CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTIONSENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE APRIL 1997
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
S. Hrg. 105-183
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
Appendix
Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention.................... 261
A P P E N D I X
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Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(1) Effect of Article XXII
Summary:
The Senate reserves the right to add reservations to the resolution
of ratification, despite the ban (in Article XXII of the Convention) on
reservations to the Convention. This condition asserts the Senate's
right under the U.S. Constitution, but does not exercise it.
Text:
(1) Effect of Article XXII.
Upon the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification.
The President shall certify to the Congress that the United States has
informed all other States Parties to the Convention that the Senate
reserves the right, pursuant to the Constitution, to offer advice and
consent to ratification of the Convention subject to reservations,
notwithstanding Article XXII of the Convention.
(2) Financial Contributions (Helms #3)
Summary:
Requires statutory authorization and appropriation for payments or
assistance to the Organization.
Text:
(2) Financial Contributions.
(A) Notwithstanding any provision of the Convention, no funds may
be drawn from the Treasury of the United States for payments or
assistance (including the transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16
of Article IV, paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII,
paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision of the
Convention, without statutory authorization and appropriation.
(3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office (Helms #4)
Summary:
Requires the equivalent of an independent OPCW Inspector General's
Office by late December 1997; withholds 50 percent of regular U.S.
contributions to the OPCW, beginning April 29, 1998, if the required
independent oversight office has not been established.
Text:
(3) Establishment of an Internal Oversight Office.
(A) No later than 240 days after the deposit of the instrument of
ratification of the United States to the Convention (in this resolution
referred to as the ``United States instrument of ratification''), the
President shall certify to the Congress that the current internal audit
office of the Preparatory Commission has been expanded into an
independent internal oversight office whose functions will be
transferred to the Organization upon its establishment. The independent
internal oversight office shall be obligated to protect confidential
information pursuant to the obligations of the Confidentiality Annex.
The independent internal oversight office shall--
(i) make investigations and reports relating to all programs of the
Organization;
(ii) undertake both management and financial audits, including--
(I) an annual assessment verifying that classified and confidential
information is stored and handled securely pursuant to the
general obligations set forth in Article VIII and in
accordance with all provisions of the Annex on the
Protection of Confidential Information; and
(II) an annual assessment of laboratories established pursuant to
Paragraph 55 of Part II of the Verification Annex to ensure
the Director General is carrying out his functions pursuant
to Paragraph 56 of Part II of the Verification Annex;
(iii) undertake performance evaluations annually to ensure the
Organization has complied to the extent practicable with the
recommendations of the independent internal oversight office;
(iv) have access to all records relating to the programs and
operations of the Organization;
(v) have direct and prompt access to any official of the
Organization; and
(vi) be required to protect the identity of, and prevent reprisals
against, all complainants.
(B) The Organization shall ensure, to the extent practicable,
compliance with recommendations of the independent internal oversight
office, and shall ensure that annual and other relevant reports by the
independent internal oversight office are made available to all member
states pursuant to the requirements established in the Confidentiality
Annex.
(C) Until a certification is made under subsection (A), 50 percent
of the amount for United States contributions to the regular budget of
the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII shall
be withheld, in addition to any other amounts required to withheld by
any other provision of law.
(D) Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for the
first year of the Organization's operation, ending on April 29, 1998,
the United States shall make its full contribution to the regular
budget of the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article
VIII.
(E) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``internal oversight
office'' means the head of an independent office (or other independent
entity) established by the Organization to conduct and supervise
objective audits, inspections, and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of the Organization.
(4) Cost-Sharing Arrangements (Helms #5)
Summary:
Requires cost-sharing for ``any new research or development
expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or improving the
Organization's regime for verification of compliance under the
Convention, including the training of inspectors and the provision of
detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling and analysis
techniques.'' Permits programs to improve U.S. monitoring without cost-
sharing.
We would not want the United States to do all the expensive
research and development needed to maximize verification of compliance
with the CWC, and not be reimbursed by other countries for such
efforts. It will still be possible for U.S. agencies to pursue R&D
programs so as to improve U.S. monitoring of chemical weapons, however,
and cost-sharing arrangements need not be in place unless and until the
United States wants to share the results with the OPCW.
Text:
(4) Cost-Sharing Arrangements.
(A) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a
report to Congress identifying all cost-sharing arrangements with the
Organization.
(B) The United States shall not undertake any new research or
development expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or
improving the Organization's regime for verification of compliance
under the Convention, including the training of inspectors and the
provision of detection equipment and on-site analysis sampling and
analysis techniques, or share the articles, items, or services
resulting from any research and development undertaken previously,
without first having concluded and submitted to the Congress a cost-
sharing arrangement with the Organization.
(C) Nothing in this paragraph may be construed as limiting or
constricting in any way the ability of the United States to pursue
unilaterally any project undertaken solely to increase the capability
of United States means for monitoring compliance with the Convention.
(5) Intelligence Sharing and Safeguards (Helms #6)
Summary:
Requires interagency Intelligence Community approval and
sanitization of intelligence information before release to the OPCW,
such that there would be only minimal damage from unauthorized
disclosure. The Director of Central Intelligence may waive these
requirements on a case-by-case basis, with notice to appropriate com-
mittees of Congress. Any unauthorized disclosure by the OPCW must be
reported to Congress within 15 days of after the executive branch
learns of it.
