The sixth Plenary meeting of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) was held in Bratislava, 30 November - 1 December, 2000, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Alojz Nemethy (Slovak Republic).

The Foreign Minister of Slovakia, Mr. Eduard Kukan, as host of the Plenary meeting, welcomed participants to Bratislava. He stressed the importance that Slovakia attached to the Wassenaar Arrangement. He also emphasised that the gradual building of mutual trust and broader transparency, which was crucial in today's world, would ensure achieving the common objectives of the Wassenaar Arrangement Initial Elements.

Participating States took note of work done over the year by the General Working Group to improve the efficiency of the General Information Exchange in accordance with the conclusions reached at the 1999 Plenary.

Participating States reaffirmed their commitment to maintain responsible national policies in the licensing of exports of arms and sensitive dual-use items. They noted with concern illicit arms flows to zones of conflict and areas covered by UNSC embargoes, as well as licit transfers to zones of conflict from states not participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Participating States agreed to continue consideration of practical arms control measures, including of an appropriate collaborative role with ECOWAS member states to respect the provisions of the ECOWAS Moratorium, and of providing advisory and/or technical assistance in the implementation of the Moratorium. They expressed support for the UNSC's efforts to prevent illegal arms transfers to the UNITA forces in Angola.

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The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established in July 1996 by 33 Participating States on the basis of the Initial Elements.
Meetings are normally held in Vienna, Austria, where the Arrangement is based. The Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and the United States.

Participating States reaffirmed their concern about the threat posed by the illicit possession and use of Man Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) and agreed on elements of export controls on such weapons.

The Plenary reaffirmed the importance of responsible export policies towards, and effective export controls over, small arms and light weapons to prevent destabilising accumulations. Participating States would continue to share information and explore practical measures. The Plenary took note positively of other international efforts including the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects to be held in July 2001, and the work of the OSCE, including its adoption of a document on small arms and light weapons.

The Plenary agreed on non-binding best practices  regarding: the effective enforcement of national export controls; the disposal of surplus military equipment; and the control of exports of items designated as very sensitive.

The Plenary agreed to a number of control list amendments which will be published shortly. Participating States affirmed the importance they attach to timely updating of the lists to keep pace with technology advances while maintaining security interests. The Plenary took note of an indepth study conducted in 2000 on controls of computers and microprocessors.

The Plenary identified other areas for further consideration, including:

• Arms transparency: Participating States agreed to continue study of this topic;
• Arms brokering: Participating States recognised the importance of this issue and agreed to continue to exchange information on national legislation and practices, and discuss possible enforcement measures;
• Intangible transfers: Participating States recognised that it is important to continue deepening Wassenaar Arrangement understanding of how and how much to control such transfers;
• Review of computer and microprocessor controls with a view to further liberalisation, taking into account technology advances and security concerns of Participating States.

Members of the Plenary thanked Ambassador Alojz Nemethy for his major contributions as Plenary Chairman to the work of the Wassenaar Arrangement.

The next WA Plenary regular meeting is to be held in Vienna in December 2001. Ambassador H. Aydin Sahinbas (Turkey) will assume the Plenary Chairmanship on 1 January 2001.

The following list of "best practices" for disposal of surplus military equipment (items that may or may not have been demilitarised) is drawn from the responses provided by Participating States on this subject. These practices are those actually followed or aspired to by Wassenaar Arrangement Participating States and are illustrative of effective export control over surplus/demilitarised military equipment.

1. Items of surplus military equipment (including small arms and light weapons), i.e., items designed for military use but no longer needed, remain subject to the same export controls as new equipment.
2. Safeguards are in place to prevent illicit resale and export of items of surplus military equipment that have been sold or otherwise transferred domestically.
3. Physical security measures and inventory controls are sufficient to prevent theft/diversion of items in storage.
4. Demilitarised equipment capable of being re-militarised is also subject to stringent export controls, in almost all cases identical to those controls applied to new military equipment.
5. The "Best Practices for Effective Enforcement", including preventive enforcement, investigation, effective penalties, and international cooperation, are applied to ensure effective control of surplus/demilitarised military equipment.

Introduction

The Initial Elements (IE) called on Participating States to discuss and compare national practices concerning their commitment to exercise extreme vigilance for items included in the sub-set of Tier 2 (Very Sensitive List) by applying to those exports national conditions and criteria (IE V.5).

There follows a non-binding list of "best practices' with respect to export controls on VSL items.

