THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT
CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20
BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT:
INTERIM STORAGE OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
AT THE Y-12 PLANT, OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE
ACQUIRED FROM KAZAKHSTAN BY THE UNITED STATES
AGENCY: United States Department of Energy
ACTION: Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Interim Storage of Highly Enriched Uranium at the Y-12 Plant
SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared a classified Environmental Assessment (DOE/EA-1006, October 1994) to evaluate the potential environmental impacts for the transportation of highly enriched uranium (HEU) acquired by the United States from Kazakhstan to the DOE Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and interim storage until decisions on disposition can be made and implemented. The proposed action includes: transport of the HEU via U.S. Air Force C-5 aircraft from Kazakhstan to Dover Air Force Base (AFB), Delaware; transfer of the HEU from C-5 aircraft to Safe Secure Transport vehicles at Dover AFB for highway transport to the Y-12 Plant; and interim storage of the HEU at the Y-12 Plant located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Based on the analyses in the Environmental Assessment, the Department has determined that interim storage at the Y-12 Plant of the HEU acquired from Kazakhstan does not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act. Therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required and the Department is issuing this Finding of No Significant Impact.
ADDRESSES AND FURTHER INFORMATION
Persons requesting additional information regarding this action or desiring a copy of the Environmental Assessment should contact:
Mr. Michael C. Mazaleski
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, NN-12
1000 Independence Ave., SW
Washington, D.C. 2O585
(202) 586-8718
For information regarding the DOE National Environmental Policy Act process, contact:
Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of National Environmental Policy Act Oversight
1000 Independence Ave., SW
Washington, D.C. 20585
(202) 586-4600 or 1-800-472-2756
The Environmental Assessment will be declassified and made available for public review as soon as possible at the following DOE reading rooms:
U. S. Department of Energy
Freedom of Information Reading Room
Forrestal Building, Room 1E-190
1000 Independence Ave., SW
Washington, D.C. 20585
U.S. Department of Energy
Oak Ridge Public Reading Room
55 Jefferson Avenue
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830
(615) 576-1216
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background:
The United States Government has determined that action is needed immediately to minimize the nuclear proliferation risk associated with certain HEU in Kazakhstan, which is of sufficient quality and quantity for persons with low technical skills to make 20 or more nuclear weapons. Action is necessary before the onset of winter to ensure that departure of the aircraft transporting the HEU from Kazakhstan is not affected by snow or ice storms. The potential need to acquire and store HEU from foreign sources was proposed in the Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/EA-0929). This EA is currently undergoing a second round of public comment. It includes analysis of interim storage of approximately five metric tons of HEU from foreign sources, which would be no more than one percent of the HEU proposed to be received for interim storage at Y-12 over the next ten years. The HEU from Kazakhstan represents approximately 11 percent of the five metric tons from foreign sources addressed in the Y-12 Interim Storage EA. Interim storage would be needed until decisions on disposition can be made and implemented. The Governments of the United States and Kazakhstan have agreed that the HEU would be stored under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The Department is taking the necessary steps to implement this agreement.
Proposed Action:
The proposed action is to transport HEU acquired by the United States from Kazakhstan to the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee for interim storage. The proposed action includes; air transport by U.S. Air Force C-5 aircraft to the proposed U.S. aerial port of entry, Dover Air Force Base (AFB); transfer of HEU from the C-5 aircraft to Safe Secure Transport (SST) vehicles: SST transport of the, HEU via highways to the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and interim storage (without processing) at the, Y-12 Plant.
The HEU to be acquired includes approximately 566 kg (0.566 MT) of HEU. The HEU is contained in about 2,200 kg (2.2 MT) of alloy, metal, and oxide. The HEU includes four material types: uranium oxide; uranium metal; uranium beryllium machined stock as broken alloy rods, turnings, and powders; and uranium-beryllium alloy rods which were intended to be used as fuel for a naval reactor project, but never were actually used. None of these materials have been irradiated or used in a reactor. Less than one half kilogram of thorium uranium compound is also included in the material. The bulk of the HEU is alloyed with beryllium (Be), of which about half is machining scrap and oxide. It is estimated that approximately 1500 kg (1.5 MT) of beryllium is in the 2,200 kg (2.2 MT) of material to be acquired. Beryllium in weapons components have been previously staged or stored in Building 9720-5 at the Y-12 Plant. The HEU would be packaged in containers meeting DOT regulatory requirements and IAEA standards. The DOT Type B packaging with the specification 6M (49 CFR 178.354) would be used. A total of 4566M-2R containers would be transported to Kazakhstan to repackage the HEU.
