solid foundation for global nuclear disarmament. In broad terms, the U.S. seeks a world in which the role of nuclear weapons is further diminished, bringing us closer to our ultimate goal of complete elimination. A number of separate, but mutually reinforcing bilateral and multilateral steps play a key role in the long-term process of nuclear disarmament. These steps include: (1) freezing the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; (2) reducing the number of delivery vehicles and warheads; (3) limiting the amount of fissile material available for use in nuclear weapons; and (4) ensuring that excess fissile material is never returned to nuclear weapons programs. These steps are being vigorously pursued through the START process, the CTBT, and various other bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral initiatives. For example, the U.S. has removed more than 225 metric tons of fissile material from its nuclear stockpile and has voluntarily pledged to place this excess fissile material under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards as soon as possible. This process -- along with many other initiatives -- is well underway. But the current mosaic of nuclear disarmament initiatives still lacks a multilateral agreement to cut off the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Such a treaty would apply equally to all parties, thereby extending to the nuclear weapons states some constraints that non-nuclear weapons states have already accepted. In sum, a cutoff treaty would have clear benefits from a nuclear disarmament perspective: -- It would cap the amount of fissile material available for nuclear weapons globally. Just as the CTBT places a qualitative limit on states' abilities to develop new nuclear weapons, an FMCT would put a quantitative constraint on the amount of fissile material available for nuclear explosives. -- It would extend verification measures to fissile material production facilities that are not currently subject to international monitoring. These would include, for the first time, all reprocessing and enrichment facilities that are not yet subject to verification, including those in the United States. -- It would bind legally and subject to international verification those countries that have recently halted fissile material production, including the United States. It is important to point out, as Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs stated here in early February, that the current consensus among the nuclear weapon states in favor of negotiating a cutoff treaty reflects their policies under current circumstances; we cannot assume this collective resolve will last forever. We have an opportunity to "lock that consensus in" through an indefinite, legally-binding treaty. We should not let this opportunity pass. -- The FMCT would help foster the creation of a climate conducive to continued, long-term progress on reducing nuclear-weapon stockpiles. Looking at post-START III negotiations, perhaps involving all the nuclear weapon states, it is difficult to imagine how nuclear arms reductions could go much deeper, unless there is a dependable limit on fissile material for weapons, as well as confidence that the international community would detect clandestine production. -- And the FMCT would meet an important nuclear disarmament commitment made by NPT parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference -- to seek the "immediate commencement and early conclusion" of cutoff negotiations. The United States stands ready to meet its commitment to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty as an important part of our effort to continue fulfilling the obligations outlined in NPT Article VI. A cutoff treaty would also have significant non-proliferation benefits. In addition to extending safeguards to facilities not currently covered, it would: -- Promote stability in regions where the risks of escalating arms races are greatest. We hear talk of dangerous regional "imbalances" which must be addressed. Would it not make sense to take an important step -- a step we can take now -- to ensure that those imbalances do not grow larger? Mr. President, there is a strong sentiment in this body to advance the nuclear disarmament process. We have heard and take note of the concerns raised by other delegations. I have stated that the United States is prepared to listen, to participate, to contribute, and to discuss issues of concern to all members of this body. I have also said that the United States is prepared to work with every member of this body in an effort to find a way forward. But as we continue our general discussion, we also must act. We must do what is realistically achievable, that is, to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty on the basis of the agreed 1995 mandate. We must not shirk this responsibility. APL Mr. President, I would now like to turn briefly to the challenge of negotiating further restrictions on anti-personnel landmines (APL), another important responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament. A number of the largest producers and stockpilers of APL have not adhered to existing agreements, citing national security concerns and other significant factors. Given these realities, an export/transfer ban negotiated in the CD would enable many more states to accept international obligations that restrict APL. The right question to ask is not whether this or that agreement is better than another, but whether we in this forum can act in a tangible way that will further diminish the damage and loss of life that APL cause. It is very clear that we can. Mr. President, the United States hoped that by this stage of our work this year, the Conference would already have reached agreement to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to conduct negotiations on this important subject. But appointment of a special coordinator would be a significant first step, and we look forward to working with the special coordinator as he seeks to formulate a mandate that members of the Conference can accept and support. We must not delay further. The international community is looking to the CD for action. (end text)