18 February 2000
(Clinton administration will work to win pact's ratification) (3150) Senior Adviser for Arms Control and International Security John Holum said February 16 that despite the U.S. Senate's failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999, the Clinton administration will continue to discuss the benefits of the treaty for U.S. national security in an effort to build strong support for ratification in the future. In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Holum said that administration officials do not expect the CTBT to face a Senate vote in 2000, but hope to make real progress on correcting misperceptions that arose during the Senate debate. Holum, who was the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) before it merged into the Department of State, said he hopes the national dialogue will help rebuild the bipartisan consensus that dates back to the 1950s that arms control is a vital part of the U.S. national security agenda. Holum also said that: -- nuclear weapons have a smaller role in U.S. national security today than at any time since their inception; -- all the basic capabilities of stockpile stewardship are in place and working; -- the CTBT creates an unprecedented international monitoring system with some 321 sensors around the world; -- the CTBT adds an entirely new verification capability -- on-site challenge inspections; -- the U.S. has concluded that the CTBT is effectively verifiable; -- the CTBT reinforces the U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction process and can help head off a nuclear arms race in South Asia; -- the CTBT is a valuable component of the U.S. overall non-proliferation strategy; and -- the United States remains committed to the comprehensive test ban and will support the international monitoring system. "Eventually I believe the U.S. will ratify the CTBT and see it enter into force," Holum said. "As President Clinton said, 'The Senate has taken us on a detour, but America eventually always returns to the main road and we will do so again.'" Following is the text of Holum's remarks: (begin text) REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. HOLUM Senior Adviser for Arms Control and International Security U.S. Department of State Foreign Policy Association New York, New York February 16, 2000 The start of a new millennium is a natural time for new thinking about tough policy problems. We need a fresh start after the Senate's vote last October against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty -- by far the most disappointing arms control event of my tenure in the Clinton Administration. Anyone who wants to end nuclear testing is familiar with frustration. Dwight Eisenhower ranked his failure to achieve a test ban, "as the greatest disappointment of any administration -- of any decade -- of any time and of any party...." By responding to each setback with renewed determination, we have made progress. President Kennedy helped end nuclear tests everywhere except underground. Presidents Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush all contributed to treaties limiting the size of underground tests. Under President Clinton, the United States played a lead role in negotiating, at last, a ban on nuclear explosions of any size, by anyone, anywhere, forever. That was a historic milestone in efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and build a safer world. The Treaty has been signed by 155 states and ratified by 52. By its own terms, though, it cannot enter into force until it has been ratified by 44 named states, those with nuclear power or research reactors that participated in negotiations. Twenty-six of the "magic 44" have now ratified, including the U.K., France, and most of our other NATO allies. Eventually I believe the United States will ratify the CTBT and see it enter into force. As President Clinton said, "The Senate has taken us on a detour, but America eventually always returns to the main road and we will do so again." Or perhaps you prefer the version attributed to Winston Churchill: "America can always be counted on to do the right thing -- after exhausting all the alternatives." When the CTBT was sent to the Senate it was largely ignored for two years. Then we had a few days of hearings, an abbreviated floor debate, and a vote in barely two weeks' time. That was not enough for something so complex, so controversial, and so consequential. Many Senators who voted "no" would have preferred more time -- indeed, 62 Senators sponsored a resolution to that effect. We want to take them up on that. So one of my top priorities is to discuss these issues with as many Senators and other interested Americans as I can. That's why I'm here. Let me begin where the debate left off, with the rain points in opposition to the Treaty. They fell into two categories: first, can the United States maintain its nuclear deterrent without explosive testing; second, can the treaty be verified. As to the first, the CTBT does not force the United States to choose between deterrence and arms control; it strengthens both simultaneously. Even before CTBT negotiations started, the United States had voluntarily stopped nuclear testing. In the summer of 1992 President Bush declared that we would no longer test to develop new types of nuclear weapons, but only to ensure the safety and reliability of the existing arsenal. This policy shift reflected changes in the security environment that are even truer today. Nuclear weapons have smaller role in our national security now than at any time since their inception. We have no plans and no reason to build new types of warheads. Indeed, we're going the other way; where we once had scores of different types of warheads in the arsenal, we now have fewer than ten, all fully tested and certified safe and reliable. The CTBT "bans the bang, not the bomb." It was carefully negotiated to permit stockpile stewardship activities, such as visual inspection, non-nuclear tests, subcritical experiments, and computer simulations. Our Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program also includes activities to remanufacture or replace and certify aging weapons components, to train new scientists, and to retain the ability to test again if necessary. It was argued in the debate that this program is not yet in place, and we