Article XIV consists of six paragraphs. This Article sets forth the basic rights and obligations regarding on-site inspections the State Parties will conduct, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection, to assist in verification of compliance with the Treaty.

Article XIV, along with the Protocol on Inspection, provides for four basic types of inspections: declared site inspections (subparagraph 2(A) and Section VII of the Protocol on Inspection); challenge inspection (subparagraph 2(A) and Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection); reduction inspections (subparagraph 2(B) and Section X of the Protocol on Inspection); and certification inspections (subparagraph 2(C) and Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection). Also, the on-site inspection regime created by Article XIV and the Protocol on Inspection provides for four inspection periods or phases: the baseline validation period (the 120-day period following entry into force of the Treaty); the reduction period (the 36-month period following the baseline validation period); the residual level validation period (the 120-day period following the reduction period); and the residual period (the final period following the residual level validation period for the duration of the Treaty).

Paragraph I of Article XIV provides that, for the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to conduct, and the obligation to accept, within the area of application, inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection.

Paragraph 2 of Article XIV lists three specific purposes for the on-site inspections provided for in paragraph 1 and the Protocol on Inspection. First, subparagraph (A) of paragraph 2 provides that inspections, in particular declared site and challenge inspections, conducted pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of the Protocol on Inspection, respectively, are to verify, on the basis of the information provided pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, the compliance of States Parties with the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, and VI.

Second, subparagraph (B) of paragraph 2 provides that inspections, in particular, reduction inspections conducted pursuant to Section X of the Inspection Protocol, are to monitor the process of reduction of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters carried out at the reduction sites in accordance with Article VIII and the Protocol on Reduction.

Third, subparagraph (C) of paragraph 2 of Article XIV provides that inspections, in particular, certification inspections conducted pursuant to Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, are to monitor the certification of recategorized multipurpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft carried out in accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorization and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, respectively.

Paragraph 3 of Article XIV provides that no State Party shall exercise the rights set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article XIV in respect of States Parties which belong to the group of States Parties to which it belongs in order to elude the objectives of the verification regime. The purpose of this provision is to preclude a potential problem arising from the fact that the States Parties within the same group have the right to inspect each other and that the number of inspections that each State Party is obligated to receive is limited. Theoretically, members of the same group of States Parties could agree to inspect one another, thereby expending their passive inspection quotas, in order to reduce the number of inspections of them available to members of the other group of States Parties. Such "friendly inspections," if taken to extreme lengths, could circumvent the purpose of the on-site inspection regime. Paragraph 3 makes clear that such a circumvention scenario is unlawful. In this regard, the potential for such circumvention is limited by paragraph 24 of Section II of the Protocol on Inspection. Paragraph 24 of Section II provides that no State Party shall have the right to conduct more than five declared site and challenge inspections annually of a member of its group of States Parties.

Paragraph 4 of Article XIV provides that, in the case of an inspection conducted jointly by more than one State Party, one of them shall be responsible for the execution of the provisions of the Treaty. This paragraph provides that in the case of a joint inspection, a State Party must be placed in charge of the inspection and be responsible for ensuring that the Treaty provisions relating to that inspection are carried out properly.

Paragraph 5 of Article XIV provides that the number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII (i.e., declared site and challenge inspections) of the Protocol on Inspection which each State Party shall have the right to conduct and the obligation to accept during each specified time period shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of Section II of that Protocol. The number of declared site inspections conducted pursuant to Section VII that each State Party is obliged to accept is calculated in accordance with paragraphs 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 23 of Section II of the Protocol on Inspection. The number of challenge inspections conducted pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection that each State Party is obliged to accept is calculated in accordance with paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 16, and 23 of Section II of the Protocol on Inspection.

Each group's active inspection quota (i.e., the aggregate number of inspections a group may conduct against the other group) is derived from the other group's passive declared site inspection quota. (However, any inspections conducted within the same group by its members, pursuant to paragraph 24 of Section II of the Protocol on Inspection, also are counted against that group's passive declared inspection quota.) Paragraph 24 of Section II of the Protocol on Inspection makes clear that the members of each Group can allocate such active inspections among themselves as they see fit.