Dover AFB meets the aerial port requirements and considerations, described in the EA. Dover AFB routinely handles C-5 flights of this nature are permanently established at Dover AFB. Dover AFB is located in a suburban area within Kent County, Delaware which has a population of 110,000. The population density within approximately 10 km of Dover AFB is moderate (475.4 persons/km2).
The United States Air Force Transportation Command would utilize three C-5 aircraft to transport the HEU, personnel, and equipment from Kazakhstan to the United States. Two of the three planes would be used to transport HEU. The total nonstop flight time is approximately 21 hours over a distance of approximately 8,000 miles. The two aircraft with HEU cargo would proceed directly to Dover Air Force Base without any intermediate stop in a foreign country; two air refueling would be required. The third aircraft with the majority of the repackaging team and its support equipment, (and no HEU cargo) would make refueling stops in Europe and proceed to the Tennessee Air National Guard Base, co-located with the McGhee Tyson Airport of Knoxville, Tennessee (hereafter called McGhee Tyson). McGhee Tyson is the site from which the team and its equipment would depart from the U.S. to Kazakhstan.
SSTs would be parked in a secure area at Dover AFB to await the arrival of the two C-5 aircraft. The HEU would be transported by Safe Secure Transport (SST) from Dover Air Force Base to the Y-12 Plant.
Environmental Impacts:
The Department evaluated the potential impacts of the proposed action and alternatives under incident free and accident conditions on: the global commons; the proposed and alternative aerial ports of entry and their surrounding areas; the Y-12 Plant and the surrounding area, and the areas along the highway routes on which the HEU would be transported. There will be no new building constructed or demolished for the proposed action, and thus, there will be no impact to land use, archaeological and cultural resources, or ecological resources. The proposed action is to provide interim storage of the HEU without any pre-storage processing. There would be no additional releases of airborne contaminants beyond the effects analyzed in the Y-12 Interim Storage EA (DOE/EA-0929) because no processing would be required. No waste water discharges would be generated.
The 12 workers involved in handling the HEU acquired from Kazakhstan to place the containers in interim storage would receive a collective dose of 0.1 person-rem. The individual dose would be 0.008 rem. Using the worker dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC,1991), the collective dose of 0.1 person-rem would be estimated to result in a probability of 4 x 1OE-5, or 1 chance in 25,000 of an excess latent cancer fatality among those 12 workers.
The worker exposure from ongoing operations in Building 9720-5 would continue regardless of whether the proposed action is undertaken. These annual doses are well below the Y-12 Plant annual limit of 1 rem.
Under incident free operations there would be essentially no uranium releases to the atmosphere, and therefore, there would be no dose to the public caused by the proposed action.
Building 9720-5 is a warehouse with no processing operations. Therefore, the postulated bounding accident is a fire or a criticality, either of which could be initiated by natural phenomena (earthquake, tornado, lightning), an aircraft crash, or inadvertent ignition of combustible materials.
The bounding accident scenario at Y-12 is the beyond design basis collapse of Building 9212, which could result from an extreme natural hazard (tornado or earthquake) or an airplane crash; this postulated accident bounds the consequences of the collapse of Building. Fatalities to workers would be expected as a result of the building collapse and the criticality that is postulated in this bounding scenario. In addition, a fire and simultaneous release of HEU is postulated. The estimated exposure to uninvolved workers is an average does of 2 rem. The average collective dose to all the workers on-site at Y-12 would be 14,000 person-rem. The average collective dose of 14,000 person-rem from the collapse of Building 9212 is estimated to result in five excess cancer fatalities. For the pubic, there would be a collective dose of 190 person-rem from the beyond-design-basis-accident, which is estimated to result in 0.1 excess latent cancer fatalities. Therefore, it is expected that not a single member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the beyond-design-basis-accident.
In the postulated fire in Building 9720-5, beryllium as well as uranium could potentially ignite and become airborne. The acute effects of airborne beryllium are respiratory distress. There is currently no Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health standard for beryllium issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health gives an Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health value of 10 mg/m3 for 30 minute exposure. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration Permissible exposure Limit for an 8 hour time weighted average is 2 ug/m3, and the Short-Term Exposure Limit is 5 ug/m3 over a 30 minute time period. In a beryllium fire, the workers could be exposed to concentrations greater than the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health standard or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Permissible Exposure Limit or the Short-Term Exposure Limit. At high concentrations of airborne beryllium worker fatalities could occur. It is extremely unlikely that members of the public would experience acute effects.