Text:
(5) Intelligence Sharing and Safeguards.--
(A) Provision of Intelligence Information to the Organization.--
(i) In General.--No United States intelligence information may be
provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
thereof, unless the President certifies to the appropriate
committees of Congress that the Director of Central
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense, has established and implemented
procedures, and has worked with the Organization to ensure
implementation of procedures, for protecting from unauthorized
disclosure United States intelligence sources and methods
connected to such information. These procedures shall include,
but not be limited to--
(I) offering and provision of advice and assistance to the
Organization in establishing and maintaining the necessary
measures to ensure that inspectors and other staff members
of the Technical Secretariat meet the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity, pursuant to
subparagraph l(b) of the Confidentiality Annex, and in
establishing and maintaining a stringent regime governing
the handling of confidential information by the Technical
Secretariat, pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality
Annex;
(II) explicit recognition, in each case in which intelligence
information is to be provided to the Organization or any
organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any
officials or employees thereof, of the risks of
unauthorized disclosure of the U.S. information to be
provided to the Organization, and determination that such
disclosure would result in no more than minimal damage to
national security;
(III) sanitization of intelligence information that is to be
provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
thereof, to remove all information that could betray
intelligence sources and methods; and
(IV) interagency United States Intelligence Community approval for
any release of intelligence information to the Organization
or any organization affiliated with the Organization, or to
any officials or employees thereof, no matter how
thoroughly it has been sanitized.
(ii) Waiver Authority.--
(I) In General.--The Director of Central Intelligence may waive the
application of clause (i) if the Director of Central
Intelligence certifies in writing to the appropriate
committees of Congress that providing such information to
the Organization or an organization affiliated with the
Organization, or to any official or employee thereof, is in
the vital national security interests of the United States
and that all possible measures to protect such information
have been taken, except that such waiver must be made for
each instance such information is provided, or for each
such document provided. In the event that multiple waivers
are issued within a single week, a single certification to
the appropriate committees of Congress may be submitted,
specifying each waiver issued during that week.
(II) Delegation of Duties.--The Director of Central Intelligence
may not delegate any duty of the Director of Central
Intelligence under this subsection.
(B) Periodic and Special Reports.--
(i) Periodic Reports.--
(I) In General.--The President shall report periodically, but not
less frequently than semiannually, to the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
on the types and volume of intelligence information
provided to the Organization or any organization affiliated
with the Organization, or to any officials or employees
thereof, and the purposes for which it was provided during
the period covered by the report.
(II) Exemption.--For purposes of subclause (i), intelligence
information provided to the Organization or any
organization affiliated with the Organization, or to any
officials or employees thereof, does not cover information
that is provided only to, and only for the use of,
appropriately cleared United States Government personnel
serving with the Organization or any organization
affiliated with the Organization.
(ii) Special Reports.--
(I) Report on Procedures.--Accompanying the certification provided
pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the President shall
provide a detailed report to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives
identifying the procedures established for protecting
intelligence sources and methods when sanitized
intelligence information is provided pursuant to this
section.
(II) Reports on Unauthorized Disclosures.--The President shall
report to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives, within 15 days after it
has become known to the U.S. Government, regarding any
unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information
provided by the United States to the Organization.
(C) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate or assign
the duties of the President under this section.
(D) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this paragraph may he
construed to--
(i) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director of
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section
103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(c)(5)); or
(ii) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title V of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).
(E) Definitions.--In this section:
(i) Appropriate Committees of Congress.--The term ``appropriate
committees of Congress'' means the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and the Committee on International Relations and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(ii) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established under the
Convention and includes any organ of that Organization and any
board or working group, such as the Scientific Advisory Board,
that may be established by it.
(iii) Organization Affiliated with the Organization.--The term
``organization affiliated with the Organization'' includes, but
is not limited to, the Provisional Technical Secretariat under
the Convention and any laboratory certified by the Director-
General of the Organization as designated to perform analytical
or other functions.
(6) Amendments to the Convention (Helms #7)
Summary:
Requires the United States to vote on all proposed amendments and
requires the executive branch to submit all amendments to the Senate
for its advice and consent.
Text:
(6) Amendments to the Convention.
(A) A United States representative will be present at all Amendment
Conferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative or negative, on
all proposed amendments made at such conferences.
(B) The President shall submit to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification under Article 11, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States any amendment to the Convention
adopted by an Amendment Conference.
(7) Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export
Controls (Helms #11)
Summary:
Requires the President to certify, before depositing instruments of
ratification, that the CWC will in no way weaken the Australia Group,
and that each member of the Group agrees there is no CWC requirement to
weaken their export controls.
Requires annual certification that Australia Group controls have
not been weakened and remain effective or, if this cannot be certified,
consultation with the Senate on a resolution of continued adherence to
the CWC.
Requires the President to block any attempt within the Australia
Group to change the Group's view of its obligations under the CWC.
Text:
(7) Continuing Vitality of the Australia Group and National Export
Controls.
