THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ______________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release October 4, 1999 PRESS BRIEFING BY JOE LOCKHART The Briefing Room 1:10 P.M. EDT ................... Q On another issue that's going to come up this week, the supporters of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty have asked the President to go all out. Can you tell us what public and private things he has planned? MR. LOCKHART: I don't think the Senate will take up a more important issue this year, as far as our national security and the safety of both Americans and the safety of free people around the world. The President will do everything he can -- I think you'll see him in an hour or so meeting with his team, and have a chance to question him on where he stands on CTBT. We will find a way to publicly address this, probably -- or almost every day between now and the vote. We'll find a way to find private time for the President to talk to senators individually and in small groups. This is very important, we have a lot of work to do. It is highly unusual, the tactics that are being employed by the Senate Republican majority. This is a crucial piece of legislation, a crucial treaty that Presidents since Eisenhower have been trying to enact. The Presidents since Eisenhower on both sides of the political aisle have viewed in our national interest. And given all of that, and given the fact that for two years they couldn't find time to even mention this comprehensive test ban treaty, now they've decided to throw it on the floor, not have any hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- Q -- or in hearings -- MR. LOCKHART: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as far as I know, is being chaired by Senator Helms, and he's not holding hearings. Senator Warner is holding hearings, but treaties like this traditionally go through the Foreign Relations Committee -- I can read you the list again and bore you, those of you -- Q Is it a legitimate hearing if it's with the Armed Services? MR. LOCKHART: I'm discussing what I think are highly unusual tactics. I cannot remember a significant arms control treaty or foreign policy treaty that the Senate Foreign Relations couldn't find time to debate. Now, this tactic says we're going to go ahead and do this in nine days. We think that that's unusual and I can't explain -- but we're going to go ahead. And the President is going to do everything he can to make the case, to talk about how it's manifestly in our U.S. interests. I mean, this is a very simple equation. This is not something that you have to get into very specific -- throw weights and things that you have on some other, the sort of START I and START II about different limits. This is a situation where we don't test because we don't have to. We can maintain effective and strong deterrent without testing. There are people around the world -- whether it be Russia and China, India and Pakistan -- who can't say that. This is about keeping other people from testing. And I'll remind you, I stood here for the last year and many a day took a lot of questions from a lot of those who said they were concerned, in particular about China and their ability to modernize their nuclear arsenal. If you go and you look at the Cox Report, the Cox Report is pretty clear that what can have the biggest impact on modernizing in China is if they resume testing. China has not tested since they signed in 1996. They and many other countries are looking to the United States to see whether we will ratify. We will live in a safer world if the Senate does the right thing and ratifies this treaty. Q But you are going to cooperate, aren't you, with the hearings and send people up? MR. LOCKHART: Absolutely. Absolutely. Q So it is a hearing and there will be three days -- MR. LOCKHART: Listen, I think Senator Warner should be applauded for holding his hearings. I think a strong case will be made for passing this treaty. I think, as I said this morning, there is very little opposition on the substance of this. There are a few people here and there, but the majority, the vast majority of the foreign policy community -- whether it be the Joint Chiefs of Democrats and Republicans, whether it be former Secretaries of State, whether it be former National Security Advisors -- the scientific community, the arms control community is all solidly behind this treaty. Q Why are you so worried that you can't get the two-thirds -- do you need two-thirds -- MR. LOCKHART: Well, right now, it's a matter of count. Clearly, Senator Lott and the Republican majority have decided to short circuit this, make it hit-and-run, rather than advise and consent, and try to get out before people have had a chance to really focus on it. But we're going to, in the next week or so, make sure that people focus on this issue, they look at how it impacts them. I really don't think there's a constituency in this country for resuming nuclear testing. Q Joe, the President has been asking them take this up for two years. Why weren't you ready with the votes? MR. LOCKHART: Okay, let me bore you then. Let me go through what we've done in the past when it comes to important issues like this. Q I'm just asking why you don't have the votes lined up since this isn't a surprise. I mean, you've