Impacts on the transportation crew and the public from the HEU shipping campaign were calculated by means of RADTRAN risk analysis (Sandia 1994). The EA analyzes the air transport via C-5 aircraft of HEU in the global commons and over U.S. territory; the landing at Dover AFB and the two alternate ports of entry, (Fort Campbell, a U.S. Army Base located in southwestern Kentucky, and McGhee Tyson); the transfer Of HEU from the C-5, and the SST transport to the Y-12 Plant.
The transport of HEU under incident-free conditions would result in radiological exposure only to the personnel on the aircraft. There would be no radiological exposure to the public caused by incident-free air transport. The radiological exposure received by persons on the C-5 aircraft would be approximately the same whether the aerial port of entry is Dover AFB, Fort Campbell or McGhee Tyson. The maximum individual dose resulting from proximity to the HEU is estimated to be 0.01 rem. This would be added to the background individual dose of 0.015 rem resulting from cosmic radiation on a flight (round trip) of this length. The maximum collective dose to the 34 (maximum) persons on board is estimated to be 9.34 person-rem. The collective dose of 0.34 person-rem would be estimated to result in 1.4 x 1O latent cancer fatalities. Under incident free conditions, there would be negligible effect on the global commons from the C-5 aircraft flight to Dover.
The historical data for the C-5 aircraft indicate that the probability of accidents is extremely low (no class A accidents or 0 rate per 100,000 flying hour average for last three years). For Dover AFB, the accident scenario of most concern is the landing/stall accident. The extremely unlikely event of a landing/stall accident, there is a 75 percent probability that the accident would not breach a container. For the alternate ports of entry (Fort Campbell and McGhee Tyson), the probability of occurrence of a landing/stall accident is equally low, but the probabilities of an in flight accident are somewhat greater because the routes traverse greater distances over U.S. territory. In-flight accidents have higher probabilities of causing the breach of some of the containers. For example, the probability that an accident would not breach a container drops to 36 percent.
If an accident occurred during overflight of U.S. territory the probability of it occurring in a rural population zone was estimated to be 80 percent. Similarly, suburban and urban accident probabilities were set equal to 19 percent and 1 percent respectively. These percentages represent the national average occurrence of rural, suburban, and urban population densities. In the global commons, only in-flight accident probabilities are applicable because no landings would occur in the global commons.
The consequences of a bounding accident over U.S. territory are given in the EA for in-flight and landing/stall accidents. For in-flight accidents, the consequences were calculated for a generic high population urban area; a conservative generic population estimate is used because it is not possible to predict the exact location of such an accident. The probability of occurrence of such an accident varies with total distance of flight over U.S. territory. For each port of entry, the collective dose would be 15.6 person-rem distributed among the generic population of 5,210,090. This would result in 7.8 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities in the exposed population. There is about a 1 in 1300 chance of a single latent cancer fatality occurring as a result of this dose among the exposed population.
A maximum consequence landing/stall accident has an equal chance of occurring (2.0 x 10E-8) at any of the proposed ports of entry, but the collective dose varies according to differences in the size of the sounding populations. Thus, the collective dose for Fort Campbell, which has the smallest surrounding population density, would be lowest at 1.2 person-rem. Dover is next lowest, with an estimated collective dose for the maximum consequence landing/stall accident of 1.3 person-rem; the highest collective dose (4.9 person-rem) would occur at McGhee Tyson. At Dover AFB, the collective dose of 1.3 person-rem would result in 6.5 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities. This would be a probability of 0.00065 or about 7 chances in 10,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur in the surrounding population.
Because the proposed action would involve air transport over the oceans, this EA analyzes the potential environmental impacts of the proposed action on the global commons in accordance with Executive Order 12114.1 For the purposes of this analysis, it is conservatively assumed that the containers of HEU deeper than 200 m would be breached, and the HEU would be instantaneously released into the ocean. It is more likely, that the container would be eventually breached and that there would be a slow release over time, which would have less effect on the marine environment. The existing oceanic environment contains substantial quantities of uranium and its daughter products from naturally occurring processes. Depending on the concentrations in the sea water, either the uranium and beryllium could potentially result in fatalities to marine organisms. As a result of the large volumes of water, the mixing mechanisms within it, the background concentrations of uranium, and the radiation resistance of aquatic organisms, the radiological and toxic impact of this very low probability accident releasing uranium and beryllium into the ocean would likely be localized and of short duration.