(A) The Senate declares that the collapse of the informal forum of
states known as the ``Australia Group,'' either though changes in
membership or lack of compliance with common export controls, or the
substantial weakening of common Aus-
tralia Group export controls and non-proliferation measures in force on
the date of United States ratification of the Convention, would
constitute a fundamental change in circumstances to United States
ratification of the Convention.
(B) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that--
(i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States to accept
any modification, change in scope, or weakening of its national
export controls. The United States understands that the
maintenance of national restrictions on trade in chemicals and
chemical production technology is fully compatible with the
provisions of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and
solely within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States;
(ii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties,
unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export
controls on chemicals and related chemical production
technology for foreign policy or national security reasons,
notwithstanding Article XI(2); and
(iii) each Member-State of the Australia Group, at the highest
diplomatic levels, has officially communicated to the U.S.
Government its understanding and agreement that export control
and nonproliferation measures which the Australia Group has
undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions of the
Convention, including Article XI(2), and its commitment to
maintain in the future such export controls and
nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group members.
(C) (i) The President shall certify to Congress on an annual basis
that--
(a) Australia Group members continue to maintain an equally effective
or more comprehensive control over the export of toxic
chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing equipment,
human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins with potential
biological weapons application, and dual-use biological
equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group as of the
date of ratification of this Convention by the United States;
and
(b) the Australia group remains a viable mechanism for limiting the
spread of chemical and biological weapons-related materials and
technology, and that the effectiveness of the Australia Group
has not been undermined by changes in membership, lack of
compliance with common export controls and nonproliferation
measures, or weakening of common controls and nonproliferation
measures in force as of the date of ratification of this
Convention by the United States.
(ii) In the event that the President is, at any time, unable to
make the certifications described in subparagraph (C)(i), the President
shall consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a
resolution of continued adherence to the Convention, notwithstanding
the fundamental change in circumstance.
(D) The President shall consult periodically, but not less
frequently than twice a year, with the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House
of Representatives, on Australia Group export control and
nonproliferation measures. If any Australia Group member adopts a
position at variance with the certifications and understandings
provided under subparagraph (B), or should seek to gain Australia Group
acquiescence or approval for an interpretation that various provisions
of the Convention require it to remove chemical-weapons related export
controls against any State Party to the Convention, the President shall
block any effort by that Australia Group member to secure Australia
Group approval of such a position or interpretation.
(E) For the purposes of this paragraph--
(i) ``Australia Group'' means the informal forum of states, chaired
by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical
and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing national
export controls, chemical weapons precursor chemicals,
biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use production
equipment, and through other measures: and
(ii) ``Highest diplomatic levels'' means at the level of a senior
official with the power to authoritatively represent their
government, and does not mean a diplomatic representative of
that government to the United States.
(8) Negative Security Assurances (Helms #12)
Summary:
Requires a classified Presidential report regarding the impact of
CWC on U.S. options for responding to chemical or biological attacks,
and on the assurances we offer to other countries that foreswear the
use of nuclear weapons.
Some Members are concerned because ratification of the CWC will
leave the United States unable to threaten retaliatory use of chemical
weapons against a state that used chemical weapons on U.S. or allied
forces. The United States has no in-
tention of using chemical weapons, however, even in response to a
foreign chemical weapon attack. Even before the CWC was negotiated, the
United States committed itself to the destruction of nearly all U.S.
chemical weapons.
This condition requires the President to submit a classified report
on the impact of CWC upon U.S. ``negative security assurances'' to
other countries. Such assurances are the ``umbrella'' that we offer to
countries that agree to forego weapons of mass destruction.
Text:
(8) Negative Security Assurances.
(A) In forswearing the possession of chemical weapons retaliatory
capability under the Convention, the Senate understands that deterrence
of attack by chemical weapons requires a reevaluation of the negative
security assurances extended to non-nuclear-weapon states.
(B) Accordingly, 180 days after the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall submit to the Congress
a classified report setting forth the findings of a detailed review of
United States policy on negative security assurances, including a
determination of the appropriate responses to the use of chemical or
biological weapons against the United States military, United States
citizens, allies, and third parties.
(9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology (Helms #13)
Summary:
Requires the President to certify, prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification and annually thereafter, that
the legitimate commercial activities and interests of U.S. chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms are not being significantly
harmed by the Convention.
The Administration is prepared to certify, both now and annually,
that the CWC's limits on the production and use of the most toxic
chemical weapons and their precursors are not significantly harming the
legitimate commercial activities and interests of U.S. chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms.
Most of those firms played a major role in the negotiation of this
Convention, of course, so they have long since signed up to any
sacrifices that U.S. firms may have to make in order to limit the
ability of rogue states to obtain and use chemical weapons. And the
Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations have all taken extraordinary
measures to limit the impact of the CWC upon U.S. businesses.
Text:
(9) Protection of Advanced Biotechnology.
Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, and on January 1 of every year thereafter, the President
shall certify to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives that the legitimate commercial activities
and interests of the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms
in the United States are not being significantly harmed by the
limitations of the Convention on access to, and production of, those
chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 contained in the Annex on
Chemicals of the Convention.
(10) Monitoring and Verification of Compliance (Helms #14)
Summary:
Requires detailed annual country-by-country reports on chemical
weapons developments and U.S. intelligence coverage, as well as at
least quarterly briefings on U.S. actions to pursue CWC compliance
issues.