Paragraph 6 of Article XIV provides that upon completion of the 120-day residual level validation period, each State Party shall have the right to conduct, and each State Party with territory within the area of application shall have the obligation to accept, an agreed number of aerial inspections within the area of application. Such aerial inspections will augment the monitoring capabilities already provided for through on-site inspection and national and multinational technical means of verification. Paragraph 6 adds that such agreed numbers and other applicable provisions for an aerial inspection regime shall be developed during negotiations referred to in Article XVIII (Follow-on Negotiation of the Treaty).

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Article XV consists of three paragraphs. This Article sets forth the basic rights and obligations regarding national or multinational technical means (NTM) or verification that the States Parties will use along with on-site inspection to assist monitoring of compliance with the Treaty. With one exception, this Article is very similar to provisions on national technical means found in U.S. bilateral arms control treaties such as the 1987 INF Treaty and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The exception is that Article XIV refers to "multinational" as well as national technical means of verification. The reference to multinational technical means was added at the request of NATO Allies who wished to make clear that States Parties could jointly operate technical means of verification. Such means of verification include a broad range of systems for collecting information. Such systems include, for example, reconnaissance satellites, ships, aircraft, and ground stations.

Paragraph 1 of Article XV provides that for the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, a State Party shall have the right to use, in addition to the procedures referred to in Article XIV, national or multinational technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

Paragraph 2 of Article XV provides that a State Party shall not interfere with national or multinational technical means of verification of another State Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Article.

Paragraph 3 of Article XV provides that a State Party shall not use concealment measures that impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty by national or multinational technical means of verification of another State Party operating in accordance with paragraph I of the Article. Paragraph 3 further provides that this obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices associated with normal personnel training, maintenance or operations involving conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty.

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Article XVI consists of seven paragraphs. This Article establishes the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) and sets forth the general framework in which it is to operate. The JCG was convened on November 26, 1990, for its first session, and has regularly met since that time. It consists of representatives from all 22 States Parties and will be responsible for promoting the objectives and implementation of the Treaty. In particular, the JCG is to deal with disputes arising out of the operation of the Treaty as well as with proposed measures and amendments to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group supplements Article XVI of the Treaty by providing specific rules and procedures for the operation of the Joint Consultative Group.

Paragraph I of Article XVI provides that, to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the States Parties agree to establish immediately a Joint Consultative Group.

Paragraph 2 of Article XVI sets forth nine tasks on which the States Parties within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group shall specifically concentrate. These tasks are to:

Subparagraph (G) of Article XVI merits further clarification. This provision was added to address a Turkish concern about the untimely release to the public of sensitive information acquired through the information exchanges and inspections. Turkey feared that the release of such sensitive information by other States Parties could be used by third parties, such as terrorists, to the disadvantage of the State Party that provided the information or was inspected. The purpose of subparagraph (G) is to provide States Parties with a formal opportunity to safeguard such sensitive information.

However, all States Parties agreed that the information exchanged at signature would not be so safeguarded and could be made available to the public. This decision was made for two reasons. First, it was agreed that information required by Section VII of the Protocol on Information Exchange was generally not of a sensitive nature. Second, it was deemed appropriate that such information could be made public in order to facilitate each State Party's ratification process. However, it also was agreed among the 22 States Parties that they would consider and work out appropriate measures to ensure that information obtained through subsequent information exchanges and through inspections is used solely for the purposes of the Treaty, when taking into account the particular requirements of each State Party in respect of safeguarding information which that State Party specifies as being sensitive (see subparagraph (G) of paragraph 2 above).

Paragraph 3 of Article XVI provides that each State Party shall have the right to raise before the Joint Consultative Group, and have placed on its agenda, any issue relating to the Treaty. This paragraph is essentially a broad "catch-all" provision and should be read in conjunction with paragraph 2 of the Article. Paragraph 3 makes clear that, in addition to the nine specific tasks listed in paragraph 2, the Joint Consultative Group may consider any issue that falls within the scope of the Treaty.

Paragraph 4 of Article XVI provides that the Joint Consultative Group shall take decisions or make recommendations by consensus. Paragraph 4 further provides that consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection by an representative of a State Party. This paragraph thus ensures that the Joint Consultative Group cannot undertake action objectionable to any State Party. On the other hand, paragraph 4 requires an explicit objection in order to break consensus, rather than an affirmative response in order to sustain consensus.

