Reference Number:
No. 278-96
(703)695-0192(media)
(703)697-3189(copies)
(703)697-5737(public/industry)
May 13, 1996
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Remarks As Prepared
for Delivery by
William J. Perry
Secretary of
Defense
John F. Kennedy
School of Government
Harvard University
May 13, 1996
In a famous 1837
lecture at Harvard, Ralph Waldo Emerson asked his audience, If there
is any period one would desire to be born in, is it not the age of Revolution,
when the old and the new stand side by side, when the energies of all
men are searched by fear and by hope, when the historic glories of the
old can be compensated by the rich possibilities of the new?
Like Emerson, we,
too, live in an age of revolution: In politics, with the ending of the
Cold War; in economics, with the dramatic growth in global trade; and
in technology, with the continuing explosion of information systems.
Today, we are living Emerson's desire in a revolutionary era of rich
possibilities, an era when our energies are searched by fear and by
hope. Our hope is symbolized by the success of democracy around the
globe, by the growth of new global trade relationships, by the expansion
of global communications, and by the explosion of information. Indeed,
in this revolutionary new era, the term closed society is rapidly becoming
obsolete. Even those states that still desire isolation find it increasingly
difficult to achieve. Indeed, it is impossible to achieve if they want
to reap the benefits of the global economy, as China discovered during
the Tiananmen Square crackdown, when they could not control the fax
machines and modems.
But along with
this hope, our energies in this revolutionary era are also searched
by fear: Fear of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; fear
of ethnic hatreds ripping asunder existing states; fear of terrorism
by extremist groups; and fear of aggression by rogue nations freed from
the constraints of their former Cold War alliances. For many, this revolutionary
new era has meant a decreased sense of personal safety, symbolized by
pictures of the bodies being carried from the Federal building in Oklahoma
or of the gassed passengers rushing from a Tokyo subway.
The stark contrast
between our hopes and our fears makes clear that this revolutionary
new era is characterized by the increased capacity of humankind for
good and for evil. It also makes clear that in addition to revolutions
in politics, economics and technology, there must also be a revolution
in our thinking about security strategy.
The security of
the United States continues to require us to maintain strong military
forces to deter and, if necessary, to defeat those who threaten our
vital national interests -- and we do. But today, the United States
also has a unique historical opportunity, the opportunity to prevent
the conditions for conflict and to help create the conditions for peace.
Today, I want to talk to you about how America's security policy in
the post-Cold War era requires us to take advantage of that opportunity:
to make preventive defense the first line of defense of America, with
deterrence the second line of defense, and with military conflict the
third and last resort.
Preventive defense
may be thought of as analogous to preventive medicine. Preventive medicine
creates the conditions which support health, making disease less likely
and surgery unnecessary. Preventive defense creates the conditions which
support peace, making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary.
Twice before in
this century, America has had similar opportunities to prevent the conditions
for conflict. After World War I, the United States had the opportunity
to help prevent conflict by joining the League of Nations and engaging
the world. Instead, we chose to isolate ourselves from the world. That
strategy of isolationism, coupled with the Europeans' strategy of reparations
and revenge, utterly failed to prevent the conditions for future conflict.
In fact, it helped create them. And over three hundred thousand Americans
paid with their lives in a second World War. After World War II, America
was determined to learn from that costly lesson -- this time we chose
the path of engagement. We sought to prevent conflict from recurring.
Through our engagement in the United Nations and by our leadership,
we promoted a post-war program of reconciliation and reconstruction,
in sharp contrast to the reparation and revenge practiced after World
War I. Our most dramatic national effort to prevent future conflict
was announced at Harvard's 1947 commencement by George C. Marshall.
It came to be called the Marshall Plan.
Marshall acted
at a pivotal moment in this century. Like Emerson, Marshall saw America
in a world standing between two eras, a period Marshall described as
between a war that is over and a peace that is not yet secure. At this
pivotal moment, Marshall set forth a strategy of preventive defense.
