8
November 2001
Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, told
correspondents today at a Headquarters press briefing that the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a long-held demand of the disarmament community,
was an effective legal barrier against nuclear proliferation and, to that
extent, had made it less likely that terrorists would get their hands on nuclear
weapons.
Briefing correspondents on the Conference on
Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, to be held in New York from 11 to
13 November, Mr. Dhanapala said that the more nuclear explosions, the more
likely it was that there could be a refinement of new generations of nuclear
weapons and proliferation.
He was joined by Hannelore Hoppe, Chief,
Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch of the Department, who will be Executive
Secretary of the Conference, and Daniela Rozgonova, Chief of Public Information
of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.
[The CTBTO is the working title of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organization, which will be established when the Treaty comes into force
to ensure implementation and provide a forum for consultation among States
parties].
Mr. Dhanapala explained that the Conference had
been convened by the Secretary-General, in his capacity of depositary of the
Treaty, following a request that he received from the majority of ratifying
States, in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty. The Conference will be the second of the
so-called "Article XIV" Conferences -- the first had been held in October 1999
in Vienna, Austria -- and the purpose was to examine what measures could be
taken to accelerate the ratification process and facilitate the early treaty’s
entry into force.
He said the Secretary-General would open the
Conference on Sunday at
10 a.m. in the Trusteeship Council Chamber. The election of President would take
place while the Secretary-General was there. It was expected that the Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Mexico would be the Conference President. After the adoption of rules, the agenda,
election of officers, and so forth, the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory
Commission for the CTBTO, Wolfgang Hoffman, would describe the Commission's
work.
Meetings on Sunday and Monday would be devoted
to a general exchange of views of the ratifiers and State signatories, he
said. Seventy-nine States had
inscribed on the list of speakers, so far; 59 of them would be at the
ministerial level. France, the
Russian Federation and the United Kingdom were among those States represented at
the ministerial level. On Tuesday,
the Conference would hear statements by non-signatory States and representatives
of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
He said that the Conference would conclude its
work with a Final Declaration and a report. As of now, the status of the Treaty was,
as follows:
161 signatories, with
84 States having ratified it.
According to the Treaty, it could only enter into force when 44 States
listed in Annex 2 as possessors of nuclear research or nuclear power reactors
have signed and ratified it. Of
those 44, 41 States had signed and 31 had ratified. Three of those States had neither signed
nor ratified -- India, Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea. Of the
nuclear-weapon-States, it was important to note that France, the Russian
Federation, and the United Kingdom had ratified the Treaty, while China and the
United States had only signed it.
The Treaty bans all nuclear test explosions for
military or civilian purposes, he continued. After its adoption and opening for
signature, the Preparatory Commission and its provisional technical secretariat
was established to prepare for the Treaty's entry into force. After that, there would be the CTBTO,
itself, established in Vienna. A
global verification regime was being established to monitor compliance with the
Treaty. That consisted of a global
monitoring system (IMS), with communications and data management techniques,
consultation and clarification process, on-site inspection process, and
confidence-building measures. The
IMS consisted of a network of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide
laboratories, which monitor the entire world for evidence of nuclear explosions
in all environments.
Asked by a correspondent whether Mr. Dhanapala
had received confirmation on whether or not the United States would be speaking,
he said he had not received any information as to whether the United States
would participate in the Conference.
What were the prospects for ratification by the
13 "Annex 2" States? another correspondent asked. “Your guess is as good as mine", Mr.
Dhanapala replied. He continued to
hope that those 13 States would come on board. In the cases of India and Pakistan, for
example, they had made statements in the past here in the General Assembly they
those would sign the Treaty, but they still had not.
He replied to another question that two
non-signatory States had inscribed on the speaker's list –- Libya and Saudi
Arabia –- and Pakistan and the Sudan would also attend as non-signatory
states.
Asked whether he had received "any signal" from
South Asia that either of the two countries would be signing the CTBT during the
Conference, he said he had received no such signal.
The United States twice this past week had said
"flat out" that it did not support the CTBT, another correspondent said. Since the United States was needed for
the Treaty's entry into force, what could be done to re-engage it on that? he
asked. Mr. Dhanapala said that that
subject would be discussed by the States parties, and the Final Declaration
would presumably contain a general exaltation to those that had neither signed
nor ratifified, or signed and not ratified, to help the Treaty's entry into
force.
Another correspondent said that, from a
political point of view, it looked like the CTBT was going to be "ineffective
for a long time". From a practical
point of view then, had the international monitoring system already started to
work and what could that achieve? he asked.
Mr. Dhanapala replied that a week was sometimes
a short time in politics, and so it was difficult to dismiss the CTBT as not
going to be effective for a long time.
Events changed. It had been
thought some time ago that even having a CTBT signed was going to be a long-term
prospect; certainly that had been the policy objective of the Reagan
Administration. But within a few
years, a negotiating process had been launched and completed and the CTBT was
opened for signature. So, he would
not say that the Treaty's entry into force would be such a long- term
process.
Ms. Rozgonova, speaking about implementation,
said that about one-third of the system was already functional and providing
data from around the world to the international data centre in Vienna, where it
was analyzed and processed. Of the
321 verification stations, more than 100 were already in place and
functional. The stations were built
up almost continuously, every year, and the plan was that in three to five
years, depending upon the political climate surrounding the Treaty, the whole
system would be in place.
Asked if there were any stations in the South
Asia region and whether those were functional, she held up a map of the globe,
which she said showed the location of those 321 stations plus 16 laboratories --
altogether,
337 facilities. Those were
spread fairly evenly to cover the whole globe, in an equal geographical
spread. There might not be an
exactly equal spread at any given moment, but the idea was to cover the globe as
best as possible and then go from there.
