Remarks by Senator John McCain (R-AZ) on the CTBT

Congressional Record - 106^th Congress
Pages S12398-99
October 12, 1999

Jump down to: Press Release by Senator McCain on the CTBT, October 12, 1999.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my very grave concerns over the path down which we are heading. The United States Senate is on the verge of voting down a treaty the intent of which is consistent with U.S. national security objectives, but the letter and timing of which are fraught with serious implications for our security over the next decade.

Mr. President, I will vote against ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is not a vote I take lightly. I am not ideologically opposed to arms control, having voted to ratify the START Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. But, my concerns about the flaws in this Treaty's drafting and in the administration's plan for maintaining the viability of the stockpile leave me no other choice.

On October 5, Henry Kissinger, John Deutch and Brent Scowcroft wrote to the majority and minority leaders stating their serious concerns with the Senate's voting on the treaty so far in advance of our being able to implement its provisions and relying solely on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. They noted that `. . . few, if any, of the benefits envisaged by the treaty's advocates could be realized by Senate ratification now. At the same time, there could be real costs and risks to a broad range of national security interests--including our nonproliferation objectives--if [the] Senate acts prematurely.' These are sage words that should not be taken lightly by either party in the debate on ratification.

In the post-cold-war era, a strong consensus exists that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our single greatest national security concern. Unfortunately, a ban on nuclear testing, especially when verification issues are so poorly addressed, as in this treaty, will not prevent other countries from developing nuclear weapons. A number of countries have made major strides in developing nuclear weapons without testing. South Africa and Pakistan both built nuclear stockpiles without testing; North Korea may very well have one or two crude nuclear weapons sufficient for its purposes; and Iraq was perilously close to becoming a nuclear state at the time it invaded Kuwait. Iran has an active nuclear weapons program, and Brazil and Argentina were far along in their programs before they agreed to terminate them. Testing is not necessary to have very good confidence that a first generation nuclear weapon will work, as the detonation over Hiroshima, utilizing a design that had never been tested, demonstrated more than half-a-century ago.

Whenever an arms control agreement is debated, the issue of verification rightly assumes center stage. That is entirely appropriate, as the old adage that arms control works best when it is needed least continues to hold true. That the leaders of Great Britain, France, and Germany support ratification is less important than what is going on inside the heads of the leaders of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. We don't need arms control agreements with our friends; we pursue arms control as a way of minimizing the threat from those countries that may not have our national interests at heart. Some of the countries with active nuclear weapons programs clearly fall into that category. On that count, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty falls dangerously short.

In order to fully comprehend the complexity of the verification issue, it is important to understand the distinction between monitoring and verifying. Monitoring is a technical issue. It is the use of a variety of means of gather information--in other words, detecting that an event took place. Verification, however, is a political process.

Even if we assume that compliance with the treaty can be monitored--and I believe very strongly, based in part on the CIA's recent assessment, that that is not the case--we are left with the age-old question posed most succinctly some 40 years ago by Fred Ikle: After Detection--What? What are we to make of a verification regime that is far from prepared to handle the challenges it will confront. For example, we are potentially years from an agreement among signatories on what technologies will be employed for monitoring purposes. More importantly, the treaty requires 30 disparate countries to agree to a challenge on-site inspection when 19 allies couldn't agree on how to conduct air strikes against Yugoslavia?

Furthermore, we are being asked to accept arguments on verification by an administration that swept under the rug one of the most egregious cases of proliferation this decade, the November 1992 Chinese transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, and that continues to cling tenaciously to the ABM Treaty despite the scale of global change that has occurred over the last 10 years.

In determining whether to support this treaty at this time, it is essential that we examine the continued importance of nuclear weapons to our national security. Last week's testimony by our nuclear weapons lab directors that the Stockpile Stewardship Program will not be a reliable alternative to nuclear testing for five to 10 years is a clear and unequivocal statement that ratification of this treaty is dangerously premature. General John Vessey noted in his letter to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee that the unique role of the United States in ensuring the ultimate security of our friends and allies, obviating their requirement for nuclear forces in the process, remains dependent upon our maintenance of a modern, safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. As General Vessey pointed out, `the general knowledge that the United States would do whatever was necessary to maintain that condition certainly reduced the proliferation of nuclear weapons during the period and added immeasurably to the security cooperation with our friends and allies.' This sentiment was also expressed by former Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger, Cheney, Carlucci, Weinberger, Rumsfeld, and Laird, when they emphasized the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its deterrent value relative not just to nuclear threats, but to chemical and biological ones as well.