The soldier in Marshall wanted desperately to prevent war from recurring
-- the statesman in Marshall found a way. His vision was of a Europe
-- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- united in peace, freedom and democracy.
His tool for realizing his vision was a plan for rebuilding a European
continent that had been physically, economically and spiritually shattered
by war.
The Marshall Plan
rested on three premises: That what happens in Europe affects America;
that economic reconstruction in Europe was critical to preventing another
war; and that economic reconstruction of Europe would not happen without
US leadership. Acting on these premises, Marshall and his generation
rebuilt Europe and they led America to assume the mantle of world leadership.
Their preventive defense program was successful in creating the conditions
of peace and stability wherever applied.
In the end, however,
Marshall's vision was only half realized, because Joseph Stalin slammed
the door on Marshall's offer of assistance. Within a matter of years,
the world was divided into two armed camps. And deterrence, not prevention,
became the overarching security strategy of the Cold War. While geopolitics
doomed Marshall's efforts at preventive security for Europe, the technology
of nuclear weapons made a global war too terrible to contemplate --
so deterrence worked. Now, after more than forty dangerous years of
the nuclear balance of terror, the Cold War is over.
Today, we are at
another pivotal moment in history, a point between two centuries --
a point between a Cold War that is over and a peace that is not yet
secure. Today, the world does not need another Marshall Plan. But to
ensure that it is our hopes and not our fears that will be realized
in this revolutionary age, we do need to build on Marshall's core belief
that the United States must remain a global power, and that our best
security policy is one which prevents conflict.
Just as the Marshall
Plan was based on a set of premises, so today our program of preventive
defense rests on its own set of premises. First, that fewer weapons
of mass destruction in fewer hands makes America and the world safer.
Second, that more democracy in more nations means less chance of conflict
in the world. And third, that defense establishments have an important
role to play in building democracy, trust and understanding in and among
nations.
From these premises
follows the conclusion that for the post- Cold War world to be one of
peace, and not conflict, America must lead the world in preventing the
conditions for conflict and in creating the conditions for peace. In
short, we must lead with a policy of preventive defense. So we have
created an innovative set of programs in the Defense Department to do
just that -- some national, some international. They include: The Cooperative
Threat Reduction program to reduce the nuclear weapon complex of
the nuclear nations of the former Soviet Union; the counter- proliferation
program to deal with the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction; the Framework Agreement to eliminate the nuclear weapons
program of North Korea; and the Partnership for Peace to begin the integration
of 27 nations of Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia into the
European security structure. I will describe the progress in some of
these programs, and how they are, in fact, creating conditions which
prevent conflict.
Nowhere is preventive
defense more important than in countering the spread of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons. During the Cold War, the world lived with the
nightmare prospect of global nuclear holocaust, and the United States
and the Soviet Union relied on deterrence, a balance of terror known
as Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD. Today, the threat of global nuclear
holocaust is vastly reduced, but we face the new danger that weapons
of mass destruction will fall into the hands of terrorist groups or
rogue states. The threat of retaliation may not matter much to a terrorist
group or a rogue nation -- deterrence may not work with them. This new
class of undeterrables may be madder than MAD.
The aspiration
of these rogue nations to obtain weapons of mass destruction is set
against the backdrop of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union.
This disintegration meant that instead of one nuclear empire, we were
left with four new states, each with nuclear weapons on their soil:
Russia, Kazakstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. The depressed economies of
these nations created a buyer's market for weapons of mass destruction,
including the materials, infrastructure, and work- force, and the unsettled
political conditions made it potentially harder to protect those weapons
and materials.
The increase in demand for nuclear weapons, and the potential increase
in supply of weapons, material and know-how have required us to augment
our Cold War strategy of deterrence with a post-Cold War strategy of prevention.