Paragraph 5 of Article XVI provides that the Joint Consultative Group may propose amendments to the Treaty for consideration and confirmation in accordance with Article XX. Paragraph 5 further provides that the Joint Consultative Group may also agree on improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, consistent with its provisions. Paragraph 5 also provides that, unless such improvements relate only to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature, they shall be subject to consideration and confirmation in accordance with Article XX before they can take effect.

Paragraph 5 should be read in conjunction with subparagraph (C) of paragraph 2 of Article XVI and with Article XX. Paragraph 5 clarifies which changes that affect the Treaty text can be dealt with solely within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group and which must ultimately be dealt with pursuant to the amendment process described in Article XX. Paragraph 5 does so by relating such changes to the amendment process. In this regard, an amendment is any change or improvement to the Treaty text other than one that relates only to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature. Paragraph 5 makes clear that improvements or changes to the Treaty text that rise to the level of amendment must be dealt with through the amendment process, even though they may be proposed and considered initially in the Joint Consultative Group. On the other hand, measures, improvements or changes that do not amount to amendments can be agreed and implemented within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group.

Such "minor" matters might include, for example, correcting typographical or conforming errors in the Treaty text. Also, several provisions in the Treaty identify changes to the Treaty that are deemed to be improvements relating only to "minor matters." Such provisions include: paragraph 2 of Article II (updating the list of existing types in the Protocol on Existing Types); Section XII of the Protocol on Information Exchange (changes to the formats provided for in the Annex on Format to the Protocol on Information Exchange); and Section XIII of the Protocol on Information Exchange (changes to the document listing other notifications required by the Treaty).

Paragraph 6 of Article XVI provides that nothing in the Article shall be deemed to prohibit or restrict any State Party from requesting information from or undertaking consultations with other States Parties on matters relating to the Treaty and its implementation in channels or for other than the Joint Consultative Group. The principal purpose of this paragraph is to make clear that the Joint Consultative Group, while a primary focal point for discussions, is not the only forum in which States Parties may consult concerning issues relating to the Treaty.

Paragraph 7 of Article XVI provides that the Joint Consultative Group shall follow the procedures set forth in the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group.

Finally, it should be noted that several provisions of Article XVI have been applied provisionally between signature and entry into force of the Treaty pursuant to subparagraph l(E) of the Protocol on Provisional Application. Those provisions that are already in force include paragraph 1, subparagraphs (F) and (G) of paragraph 2, paragraph 4, paragraph 6, paragraph 7, and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group. The provisional application of these provisions allowed the Joint Consultative Group to begin operating, albeit with a restricted charter, upon signature of the Treaty rather than waiting until its entry into force.

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Article XVII provides that the States Parties shall transmit information and notifications required by this Treaty in written form. It further provides that they shall use diplomatic channels or other official channels designated by them, including in particular a communications network to be established by a separate arrangement.

The specific notifications and information exchanges to be provided in accordance with Article XVII are those set forth in the Protocol on Information Exchange as well as the other notifications that will be in the notification document to be developed in accordance with Section XIII of the Protocol on Information Exchange.

"Other official channels," that may be used to transmit such notifications and information might include, for example in the U.S.-USSR context, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established pursuant to the Agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

The "communications network to be established by a separate arrangement" is the communications system being developed pursuant to Chapter IX and Annexes II-IV of the Vienna Document of November 17, 1990, of the Vienna Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Finally, it should be noted that Article XVII has been applied provisionally between signature and entry into force of the Treaty pursuant to subparagraph I(F) of the Protocol on Provisional Application. The States Parties are therefore legally obligated to comply with the Article even though the Treaty is not yet in force.

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Article XVIII consists of three paragraphs. This Article sets forth the general parameters of the negotiation that will succeed the CFE negotiation. This follow-on negotiation is also referred to as CFE IA.

