The Statement by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consists of a Preamble and seven sections. The Statement by the Government of the United States of America, which is in response to the Soviet Statement, consists of two paragraphs.

Both Statements were presented during an extraordinary conference of the 22 Signatories to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the Treaty), convened pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XXI of the Treaty, in Vienna on June 14, 1991. During that extraordinary conference, the other 20 Treaty Signatories also presented statements identical in content to the Statement of the United States. While not part of the Treaty, the statements were specifically acknowledged by all Signatories to be legally binding. As such, they constitute a separate international agreement associated with the Treaty.

The objective of the statements is to resolve a dispute concerning the application of the Treaty's principal counting rules set forth in Article III. The dispute arose upon signature of the Treaty on November 19, 1990, when the 22 States Parties exchanged information about the holdings of their conventional armed forces within the area of application of the Treaty. Among other problems, the information provided at that time by the Soviet Union failed to count against the Treaty's numerical limitations over 6,000 items of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty held within the area of application by its Naval Infantry units, Coastal Defense forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, Civil Defense and DOSAAF organizations, and internal security organizations. In its corrected data as of signature (provided pursuant to subparagraph l(B) of Section VII of the Protocol on Information Exchange), the Soviet Union accepted that items held by DOSAAF, and battle tanks and artillery held by internal security organizations counted against the Treaty's numerical limitations, but still did not count almost 5,500 items held within the area of application in its Naval Infantry units, Coastal Defense forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Civil Defense organizations. The Soviet Union claimed that conventional armaments and equipment held by such organizations were not subject to the counting rules in Article III. Led by the United States, this position was consistently rejected by the 21 other Treaty Signatories as being without foundation in either the Treaty text of the negotiating record of the Treaty.

In bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union over a period of several months, the United States sought to achieve a resolution of the Article III dispute that would: (a) not compromise the substantive provisions or objectives of the Treaty; and (b) be acceptable to the other 20 Signatories. It became clear that these objectives could only be satisfied if there were a practical solution that did not require either the United States or the Soviet Union formally to abandon its position with respect to the interpretation of Article III. The Soviet Statement, in conjunction with the other statements, accomplishes these objectives in the following manner:

The Preamble provides that, in order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (the Treaty), the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states that it assumes the obligations in the Statement outside the framework of the Treaty.

Three points should be noted with respect to the Preamble. First, the use of the word "obligations" is one of the many ways in which the drafters intended to make clear that the Statement is legally binding. The legally binding nature of the Statement is also emphasized in Section VII.

Second, the Preamble states that the legal obligations set forth in the Statement are "outside the framework of the Treaty." Thus, the Statement is not part of the Treaty; rather, it is associated with the Treaty in a manner similar to the three political declarations that accompanied the Treaty when it was signed in Paris (although it differs from them in that it is legally binding). A violation of the Statement by the Soviet Union would not necessarily constitute a violation of the Treaty (although there would be cases in which an action could violate both the Statement and the Treaty). On the other hand, a violation of the Statement, particularly in view of the fact that it is legally binding, may constitute an extraordinary event jeopardizing the supreme national interests of the other States Parties. In that event, a State Party would be entitled to withdraw from the Treaty in accordance with paragraph 2 or 3 of Article XIX of the Treaty.

Third, the Preamble makes clear that the objective of the Statement is to promote the implementation of the Treaty. This explicit link to Treaty's implementation means that even though the Statement is not part of the Treaty, the Joint Consultative Group is nonetheless empowered to consider issues relating to the Statement. This follows from subparagraph 2(I) of Article XVI of the Treaty, which provides that the States Parties shall, within the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, "consider matters of dispute arising out of implementation of the Treaty."

Section I caps the numbers of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery held within the area of application by Soviet Naval Infantry, Coastal Defense, and Strategic Rocket Forces at the levels that were declared by the Soviet Union to be present as of the date the Treaty was signed, that is, November 19, 1990.

Section I provides that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall hold within the area of application of the Treaty conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories not to exceed:

Five points should be noted with respect to Section I. First, it does not "freeze" the holdings in Naval Infantry, Coastal Defense and the Strategic Rocket Forces; rather, it places an upper limit on their holdings of conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories. Thus, Section I does not prevent the Soviet Union from reducing the numbers of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery held in Naval Infantry or Coastal Defense, or the number of armored combat vehicles held by Strategic Rocket Forces.

Second, the numbers specified for Naval Infantry, Coastal Defense, and Strategic Rocket Forces correspond to those levels that were reported by the Soviet Union in its February 1991 correction of information provided at Treaty signature as being within the area of application as of November 19, 1990.