Replying to a series of questions about
cooperation from the United States on technical and financial bases, she said
that the United States was indeed cooperating "very closely", adding that it had
been from the start and was doing so, even now. The United States had provided the
prototype of the software for data analysis, had made it accessible and allowed
that to be incorporated into the whole system of stations around the globe, most
of which were seismological. So,
its cooperation on both the technical and financial levels had been
excellent. The United States had
contributed 25 percent of the budget and was always up to date on its
payments.
To what extent would the monitoring system pick
up the use of a dirty –- perhaps not a nuclear explosion –- but something
radiological? another correspondent asked.
Ms. Rozgonova said that it would pick it up, for sure, if nothing else
through the radionuclide laboratories.
Those were basically the "nose" of the whole system and would definitely
monitor radionuclide particles in the air, presenting clear
evidence.
With respect to the "reach" of one verification
station, that was very hard to tell, she said. Of the 321 stations, most were
seismological stations, and for obvious reasons. Those were the best developed, even
before the CTBT was ever born, and but also because a nuclear test explosion, in
many ways, resembled an earthquake.
Radionuclide laboratories measured the quantity of radionuclide particles
and various gases released into the atmosphere in the case of a test or
explosion. The other technologies
were hydroacoustic, which meant measuring underwater, and infrasound, which was
a very short spectrum of sound, a frequency sound, that was created by natural
and man-made phenomenon in the atmosphere.
That, she said, helped to determine whether
that was a test event or a natural one.
So, it was really difficult to tell the range of one particular
station. In fact, in any event,
various stations would contribute to identification of the event, and all four
technologies would, too. That would
not be one station. There would be
16 hydroacoustical programmes, for example, which covered the globe, since sound
spreads underwater in a very effective and efficient way.
Another correspondent noted that, from the
appearance of the map (made available as part of a press kit), there was no
station in India. Under whose
authority had those stations operated?
Ms. Rozgonova said that those stations operated
under the authority of the host government or host State. Of course, the stations were certified
and had been updated, upgraded or built from scratch by the Preparatory
Commission. Once built, those were
actually under the authority of the host State, with the understanding that the
data went back to Vienna, where it was analyzed. The data was actually the property of
all Member States. The raw data did
not go directly to the States; it was first analyzed.
So, the correspondent said, the host country
could analyze the data before sending it to Vienna, and if they wanted to,
"fudge" it…
Ms. Rozgonova said that those countries did
have a certain jurisdiction over the station, itself, and she had known one
case, in particular, where the station had been switched off, because of a test
that was being planned. Normally
speaking, however, that did not happen.
There was a legal underpinning for that, in the form of a facilatory
agreement, which was the legal document that was signed between the Preparatory
Commission and the host State and which spelled out the conditions under which
those stations were being operated and its data forwarded to the Preparatory
Commission. That was a bilateral
document between the Preparatory Commission and the host
State.
What was the punishment for the State that had
turned off the station to conduct the test? A correspondent asked: "Were there any penalties under the
CTBT?" She said that she had not
thought there were any penalties foreseen in the Treaty for such a case. The consequences would be
political. That had occurred in
1998. It was one of those two
States.
No, there were no monitoring stations in India,
she said to another question.
Had the Indian Government not allowed her to
set up one of those stations or had that been a strategic decision on its part?
he asked. She said she did not
think that had been a "strategic decision".
Mr. Dhanapala added that the correspondent
might recall that when the Treaty was negotiated in the Conference on
Disarmament, India had not joined consensus and then the negotiated document had
been brought to the General Assembly through a resolution and finally adopted
there. It had only been more
recently that India had expressed an intention to sign the
Treaty.
With an already very effective and global
monitoring system in place. and given that the nuclear-weapon States had all
declared moratoriums and, in some
cases, dismantled their test sites, how much of
a concern was it that the Treaty, itself, had not entered into force? a
correspondent asked.
Mr. Dhanapala said that was a major concern,
because the legally binding effect of the Treaty was "put beyond any doubt" once
it entered into force. So, legally
speaking, a Treaty was only really fully-fledged once it entered into
force. The CTBT Organization had
not been established; that could not be established until the Treaty entered
into force; and, therefore, all that the provisional technical secretariat could
do was only the preliminary work of setting up the verification system. It was of great importance, therefore,
in terms of the legal applicability of the Treaty and of the entire
infrastructure, that the Treaty enter into force.
Another correspondent asked about the nature of
the political sanction against the country that had turned off the station,
since no one in the room was identifying it.
Ms. Rozgonova said that, at the time that event
had occurred, that information was known.
Of course, it was not the role of the provisional secretariat to "point
fingers"; that was up to the Member States, among themselves. There were no sanctions, really. First of all, there was a test that was
not announced ahead of time, but there was a little sign that something was
probably in the offing. But it was
the Member States among themselves who discussed those things and took whatever,
if any, political measures they wished.
In response to a further question, she said she
was not aware of any plans to build any stations in India.
Had the monitoring system picked up the
collapse of the World Trade Towers? a correspondent asked. She said that was not information that,
in any way, would be disseminated, but she was sure that, as the seismological
stations were very well distributed on this continent, they for sure had picked
it up.
Ms. Hoppe told
correspondents, in response to a number of questions, that the draft of the
Final Declaration would be made available as a document at the start of the
Conference, on Sunday morning. That
had been circulated in September to all signatory States and, as everyone was
aware, that draft had been negotiated in Vienna for some
time.
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