| A: |
The conduct of a Science Based
Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of
confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons
in the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad
range of effective and continuing experimental programs.
|
| B: | The maintenance of modern nuclear
laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and
exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain,
and ensure the continued application of our human scientific
resources to those programs on which continued progress in
nuclear technology depends.
|
| C: | The maintenance of the basic
capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by
the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to
adhere to this treaty.
|
| D: | Continuation of a comprehensive
research and development program to improve our treaty
monitoring capabilities and operations.
|
| E: | The continuing development of a
broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical
capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and
comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals,
nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear
programs.
|
| F: | The understanding that if the
President of the United States is informed by the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE) -- advised by
the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear
weapons laboratories and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic
Command -- that a high level of confidence in the safety or
reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two
Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent
could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation
with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT
under the standard "supreme national interests" clause in
order to conduct whatever testing might be required. |