Third, note that Section I does not specify when the caps are to come into effect. However, Section VII makes clear that the Statement shall enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty. Thus, the caps will come into effect upon entry into force of the Treaty. Fourth, the phrase "conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories" is a special term of art developed by the drafters of the Statement to sidestep in the Statement the issue of whether conventional armaments and equipment of a type limited by the Treaty held in Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense are actually limited by the Treaty, that is, subject to its numerical limitations by operation of the counting rules in Article III. The phrase avoids the issue by identifying the conventional armaments and equipment in question as being related to the Treaty but without describing them as being limited by the Treaty. In this sense, the phrase is essentially synonymous with the term "conventional armaments and equipment of a type limited by the Treaty." The phrase "conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories" is used throughout the Statement, as well as in the Statement by the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Joint Consultative Group, dated June 14, 1991.

Fifth, the operative word of obligation used in Section I, and in fact throughout the Statement, is the verb "shall." The use of this particular term within the context of the CFE Treaty regime is important for two reasons. First, it tracks with the word of obligation used in the Treaty and thus underscores that the Statement is legally binding. Second, the use of "shall" helps to distinguish the Statement from the political declarations also associated with the Treaty. The declarations associated with the CFE Treaty regime use as the operative word of obligation the verb "will," and represent political undertakings.

Section II establishes the regime by which the Soviet Union is obligated to maintain holdings within the area of application that, when Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense are included, do not exceed any of the numerical limitations set forth in or established pursuant to the Treaty. This objective is accomplished by ensuring that the numbers of Soviet battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery of a type limited by the Treaty within the area are reduced in order to offset and compensate for the aggregate numbers of such armaments held in Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense. This regime comes into effect in conjunction with the end of the Treaty's 40-month reduction period.

Section II provides that, 40 months after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, within the levels and sublevels that ensue from the obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty, the holdings of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and pieces of artillery shall be less than its maximum levels for holdings, as notified in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty, by the number it will have in Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry within the area of application of the Treaty.

Section II also provides an example of how such obligations will be applied with respect to battle tanks held in active units. Specifically, the second sentence in Section 11 states that, with regard to battle tanks, unless the maximum levels for holdings for the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics are revised in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty, the numbers for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within the area of application of the Treaty, including battle tanks in Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry, will not exceed: 13,150 overall; 10,500 in active units overall; 7,150 in active units within the region described in paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty; and 1,850 in active units within the area described in subparagraph l(A) of Article V of the Treaty.

Two points should be noted with respect to Section 11. First, the levels to which other conventional armaments and equipment must be reduced and maintained in order to compensate for Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense are pegged to both the actual holdings of Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense and the Soviet Union's maximum levels for holdings. Presumably, then, the amount of compensation will vary depending on changes in the holdings of Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense. In this regard, Section I makes clear that their holdings are capped, and not frozen. As a result, their holdings may vary. Thus, if holdings in Naval Infantry or Coastal Defense go down, the Soviet Union may increase its other holdings accordingly within the area of application. The same result pertains if the Soviet Union is able to increase its maximum levels for holdings for battle tanks or artillery in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty. (It may not do so for armored combat vehicles since its maximum level for that category is already at the sufficiency rule limit specified in Article VI.)

Second, the phrase "within the levels and sublevels that ensue from the obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" is intended to make clear that the Soviet Union must adhere to all numerical limitations pursuant to the Treaty. Such limitations include, for example, those relating to the regions described in paragraphs 2 through 4 of Article IV (i.e., the three subzones); the flank region described in subparagraph l(A) of Article V; the sufficiency rule set forth in Article VI; and the sublimits for active units set forth in Articles IV and V. The first three sets of limitations, as they relate to the Soviet Union, are clearly identified in the Treaty because they are linked directly to the Soviet Union's maximum levels for holdings notified under Article VII. However, because States Parties are not required by Article VII to notify maximum levels for active units, there is no clear way in which to link the compensation required by Section II to the sublimits on active units. In this regard, the example provided in Section II is intended to accomplish two objectives: emphasize the obligation of the Soviet Union to adhere to the limits on active units, and provide an example as to how the base level should be calculated in order to allow for compensation for Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense.

Section III consists of three paragraphs. This Section sets forth the obligations and procedures relating to the reductions required of the Soviet Union by Section II in order to compensate for the numbers of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery held by Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense within the area of application. Such reductions must be accomplished by means of destruction or conversion, at least 50 percent of which must be carried out within the area of application.

Paragraph 1 of Section III provides that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall reduce, in addition to the reduction liability established for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty on the basis of information it supplied, its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories within the area of application of the Treaty by the number which it had as of the date of signature of the Treaty in Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry, that is, by 933 battle tanks, 1,725 armored combat vehicles, and 1,080 pieces of artillery.