should wait until it is proven. But all the basic capabilities of stockpile stewardship are in place, and are working. They'll just get better as new facilities are added. We're doing highly advanced radiography, for example, at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, while building toward an Advanced Hydro Facility by 2007. We are operating powerful lasers, pulse power facilities, and the most advanced supercomputers in the world, while working on still greater capabilities in all these areas. But existing versions are already effective. Each year since the CTBT was signed, the Secretaries of Defense and Energy have been able to certify, based on today's program, that the stockpile remains safe and reliable. And they'll have even better tools in the future. Why bet on failure, when the record is one of success, and the prognosis is to perform even better? Moreover, unless you want to design new kinds of weapons, explosive testing doesn't add much. Only a tiny fraction of U.S. nuclear tests were done to check the safety and reliability of a deployed weapon, and many of those tests involved designs that had not been adequately tested before deployment. After President Bush's 1992 decision, top national security officials considered proposals for permissible safety and reliability tests and concluded that none were warranted. During the ratification debate, some critics argued that practicing nuclear deterrence without nuclear testing would be like expecting a car to start after it has been sitting unused for a number of years. But if you like that metaphor, consider that in this case the "car" is taken apart on a regular basis by the world's best scientists and engineers. Every spark plug, wire, and component is cleaned, checked, and certified. If any part is not perfect, it is replaced. The "ignition" is checked through subcritical experiments. And computer simulation is done to model the car's performance. As Wolfgang Panofsky, one of our most eminent nuclear physicists, asked, do we really need to throw a lighted match into the gasoline each year, just to make sure it will explode? Moreover, the Treaty has a safety valve. In the unlikely event that concerns about a nuclear weapon type deemed critical to our deterrent were to arise, the President, in consultation with Congress, could withdraw from the CTBT under the "supreme national interests" clause. The annual certification Program would be the trigger for such an event. So the issue with the stockpile really boils down to this: Should we assume failure, despite all evidence to the contrary, and pay a huge price in terms of our global leadership against the spread of nuclear weapons? Or should we expect success, and reap the benefits of this Treaty now, knowing that if our expectations do not prove out at some point in the future, we can always withdraw then and do whatever is necessary to protect our security? It seems to me, the answer is clear. We have conducted over 1000 nuclear tests, more than all the other nuclear weapons states combined. All types of warheads in our enduring stockpile have been thoroughly tested. We have the expertise, the database, and the technology to keep a safe, reliable nuclear stockpile without testing. Under those circumstances, doesn't it make sense to arrest all nations, ascent up the nuclear learning curve? The other main Senate argument was about verifiability. Couldn't someone conduct tiny nuclear explosions that would escape detection? During the negotiations we did explore the possibility of allowing nuclear tests with yields of a few pounds, so-called "hydronuclear" tests. But in 1995 independent scientific experts concluded that permitting small nuclear explosions was neither necessary, nor even very useful, for stockpile safety and reliability -- and would be unhelpful from a nonproliferation standpoint. That led to the 1995 decision to negotiate a true "zero-yield" CTBT. In one way that simplified verification -- it's easier to distinguish between something and nothing that between two somethings of different sizes. But it still left open the possibility that very low yield tests could escape our thresholds of detection. Nevertheless, it is the case that the CTBT dramatically improves what we can detect. It creates an unprecedented international monitoring system, with some 321 sensors around the world -- including 31 in Russia, 11 in China, and 17 in the Middle East. Some stations are in places where the U.S. could not gain access, on its own. And other CTBT signatories will pay 75% of the cost, to improve monitoring of events we want to know about with or without the Treaty. The Treaty also explicitly allows us to rely as heavily as we wish on our own impressive intelligence capabilities, which can be concentrated on sites of particular concern to us. And it provides an entirely new capability -- on-site challenge inspections. If the international system or our own capabilities reveal suspicious behavior, the issue can be resolved by going to the site -- something there's no chance of doing without the Treaty. A very small test might escape detection. But a standard of "foolproof" verification goes far beyond what we have required for any other arms control accord. It fails to weigh the risk to national security of undetected cheating against the danger to national security of unconstrained testing. We do know that the chances of catching a very-low yield test are greater with the CTBT's verification regime in place than without. And because a cheater can never confidently locate the threshold of detection, the Treaty would deter tests that might otherwise occur. Of course without the Treaty they wouldn't have to worry because testing is not cheating. We also know that explosions of very small size would not be of real value to the nuclear programs we are most concerned about -- aimed at small, light, deliverable designs, and by countries seeking to acquire nuclear weapons for the fist time. That is why we have concluded that the CTBT is effectively verifiable. Using national technical means and the IMS we will be able to feel, see, hear or sniff any nuclear explosion of sufficient size to make a difference to our security. We will be able to assess whether the Treaty is constraining nuclear proliferation and deterring nuclear explosions that could damage