Paragraph 1 of Article XVIII provides that States Parties, after signature of the Treaty, shall continue the negotiations on conventional armed forces with the same Mandate and with the goal of building on the Treaty. In fact, the follow-on negotiation was commenced in late November 1990. Since the Mandate for the CFE IA negotiation is the same as that of CFE Treaty negotiation, this means that the follow-on negotiation deals only with the conventional armed forces of the 22 States Parties that are based on land within the area of application. In particular, naval forces, nuclear weapons, and chemical weapons are not subjects of CFE IA. As in the negotiation of the Treaty, however, permanently land-based conventional armaments and equipment, regardless of their service subordination, will fall under the Mandate. Similarly, the other 12 States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process do not participate in the CFE IA negotiation.

Paragraph 2 of Article XVIII provides that the objective for the follow-on negotiations shall be to conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe, and pursuant to the CFE Mandate, including measures to limit the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces within the area of application. Also, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XIV, the States Parties are obligated during the follow-on negotiation to develop an aerial inspection regime.

Paragraph 3 of Article XVIII provides that the States Parties shall seek to conclude these negotiations no later than the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Helsinki in 1992.

The reference to "seek to conclude" in paragraph 3 highlights that no deadline has been set for the completion of CFE IA; in particular, the States Parties are not obligated to complete the negotiation prior to the CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki in 1992.

Finally, it should be noted that Article XVIII has been applied provisionally between signature and entry into force of the Treaty pursuant to subparagraph l(G) of the Protocol on Provisional Application. This legally obligated the States Parties to undertake the follow-on (i.e., CFE IA) negotiation soon after Treaty signature rather than wait until entry into force. As noted above, pursuant to this requirement, the States Parties have already begun the follow-on negotiation.

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Article XIX consists of three paragraphs dealing with the duration of, and withdrawal from, the Treaty.

Paragraph I of Article XIX provides that the Treaty is of unlimited duration. The paragraph further provides that the Treaty may be supplemented by a further treaty. The reference to a "further treaty" was intended to refer to the international agreement that may result from the CFE IA negotiation provided for in Article XVIII of the Treaty. Of course, neither paragraph 1 nor Article XVIII represents a legal commitment by any State Party to sign such a follow-on agreement.

Paragraph 2 of Article XIX contains the "supreme interests" withdrawal clause that is a standard provision in most modern arms control agreements. It establishes the right of a State Party to withdraw from the Treaty if it concludes that extraordinary events related to the subject matter to the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Withdrawal under this provision requires a 150-day advance notification to the Depositary and all other States Parties and a statement of the extraordinary events that the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This right of withdrawal is in addition to any other rights a State Party has under customary international law regarding termination or suspension of the Treaty, including its rights in the event of a material breach of the Treaty. In the event that a State Party does provide notice of its decision to withdraw, then paragraph 4 of Article XXI requires the Depositary to convene a conference of the States Parties to consider questions relating to the notified withdrawal.

Paragraph 3 of Article XIX provides that each State Party shall, in particular, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if another State Party increases its holdings in battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, or attack helicopters, as defined in Article II, which are outside the scope of the limitations of the Treaty, in such proportions as to pose an obvious threat to the balance of forces within the area of application.

Paragraph 3 highlights a special case under the "supreme interests" clause concerning actions that threaten the Treaty's regime, even though they are not prohibited by the Treaty (i.e., circumvention). This special provision was added at the insistence of some of our NATO allies. They feared that the Soviet Union might destabilize the Treaty regime by building up large numbers of types of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty east of the Urals just outside the area of application. The purpose of this paragraph is to help deter against such an eventuality. Paragraph 3 of Article XIX is, in fact, intended to deter two kinds of possible actions. The first type involves threatening and destabilizing buildups outside the area of application. The second type concerns buildups within the area of application involving conventional armaments and equipment not counted in the Treaty (pursuant to the counting rules set forth in Article III), such as newly-produced armaments and equipment awaiting export or armored combat vehicles held in internal security (e.g., paramilitary) organizations. This latter problem is also addressed by Article XII of the Treaty.

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Article XX consists of two paragraphs. This Article sets forth the general obligations concerning amendments to the Treaty.

Paragraph 1 of Article XX provides that any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary (The Netherlands), which shall circulate it to all the States Parties.

Paragraph 2 of Article XX provides that if an amendment is approved by all States Parties, it shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XXII governing the entry into force of the Treaty. This means that an approved amendment shall be subject to ratification by each State Party and will enter into force 10 days after instruments of ratification have been deposited with the Depositary by all 22 States Parties.

