STATEMENT
BY
AMBASSADOR LUIZ AUGUSTO DE ARAUJO CASTRO
THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION
OF BRAZIL,
UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR MULTILATERAL POLITICAL
AFFAIRS
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
New York, 12 November 2001
Madam President,
I wish to express the warm congratulations of the delegation of Brazil for the unanimous election of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch to preside over this Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. This election reflects the recognition by the international community of Mexico's consistent and longstanding efforts in favour of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, goals to which the countries of our region attach great importance.
Allow me to fully associate myself with the statement delivered on behalf of the Rio Group delegations by Minister Soledad Alvear, of Chile.
Madam President,
In the aftermath of the brutal acts of terror that shocked the world two months ago, the international community must carefully consider a number of questions related to international security and defence priorities and goals. Initiatives in favour of peace, security and the rule of law in international affairs will be meaningless if we are not able to defend our nations from the faceless enemy of terror.
The end of the cold war was seen by many as having opened a window of opportunity to redefine the functioning and configuration of the international system. Conditions seemed to be present which could have led toward a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. After more than a decade, regrettably, we seem to be as far as ever from reaching that objective. The opportunity may soon be irrevocably lost.
It is now more evident than ever that security requirements cannot be met by the possession of weapons of mass destruction. In lieu of the balance of terror derived from the "mutually assured destruction" doctrine of the cold war era, the menaces facing our world today are of a completely different nature. The conviction that the very existence of nuclear weapons poses a concrete risk to humanity is reinforced when we consider the possibility of the proliferation of this technology of mass destruction even to non-State entities, including international terrorist organisations. The only way to avoid this ominous possibility is to rid the world once and for all of this category of weapons.
It was with dismay that we saw the testing of nuclear weapons in South Asia in 1998, which proved that the international non-proliferation regime needs to be reinforced. We strongly urged the States concerned to abandon this path and to renounce their nuclear weapons development programmes.
Progress must be achieved both in disarmament and in non-proliferation, as they are intertwined and inseparable aspects of our security concerns. The progressive abandonment of policies based on the possession of nuclear arms is needed to sustain the integrity of international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. In that respect, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would represent a highly significant additional step. Universal in its scope and non-discriminatory in its nature, the CTBT, when in force, would contribute to the gradual reduction of the differences of treatment and of obligations that today exist between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States and could further promote the abandonment by all of the nuclear weapons option.
There is a clear need for urgent ratification of the CTBT by all of those countries that have not yet done so. The entry into force of the Treaty is the first of thirteen steps contained in the plan of action, which was approved by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Brazil is proud of having actively contributed – together with the other members of the New Agenda Coalition - to the positive results achieved at that Conference. In the spirit of the New Agenda Ministerial Communiqué of 8 October 2001, we urge the nuclear weapon States that have not yet done so to express their commitment to the Treaty by ratifying it without delay, a measure that would be in line with the "unequivocal undertaking" to eliminate their nuclear arsenals adopted at the NPT Review Conference last year.
Madam President,
Fully committed to the early entry into force of the CTBT, Brazil is concerned that the process of installation of the International Monitoring System is far more advanced than the real perspectives of entry into force of the Treaty. This has resulted in substantial increases in national contributions to the Preparatory Commission, without concrete perspectives for the corresponding legally binding commitments to be in force and applicable universally to the Parties to the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States and other countries supposedly having nuclear weapons capabilities. At present, non-nuclear States members of the NPT already have legal commitments to this effect, which are, in fact, monitored by the IMS. This situation is not in tandem with the idea behind the elaboration of a universal and comprehensive test ban treaty.
In the medium term, concrete measures could be conceived and adopted by the Preparatory Commission to provide recognition of the different levels of legal - and political - commitment of States with regard to the CTBT.
Madam President,
The delegation of Brazil supports the adoption of the
draft Final Declaration as an effective result of this Conference, in the hope
that it will in fact contribute to promote and to facilitate the entry into
force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.
Thank you.