The most effective way to prevent proliferation is to dismantle the arsenals
that already exist. Fortunately, through our Cooperative Threat Reduction
program with Russia and the other nuclear states of the former Soviet
Union, we have the dismantlement well started. Through a defense program
created by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, we have helped Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads
and destroy hundreds of missiles, bombers and silos. This January, I personally
detonated an SS-19 silo at Pervomaysk, which once had 700 nuclear warheads
aimed at targets in the United States. By the end of the month, this missile
field will have been converted to a wheat field. By the end of the year,
Kazakstan, Ukraine and Belarus will be entirely free of nuclear weapons.
We are also using Nunn-Lugar funds to help these nations safeguard and
secure the weapons and materials to keep them out of the global marketplace.
Under Project Sapphire, for example, we bought 600 kg of highly enriched
uranium from Kazakstan to ensure that it did not fall into the hands of
nuclear smugglers.
But preventing
proliferation means more than just dismantling the Cold War nuclear
arsenals. It also means leading the world in the right direction, as
we did last year in gaining a consensus for the indefinite extension
of the Nuclear non- Proliferation Treaty. It means working to strengthen
the Biological Weapons Convention and ratifying the Chemical Weapons
Convention. It means taking the lead in a range of international export
controls to limit the flow of goods and technologies that could be used
to make weapons of mass destruction. During the Cold War, for example,
we had the COCOM regime of export controls, designed to prevent the
spread of dangerous technologies to the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc.
Today, we are creating the Wassenaar regime, set-up in cooperation with
Russia, updated to fit today's technology and designed to prevent the
spread of dangerous technologies to potential proliferators and rogue
regimes.
Preventing proliferation
also means leading the international community in opposing rogue nations
with nuclear and/or chemical weapon aspirations, such as Iran and Libya.
Economic sanctions and export controls have helped prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons and they have significantly slowed Libya's
efforts to put a chemical weapons production plant into operation.
Sometimes preventing
proliferation means employing coercive diplomacy -- a combination of
diplomacy and defense measures. In North Korea, for example, we used
such a combination to stop that nation's nuclear weapons program. The
diplomacy came from the threat by the United States and other nations
in the region to impose economic sanctions if North Korea did not stop
their program and the promise of assistance in the production of commercial
power if they did. The defense came from our simultaneous beefing up
of our military forces in the region. The result is that today, while
North Korea continues to pose a conventional military threat on the
peninsula, it is not mounting a nuclear threat.
Overall, the United
States has been instrumental in eliminating or reversing nuclear weapon
programs in six states since 1991: Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, Iraq,
North Korea and South Africa. These efforts have made both America and
the world safer; and the gains to our national security have been dramatic,
direct and tangible. I can think of few more satisfying moments in my
life than when I turned the key to blow up that missile silo in Pervomaysk.
But the story of
preventive defense is not merely one of preventing threats from weapons
of mass destruction. It is also the story of engaging military and defense
establishments around the world to further the spread of democracy and
to further trust and understanding among nations. Here, the results
may be less immediately tangible, but they are no less significant.
America has long
understood that the spread of democracy to more nations is good for
America's national security. It has been heartening this past decade
to see so many nations around the world come to agree with us that democracy
is the best system of government. But as the nations of the world attempt
to act on this consensus, we are seeing that there are important steps
between a world-wide consensus and a world-wide reality. Democracy is
learned behavior. Many nations today have democracies that exist on
paper, but, in fact, are extremely fragile. Elections are a necessary
but insufficient condition for a free society. It is also necessary
to embed democratic values in the key institutions of nations.
The Defense Department
has a key role to play in this effort. It is a simple fact that virtually
every country in the world has a military. In virtually every new democracy
-- in Russia, in the newly free nations of the Former Soviet Union,
in Central and Eastern Europe, in South America, in the Asian Tigers
-- the military represents a major force. In many cases it is the most
cohesive institution. It often contains a large percentage of the educated
elite and controls key resources. In short, it is an institution that
can help support democracy or subvert it.
We must recognize
that each society moving from totalitarianism to democracy will be tested
at some point by a crisis. It could be an economic crisis, a backslide
on human rights and freedoms, or a border or ethnic dispute with a neighboring
country. When such a crisis occurs, we want the military to play a positive
role in resolving the crisis, not a negative role by fanning the flames
of the crisis -- or even using the crisis as a pretext for a military
coup.