We all know that monitoring and verification of some aspects of CWC
compliance will be difficult. This fact of life has prompted
understandable concern on the part of some Members, and the
administration is prepared to accept a condition that requires both
periodic reports and prompt notice regarding world chemical weapons
programs and the status of CWC compliance. The executive branch would
also offer briefings on current compliance issues, including issues to
be raised in OPCW meetings and the results of those meetings.
Text:
(10) Monitoring and Verification of Compliance.
(A) The Senate declares that--
(i) the Convention is in the interests of the United States only if
all parties to the Convention are in strict compliance with the
terms of the Convention as submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, such compli-
ance being measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or
commitments to comply; and
(ii) the Senate expects all parties to the Convention to be in strict
compliance with their obligations under the terms of the
Convention, as submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification;
(B) Given its concern about the intelligence community's low level
of confidence in its ability to monitor compliance with the Convention,
the Senate expects the executive branch of Government to offer regular
briefings, not less than four times a year, to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of
the House of Representatives on compliance issues related to the
Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of all United
States efforts in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels and
forums to resolve compliance issues and shall include a complete
description of--
(i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise at
meetings of the Organization, in advance of such meetings;
(ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the Organization,
within 30 days of each such meeting;
(iii) any determination by the President that a party is in
noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner
inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Convention,
within 30 days of such a determination.
(C) The President shall submit annually on January 1 to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives a full and
complete classified and unclassified report setting forth--
(i) a certification of those priority countries included in the
Intelligence Community's Monitoring Strategy, as defined by the
Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence
Staff and the National Intelligence Council, deter-mined to be
in compliance with the Convention, on a country-by-country
basis;
(ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause (i), an
identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising
with regard to the adherence of the country to its obligations
under the Convention;
(iii) the steps the United States has taken, either unilaterally or
in conjunction with another State Party--
(I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant party
with the objective of demonstrating to the international
community the act of noncompliance;
(II) to call attention publicly to the activity in question; and
(III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant party into
compliance.
(iv) a determination of the military significance and broader
security risks arising from any compliance issue identified
pursuant to clause (ii); and
(v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the noncompliant party
in question to actions undertaken by the United States
described in the report submitted pursuant to clause (iii).
(D) On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall submit to the Committees on Foreign
Relations, Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate and to the Committees on International Relations, National
Security, and Permanent Select Committee of the House of
Representatives, a full and complete classified and unclassified report
regarding--
(i) the status of chemical weapons development, production,
stockpiling, and use, within the meanings of the Convention, on
a country-by-country basis;
(ii) any information made available to the U.S. Government concerning
the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling,
retention, use, or direct or indirect transfer of novel agents,
including any unitary or binary chemical weapon comprised of
chemical components not identified on the schedules of the
Annex on Chemicals, by any country;
(iii) the extent of trade in chemicals potentially relevant to
chemical weapons programs, including all Australia Group
chemicals and chemicals identified on the schedules of the
Annex on Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis;
(iv) the monitoring responsibilities, practices, and strategies of
the intelligence community and a determination of the level of
confidence of the intelligence community (as defined in section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) with respect to each
specific monitoring task undertaken, including an assessment by
the intelligence community of the national aggregate data
provided by parties to the Organization, on a country-by-
country basis;
(v) an identification of how U.S. national intelligence means,
including national technical means and human intelligence, is
being marshaled together with the Convention's verification
provisions to monitor compliance with the Convention; and
(vi) the identification of chemical weapons development, production,
stockpiling, or use, within the meanings of the Convention, by
subnational groups, including terrorist and paramilitary
organizations.
(E) The report required under subparagraph (D) shall include a full
and complete classified annex submitted solely to the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Permanent Select Committee of
the House of Representatives regarding--
(i) a detailed and specific identification of all United States
resources devoted to monitoring the Convention, including
information on all expenditures associated with the monitoring
of the Convention; and
(ii) an identification of the priorities of the executive branch of
Government for the development of new resources relating to
detection and monitoring capabilities with respect to chemical
and biological weapons, including a description of the steps
being taken and resources being devoted to strengthening U.S.
monitoring capabilities.
(11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defenses (Helms
#15)
Summary:
Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are
capable of carrying out required military missions in U.S. regional
contingency plans, regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical
weapons, and that the U.S. Army Chemical School remains under the
supervision of an Army general.
Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and others have
asserted that ratifying CWC could lead to complacency regarding the
need for chemical weapons defenses. This concern is frankly a bit
mystifying. The fear of complacency persists, however, so the
administration has agreed to a condition requiring the Secretary of
Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out required
military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, regardless of any
foreign threat or use of chemical weapons. This means not only
improving the defensive capabilities of U.S. forces, but also
initiating discussions on chemical weapons defense with likely
coalition partners and countries whose civilian personnel would support
U.S. forces in a conflict.
The Administration has also agreed to assure that the U.S. Army
Chemical School remains under the supervision of an Army general.
Text:
(11) Enhancements to Robust Chemical and Biological Defenses.