been asking for this vote for so long, you'd think -- MR. LOCKHART: We've been asking the Senate to do their constitutional -- assume their constitutional responsibility on CTBT and take this up, hold hearings, allow those who are in support of this to make their case. And let me just give you some examples. The ABM treaty in 1972, there were eight days of hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee, 18 days of Senate floor consideration. The intermediate nuclear forces treaty in 1988, there were 23 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings and nine days of Senate floor consideration. The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, there were five days of Foreign Relations committee hearings and two days on the floor. START I, 19 days in Foreign Relations and 5 days on the floor. START II, 8 days in Foreign Relations committee and 3 days on the floor. Chemical weapons, 14 days in the committee, 3 days on the floor. And NATO enlargement, 7 days of committee hearings and 8 days on the floor. These are serious issues; they should be treated seriously. And they should not be dealt with in a way that some senators can walk around and talk about how clever they are and how good their legislative tactics are. Q Joe, one of the things you said was that the U.S. doesn't have to test. That is true because the U.S. has supercomputers and can simulate testing. The Russians have suggested that if they were to go along and ratify the treaty that they would also need supercomputers in order to simulate testing. Is the U.S. willing to supply them? MR. LOCKHART: Well, we are in discussions with them on this issue, but there's no suggestion that I know of changing our export technology policy. Q -- CIA analysis yesterday, was that a Republican leak, and do you have any comment about that? MR. LOCKHART: I don't know where it came from. I can tell you that we don't have any data of any nuclear explosion in Russia. I can tell you that it's nothing new that on low-level nuclear tests, they are difficult to detect. That's been an old problem and something we've worked very hard on. But I can assure you that having CTBT in place helps to solve that problem. Having on-site inspection, having 300 monitoring stations in the world, having other countries in the world commit to not testing helps to deal with this problem. That story, wherever it came from, is a strong argument for ratifying the treaty. Q Can you remind us that the India-Pakistan situation with regard to the treaty? MR. LOCKHART: Yes. India and Pakistan have indicated they want to sign. I think the Indian Foreign Ministry made a very positive statement yesterday; they said that they plan to sign the treaty when the new parliament is in place. I think that -- again, we spent some time surrounding -- in a time of crisis when India and Pakistan tested recently, and there was a lot of concern expressed from a lot of quarters. This addresses it directly. This is India and Pakistan agreeing that they will not test. And testing is, as the scientists know, the key to modernizing a nuclear arsenal. They have indicated they're willing to move forward and agree not to test. But I think that we are in a completely different world if the Senate votes this down and undercuts our ability to make this case around the world. Look at the other -- look at what happened after we signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Within a short time span, I think China, Russia, and India -- or one of -- three major countries came on board and signed shortly after. The world is looking to us, and this is very important. This is something now for 30 or 40 years we have faced. We have faced the danger of modernizing nuclear arsenals. The world is looking for United States leadership, and the Senate is responsible for dealing with that. Q Let's see if I have the China argument straight. You're essentially saying that people who scream the loudest about possible espionage by the Chinese, if they vote against this treaty are making it possible for the Chinese to utilize that information -- MR. LOCKHART: No. The argument I'm making is there are people who -- there was a lot of rhetoric and a lot of concern about China modernizing their nuclear arsenal. And that concern came from many places, but including from the Senate. I think this is a chance to do something about it. Q Joe, on the -- MR. LOCKHART: Let me finish, please. This is a chance to do something about. If you read the Cox report, if you talk to scientists, you'll understand that testing is an absolute essential key to modernizing a nuclear arsenal. And I think opposition to this, for me, brings into question much of that concern that was expressed. I think there was a lot of real concern about dangers that were posed. Here's a chance to do something about it. Q -- what the Chinese said about signing the treaty and ratifying it? MR. LOCKHART: They have not tested since 1996. They have signed it, they still have to go through -- I'm not sure what their process is, but they have another step. I believe that China and other countries are probably waiting for a signal from the United States. Q But, Joe, the argument has been made that until such time as your intelligence services can come up with a mechanism of verifying low level subcritical nuclear