The immensely important role that a viable nuclear deterrent continues to play in U.S. national security strategy requires the United States to be able to take measures relative to our nuclear stockpile that are currently precluded by the Test Ban Treaty. Our stockpile is older today than at any previous time and has far fewer types of warheads--a decrease from 30 to nine--than it did 15 years ago. A fault in one will require removing all of that category from the stockpile. The military typically grounds or removes from service all of a specific weapons system or other equipment when a serious problem is detected. Should they act differently with nuclear warheads? Obviously not.

Finally, this treaty will actually prevent us from making our nuclear weapons safer. Without testing, we will not be able to make essential safety improvements to our aging stockpile--a stockpile that has already gone seven years without being properly and thoroughly tested.

I hope the time does arrive when a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing will be consistent with our national security requirements. We are simply not yet there. I will consider supporting a treaty when alternative means of ensuring safety and reliability are proven, and when a credible verification regime is proposed. Until then, the risks inherent in the administration's program preclude my adopting a more favorable stance.

These are the reasons that I must vote against ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at this time. The viability of our nuclear deterrent is too central to our national security to rush approval of a treaty that cannot be verified and that will facilitate the decline of that deterrent. Preferably, this vote would be delayed until a more appropriate time, but, barring that, I cannot support ratification right now.

The operative phrase, though, is `right now.' The concept of a global ban on testing has considerable merit. Defeating the treaty would not only imperil our prospects of attaining that objective at some future point, it would in all likelihood send a green light to precisely those nations we least want to see test that it is now okay to do so. Such a development, I think we can all agree, is manifestly not in our national interest.

In articulating his reasons for continuing to conduct nuclear tests, then-President Kennedy stated that, `If our weapons are to be more secure, more flexible in their use and more selective in their impact--if we are to be alert to new breakthroughs, to experiment with new designs--if we are to maintain our scientific momentum and leadership--then our weapons progress must not be limited to theory or to the confines of laboratories and caves.' This is not an obsolete sentiment. It rings as true today as when President Kennedy uttered those words 37 years ago.

I thank the Chair.

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1999
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT: NANCY IVES 202-224-7130

McCAIN VOICES GRAVE CONCERNS ABOUT SENATE VOTE
ON COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Citing the concerns of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Director of the CIA John Deutch, and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and others, U.S. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) today said he will vote against the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty if it comes to a vote. A full text of McCain's statement follows:

"Mr. President, I rise today to express my very grave concerns over the path down which we are heading. The United States Senate is on the verge of voting down a treaty the intent of which is consistent with U.S. national security objectives, but the letter and timing of which are fraught with serious implications for our security over the next decade.

"Mr. President, I will vote against ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is not a vote I take lightly. I am not ideologically opposed to arms control, having voted to ratify the START Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. But, my concerns about the flaws in this Treaty's drafting and in the Administration's plan for maintaining the viability of the stockpile leave me no other choice.

"On October 5, Henry Kissinger, John Deutch and Brent Scowcroft wrote to the Majority and Minority Leaders stating their serious concerns with the Senate's voting on the treaty so far in advance of our being able to implement its provisions and relying solely on the Stockpile Stewardship Program. They noted that '...few, if any, of the benefits envisaged by the Treaty's advocates could be realized by Senate ratification now. At the same time, there could be real costs and risks to a broad range of national security interests--including our nonproliferation objectives--if [the] Senate acts prematurely.' These are sage words that should not be taken lightly by either party in the debate on ratification.

"In the post-Cold War era, a strong consensus exists that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our single greatest national security concern. Unfortunately, a ban on nuclear testing, especially when verification issues are so poorly addressed, as in this treaty, will not prevent other countries from developing nuclear weapons. A number of countries have made major strides in developing nuclear weapons without testing. South Africa and Pakistan both built nuclear stockpiles without testing; North Korea may very well have one or two crude nuclear weapons sufficient for its purposes; and Iraq was perilously close to becoming a nuclear state at the time it invaded Kuwait. Iran has an active nuclear weapons program, and Brazil and Argentina were far along in their programs before they agreed to terminate them. Testing is not necessary to have very good confidence that a first generation nuclear weapon will work, as the detonation over Hiroshima, utilizing a design that had never been tested, demonstrated more than half-a-century ago.

