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Article VI of the Treaty sets forth one of the most important provisions 6f the Treaty. This is the so-called "sufficiency rule," which limits each State Party to a certain portion of the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty located within the area of application. The purpose of Article VI is to limit the potential of any one State Party to acquire or possess within the area of application an overwhelming preponderance of weaponry in those categories of conventional armaments and equipment most relevant to carrying out a large-scale surprise attack. Article VI provides that no single State Party may possess more than approximately one-third in each of the five categories of all the conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty located within the area of application. In this regard, the overall totals, in each category, of such conventional armaments and equipment are set forth in the tenth paragraph of the Preamble (i.e., 40,000 battle tanks; 60,000 armored combat vehicles; 40,000 pieces of artillery; 13,600 combat aircraft; and 4,000 attack helicopters). This Article specifically provides that each State Party must limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters so that, 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, the numbers in each category of such conventional armaments and equipment for that State Party do not exceed:
(B) 20,000 armored combat vehicles; (C) 13,700 pieces of artillery; (D) 5,150 combat aircraft; and (E) 1,500 attack helicopters. The numerical limitations set forth in Article VI, like those in Articles IV and V, only come into effect 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty.
Article VII consists of seven paragraphs. This Article is critical to the Treaty's operation. It is to be read in conjunction with Articles IV, V, and VI of the Treaty. These three Articles set forth the principal numerical limitations of the Treaty on a group-to-group basis. However, the definition of the term "group of States Parties," set forth in subparagraph (A) of paragraph 1 of Article II, makes clear that the individual States that comprise each group are the parties to the Treaty, rather than the groups themselves. Without further clarification, such a situation could imply that every State Party within a group would be collectively responsible for ensuring that its group's numerical limitations were not breached. For example, if a single group member caused the ceiling of 20,000 for battle tanks to be breached, all States Parties within its group could be potentially liable for the violation. In such a situation, there would be no clear way in the event of a violation to ascertain which member or members of the group were actually responsible. Put another way, there would be no way in which to hold legally accountable only that member that actually caused the breach. The purpose of Article VII is to remedy this potential problem. Article VII accomplishes this objective in the following manner. It requires the States Parties within a group to consult and agree on the maximum levels, by category (and subcategory in the case of armored combat vehicles), of Treaty-limited armaments and equipment to which each member will be entitled within the numerical ceilings set forth for the group. These maximum levels (or entitlements) thus represent an agreed apportionment, on an individual State basis, of Treaty-limited conventional armaments and equipment permitted to each group. Article VII also requires each State party to notify all other States Parties of the maximum levels for its holdings in each category and to work with the members of its group in the event that it desires to increase those maximum levels. Thus, this legal regime ensures that: (a) the States Parties in a group work together to ensure that their group does not exceed a numerical limitation set forth in Article IV or V; and (b) in the event that a violation does occur, the individual State Party responsible can be readily identified and thus be held accountable for the breach. In turn, this means that the other group members, which did not cause the violation, are not held collectively responsible for their group's ceiling having been breached. It is important to bear in mind the distinction between maximum levels for holdings and actual levels of holdings. The maximum levels notified pursuant to Article VII refer to the maximum numbers (i.e., ceiling) of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty that each State Party may hold within the area of application. Actual holdings refer to the number of Treaty-limited armaments and equipment reported pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange actually present within the area of application. Significantly, while Article VII provides that no State Party may exceed its notified maximum levels, it does not require a State Party to maintain actual holding equal to those maximum levels. Article VII also provides for a mechanism by which a State Party may adjust its previously notified maximum levels for holdings. Paragraph I of Article VII provides that, in order that the limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, and