(A) It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) chemical and biological threats to deployed U.S. Armed Forces
will continue to grow in regions of concern around the world,
and pose serious threats to U.S. power projection and forward
deployment strategies;
(2) chemical weapons or biological weapons use is a potential
condition of future conflicts in regions of concern;
(3) it is essential for the United States and key regional allies to
preserve and further develop robust chemical and biological
defenses;
(4) the United States Armed Forces are inadequately equipped,
organized, trained and exercised for chemical and biological
defense against current and expected threats, and that too much
reliance is placed on non-active duty forces, which receive
less training and less modern equipment, for critical chemical
and biological defense capabilities;
(5) the lack of readiness stems from a de-emphasis of chemical and
biological defenses within the executive branch of Government
and the United States Armed Forces;
(6) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely coalition
partners, as well as civilians necessary to support U.S.
military operations, are inadequately prepared and equipped to
carry out essential missions in chemically and biologically
contaminated environments;
(7) congressional direction contained in the Defense Against Weapons
of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 should lead to enhanced
domestic preparedness to protect against chemical and
biological weapons threats; and
(8) the U.S. Armed Forces should place increased emphasis on
potential threats to deployed U.S. Armed Forces and, in
particular, make countering chemical and biological weapons use
an organizing principle for U.S. defense strategy and
development of force structure, doctrine, planning, training,
and exercising policies of the U.S. Armed Forces.
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to
ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are capable of carrying out required
military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, despite the
threat or use of chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are
effectively equipped, organized, trained and exercised (including at
the large unit and theater level) to conduct operations in a chemically
or biologically contaminated environment that are critical to the
success of U.S. military plans in regional conflicts, including--
(1) deployment, logistics and reinforcement operations at key ports
and airfields;
(2) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at critical regional
airbases; and
(3) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
(C) The Secretaries of Defense and State shall, as a priority
matter, initiate discussions with key regional allies and likely
regional coalition partners, including those countries where the U.S.
currently deploys forces, where U.S. forces would likely operate during
regional conflicts, or which would provide civilians necessary to
support U.S. military operations, to determine what steps are necessary
to ensure that Allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians
are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically- and
biologically-contaminated environments. No later than one year after
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
Secretaries of Defense and State shall provide a report to the
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate and to
the Speaker of the House on the results of these discussions, plans for
future discussions, measures agreed to improve the preparedness of
foreign forces and civilians, and proposals for increased military
assistance, including through the Foreign Military Sales, Foreign
Military Financing and the International Military Education and
Training programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
(D) The Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to
ensure that the United States Army Chemical School remains under the
oversight of a general officer of the United States Army.
(E) Given its concerns about the present state of chemical and
biological defense readiness and training, it is the sense of the
Senate that--
(1) the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of the United
States Army Chemical School, the Army should not disrupt or
diminish the training and readiness of the United States Armed
Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare environment;
(2) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical Defense Training
Facility at Fort McClellan until such time as the replacement
training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is functional.
(F) On January 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the President
shall submit a report to the Committees on Foreign Relations,
Appropriations, and Armed Services and the Committees on International
Relations, National Security, Appropriations, and Speaker of the House
on previous, current, and planned chemical and biological weapons
defense activities. The report shall include the following information
for the previous fiscal year and for the next three fiscal years--
(1) Proposed solutions to each of the deficiencies in chemical and
biological warfare defenses identified in the March 1996
General Accounting Office Report, titled ``Chemical and
Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve
Continuing Problems,'' and steps being taken pursuant to
paragraph (B) of this section to ensure that the U.S. Armed
Forces are capable of conducting required military operations
to ensure the success of U.S. regional contingency plans
despite the threat or use of chemical or biological weapons;
(2) An identification of priorities of the executive branch of
Government in the development of both active and passive
chemical and biological defenses;
(3) A detailed summary of all budget activities associated with the
research, development, testing, and evaluation of chemical and
biological defense programs;
(4) A detailed summary of expenditures on research, development,
testing, and evaluation, and procurement of chemical and
biological defenses by fiscal years defense programs,
department, and agency;
(5) A detailed assessment of current and projected vaccine production
capabilities and vaccine stocks, including progress in
researching and developing a multivalent vaccine;
(6) A detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities necessary to
protect and decontaminate infrastructure to reinforce United
States power-projection forces, including progress in
developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination capability;
(7) The progress made in procuring light-weight personal protective
gear and steps being taken to ensure that programmed
procurement quantities are suffi-
cient to replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and chemical
protective overgarments to maintain required wartime inventory levels;
(8) The progress in developing long-range standoff detection and
identification capabilities and other battlefield surveillance
capabilities for biological and chemical weapons, including
progress on developing a multi-chemical agent detector,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned ground sensors;
(9) Progress in developing and deploying layered theater missile
defenses for deployed U.S. Armed Forces which will provide
greater geographic coverage against current and expected
ballistic missile threats and will help mitigate chemical and
biological contamination through higher altitude intercepts and
boost-phase intercepts;
(10) An assessment of the training and readiness of the United States
Armed Forces to operate in a chemically or biologically
contaminated environment and actions taken to sustain training
and readiness, including at national combat training centers;
(11) The progress in incorporating chemical and biological
considerations into service and Joint exercises as well as
simulations, models, and wargames and the conclusions drawn
from these efforts about the U.S. capability to carry out
required missions, including with coalition partners, in
military contingencies;
(12) The progress in developing and implementing service and joint
doctrine for combat and non-combat operations involving
adversaries armed with chemical or biological weapons,
including efforts to update the range of service and joint
doctrine to better address the wide range of military
activities, including deployment, reinforcement and logistics
operations in support of combat operations, and for the conduct
of such operations in concert with coalition forces; and
(13) The progress in resolving issues relating to the protection of
United States population centers from chemical and biological
attack, including plans for inoculation of populations,
consequence management, and progress made in developing and
deploying effective cruise missile defenses and a national
ballistic missile defense.
