MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY ON BEHALF OF MY OPPOSITION TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY AS IT IS CURRENTLY WRITTEN, AS SUBMITTED, IT IS MY OPINION THAT IT PRESENTS TO THIS COMMITTEE AND TO THE FULL BODY OF THE SENATE A FLAWED SET OF LOGIC.

BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, I HAVE SPENT THAN THIRTY YEARS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF THIS COUNTRY, WITH MOST OF MY CAREER ASSOCIATED WITH NUCLEAR TESTING. SINCE MY RETIREMENT IN 1989, I HAVE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY AND HAVE WORKED TO ASSURE THAT THE ISSUES WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR ARE PROPERLY CONSIDERED.

I AM PART OF A RAPIDLY DIMINISHING NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE WITNESSED THE AWESOME FORCE OF AN ATMOSPHERIC NUCLEAR TEST AND, THEREFORE. I CAN COMFORTABLY CATEGORIZE MYSELF AS ONE WHO HAS SPENT HIS ENTIRE CAREER WORKING ON A PROGRAM THAT WOULD BRING STRENGTH TO THE U. S. DEFENSE BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, ONE WHO HAS ALSO PRAYED THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPON WOULD NEVER NEED TO BE USED AGAIN.

TREATIES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN A PART OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, AND I HAVE PARTICIPATED IN ALL OF THEM, NOTING THAT ALL HAVE BEEN DRIVEN BY INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES. AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT TO THE NATION ARE THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY IN 1963, FOLLOWED IN 1974 BY THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY.BOTH OF THOSE TREATIES WERE RATIFIED BECAUSE THERE WAS REASONABLE ASSURANCE

THAT THE TREATIES COULD BE VERIFIED.

AS THE NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY MOVED FORWARD DURING THE REAGAN YEARS, THIS NATION PARTICIPATED IN A JOINT PROGRAM WITH THE SOVIET UNION. CALLED THE JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT (JVE), TO DETERMINE EACH NATION'S CAPABILITY TO MONITOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. THE JVE'S WERE VERY SUCCESSFUL IN THAT THEY DEMONSTRATED TO BOTH NUCLEAR POWERS THAT ONE COULD SUCCESSFULLY INSTRUMENT A TEST TO ASSURE THAT IT DID NOT EXCEED THE NUCLEAR YIELDS SPECIFIED BY THE TREATY REQUIREMENTS. LOST IN THE RHETORIC IS THE FACT THAT THE JVE'S DID NOTHING TO ASSURE ANYONE THAT LOW YIELD NUCLEAR TESTS COULD BE ROUTINELY AND ACCURATELY DETECTED.

GIVEN THE TECHNICAL FACTS KNOWN AT THE TIME, IT IS REMARKABLE THAT THE U. S. OR ANY OF ITS CLOSE ALLIES WOULD AGREE TO A ZERO-YIELD PROVISION IN THE PROPOSED TREATY, AS THE COMMITTEE KNOWS, RECENT REPORTS FROM THE CIA CONTINUE TO HIGHLIGHT OUR INABILITY TO VERIFY WHETHER OR NOT LOW-YIELD NUCLEAR TESTS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED BY RUSSIA.

GIVEN MY BACKGROUND IN TESTING, I AM PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT SEVERAL THINGS. FOR EXAMPLE, I KNOW FROM FIRSTHAND EXPERIENCE THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE NOT LIKE ARTILLERY SHELLS. YOU CANNOT STORE THEM IN A BUTLER BUILDING ON THE BACK FORTY AND GO GET THEM WHENEVER THE EXlGENClES OF THE SITUATION PROMPT YOU TO DO SO. NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE VERY COMPLICATED ASSEMBLIES THAT REQUIRE CONTINUED VIGILANCE TO ASSURE RELIABILITY AND SAFETY. IT IS A FIRST ORDER PRINCIPAL THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT ARE NOW EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE IN THE ENDURING STOCKPILE FOR MUCH LONGER THAN WAS CONTEMPLATED BY THE DESIGNERS WILL REQUIRE ENHANCED VIGILANCE TO CONTINUE TO ASSURE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY. I HAVE BEEN, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE, A SUPPORTER OF STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP, BUT I AM A SUPPORTER ONLY BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS A WAY TO DEVELOP THE COMPUTATIONAL CAPABILITY TO ASSURE THE ANNUAL CERTIFICATION PROCESS FOR WARHEADS THAT HAVE NOT CHANGED. OR FOR WHICH THERE IS NO APPARENT CHANGE. FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT DO NOT FIT THAT CATEGORY. STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP IS MERELY A CRAP SHOOT NUCLEAR TESTING HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE TOOL NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN, WITH HIGH CONFIDENCE, THE RELIABILITY AND SAFETY OF THE STOCKPILE. IN FACT, PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH MUST HAVE BELIEVED AS I DO WHEN HE SAID, AND I QUOTE, "THE REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF U. S. FORCES NECESSITATES CONTINUED NUCLEAR TESTING FOR THESE PURPOSES, ALBEIT AT A MODEST LEVEL, FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE"

THIS TREATY WOULD REMOVE THE PRINCIPAL "TOOL" FROM THE TOOL CHEST OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSURING STOCKPILE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY. TO USE A SIMPLE ANALOGY, IF THE CHAIR PERMITS, MAINTAINING THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT OF THE U. $. WITHOUT PERMITTING NEEDED TESTING IS LIKE REQUIRING THE LOCAL AMBULANCE SERVICE TO GUARANTEE 99% RELIABILITY ANYTIME THE AMBULANCE IS REQUESTED, BUT WITH A PROVISION THAT THE AMBULANCE IS NEVER TO BE STARTED UNTIL THE CALL COMES. THIS IS A PATENTLY ABSURD PREMISE.