VI of the Treaty are not exceeded, no State Party shall exceed, beginning 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty, the maximum levels it has notified for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty upon which it has previously agreed within its group of States Parties and for which it has provided notification to all other States Parties. Paragraph 1 makes clear that the levels permitted for each individual State Party are designed to ensure compliance with the aggregate group limits set forth in Articles IV and V. The purpose of paragraph I also is to ensure that a State Party does not exceed the sufficiency rule set forth in Article VI. This means that a State Party may never have a maximum level for holdings that would exceed the sufficiency rule, even if such a maximum level were otherwise agreed within its group and fell within that group's aggregate limit. Finally, paragraph 1 makes clear that the States Parties are not required to be in compliance with their notified maximum levels for holdings until 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty. This requirement coincides with the end of the third and final reduction phase stipulated by paragraph 4 of Article VIII of the Treaty. Thus, maximum levels for holdings come into effect, along with the specific numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, and VI, during the "residual" phase of the Treaty. Paragraph 2 of Article VII provides that each State Party shall notify all other States Parties of its maximum levels for holdings at the time of signature of the Treaty. Paragraph 2 also provides that such notification provided at signature shall remain valid until a subsequent notification is given pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Article. Paragraph 2 required the States Parties to engage in consultations within their respective alliance groups, during the CFE negotiation, in order to establish for each group member its maximum levels for holdings within the overall numbers permitted for each group under Articles IV and V. These maximum levels had to be established consistent with the sufficiency rule set forth in Article VI. For example, Article VI(A) provides that the maximum number of battle tanks that any State Party may possess within the area of application is 13,300. The Group of 6 members agreed in this instance that the Soviet Union would be entitled, pursuant to Article VII, to hold no more than 13,150 battle tanks (i.e., 150 below the sufficiency rule limit for battle tanks). The notifications required by paragraph 2 were made by the States Parties on November 18, 1990, in Vienna when the Treaty was initialed. The maximum levels for holdings notified by the members of the Group of 16 are set forth in Table One, and those for the Group of 6 are displayed in Table Two. Paragraph 3 of Article VII provides that, in accordance with the limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, and VI, each State Party has the right to change its maximum permitted levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Paragraph 3 further provides that any such change must be notified 90 days in advance of such change taking effect. Paragraph 3 of Article VII also provides that, in order that neither the overall nor any regional limit is exceeded as a result of such a change, any increase in the maximum levels for holdings of a State Party that would otherwise cause those limitations to be exceeded must be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding reduction in previously notified maximum levels by one or more other States Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties. Finally, paragraph 3 provides that the notification of such a change in maximum levels for holdings shall remain valid and binding on all States Parties until a subsequent notification of change. Paragraph 3 thus establishes the right of a State Party to change its initially notified maximum levels of holdings (i.e., the maximum levels notified at signature pursuant to paragraph 2). Under paragraph 3, a State Party may unilaterally decrease its maximum ,levels without consultation and agreement among the members of its group. However, if a State Party wishes to increase any of its maximum levels, and such a change would result in the aggregate total of its group's maximum levels exceeding a numerical limitation set forth in Article IV or V, then that State Party may undertake such an increase only if another member of its group agrees to decrease its maximum levels by an amount sufficient to avoid the breach. The aggregate total of the group's maximum levels for holdings may never exceed a numerical limitation set forth in Article IV, V, or VI. Paragraph 4 of Article VII provides that notifications of maximum levels, either made initially pursuant to paragraph 2 or subsequently pursuant to paragraph 3, for armored combat vehicles must also include the maximum levels for the subcategories within the armored combat vehicle categories of armored infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that individual States Parties as well as their groups also comply with the sublimits for armored combat vehicles set forth in Article IV(I)(B).
