Mr. President,

At the outset I wish to thank the Government of Japan for the contribution which they have made to this important phase of the Article XIV process.

I congratulate Mexico on assuming the presidency for this second Conference, and thank them for their preparation work in Vienna. I also wish to associate the United Kingdom with the earlier statement of my Belgian colleague on behalf of the European Union.

Under Japan's stewardship since the first Conference in 1999, we have moved towards the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an aspiration which has existed almost as long as nuclear weapons technology itself.

Just over 44% of UN members have now signed and ratified the Treaty. Nearly three quarters of the Annex 2 countries are among them, including Russia, whose ratification since the last Article XIV Conference is most welcome. But we cannot pretend that we do not still face major challenges in bringing the Treaty into force.

This Conference goes ahead in circumstances, which are rather different from those, which we expected when this event was first envisaged. The events of September 11 cast a long shadow, not just over this city, but over the whole world.

The terrorists attacked a symbol of globalization in a city, which is itself, a symbol of global co-operation and the home of the United Nations itself. They showed that they abhor the very idea that nations might work together in harmony for their common good.

Those dreadful events have given our non-proliferation efforts, and this Conference in particular, added significance, for two reasons.

First, September 11 showed beyond doubt the unpalatable truth that there are individuals for whom mass destruction holds no horrors.

It is now obvious that people who have the means, and the ruthlessness, to fly airliners, laden with fuel and passengers, into skyscrapers, will not be deterred by human decency from using chemical, biological or nuclear weapons if they are given the chance.

The idea of Mutually Assured Destruction is no deterrent for people who attach no value to human life - nor even to their own lives.

We all have an overriding interest in ensuring that weapons of mass destruction do not fall into the hands of the terrorists. The best way to do this is to stem the proliferation of these weapons in the first place.

But secondly, and on a more optimistic note, September 11 marks one of those rare moments in world history when the whole world is galvanized to action. We have rarely witnessed such unity of purpose in the face of a, common threat - not least among the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council.

Old Cold War adversaries have emerged as allies in every aspect of the coalition against terrorism - military, humanitarian, political and diplomatic.

But this emerging consensus must go deeper still. We have to seize this moment to tackle the other challenges, which we face together.

Where previously we thought our security was best guaranteed by a balance of power, or even a balance of terror, we now have a real chance of establishing a balance of trust.

If we can learn to trust one another, we shall have no more need of weapons of mass destruction to defend ourselves against each other. Peace is the best form of security.

Today I therefore want to underline our commitment to multilateral non-proliferation regimes and to this Treaty. As the Treaty recognized, the cessation` of all nuclear explosions will constitute an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

For this reason, the CTBT was one of the practical steps noted under the Article VI section of the Final Document of the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

We strongly support this Document, which called for early entry into force of the CTBT and a moratorium on nuclear explosions. We welcome the fact that several countries, which have not yet felt able to ratify the Treaty, are nonetheless maintaining moratoria on nuclear explosions.

We in the UK have shown our commitment to the CTBT and have not tested since 1992.

We now have an obligation to work towards universalizing the CTBT.

This is a complex and difficult task.

The work of the Preparatory Commission, the Provisional Technical Secretariat and its Executive Secretary are vital to carrying out the necessary practical steps.

We need an International Monitoring System so that we can verify the Treaty by detecting nuclear explosions anywhere in the world. We continue to give our strong support to the development of the verification regime.

We all have to meet our budgetary commitments to enable this work to continue.

And, most importantly, we have to step up our efforts to bring the Treaty into force. I urge all states, which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty.

Let us show that the world can act as one, and that in the 21st century we are all on the same side.
 

Sources

• http://www.un.org/webcast/ctbt/statements/ukE.htm