(12) Noncompliance (Helms #16)
Summary:
In the event of noncompliance by a State Party, requires the
President to inform and consult with the Senate and to take a series of
actions designed to expose noncompliance and to force compliance. These
actions include making effective use of CWC provisions for challenge
inspections, high-level diplomacy and U.N. sanctions.
The President must also implement any sanctions required by U.S.
law. If the noncompliance should persist for a year, the President must
consult with the Senate regarding continued adherence to the
Convention.
Text:
(12) Noncompliance.
(A) If the President determines that persuasive information exists
that a party to the Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons
production or production mobilization capability, is developing new
chemical agents, or is in violation of the Convention in any other
manner so as to threaten the national security interests of the United
States. Then the President shall--
(1) consult with, and promptly submit to, the Senate a report
detailing the effect of such actions,
(2) seek on an urgent basis a challenge inspection of the facilities
of the relevant party in accordance with the provisions of the
Convention with the objective of demonstrating to the
international community the act of noncompliance;
(3) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the relevant party with the objective of
bringing the noncompliant party into compliance,
(4) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the relevant party
as required by law;
(5) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent basis
within the Security Council of the United Nations a
multilateral imposition of sanctions against the noncompliant
party for the purposes of bringing the noncompliant party into
compliance; and
(6) in the event that noncompliance persists for a period of longer
than 1 year after the date of determination made pursuant to
subparagraph (A), promptly consult with the Senate for the
purposes of obtaining a resolution of support of continued
adherence to the Convention, notwithstanding the changed
circumstances affecting the object and purpose of the
Convention.
(B) Nothing in this section may be construed to impair or otherwise
affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant
to section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(c)(5)).
(C) If the President determines that an action otherwise required
under paragraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the authority of
the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure, he shall report that
determination, together with a detailed written explanation of the
basis for that determination, to the Chairmen of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence no later than 15 days after making such determination.
(13) Primacy of the United States Constitution (Helms #17)
Summary:
Makes clear that the CWC does not contradict the U.S. Constitution.
Some CWC opponents have said that on-site inspections would be
conducted in violation of the U.S. Constitution. This is simply not the
case. No administration would agree to a treaty that violated the
Constitution, no treaty ever takes precedence over the Constitution,
and only the United States interprets our Constitution.
This condition states those facts.
Text:
(13) Primacy of the United States Constitution.
Nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or
other action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution of
the United States, as interpreted by the United States.
(14) Financing Russian Implementation (Helms #18)
Summary:
Requires the United States not to accept any effort by Russia to
make Russia's CWC ratification contingent upon U.S. financial
guarantees to cover Russian destruction costs.
None of us would want the United States to be stuck with the bill
for Russian destruction of their vast chemical weapons stockpile. So
there is agreement on a condition that the United States shall not
accept any Russian effort to condition its ratification of CWC upon the
United States providing guarantees to pay for Russian implementation of
CWC or of the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement.
Text:
(14) Financing Russian Implementation.
The United States understands that in order to be assured of the
Russian commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles,
Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the
implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement, and
the Convention. The United States shall not accept any effort by Russia
to make deposit of Russia's instrument of ratification contingent upon
the United States providing financial guarantees to pay for
implementation of commitments by Russia under the 1990 Bilateral
Destruction Agreement or the Convention.
(15) Assistance Under Article X (Helms #19)
Summary:
Requires the United States not to contribute to the voluntary fund
for chemical weapons defense assistance to other States Parties, and
limits U.S. assistance to certain states to medical antidotes and
treatments.
Opponents of CWC assert that Article X would require the United
States to provide assistance and equipment to countries like Cuba to
improve their chemical weapons defense capabilities. This is a
misconception of paragraph 7 of Article X, which says: ``Each State
Party undertakes to provide assistance through the Organization.''
Assistance may include ``detection equipment and alarm systems,
protective equipment; decontamination equipment and decontaminants;
medical antidotes and treatments; and advice on any of these protective
measures.''
The rest of paragraph 7 of Article X makes clear that a State Party
may simply declare what assistance it might provide in response to an
appeal by the OPCW. CWC does not compel the United States to give any
country, let alone an enemy like Cuba, anything more than medical
assistance or advice.
Text:
(15) Assistance Under Article X.
(A) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that the
United States shall not provide assistance under paragraph 7(a) of
Article X.
(B) Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President shall certify to the Congress that for any
States Party the government of which is not eligible for assistance
under chapter 2 of Part II or chapter 4 of Part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961--
(i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be provided
to the States Party; and
(ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other than
medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the States
Party.