Paragraph 5 of Article VII provides that, 90 days before expiration of the 40-month reduction period and subsequently at the time of any notification of a change made pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Article, each State Party must notify the maximum levels for holdings of its battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery in each of the regional areas described in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 6f Article IV and subparagraph (A) of paragraph 1 of Article V. Paragraph 5 of Article VII thus requires a special notification 90 days before the end of the reduction period in order to provide a regional breakdown of each State Party's maximum levels for holdings. Assuming that no State Party has changed its initial notification provided at signature pursuant to paragraph 2, this means that paragraph 5 ,in effect, mandates that this initial notification be expanded to provide a regional breakdown. The purpose of this regional breakdown is to ensure that the regional (as well as overall) limits are complied with and to enable the State Parties to identify the malefactor in the event that such limits are breached. Paragraph 5 also requires that each time a State Party changes (pursuant to paragraph 3) its maximum levels for holdings after it has provided its initial paragraph 5 regional notification, that State Party also will automatically update its regional breakdown of its maximum levels (even if the notified change does not affect its regional breakdown). Paragraph 6 of Article VII provides that any decrease in the actual numbers of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty held by a State Party and notified pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange shall by itself confer no right on any other State Party to increase its maximum levels for holdings. The purpose of paragraph 6 of Article VII is to make clear that State Parties may not take advantage of the unused portions of another State Party's maximum levels for holdings. For Example, if the United States had a maximum level for holdings for battle tanks of 1,000 but actually had only 500 battle tanks, Germany could not unilaterally increase its actual or maximum levels of holdings by 500 to make up the difference. If, in this example, Germany wished to have 500 more battle tanks and had already reached its maximum levels ceiling, it would have to increase its notified maximum levels for holdings for tanks by 500, after consultation within the Group of 16, before it could increase its actual holdings by that amount. However, assuming that the Group of 16 had fully apportioned its allotment of 20,000 battle tanks, Germany could only increase its maximum levels by obtaining agreement from one or more State Parties within the Group of 16 to decrease their maximum levels for battle tanks by an aggregate number of 500. Paragraph 7 of Article VII provides that each State Party shall be solely responsible for ensuring that it does not exceed its maximum levels for holdings. The purpose of this provision is twofold. First, it emphasizes, in conjunction with paragraph 1, that each State Party must not breach its notified maximum levels for holdings. Second, it makes clear that there is no intra-group collective responsibility for ensuring that a group member does not exceed its maximum levels for holdings. In turn, this means that there is no collective responsibility within a group for ensuring that the group-to-group numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV and V are not exceeded. Paragraph 7 of Article VII also provides that State Parties belonging to the same group of State Parties must consult in order to ensure that the maximum levels for holdings allocated to each State Party within the group, when taken together as appropriate, do not exceed the overall limitations and the regional sublimits set forth in Articles IV and V or the sufficiency rule set forth in Article VI. The purpose of this provision is to help ensure that no group member undertakes unilateral action that could jeopardize a limitation pertaining to its group. This point is particularly important in a case in which a State Party wishes to unilaterally reduce its maximum levels for holdings, thereby providing an opportunity for the other members of its group to increase their maximum levels by taking advantage of the unused maximum levels relinquished by the decreasing State Party. In such a case, several group members might simultaneously attempt, without consulting each other, to take advantage of the unclaimed maximum levels and thus accidentally cause the group as a whole to exceed a limitation. There are two other points with regard to the application of Article VII to conventional armaments and equipment. First, the State Parties are not required to notify maximum levels for holdings of Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty held in active units. Thus, maximum levels are only required for each category and subcategory of Treaty-limited armaments and equipment on an overall and a regional basis. Second, although armored vehicle launched bridges in active units are subject to numerical limitations in Article XI(l) of the Treaty on a group-to-group basis, State Parties are not required to notify maximum levels for holdings for such equipment. This is because there is no limit on the aggregate total of armored vehicle launched bridges that may be held in both active units and designated permanent storage sites. Finally, it should be noted that paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Article VII have been applied provisionally between signature and entry into force of the Treaty pursuant to subparagraph l(A) of the Protocol on Provisional Application. The State Parties are therefore legally obligated to comply with these three provisions even though the Treaty as a whole is not yet in force. In turn, this means that State Parties may adjust their notified maximum levels for holdings between signature and entry into force of the Treaty as long as such changes are made in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article VII and the Protocol on Provisional Application.