Also, paragraph 3 of Article XXI of the Treaty provides for amendment conferences, if so requested by three or more States Parties. Such conferences, while likely to be useful in the majority of cases, do not constitute a prerequisite for the approval of amendments. Cases can be envisioned in which amendments could be approved without the necessity of an amendment conference. In such cases, amendments might be proposed and approved, for example, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article XVI of the Treaty. Of course, amendments approved within the Joint Consultative Group (or by an amendment conference) would not enter into force until ratified by all the States Parties.

In sum, four steps must be accomplished before an amendment can take effect. First, the amendment must be proposed by a State Party, submitted to the Depositary, and then circulated to all States Parties. Second, the proposed amendment must be considered by the States Parties, either in the context of an amendment conference, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, or in some other forum. Third, the proposed amendment must be approved by all 22 States Parties. Fourth, the approved amendment must then be ratified by all 22 States Parties.

Finally, paragraph 5 of Article XVI provides the standard by which to judge whether a proposed change to the Treaty should be handled as an amendment in accordance with Article XX or treated as a lesser measure to enhance the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The standard is whether the proposed change relates only to minor matters of an administrative or technical nature. If the answer is no, then the proposed change must be treated as an amendment. A decision as to whether a proposed change relates only to "minor matters" must be made on the basis of consensus among the 22 States Parties pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article xvi.

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Article XXI consists of four paragraphs. This Article provides for four types of conferences: (1) five-year regular review conferences; (2) ad hoc extraordinary conferences; (3) amendment conferences; and (4) withdrawal conferences.

Paragraph 1 of Article XXI provides that 46 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties to conduct a review of the operation of the Treaty. The first review conference is thus scheduled to be convened six months after the conclusion of the 40-month reduction period under paragraph 4 of Article VIII of the Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article XXI provides that the Depositary shall convene an extraordinary conference of the States Parties if requested to do so by any State Party which considers that exceptional circumstances relating to the Treaty have arisen, in particular, in the event that a State Party has announced its intention to leave its group of State Parties or to join the other group of States Parties, as defined in Article II, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A). This paragraph further provides that, in order to enable the other States Parties to prepare for this conference, the request shall include the reason why the State Party deems an extraordinary conference to be necessary. Paragraph 2 also notes that the conference shall consider the circumstances set forth in the request and their effect on the operation of the Treaty. Finally, this paragraph provides that the conference shall open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, shall last no longer than three weeks.

The particular example adduced in the first sentence of paragraph 2 was added at the insistence of the Soviet Union. It wanted to ensure that it would have the right to call an extraordinary conference in the event that another member of the Group of 6 announces its intention to leave the Group of 6 or to join the Group of 16.

Paragraph 3 of Article XXI provides that the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties to consider an amendment proposed pursuant to Article XX, if requested to do so by three or more States Parties. Paragraph 3 further provides that such a conference shall open no later than 21 days after receipt of the necessary requests. Requests from a minimum of three States Parties are required to convene an amendment conference in order to help deter conferences to discuss frivolous proposed amendments. Also, amendment conferences are not required in order to consider or approve a proposed amendment. Amendments can, for example, be proposed, considered, and approved within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group or other fora. However, no amendment can enter into force until it is ratified by all 22 States Parties.

Paragraph 4 of Article XXI provides that in the event that a State Party gives notice of its decision to withdraw from the Treaty pursuant to Article XIX, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States Parties which shall open no later than 21 days after receipt of the notice of withdrawal in order to consider questions relating to the withdrawal from the Treaty.

Finally, it should be noted that paragraph 2 of Article XXI has been applied provisionally between signature and entry into force of the Treaty pursuant to subparagraph l(H) of the Protocol on Provisional Application. This means that, prior to entry into force of the Treaty, a State Party has the right to request, and the Depositary is obligated to convene, an extraordinary conference. In fact, an extraordinary conference was held by the States Parties on June 14, 1991, in Vienna in order to formally approve the legally binding Statements that resolved the Article III dispute concerning battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery held by the Soviet Union in its Naval Infantry, Coastal Defense forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Civil Defense organizations within the area of application. Further details concerning this issue are provided in the Article-by-Article Analyses of the two legally binding Statements.

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