"Best practices" does not necessarily imply "common practices." Therefore, not all of the practices are presently followed by all Participating States. The list does represent, however, an amalgam of the export control practices followed with respect to VSL items by WA Participating States, consistent with national legislation and international law.

Extreme Vigilance for Sub-set of Tier 2 (VSL) items: "Best Practices"

1. Licences are granted on a case-by-case basis. Documentation required for the licence includes information concerning:

1. Identification/Description (type, quantity, value, weight)/ Specifications of item/Performance characteristics;
2. Applicant;
3. Purchaser; and
4. End-user (if different from purchaser) and end-use.

 
2.    Consultations occur among relevant government agencies within the exporting country with respect to licence applications to export VSL items. During
        these consultations, the appropriateness of the quantity and technological level of the item to the stated end-use, and the bona fides of the end-user are
        among the criteria considered.

3.     In order to determine, inter alia, the risk of diversion or unauthorized use, additional information on end-users may be gathered, as necessary, using
        appropriate means ranging from documentation to visitation (with the consent of the recipient country) prior to the licensing decision.

4.    As a condition of any licence to export a VSL item, the following may be required:

1. Import Certification or end-user statement;
2. Assurance of no re-export without authorisation; and
3. Delivery Verification or other acknowledgement of delivery from the receiving Government.

 

 

5.    As necessary, post-shipment verification may be carried out through appropriate means by the exporter, supplier or officials of the exporting
        country.
 

The following list of "best practices" for effective export control enforcement were adopted by the Wassenaar Plenary as a non-binding amalgam of the enforcement practices followed by different Wassenaar Arrangement Participating States which are illustrative of an effective enforcement programme.

Recognizing the threats posed by unauthorized proliferation and use of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems, especially to civil aviation, peace-keeping, crisis management and anti-terrorist operations, Participating States affirm that they apply strict national controls on the export of MANPADS.

1. Definitions and Scope.

1.1    MANPADS are herein defined as surface-to-air missile systems designed to be carried by an individual or by individuals, including complete
           systems, components, spare parts, models, training systems, and simulators. They include, but are not limited to, all man-portable variants of the
            Blowpipe, Hamlet, Javelin, Keiko, Mistral, RBS-70, RBS-70 Mk-2, Redeye, SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, SA-18, Starburst, Starstreak, Stinger,
            and Vanguard.

1.2    National export controls apply to the international transfer or retransfer of MANPADS, for any purpose, by any means, including licensed
           export, sale, grant, loan, lease, co-production or licensing arrangement for production (hereafter "export"). The scope of export regulation and
            associated controls includes research, design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance,
            servicing, modification, upgrade, modernization, operation, use, replacement or refurbishment, demilitarization, and destruction of MANPADS;
            technical data, software, technical assistance, demonstration, and training associated with these functions; and secure transportation, storage,
            and use.

• Potential for diversion or misuse in the recipient country;
• The recipient government's ability and willingness to protect against unauthorized re-transfers, loss, theft and diversion; and
• The adequacy and effectiveness of the physical security arrangements of the recipient government for the protection of military property, facilities, holdings, and inventories.

• not to re-export MANPADS except with the prior consent of the exporting government;
• to afford requisite security to classified material and information in accordance with applicable bilateral agreements, to prevent unauthorized access or compromise;
• to inform promptly the exporting government of any instance of compromise, unauthorized use, loss, or theft of any MANPADS material.

• Written verification of receipt of MANPADS shipments.
• Inventory by serial number initial shipments of all transferred firing mechanisms and missiles, if physically possible; and maintain written records of inventories.
• Physical inventory of all MANPADS subject to the transfer, at least once a month; account by serial number for MANPADS components expended or damaged during peacetime.

• Store MANPADS in a manner that ensures their physical security, but at a minimum store missiles and firing mechanisms in separate locations.

• Transport MANPADS in accordance with standards and practices for safeguarding munitions in transit, and at a minimum, transport missiles and firing mechanisms in separate containers.
• Bring together and assemble the principal components - typically the gripstock and the missile in a launch tube - only in the event of hostilities or imminent hostilities; for firing as part of regularly scheduled training or for lot testing, for which only those rounds intended to be fired will be withdrawn from storage and assembled; when systems are deployed as part of the point defenses of high priority installations or sites; and in any other circumstances which might be agreed between the receiving and transferring governments.