"Whenever an arms control agreement is debated, the issue of verification rightly assumes center stage. That is entirely appropriate, as the old adage that arms control works best when it is needed least continues to hold true. That the leaders of Great Britain, France, and Germany support ratification is less important than what is going on inside the heads of the leaders of Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. We don't need arms control agreements with our friends; we pursue arms control as a way of minimizing the threat from those countries that may not have our national interests at heart. Some of the countries with active nuclear weapons programs clearly fall into that category. On that count, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty falls dangerously short.

In order to fully comprehend the complexity of the verification issue, it is important to understand the distinction between monitoring and verifying. Monitoring is a technical issue. It is the use of a variety of means to gather information--in other words, detecting that an event took place. Verification, however, is a political process.

Even if we assume that compliance with the treaty can be monitored--and I believe very strongly, based in part on the CIA's recent assessment, that that is not the case--we are left with the age-old question posed most succinctly some forty years ago by Fred Ikle: After Detection--What? What are we to make of a verification regime that is far from prepared to handle the challenges it will confront. For example, we are potentially years from an agreement among signatories on what technologies will be employed for monitoring purposes. More importantly, the treaty requires 30 disparate countries to agree to a challenge on-site inspection when 19 allies couldn't agree on how to conduct air strikes against Yugoslavia?

Furthermore, we are being asked to accept arguments on verification by an Administration that swept under the rug one of the most egregious cases of proliferation this decade, the November 1992 Chinese transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, and that continues to cling tenaciously to the ABM Treaty despite the scale of global change that has occurred over the last 10 years.

In determining whether to support this treaty at this time, it is essential that we examine the continued importance of nuclear weapons to our national security. Last week's testimony by our nuclear weapons lab directors that the Stockpile Stewardship Program will not be a reliable alternative to nuclear testing for five to 10 years is a clear and unequivocal statement that ratification of this treaty is dangerously premature. General John Vessey noted in his letter to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee that the unique role of the United States in ensuring the ultimate security of our friends and allies, obviating their requirement for nuclear forces in the process, remains dependent upon our maintenance of a modern, safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. As General Vessey pointed out, "the general knowledge that the United States would do whatever was necessary to maintain that condition certainly reduced the proliferation of nuclear weapons during the period and added immeasurably to the security cooperation with our friends and allies." This sentiment was also expressed by former Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger, Cheney, Carlucci, Weinberger, Rumsfeld, and Laird, when they emphasized the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its deterrent value relative not just to nuclear threats, but to chemical and biological ones as well.

The immensely important role that a viable nuclear deterrent continues to play in U.S. national security strategy requires the United States to be able to take measures relative to our nuclear stockpile that are currently precluded by the Test Ban Treaty. Our stockpile is older today than at any previous time and has far fewer types of warheads--a decrease from 30 to nine--than it did 15 years ago. A fault in one will require removing all of that category from the stockpile. The military typically grounds or removes from service all of a specific weapons system or other equipment when a serious problem is detected. Should they act differently with nuclear warheads? Obviously not.

"Finally, this treaty will actually prevent us from making our nuclear weapons safer. Without testing, we will not be able to make essential safety improvements to our aging stockpile--a stockpile that has already gone seven years without being properly and thoroughly tested.

"Mr. President, I hope the time does arrive when a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing will be consistent with our national security requirements. We are simply not yet there. I will consider supporting a treaty when alternative means of ensuring safety and reliability are proven, and when a credible verification regime is proposed. Until then, the risks inherent in the Adminisration's program preclude my adopting a more favorable stance.

"These are the reasons, Mr. President, that I must vote against ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at this time. The viability of our nuclear deterrent is too central to our national security to rush approval of a treaty that cannot be verified and that will facilitate the decline of that deterrent. Preferably, this vote would be delayed until a more appropriate time, but, barring that, I cannot support ratification right now.

"The operative phrase, though, is 'right now.' The concept of a global ban on testing has considerable merit. Defeating the treaty would not only imperil our prospects of attaining that objective at some future point, it would in all likelihood send a green light to precisely those nations we least want to see test that it is now okay to do so. Such a development, I think we can all agree, is manifestly not in our national interest.

"In articulating his reasons for continuing to conduct nuclear tests, then-President Kennedy stated that, "If our weapons are to be more secure, more flexible in their use and more selective in their impact--if we are to be alert to new breakthroughs, to experiment with new designs--if we are to maintain our scientific momentum and leadership--then our weapons progress must not be limited to theory or to the confines of laboratories and caves." This is not an obsolete sentiment. It rings as true today as when President Kennedy uttered those words 37 years ago."