In these new democracies,
we can choose to ignore this important institution, or we can try to
exert a positive influence. We do have the ability to influence, indeed,
every military in the world looks to the U.S. armed forces as the model
to be emulated. That is a valuable bit of leverage that we can put to
use creatively in our preventive defense strategy.
In addition, if
we can build trust and understanding between the militaries of two neighboring
nations, we build trust and understanding between the two nations themselves.
Some have said that war is too important to be left solely to the generals.
Preventive defense says peace is too important to be left solely to
the politicians.
In this effort,
preventive defense uses a variety of tools, such as educating foreign
officers at our military staff and command colleges, where they learn
how to operate in a democratic society and how to operate under civilian
control and with legislative oversight. Over 200 officers from the Former
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries are right now studying at U.S.
institutions, and another 60 are about to complete a special course
we have set up at the Marshall Center in Germany.
Another tool is
sending out teams of American military officers and civilians to help
nations build modern, professional military establishments under strong
civilian defense leadership. Since 1992, these teams have had thousands
of contacts with dozens of newly-free nations. These contacts have led
Hungary, for example, to enact new laws placing the Hungarian military
under civilian, democratic control. They have helped Romania develop
a new code of conduct for their military forces based on the American
military's Uniform Code of Military Justice. They have helped Lithuania,
Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan to improve their training for Non-Commissioned
Officers.
We also use tools
such as joint training exercises in peacekeeping, disaster relief and
search and rescue operations. We have held four such training exercises
in the last year with Russian troops -- two in Russia and two in the
U.S. We also held a joint peacekeeping exercise in Louisiana last July,
involving troops from fourteen nations with whom we had never had security
relations, including Albania and Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, Uzbekistan
and Kazakstan, and all three Baltic nations. Next month, I will meet
up with the ministers of defense from Ukraine, Russia, Poland and other
nations for the opening ceremonies of an exercise in Lviv, Ukraine.
Confidence-building
measures are another important tool, particularly in building trust
between countries. One of the most important confidence building measures
is developing openness about military budgets, plans and policies. Openness
is an unusual concept when it comes to defense. The art of war, after
all, involves secrecy and surprise, but the art of peace involves exactly
the opposite -- openness and trust. That's why when I travel to newly
democratic states, I try to set an example by handing out copies of
my annual report to Congress, which details our defense budget and our
security policies. I also talk about legislative oversight and our budget
process. These concepts seem elementary to you and me, but to military
officers and defense officials who grew up under totalitarianism, they
are positively revolutionary.
In Europe and Central
Asia, these tools of preventive defense come together in a NATO program
known as Partnership for Peace, or PFP. The name Partnership for Peace”
was coined by Joe Kruzel, a former fellow at the Center for Science
and International Affairs we honor today, who died while working for
peace in Bosnia last August.
Through Partnership
for Peace, NATO is reaching out to the nations of Eastern and Central
Europe, Russia and the Newly Independent States, and truly integrating
them into the security architecture of Europe. It used to be when the
Secretary of Defense went to meetings at NATO headquarters in Belgium,
he sat next to his counterpart from the United Kingdom. Today, when
I go to meetings in Belgium, I sit with my counterpart from Uzbekistan
on one side and the ministers from the United Kingdom and Ukraine on
the other.
Just as the Marshall
Plan had an impact well beyond the economies of Western Europe, PFP
is echoing beyond the security realm in Partner nations and into the
political and economic realms. PFP members are working to uphold democracy,
tolerate diversity, respect the rights of minorities and freedom of
expression. They are working to build market economies. They are working
hard to develop democratic control of their military forces, to be good
neighbors and to respect the sovereign rights of bordering countries.
They are working hard to make their military forces compatible with
NATO.