(16) Constitutional Prerogatives (Helms #22)
Summary:
Sense of the Senate that U.S. negotiators should not agree to
treaties that bar reservations and that the Senate should not consent
to ratification of any such future treaties. (See also #1.)
Article XXII of the CWC states: ``The Articles of this Convention
shall not be subject to reservations. The Annexes of this Convention
shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with its object and
purpose.'' Senator Helms rightly notes that although the United States
has ratified other treaties with similar provisions, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has maintained that ``the President's agreement to
such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's constitutional right
and obligation to give its advice and consent to a treaty subject to
any reservation it might determine is required by the national
interest.''
The U.S. Constitution vests in the Senate the power to give its
advice and consent subject to reservations. So I am happy to support
this condition that reminds the executive branch of the Senate's role.
Text:
(16) Constitutional Prerogatives.
(A) The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) The Constitution states that the President ``shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.''
(2) At the turn of the century, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge took the
position that the giving of advice and consent to treaties
constitutes a stage in negotiation on the treaties and that
Senate amendments or reservations to a treaty are propositions
``offered at a later stage of the negotiation by the other part
of the American treatymaking power in the only manner in which
they could then be offered.''
(3) The executive branch has begun a practice of negotiating and
submitting to the Senate treaties which include a provision
which has the purported effect of inhibiting the Senate from
attaching reservations which the Senate considers necessary in
the national interest or of preventing the Senate from
exercising its constitutional duty to give its advice and
consent to treaty commitments before ratification.
(4) During the 85th Congress, and again during the 102d Congress, the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate made its position
on this issue clear when stating that ``the President's
agreement to such a prohibition can not constrain the Senate's
constitutional right and obligation to give its advice and
consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it might
determine is required by the national interest.''
(B) Sense of the Senate.
It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the past ratification by the Senate of treaties containing
provisions which prohibit amendments or reservations should not
be construed as a precedent for such clauses in future
agreements with other nations which require the advice and
consent of the Senate;
(2) United States negotiators to a treaty should not agree to any
provision which has the effect of inhibiting the Senate from
attaching reservations or offering amendments to the treaty;
and
(3) the Senate should not consent in the future to any treaty article
or provision which would prohibit the Senate from giving its
advice and consent to the treaty subject to amendment or
reservation.
(17) Additions to the Annex on Chemicals (Replaces Helms #25)
Summary:
There may well be occasions where it is in our national security
interest to add new chemicals to the list of restricted and prohibited
chemicals when it becomes clear that they have chemical weapon uses.
However, some have expressed a concern that the addition of certain
chemicals to the annex on chemicals might introduce new burdens on U.S.
industry.
This condition requires that the executive branch inform Congress
when a chemical is proposed for addition to the Schedules.
Consultation with Congress at that stage would enable the United
States to object to routine adoption of a change that might have
serious impact upon U.S. companies. Such an objection would force the
OPCW to seek a two-thirds vote in the Conference of States Parties.
Text:
(17) Additions to the Annex on Chemicals.
(A) Presidential Notification.--Not later than ten days after the
Director-General communicates information to all States Parties,
pursuant to Article XV(5)(a) of the Convention, of a proposal for the
addition of a chemical or biological substance to a schedule of the
Annex on Chemicals, the President shall notify the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the U.S. Senate of the proposed addition.
(B) Presidential Report.--Not later than 60 days after the
Director-General communicates information of such a proposal pursuant
to Article XV(5)(a) or not later than 30 days after a positive
recommendation by the Executive Council pursuant to Article XV(5)(c) of
the Convention, whichever is sooner, the President shall transmit to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate a report, in
classified and unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the
proposed addition to the Annex on Chemicals. Such report shall include,
but not be limited to--
(i) an assessment of the likely impact on U.S. industry of the
proposed addition of the chemical or biological substance to
the Annex on Chemicals;
(ii) a description of the likely costs and benefits, if any, to U.S.
national security of the proposed addition of such chemical or
biological substance to the Annex on Chemicals; and
(iii) a detailed assessment of the effect of the proposed addition on
U.S. obligations under the Verification Annex;
(C) Presidential Consultation.--The President shall, after the
submission of the notification required under subparagraph (A) and
prior to any action on the proposal by the Executive Council under
Article XV(5)(c), consult promptly with the Senate as to whether the
United States should object to the proposed addition of a chemical or
biological substance pursuant to Article XV(5)(c).
(18) Effect on Terrorism (Helms #27)
Summary:
Senator Helms and you have agreed to a condition by which the
Senate will find that the CWC would not have stopped the Aum Shinrikyo
group in Japan and that future terrorist groups will likely seek
chemical weapons.
Both of these statements are probably quite accurate, and no harm
is done by attaching them to the resolution of ratification.
Text:
(18) Effect on Terrorism.
The Senate finds that--
(A) Irrespective of whether the Convention enters into force,
terrorists will likely look upon chemical weapons as a means to gain
greater publicity and instill widespread fear; and
(B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo would
not have been prevented by the Convention.