Article VIII consists of 13 paragraphs. This Article sets forth the general legal obligations concerning the Treaty's reduction regime. The purpose of such a regime is to provide agreed means by which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are reduced in order to achieve compliance with the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, VI, VII, and XII of the Treaty. The reduction regime established by Article VIII is intended to be used to achieve the reductions required to meet the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty. This means that the reduction regime established is principally applicable during the reduction period (i.e., the 40-month period after entry into force of the Treaty). The Treaty is silent as to what means may be used during the residual period to ensure that States Parties continue to remain within the numerical limitations. Of course, they are free to continue to use the reduction procedures specified in the Treaty after the reduction period is completed. It is clear that they also could, for example, export excess items out of the area of application in accordance with the export counting rule in Article III(l)(E). However, if, during the reduction period, a State Party wished to reduce an item using a procedure not already specified in the relevant protocols, that procedure would first have to be approved by the Joint Consultative Group in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Reduction. Paragraph I of Article VIII provides that the numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V, and VI must be achieved only by means of reduction in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction, the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorization, the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, the Footnote on the MT-LB in subparagraph (A) of paragraph 2 of Section I of the Protocol on Existing Types, and the Protocol on Inspection. The word "only" in paragraph 1 is intended to emphasize that the provisions listed therein set forth the sole means by which battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters may be reduced under the Treaty. Paragraph 2 of Article VIII provides that the five categories of conventional armaments and equipment subject to reduction are battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. Paragraph 2 further provides that the specific types of such armaments and equipment are listed in the Protocol on Existing Types. Paragraph 2 of Article VIII also lists the specific ways in which conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty may be reduced. Subparagraph (A) of paragraph 2 provides that battle tanks and armored combat vehicles may be reduced by destruction, conversion for nonmilitary purposes, placement on static display, use as ground targets, or, in the case of armored personnel carriers, modification in accordance with the Footnote on the MT-LB (Footnote to Section 1, paragraph 2, subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on Existing Types). Subparagraph (B) of paragraph 2 provides that artillery may be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, or, in the case of self-propelled artillery, use as ground targets. Subparagraph (C) of paragraph 2 provides that combat aircraft may be reduced by destruction (including by use as target drones), placement on static display, use for ground instructional purposes, or, in the case of a limited number of specific older models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft, reclassification into unarmed trainer aircraft in accordance with the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification. It should be noted that only certain Soviet-produced aircraft are on the list of aircraft that are eligible to be reclassified, and that the Group of 16 for reasons of its own chose not to reclassify any aircraft. Subparagraph (D) of paragraph 2 provides that specialized attack helicopters may be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, or use for ground instructional purposes. Subparagraph (E) of paragraph 2 provides that multipurpose attack helicopters may be reduced by destruction, placement on static display, use for ground instructional purposes, or recategorization in accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorization. Paragraph 3 of Article VIII provides that conventional armaments and equipment will be deemed to have been reduced only upon implementation of the procedures set forth in the appropriate Protocols and upon notification as required by such Protocols. Paragraph 3 also provides that conventional armaments and equipment so reduced are no longer counted against the limitations of Articles IV, V, and VI of the Treaty. Since paragraph 3 makes clear that an item will not be deemed reduced (i.e., "taken off the books") until both the reduction procedures have been completed and the appropriate notification has been transmitted, failure to provide the proper notification will mean that an item will not be considered reduced for purposes of the Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article VIII sets forth the timetable in which reductions to meet the numerical ceilings specified in Article IV, V, and VI must take place. Paragraph 4 provides that such reductions must be effected in three phases and must be completed no later than 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty. Subparagraph (A) of paragraph 4 of Article VIII provides that the first reduction phase is to commence upon entry into force and continued for 16 months, at the end of which each State Party must have ensured the reduction of 25 percent of its total reduction liability in each of the categories of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. In this regard, the term "reduction liability" is defined in subparagraph (U) of paragraph 1 of Article II and the means by which it is calculated for each State Party is set forth in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article VIII. Subparagraph (B) of paragraph 4 provides that the second reduction phase will terminate 28 months after entry into force of the Treaty, at which time each State Party must have ensured the reduction of its total reduction liability in each category by 60 percent. Subparagraph (C) of paragraph 4 provides that by the third reduction phase, which ends 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party must have ensured reduction of its entire reduction liability