For those Partner
countries that are embracing PFP as a path to NATO membership, these
actions are a key to opening that door. For many of these nations, aspiration
to NATO membership has become the rock on which all major political
parties base their platforms. It is providing an overlapping consensus
on a unifying goal, making compromise and reconciliation on other issues
possible. To lock in the gains of reform, NATO must ensure that the
ties we are creating in PFP continue to deepen and that we actually
proceed with the gradual and deliberate, but steady process of outreach
and enlargement to the East.
Ultimately, PFP
is doing more than just building the basis for NATO enlargement. It
is, in fact, creating a new zone of security and stability throughout
Europe, Russia and the NIS. By forging networks of people and institutions
working together to preserve freedom, promote democracy and build free
markets, PFP today is a catalyst for transforming Central and Eastern
Europe, much as the Marshall Plan transformed Western Europe in the
'40s and '50s. In short, PFP is not just defense by other means, it
is democracy by other means; It is helping prevent the realization of
our fears for the post-Cold War era and taking us closer to realizing
our hopes.
One of these hopes
is that Russia will participate in a positive way in the new security
architecture of Europe. Russia has been a key part of the European security
picture for over 300 years. It will remain a key player in the coming
decades, for better or worse. The job for the United States, NATO and
Russia is to make it for the better. Unlike with the Marshall Plan 50
years ago, Russia today has chosen to participate in Partnership for
Peace. We welcome Russia's participation, and hope that over time it
will take on a leading role in PFP commensurate with its importance
as a great power.
NATO's efforts
to build cooperative ties with Russia complement the bilateral efforts
of the United States and Russia to build what we call a pragmatic partnership
-- another piece of preventive defense. The pragmatic partnership involves
working with Russia in important areas where our interests overlap,
such as Nunn-Lugar; while trying to build trust and cooperation through
such things as military exchanges and joint exercises.
The immediate payoff
for our joint training with the PFP nations and our efforts to build
a cooperative relationship with Russia has come, ironically, in Bosnia.
Up until late last year, to say that the future history of Europe is
being written in Bosnia, would have been a profoundly pessimistic statement.
Today, however, this statement qualifies as guarded optimism; not only
because there is satisfactory compliance with the Dayton peace agreement,
but because of the way IFOR has been put together and because of the
way it is performing. IFOR is not a peacekeeping exercise it is the
real thing. Fourteen Partner nations have joined NATO nations in shouldering
the responsibility in IFOR. A Russian brigade is operating as part of
an American division in IFOR -- the top Russian commander in Bosnia,
General Shevtsov, visited your Center for Science and International
Affairs just last week. NATO itself has a renewed sense of purpose and
sense of its own ability to put together a force for a post-Cold War
military mission. This is all positive history, and it shows why I believe
that Bosnia is turning out to be the crucible for the creation of Marshall's
Europe.
We are also seeking
to use the tools of preventive defense to prevent the occurrence of
future Bosnias. Last month, I attended a conference of ministers of
defense in Tirana, Albania, directed to the specific military cooperation
and confidence building measures that would be most effective in building
peace and stability in the South Balkans. The enthusiasm of these leaders
for the tools of preventive defense made me very hopeful that we can
be effective in preventing future conflict in this famously troubled
region.
Our hopes for democracy
and regional understanding and our opportunities to support them through
the tools of preventive defense are not confined to Europe. We have
these same hopes and opportunities here in our own Hemisphere. Ten years
ago, Latin America was made up mostly of dictatorships, but today, 34
nations in our hemisphere -- all the nations save one -- are democracies.
I have tried to seize this opportunity by opening relationships with
the defense ministries of these countries. Our efforts came to a climax
last summer when I invited the defense ministers from the other 33 hemispheric
democracies to join me at Williamsburg, Virginia, to discuss confidence
building measures and defense cooperation designed to minimize the risk
of conflict in the hemisphere. The conference was a resounding success.
As a result, today we are not only seeing increased cooperation between
the U.S. and Latin American militaries, we are also seeing cooperation
between and among the Latin American militaries themselves -- with renewed
efforts to resolve outstanding disputes peacefully and create new levels
of confidence. A second hemispheric ministerial meeting is scheduled
to be held in Argentina this fall.