(19) Constitutional Separation of Powers (Helms #30)
Summary:
This condition recognizes the Constitutional responsibility of the
Congress to pay the debts of the United States. It also declares the
Senate's view that the appropriation of funds for financial
contributions to the OPCW are beyond the control of the executive
branch, and that the United States should not be denied its vote in the
OPCW for failing to pay in full its assessed financial contribution.
Text:
(19) Constitutional Separation of Powers.
Article VIII, paragraph 8 of the Convention allows States Parties
to vote in the Organization if that member is in arrears in the payment
of financial contributions provided that the Organization is satisfied
that such non-payment is due to conditions beyond the control of that
member. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution vests in Congress the
exclusive authority to ``pay the Debts'' of the United States.
Financial contributions to the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons may be appropriated only by the Congress and thus the
Senate declares that they are, for the purposes of Article VIII,
paragraph 8, beyond the control of the executive branch of the U.S.
Government. Therefore, the United States vote in the Organization
should not be denied in the event the Congress does not appropriate
fully funds for its assessed financial contribution.
(20) The On-Site Inspection Agency
Summary:
In 1994, the Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that
Congress authorize the DoD On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) to assist
private facilities in the escorting of CWC inspectors. OSIA has done a
fine job over the years in escorting arms control inspectors at U.S.
Government and defense contractor facilities, making sure that treaty
obligations are met with minimal risk to sensitive information.
OSIA's charter restricts it to DoD and contractor sites, so new
legislation will be needed--probably in the CWC implementing
legislation. (Note: The Armed Services Committee will support this so
long as the assistance is provided on a reimbursable basis, but may
object if DoD funds are to be used to help U.S. industry.)
Text:
(20) The On-Site Inspection Agency.
It is the sense of the Senate that--
In advance of any inspection, the On-Site Inspection Agency of the
Department of Defense should be authorized to provide assistance to
United States facilities subject to routine inspections under the
Convention or to any facility which is the object of a challenge
inspection initiated pursuant to Article IX, provided that the consent
of the owner or operator of such facility has first been obtained.
(21) Further Arms Reduction Obligations
Summary:
This declaration builds upon Section 33(b) of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act of 1961, which was originally intended to ensure that
the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would be
prohibited from taking any actions in furtherance of arms control
objectives that affect the armed forces of the United States without
the approval of either a two-thirds vote of the Senate or a majority of
both Houses.
This provision, which has been attached to major arms control
treaties in recent years, sets forth the Senate position that any
international agreement that would obligate the United States to limit
its forces in a militarily significant way will only be considered by
the Senate pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution.
Text:
(21) Further Arms Reduction Obligations.
The Senate declares its intention to consider for approval
international agreements that would obligate the United States to
reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a
militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty power as set
forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
(22) Treaty Interpretation
Summary:
This provision, commonly referred to as the ``Biden Condition,''
has been attached to all major treaties since the INF Treaty. It states
the Constitutionally based principle that the shared understanding that
exists between the Executive branch and the Senate at the time the
Senate gives advice and consent to ratification can only be altered
subject to the Senate's advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or
protocol, or the enactment of a statute.
Text:
(22) Treaty Interpretation.
The Senate affirms the applicability to all treaties of the
Constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in
Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF
Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF Treaty,''
refers to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-
Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together with the related memorandum
of understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
(23) Chemical Weapons Destruction
Summary:
This condition requires the President to explore alternative
technologies for the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile. It recognizes that the deadline set in the Convention for
the completion of stockpile destruction, 2007, supersedes the 2004 date
established in an earlier law. It also reassures us that the
requirement under the Convention to submit a plan on the method of
destruction does not preclude the later use of alternative
technologies. Finally, should a safer and more environmentally friendly
alternative technology be discovered, but its employment circumscribed
by the 2007 deadline, the President would need to consult with the
Congress to determine whether the United States should exercise its
rights under the Convention and request a brief extension of the
destruction deadline.
Text:
(23) Chemical Weapons Destruction.
Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification of the Convention, the President shall certify to the
Congress that all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) Exploration of Alternative Technologies.--The President has
agreed to explore alternative technologies for the destruction
of the United States stockpile of chemical weapons in order to
ensure that the United States has the safest, most effective
and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its
obligations under the Convention for the destruction of
chemical weapons.
(B) Convention Extends Destruction Deadline.--The requirement in
Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 1521) for
completion of the destruction of the United States stockpile of
chemical weapons by December 31, 2004 will be superseded upon
the date the Convention enters into force with respect to the
United States by the deadline required by the Convention of
April 29, 2007.
(C) Authority to Employ a Different Destruction Technology.--The
requirement under Article III(l)(a)(v) of the Convention for a
declaration by each state party to the Convention, not later
than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force
with respect to that party, on general plans of the State Party
for destruction of its chemical weapons does not preclude the
United States from deciding in the future to employ a
technology for the destruction of chemical weapons different
than that declared under that Article.
(D) Procedures for Extension of Deadline.--The President will consult
with Congress on whether to submit a request to the Executive
Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons for an extension of the deadline for the destruction of
chemical weapons under the Convention, as provided under Part
IV(A) of the Annex on Implementation and Verification to the
Convention if, as a result of the program of alternative
technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons carried
out under Section 8065 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in Public Law 104-208),
the President determines that alternatives to the incineration
of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more
environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United
States from meeting the deadlines of the Convention.