in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Paragraph 4 of Article VIII also provides further requirements for States Parties carrying out the conversion for nonmilitary purposes of conventional armaments and equipment limited be the Treaty. Subparagraph (C) of paragraph 4 provides that such States Parties must ensure that all battle tanks that are to be converted in accordance with Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction must be converted by the end of the third reduction phase (i.e., 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty). Subparagraph (D) of paragraph 4 further provides that all armored combat vehicles that are deemed reduced by being partially destroyed in accordance with the conversion procedures set forth in paragraph 6 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction must, no later than 64 months after entry into force of the Treaty, be either fully converted for nonmilitary purposes or destroyed in accordance with Section IV of the Protocol on Reduction. Armored combat vehicles to be converted must be partially destroyed in accordance with Section VIII(6) of the Protocol on Reduction no later than 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty. The 24-month period between the end of the reduction period and the termination of the 64-month period is meant to provide additional time to complete the final conversion of armored combat vehicles that have already been reduced by partial destruction. With regard to the reduction that must be accomplished pursuant to paragraph 4, it must be noted that while each State Party is responsible for ensuring that its reductions are achieved, the Treaty does not require a State Party to be the one that actually carries out the physical reduction process. For example, a State Party is free under the Treaty to arrange for another State Party to carry out the actual process of reduction of its Treaty-limited armaments and equipment, provided that the other State Party does so in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. In the event that the other State Party does not accomplish the reductions in accordance with the Treaty, the State Party that arranged for the reduction would be responsible for any liabilities that might accrue. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII provides that conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty to be reduced must have been declared present within the area of application pursuant to the exchange of information that took place at the initialing of the Treaty on November 18, 1990. Paragraph 5 serves two purposes. First, it mandates that Treaty-limited armaments and equipment to be reduced to achieve the reduction liability must have been present within the area of application at the time the Treaty was signed. This legally prevents a State Party from subsequently importing into the area of application decrepit armaments and equipment that would then be destroyed in order to meet its reduction requirement. Second, paragraph 5 establishes that conventional armaments and equipment of a type limited by the Treaty not within the area of application - but assigned to conventional armed forces within the area of application - are not subject to reduction, unless they enter or reenter the area of application after the Treaty was signed. Paragraph 6 of Article VIII provides that each State Party notify all other States Parties within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty of its reduction liability. In this regard, a State Party's reduction liability is calculated in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 8. Paragraph 7 of Article VIII states that, except as provided in paragraph 8 of the Article, a State Party's reduction liability in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty will be no less than the difference between its holdings notified pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange either at signature of effective upon entry into force of this Treaty, whichever is greater. and the maximum levels for holdings it notified pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty. The purpose of the reduction liability is to ensure that each State Party's actual levels of holdings do not exceed its maximum levels for holdings by the end of the 40-month reduction period. However, the reduction liability, when applied in conjunction with paragraph 4 of Article VIII, does not require a State Party to have fewer Treaty-limited armaments and equipment within the area of application during the reduction period than it did before the Treaty entered into force. Rather, a State Party is required to reduce, in three phases, a specified number of excess armaments and equipment (i.e., its reduction liability) and, in addition, to ensure that by the end of the 40-month reduction period there are no Treaty-accountable armaments and equipment above its maximum levels for holdings within the area of application. The purpose of the phased reduction of the reduction liability is to ensure that State Parties do not wait until the end of the reduction period to undertake their required reductions. Thus, phasing helps to ensure that the reduction process is completed on schedule. Paragraph 8 of Article VIII allows each State Party to change its reduction liability under certain circumstances. Paragraph 8 was drafted in order to permit State Parties with excess or unwanted equipment, which would otherwise be destroyed as part of its reduction liability, to "cascade" or transfer that equipment to other members of its group that can absorb the excess (because their maximum levels for holdings exceed their actual holdings) or that are willing to increase their own reduction liabilities in exchange for newer or better equipment. More specifically, paragraph 8 provides that any subsequent revision of a State Party's holdings notified pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange or to its maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII must be reflected by notified adjustment to its reduction liability. Paragraph 8 further provides that any notification of a decrease in a State Party's reduction liability must be preceded or accompanied by either a notification of a corresponding increase in holdings not exceeding the maximum permitted levels for holdings pursuant to Article VII or a notification of a corresponding increase in the reduction liability by one or more State Parties belonging to the same group of State Parties. Thus, a State Party may