ALLOW ME TO GET VERY SPECIFIC ABOUT NUCLEAR TESTING. WHEN PRESIDENT CLINTON FORWARDED THE CURRENT CTBT TO CONGRESS, HE ASSURED THE CONGRESS THAT HE HAD MANDATED THAT THE CAPABILITY TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING WOULD BE MAINTAINED. IT IS MY OPINION THAT IS CURRENTLY NOT THE CASE.

I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE AT LEAST THREE REASONS THAT THE U. S. MIGHT NEED TO CONDUCT A NUCLEAR TEST.

- FIRST, A REQUIREMENT TO DO A TEST THAT WOULD RESPOND, IN A POLITICAL SENSE, TO A TEST CONDUCTED BY ANOTHER COUNTRY. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS IS A HIGH PROBABILITY EVENT AT ALL.

- SECOND, A REQUIREMENT TO DO A TEST (OR TWO OR THREE) THAT WOULD NEED TO BE CONDUCTED TO RESPOND TO A NEW, CLEAR MILITARY REQUIREMENT, SUCH AS DEEPLY-BURIED HARD TARGETS I BELIEVE THIS TO BE LIKELY OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF DECADES.

THIRD, A REQUIREMENT TO DO A TEST (OR TWO OR THREE) THAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ASSURE THAT A PROBLEM DISCOVERED IN THE ENDURING STOCKPILE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED AND THAT THE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF THE SUBJECT WARHEAD WAS AGAIN DEEMED SATISFACTORY. I BELIEVE, BASED UPON MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE. THAT THIS IS A VERY HIGH PROBABILITY EVENT.

ARE WE PREPARED TO CONDUCT A NUCLEAR TEST SHOULD WE DEVELOP A PROBLEM IN THE ENDURING STOCKPILE, OR FOR ANY OTHER REASON? I AM DISTRESSED TO HAVE TO REPORT TO THIS COMMITTEE THAT OUR CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT A TEST IS ERODING RAPIDLY LET ME GIVE YOU MY VIEW OF THE REASONS THAT THIS IS THE CASE.

FIRST, THERE IS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATION ABOUT WHAT CONSTITUTES THE "CAPABILITY TO RESUME NUCLEAR TESTING." CONGRESS VIEWS THE PLANS PRESENTED BY THE ADMINISTRATION AS IF THEY WERE PLANS DEVELOPED BY A FIRE STATION WAITING FOR A VERY LOW PROBABILITY FIRE AND. THEREFORE, ARE PROHIBITIVELY EXPENSIVE, THE ADMINISTRATION EXACERBATES THIS VIEW BY BEING UNABLE TO DEFINE THE MOST BASIC REQUIREMENTS NEEDED TO CONDUCT A NUCLEAR TEST.

THE RESULT IS AN IMPASSE. CONGRESS IS SEEKING THE CHEAPEST OPTION WHILE THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE NATIONAL LABORATORIES QUIBBLE OVER WHAT MUST BE DONE AND IN WHAT PRIORITY IT MUST BE DONE, AS A RESULT, WE ARE LOSING THE PEOPLE BOTH WEAPONS DESIGNERS AND FIELD OPERATIONS PERSONNEL) THAT ARE TRAINED TO SAFELY CONDUCT A NUCLEAR TEST, AND WE ARE ALSO LOSING THE CERTIFICATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE INSTRUMENTATION AND EQUIPMENT THAT IS NECESSARY TO CONDUCT A NUCLEAR TEST.

UNTIL ISSUES LIKE THESE ARE RESOLVED, RATIFICATION OF A TREATY THAT PREVENTS NUCLEAR TESTING PUTS OUR SYSTEM AND OUR NATION AT UNNECESSARY RISK.

IN SUMMARY, MR. CHAIRMAN, MY 31 YEARS OF SERVICE AND DEDICATION TO THIS PROGRAM TELL ME THAT THIS TREATY, AS IT IS NOW PRESENTED TO THIS COMMITTEE AND TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, IS DANGEROUS. IT IS UNVERIFIABLE, IT CLEARLY DOES NOTHING CONCRETE TO FURTHER THE NON- PROLIFERATION GOALS OF THE U. S,. AND MOST IMPORTANT TO ME, IT HAS AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON ASSURING THE CONTINUED SAFETY AND RELIABILITY OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT.I URGE THIS COMMITTEE AND THE FULL BODY OF THE SENATE TO REJECT THIS TREATY AS IT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED AND TO REQUIRE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO DEVELOP A NEW COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY THAT WILL LEAD TO THE DESIRED GOALS OF VERIFICATION WHILE ALSO PROTECTING ALL OF OUR OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY.

MR. CHAIRMAN. THAT CONCLUDES MY REMARKS. I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE THIS PRESTIGIOUS COMMITTEE AND STAND READY TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS YOU OR THE COMMITTEE MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.