U.S. interests. But given these answers, I also suggest that the arguments over stockpile stewardship and verification can inappropriately shift the burden of proof. As Secretary Albright said to another group of foreign policy experts in November, "it is not sufficient simply to say that the Treaty is imperfect. Opponents must offer an alternative that is better. And they must explain why America will be safer in a world where nuclear tests are not outlawed and may again become commonplace where there is no guarantee of an international monitoring system to detect such tests: where we have no right to request on-site inspections, and where America is held responsible by allies and friends everywhere for the absence of these protections." So let's consider the Treaty's benefits. A ban on nuclear testing essentially rules out a renewed nuclear arms race. Make no mistake, more possibilities exist -- to focus the energy from nuclear weapons, or enhance radiation, or otherwise advance the art or lower the threshold to use. But without testing, nuclear weapon states will not be able confidently to develop advanced new nuclear weapons types. Without testing, there is no way to be sure that a new weapon will function as designed, as intended, or perhaps at all. The CTBT reinforces the U.S.-Russian strategic arms reduction process. It confirms that neither the U.S. nor Russia is making significant qualitative improvements in its arsenal, which fosters a stable environment for further reductions in nuclear arms. The CTBT can help head off a nuclear arms race in South Asia. India and Pakistan are bitter rivals who conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Persuading them to formalize their testing moratoria through the CTBT is a major goal of the international community. But it is not easy asking then to give up a legal right to test when we retain it. Banning tests slows the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries by throwing another tough obstacle in the way of anyone who wants nuclear arms. Potential proliferators can make simple fission bombs without testing. But remember that we had to dig a hole under a B-29 bomber to load our first one aboard. A test ban makes it much harder to get nuclear weapons down to the sizes, shapes, and weights most dangerous to us -- deliverable in light airplanes, rudimentary missiles, even terrorists' luggage. The CTBT also strengthens the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the larger non-proliferation regime. A global test ban is explicitly mentioned in the NPT's preamble, and was prominent in the 1995 decision for a permanent NPT. Therefore it affects our leadership. The United States is more active in the battle against proliferation than any other country in the world. If we cannot follow through on our commitment to the CTBT we will be less able to persuade others to support strong agreements and tough action against proliferators. Every single ally we have in the world strongly supports our ratification of the CTBT, precisely because they fear failure weakens U.S. leadership on arms control and non-proliferation. Before the Senate vote, the leaders of Britain, France, and Germany warned that a negative decision would "be a failure in our struggle against proliferation" and would "give great encouragement to proliferators." Of course, the CTBT is not a panacea. But it is a valuable component of our overall non-proliferation strategy. Even if some state tests in total disregard for global arms control norms and agreements, the CTBT helps alert the international community and unite it for an effective response. We have a vital stake in preventing proliferation. It is hard work. We must not forego any tool that can help. So where do we go from here. First, President Clinton has made clear that the United States remains committed to the Comprehensive Test Ban. We will support the international monitoring system, and continue urging other countries to ratify. And we also intend to continue our own efforts toward that end. As the President said in his State of the Union Address, we want a constructive bipartisan dialogue to build a consensus that will lead to CTBT ratification. We would not expect the Treaty to come before the Senate again this year. But we hope to make real progress on correcting misperceptions that arose during the debate answering legitimate questions, and explaining how the CTBT supports our larger national security strategy. I am delighted that former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili will help us work with the Senate. He has held high military office in both Democratic and Republican Administrations and understands our national security requirements from the ground up. We have also established an interagency CTBT Task Force with the diplomatic, military, scientific, and technical expertise needed to answer Senators' questions and build support for ratification. I doubt that you will hear much about this on the evening news -- so much the better. For if Senators are willing to engage with us on these vital issues in a low-key, non-partisan manner, our hope is that more and more of them will embrace the Treaty -- and our other arms control efforts -- not as Democrats or Republicans, but as thoughtful Americans. In that way, through this Treaty, I hope we can also begin to rebuild the bipartisan consensus, going back to President Eisenhower, that arms control is a vital national security mission. Our arms control and nonproliferation efforts comprise a series of hard-headed, interconnected strategies that, when they are most effective, allow us to confront and reduce threats to our national security without a single shot being fired. We have demonstrated in one hard-won agreement after another that when we control arms, we control our fate ... buttress our freedom and our prosperity ... make ourselves at once more civilized and more secure. What we need to summon as a nation is the courage and will to embrace and pursue arms control as thoroughly as this new security era demands. If we do, I know we can continue to build the kind of world that is in America's deepest interests: a world where nations are esteemed not because they keep arms, but because they keep commitments -- to other nations and their own people. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)