also decrease its reduction liability by increasing its maximum levels for holdings or by cascading its excess holdings to another State Party within its group. As noted with respect to paragraph 3 of Article VII (assuming the Group has agreed on maximum levels for holdings whose aggregate totals equal the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty), a State Party will most likely to be able to increase its maximum levels only by obtaining the agreement of another State Party in its group to decrease its maximum levels. Similarly, a State Party will be able to cascade its excess armaments only it it can find another group member that has actual holdings below its maximum levels or is willing to increase its reduction liability. There is an additional point regarding the issue of cascading and reduction liability. Subject to the caveats discussed below, the combined total reduction - liabilities for States Parties within each group (i.e., the sum of the group's individual States Parties' reduction liabilities) may not be changed from that established upon entry into force of the Treaty when reduction liabilities are initially calculated pursuant to paragraph 7 and reported pursuant to paragraph 6. However, note that this point assumes that the groups have notified maximum levels for holdings that are equal to the group limitations set forth in Articles IV and V. This, in fact, was the case for the Group of 6, but was not the case for the Group of 16 (see Tables One and Two relating to the discussion of Article VII). This point also assumes that each State Party's holdings are equal to or greater than its maximum levels for holdings. If, how ever, a State Party has actual holdings that are less than its maximum levels for holdings, then it may build up to its maximum levels through cascading (i.e., by receiving "excess" Treaty-limited armaments and equipment from another member of its group). Such a procedure could result in a net reduction in the combined total reduction liabilities for the States Parties within the group. In this regard, many of the members of the Group of 16 have holdings in several categories that are below their notified maximum levels for holdings. Paragraph 9 of Article VIII provides that. upon entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party shall notify all other States Parties, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, of the locations of its reduction sites, including sites where final conversion of battle tanks and armored combat vehicles for nonmilitary purposes is to be carried out. Paragraph 10 of Article VIII provides that each State Party has the right to designate as many reduction sites as it wishes and to revise without any restriction its designation of such sites. However, paragraph 10 further provides that no State Party may carry out reduction (including final conversion) simultaneously at more than 20 such sites. Paragraph 10 also provides that States Parties have the right to share or co-locate reduction sites by mutual agreement. The purpose of the limit on the number of reduction sites that a State Party may operate at any one time is to provide States Parties from one group with a realistic capability to inspect all reduction operations conducted by the other group of States Parties. If the number of simultaneously operating reduction sites had been too high, it might have been impossible to inspect them all at once. Paragraph 11 of Article VIII provides that, notwithstanding paragraph 10 above, during the baseline validation period (that is, the period between entry into force of the Treaty and 120 days thereafter) each State party may carry out reductions simultaneously at no more than two reduction sites. Paragraph 11 caps the number of operating reduction sites at two during this period in order to minimize interference with the baseline validation phase. Paragraph 12 of Article VIII provides that reduction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty must be carried out at reduction sites within the area of application, unless otherwise specified in the Protocols listed in paragraph 1 of Article VIII. In fact, the Treaty and its Protocols do not provide for reduction sites outside the area of application. On the other hand, not all means of reduction must take place at reduction sites. For example, destruction of combat aircraft by use as target drones as well as destruction of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty by accident are envisioned to occur at locations within the area of application outside of reduction sites. Paragraph 13 of Article VIII provides that the reduction process, including the results of conversion of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty for nonmilitary purposes both during the 40-month reduction period and during the 24-month period following the reduction period during which partially destroyed armored combat vehicles are to the fully converted, is subject to inspection, without right of refusal, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection. Finally, it should be noted that paragraphs 5, 6, and 8 of Article VIII have been provisionally applied between signature and entry into force of the Treaty pursuant to subparagraph l(B) of the Protocol on Provisional Application. This means that these three provisions are in force even though the Treaty has not yet entered into force. Paragraph 5 of Article VIII was applied provisionally in order to legally obligate the States Parties to ensure that Treaty-limited armaments and equipment to be reduced were present within the area of application beginning at Treaty signature. This is turn prevents a State Party from bringing old and decrepit armaments and equipment into the area of application between the signature and entry into force of the Treaty and then reducing them in order to meet its reduction liability. Paragraph 6 of Article VIII, since it will be only applicable 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, apparently was provisionally applied in error. Paragraph 8 of Article VIII was provisionally applied in order to give States Parties the right to cascade Treaty-limited armaments and equipment within groups prior to entry into force of the Treaty. Thus, groups are able to internally "shift" armaments and equipment prior to entry into force so as to maximize the opportunity for modernization and minimize the impact of reduction liability on individual States Parties.
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