Thank you, Mr. President. May I take this opportunity to congratulate you on your assumption of the Conference Presidency. My delegation looks forward to working with you for a successful outcome that will enhance the CTBT's prospects for entry into force. May I also take this opportunity to convey the regrets of the Australian Foreign Minister who is unfortunately unable to attend this Conference because of the Federal election held in Australia yesterday.

This Conference takes place in the shadow of the terrible events of 11 September and their aftermath which have underlined the importance of renewed international commitment to the cause of non-proliferation.

Australia's strong support for a CTBT, a central plank of the global non-proliferation regime, is founded on our deep opposition to nuclear testing. Over three decades, successive Australian Governments have used every opportunity to oppose nuclear testing, and to create an international norm effectively prohibiting further tests. We do not take this position solely out of idealism. We take a practical view that a complete ban on all nuclear testing is in our security interests, and in the security interests of all.

Australia welcomed the commencement of CTBT negotiations in 1994. Two years later, we took great satisfaction in leading international action to bring the Treaty here to the United Nations, where it was adopted by an overwhelming majority of 127 countries. Australia was proud to be able to sign the CTBT five years ago, in the same venue as where we currently meet.

The Treaty places an effective barrier against the development of nuclear weapons by countries that do not have them. It also prevents nuclear weapon states developing new and more advanced weapon designs. This is a major step on the road towards ridding the world of the means to destroy itself. I would add, coming from the Pacific region that has experienced nuclear weapon tests, that the Treaty should also end further environmental damage caused by testing.

The CTBT has already established itself as a powerful international standard against further nuclear tests with 161 signatures and 84 ratifications. But the full benefits of the Treaty will only accrue to the international community once it enters into force.

So far, only 31 of the 44 states whose ratification is required for entry into force have done so. Of these, only three of the five nuclear weapon states - France, Russia and the United Kingdom - have ratified the Treaty. Furthermore, neither India nor Pakistan, both of which undertook a series of nuclear tests in 1998, has signed or ratified the Treaty. Australia has consistently urged these countries to continue their moratorium on nuclear testing, and to sign the CTBT as soon as possible. We have made representations to other countries urging them to sign and ratify the Treaty, particularly those in the Asia-Pacific region and Annex 2 countries. Of those countries to which representations have been made, three have foreshadowed ratification in the near future. We consider that our efforts, and those of other supporters of the CTBT, have helped to increase moral and political pressure on states to accede to the Treaty.

Like all strong supporters of the CTBT, Australia was disappointed by recent announcements of the United States that it would not reconsider the CTBT for ratification. We hope that the United States will reconsider its position and ratify the Treaty.

That said, the U.S. position should not be used as an excuse by other countries to delay their own signature and ratification. We would urge all countries yet to sign and ratify the Treaty to do so as soon as possible.

Australia is encouraged by the CTBTO's substantial efforts to establish the Treaty's verification machinery. Australia is confident that an operational monitoring and verification system will provide a credible and effective way to monitor Treaty compliance. Even ahead of entry into force, the Treaty's monitoring and verification mechanisms will make it virtually impossible for nuclear explosive testing of any significant yield to take place without detection. This creates a further disincentive for nuclear weapons development or proliferation.

We urge all supporters of the CTBT to continue honoring their obligations to ensure that adequate resources are provided to establish the monitoring and verification system, so that we can start reaping its benefits even before the Treaty enters into force.

To conclude, Mr. President, a ban on any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, for all time, is nearly within our reach. Australia does not underestimate the obstacles to be overcome, but it is our ardent hope that Treaty supporters will remain steadfast in seeking the early entry into force of the CTBT. I can assure you that Australia will do so until our goal is achieved.

Thank you, Mr. President.
 
 

Source

• http://www.un.org/webcast/ctbt/statements/australiaE.htm