tests, why give up the stick of testing? MR. LOCKHART: I think we have always had -- low level testing has always been a challenge. We are continuing, we believe, to meet that challenge. But it's like saying, you know, here is a tool to help solve your problem, but because you can't say that the tool is absolutely perfect, you don't want the tool. This tool will help deal with all levels of testing. If there is some reason to believe that a country in engaged in low level testing or any kind of testing, you can demand an on site inspection. That is certainly better. And this idea that somehow countries will sign on and then they may cheat -- right now there is no international ban on testing. It is absolutely in our interest, given our capabilities and given the fact that we don't need, through our technology, to test, is absolutely in our interest to make sure that others don't. Because it is those who are developing a modern nuclear arsenal, those who are the emerging threats that it is most important to restrain and constrain their growth. And many of these countries are willing to sign on. But I think this treaty just -- it absolutely does not go into effect if one of the main countries, like the United States, doesn't ratify it. Q Joe, do you think that the Republicans are intentionally trying to do something injurious to the U.S. national security? Do you think that there's not legitimate grounds for -- MR. LOCKHART: I certainly -- there is a small minority in the arms control community that has argued against this -- and I emphasize it's a small minority. I don't believe that their argument can stand the test of the facts, but I have no doubt that these people believe in their heart what they've argued. What is hard to understand and what's unusual is the tactic here. To sort of rush something to the floor and do it in a way -- Q Why do you think they did that? MR. LOCKHART: You'll have to ask them. Q No, they thought they had to deal with it, though. MR. LOCKHART: But to do something in a way that has such profound implications for our future in such a way that does not do justice to the process. Q Why did they all of a sudden -- what's the White House judgment on why, all of a sudden, Republicans said, okay, let's do it. MR. LOCKHART: You will just have to ask them. Q Well, do you think it was from outside pressure that they should? MR. LOCKHART: I don't know. But I know that on some basic issues of running the Congress and their part in running the government, if you look at the budget mess, that they've fallen short; if you look at some other areas -- I mean, look at judicial nominations, we've got a backlog that we're only now beginning to hopefully find a way out of. They've got important constitutional responsibilities and it's time for them to start doing their work and doing it responsibly. Q Well, something pressured them to do it now. MR. LOCKHART: Listen -- Q Why do you feel blindsided if you don't feel that something happened? MR. LOCKHART: Listen, again, I can't explain their motives. I can only describe for you how unusual these tactics are. .............. Q On Israel and also some of the Arab countries and Iran, what's their status on this nuclear test ban treaty? Have they said they would sign it? MR. LOCKHART: We can distribute a list on where people are. I mean, there are a number of people who have signed the treaty, a number of people who have ratified it. Again, I think there are some countries that have looked to the United States for a signal before moving. I don't have any concrete evidence that can prove that, but I think it's obvious to many. Q Joe, on the one hand you're calling for ratification of the CTBT, and then on the other hand , over the Pacific you're shooting missiles out of the sky, which some critics have said will stir the pot in the weapons race. So how do you have it both ways? MR. LOCKHART: I don't think it's a matter of having it both ways. I think what we're looking at here is looking at the feasibility cost, the viability of a missile defense. We have done this I think the proper way as far as seeing if it will work. There was an important test on Saturday, I believe, which the Pentagon reports was successful. We will make a decision on this next year. And to the extent that there are issues in the ABM treaty, we have already begun to work with the Russians directly on it. We believe that there is a threat from rogue states, that it is in our national interest to examine the feasibility of a national defense, and that's what we've done. Q But do you not believe that this will spur countries like Russia, like China, like North Korea and others to try to devise a system that will defeat the ABM? MR. LOCKHART: No, I don't think so, and I think that the fact that countries are willing to abandon testing is a strong message about -- Q Then Reagan was right in proposing Star Wars -- MR. LOCKHART: Helen, hold on, stop. There is a whole -- there is a fundamental difference between what Ronald Reagan was talking about -- a space-based missile defense system -- and the limited national missile defense system that we're talking about, which is designed to deal with rogue states and not provide the kind of things that President Reagan was talking about. ................. THE PRESS: Thank you. END 1:52 P.M. EDT #123-10/04