The HEU would be immediately transferred from the C-5 aircraft to the waiting SST vehicles at Dover AFB under the proposed action, or at Fort Campbell, or McGhee Tyson Airport under the alternatives. Because unloading would occur in a secured area at a distance from the public, the dose under incident free conditions would be negligible. Even at McGhee Tyson, where the military installations are separated from the civilian airport facilities by two parallel runways the public is sufficiently distant to avoid being exposed. The incident free radiological exposure resulting from HEU transfer activities would be the same at Dover AFB, Fort Campbell, and McGhee Tyson. The maximum collective dose to two workers who unload all CRTs and estimated to be 8.8 x 1OE-2 person-rem. The maximum individual dose is estimated to be 4.4 x 10E-2 rem. The collective dose of 8.8 x 10E-2 person-rem would be estimated to result in 3.6 x 1OE-5 latent cancer facilities. The does to other persons at the handling location is estimated to be 1.5 x 10E-2 person-rem for an average individual dose of less than 0.5 rem.
The postulated HEU transfer accident is that the loading apparatus (known as a K-loader) pierces a package. It is conservatively assumed that the accident damages the package so severely that the inner and outer containers fail and some fraction of the contents of that package are dispersed as particulate material. Persons nearby and downwind would receive a dose via inhalation of particulate. The effects of a accident during HEU transfer would be the same at Dover AFB, Fort Campbell, and McGhee Tyson. The maximum individual dose, received by a K-loader operator primarily by inhalation, is estimated to be 0.088 rem. The collective dose to the 2 operators is estimated to be 0.176 person-rem. Workers are modeled as being able to move from the immediate location to at least 100 m away. These workers would receive an average dose of 0.021 rem. The collective dose of 0.176 person-rem would be estimated to result in 7 x 1OE-5 latent cancer facilities.
The 50-year collective dose to the public from an accident during transfer activities is estimated to be 4 x 10E-2 person-rem per year. This collective dose would be distributed among an estimated 8,100 persons. The maximally exposed member of the public who is assumed to be at a distance of 500 m downwind from the accident would receive a dose of about 2 mrem. Using the general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 1OE-4 cancer, fatalities per person-rem, the collective dose to the public of 4 x 1OE-2 person-rem would be estimated to result in 2.0 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities.
Transportation impacts were analyzed for SST highway transport from Dover Air Force Base to the Y-12 Plant and from the alternate ports of entry, Fort Campbell and McGhee Tyson to Y-12.
The collective dose to the public for incident free SST transport would be 2.9 x 1OE-4 person-rem per year. This collective dose would be shared by the estimated 320,000 million persons within 800 meters (0.5 miles) of the center line of the highway routes that lie between Dover AFB and the Y-12 Plant and by the persons at SST stops. The maximum in-transit dose to an individual member of the public would be 3.6 x 10E-5 mrem. The collective dose to the public of 2.9 x 1OE-4 person-rem would be estimated to result in 1.4 x 1OE-7 latent cancer fatalities.
Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed transportation of HEU by SST from Dover AFB to Y-12.
Under the proposed action, the dose due to the bounding SST accident (that is, the accident with the greatest potential consequences, even though it might have a small probability of occurrence) is estimated to be 1.1 person-rem in an urban area. The probability of the bounding SST accident occurring in an urban area is estimated to be 4.9 x 10E-12. Given the conservatism in these estimates and the fact that an SST accident has never occurred which resulted in the release of radiological material, the actual probability may be much lower. The consequences would be diminished if the accident occurred in suburban areas or rural areas.
The transportation crew and the public are considered as one population for the purposes of the accident consequences, and the general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 1OE-4 cancer fatalities per person- rem (NRC,1991) is used. The collective dose of 1.1 person-rem in the SST accident would be estimated to result in 5.5 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities.
ALTERNATIVES
Alternatives to the proposed action considered in this EA include the no action alternative; two alternate aerial ports of entry for the C-5 aircraft landing in the United States (Fort Campbell and McGhee Tyson); and alternate storage locations.
Under the no action alternative, the United States would not acquire the HEU from Kazakhstan. This would not meet the U.S. objectives for nonproliferation and would not reduce the proliferation risk presented by the material in its current location.
The alternative ports of entry, Fort Campbell in southwestern Kentucky, and the Air National Guard Base at the McGhee Tyson Airport in Knoxville, Tennessee, have lower population densities in the vicinity than Dover AFB: However, there is an added measure of safety at Dover AFB because of the experience at the base with C-5 aircraft, which routinely fly to Dover AFB, but not to the alternate ports of entry. In addition, entry at either Fort Campbell or McGhee Tyson would require substantial flight over United States territory, while entry at Dover AFB would not. Additional ports of entry farther west than Fort Campbell, Kentucky, were determined not to be reasonable because they would require additional air refueling.
THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT
CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20
BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95