Preventive defense
also has a role in our effort to manage our relationship with China.
We are using some of these same tools to build cooperative security
ties between the United States and China. We do this not because China
is a new democracy -- it obviously is not. Rather, we do it because
China is a major world power with whom we share important interests,
with whom we have strong disagreements, and which has a powerful military
that has significant influence on the policies that China follows. We
do it, ultimately, because we believe when it comes to strategic intentions,
engagement is almost always better than ignorance.
That is why we
have sent teams to China to present our strategic thinking, and have
invited the Chinese to reciprocate. It is why we are encouraging exchanges
between academic institutions within our military structures. And it
is why we have conducted reciprocal ship visits and tours by senior
officers. In the best case, engaging China's military will allow us
to have a positive influence on this important player in Chinese politics,
opening the way for Chinese cooperation on proliferation and regional
security issues. At the very least, engagement between our two military
establishments will improve our understanding of each other, thus lowering
the chances for miscalculation and conflict.
What makes preventive
defense work -- whether it is in Russia, Europe, the Balkans, Latin
America, or China -- is American leadership. There is no other country
in the world with the ability to reach out to so many corners of the
globe. There is no other country in the world whose efforts to do so
are so respected. At the same time, no one should think that preventive
defense is a philanthropic venture -- it is not. It's about hard work
and ingenuity today, so that we don't have to expend blood and treasure
tomorrow.
While preventive
defense holds great promise for preventing conflict, we must appreciate
that it is a strategy for influencing the world -- not compelling it
to our will. We must frankly and soberly acknowledge that preventive
defense will not always work. That is why as Secretary of Defense, my
top priority is still maintaining strong, ready forces and the will
to use them to deter and defeat threats to our interests. We still maintain
a smaller but still highly effective nuclear arsenal. We have a robust,
threat-based, ballistic missile defense program. We maintain the best
conventional forces in the world, many of which are forward-deployed
in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific, and we continue to maximize our
technological advantage over any potential foe, giving us dominance
on any battlefield in the world. These forces and capabilities, coupled
with the political will to use them, allow the United States to be very
effective at deterring conflict around the world. These same capabilities
and forces mean that if we cannot prevent or deter conflict, we can
defeat aggression quickly and with a minimum of casualties.
The converse is
also true. If we can prevent the conditions for conflict, we reduce
the risk of having to send our forces into harm's way to deter or defeat
aggression. The pivotal role of preventive defense, however, is not
widely known to the public. Indeed, it is not well understood even by
national security experts. The same was true, in fact, about the Marshall
Plan in its early days. The Marshall Plan did not arise full grown like
Venus from the shell. Indeed, George Marshall often maintained that
when he gave his speech at Harvard in 1947, he did not present a Marshall
Plan. He said, instead, that it was a proposal, but he did not simply
offer his proposal and go home. Marshall the statesman was a visionary
man, but Marshall the soldier was also a practical man. As a practical
man, he recognized that in a democracy, no national proposal, especially
one involving US engagement in the world, becomes a reality unless you
can win public support. The Marshall proposal became the Marshall Plan
because George Marshall spent the next year going directly to the public
and seeking its support.
Today, I am not
issuing a proposal for preventive defense, but rather a report on how
it is already shaping our world and the world of future generations
in a positive way. But in order for preventive defense to succeed as
an approach to national security, we, too, need to convince the American
people. We need to convince America that at this pivotal point in history,
as we seek to realize our fondest hopes for the revolutionary era in
which we live, our engagement with the world and the programs supporting
preventive defense are critical to our security. I have chosen the Kennedy
School to present my thoughts on preventive defense because as scholars,
the students and faculty here are uniquely equipped to understand what
is at stake when we talk about preventive defense. As leaders and future
policy makers, you are also uniquely equipped to explain the benefits
of preventive defense to the American public and to take the concepts
I have talked about today and expand upon them in your own careers.
I urge you to do so.
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