Paragraph I of Section III should be read in conjunction with Section II. Paragraph 1 specifies the exact numbers of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, and pieces of artillery that must be reduced and eliminated from the area of application in order to compensate for Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense, as required by Section II.

Also, note that paragraph 1 makes clear that the reduction obligation in Section III is in addition to the Soviet Union's reduction liability established in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty. This result follows from the fact the information provided by the Soviet Union at Treaty signature, upon which determination of the reduction liability is based in part, did not include the 933 battle tanks, 1,725 armored combat vehicles, and 1,080 pieces of artillery held by Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense.

Paragraph 2 of Section III provides that such additional reduction shall be carried out by means of destruction or conversion into civilian equipment of 933 battle tanks and destruction of 1,080 pieces of artillery. Of the 1,725 armored combat vehicles to be additionally reduced, 972 armored combat vehicles shall be destroyed or converted into civilian equipment and 753 armored combat vehicles of the MT-LB type, included in the armored combat vehicles category and belonging to the number declared as of the date of signature of the Treaty, shall be modified, in accordance with the Protocol on Existing Types, into armored personnel carrier look-alikes of the MT-LB-AT type, which are not limited by the Treaty.

With respect to paragraph 2, the MT-LB is a type of armored personnel carrier listed in subparagraph 2(A) of Section I of the Protocol on Existing Types. The MT-LB-AT is a type of armored personnel carrier look-alike listed in paragraph 1 of Section 11 of the Protocol on Existing Types. The conversion procedure for MT-LBs is set forth in the Footnote to subparagraph 2(A) of Section I of the Protocol on Existing Types, and essentially consists of removing the seats from one side of the MT-LB armored personnel carrier and replacing them with racks welded to the vehicle to carry ammunition. This modification reduces the number of troops that can be carried.

Also, it should be noted that paragraph 2 of Section III requires all pieces of artillery to be reduced by destruction only, rather than by destruction or conversion. The reason for this more stringent requirement is that the Treaty does not provide for conversion of artillery.

Paragraph 3 of Section III provides that 50 percent of 933 battle tanks and 972 armored combat vehicles shall be destroyed or converted within the area of application of the Treaty and 50 percent of 1,080 pieces of artillery shall be destroyed within the area of application of the Treaty, within the time limits and in accordance with the procedures established by the Treaty. Paragraph 3 also provides that the remainder of these conventional armaments and equipment shall be withdrawn from the area of application of the Treaty; an equivalent number of conventional armaments and equipment shall be destroyed or converted outside the area of application of the Treaty within the time limits established by the Treaty and in accordance with procedures which provide sufficient visible evidence that the conventional armaments and equipment have been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable. Paragraph 3 further provides that the States Parties to the Treaty shall be notified in advance, giving the location, number, and types of conventional armaments and equipment to be destroyed or converted. Five points should be noted with respect to paragraph 3 of Section III. First, this provision makes clear that the Soviet Union must, within the area of application, reduce an additional:

Second, paragraph 3 provides that the remainder of the items to be "reduced" pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section III (i.e., 466 battle tanks, 486 armored combat vehicles, and 540 pieces of artillery) need only be withdrawn from the area of application. The actual items to be withdrawn are not required to be destroyed or converted; rather, an equal number of items outside of the area of application may be reduced in their place.

Third, the phrase "sufficient visible evidence" in paragraph 3 of Section III means that the Soviet Union must take steps to ensure that States Parties may observe by national technical means (or, if an Open Skies regime is established, by Open Skies aircraft) the results of the reductions conducted outside the area of application. This point was explicitly agreed between the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union during the negotiation of this provision. It was further agreed that the phrase "sufficient visible evidence" did not imply a right of the other States Parties to conduct on-site inspections within the Soviet Union in order to verify the results of such out-of-area reductions.

Fourth, the notification provisions in paragraph 3, particularly with respect to advance notice of the location and types of items to be destroyed, is helpful in the observation of out-of-area reduction activities. Such notice enables States Parties to take full advantage of opportunities to observe the "sufficient visible evidence" provided by the Soviet Union.

Fifth, as noted above, paragraph 3 provides that the Soviet Union must destroy or convert, within the area of application, 467 battle tanks and 486 armored combat vehicles. It must be noted that any conversion that the Soviet Union carries out within the area of application pursuant to paragraph 3 must respect the limitations on conversion set forth in paragraph 2 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction. In this regard, Section VIII(2) provides, in part, that no State Party may convert more than 750 battle tanks and 3,000 armored combat vehicles. Consequently, for example, if the Soviet Union elects to reduce all 467 battle tanks pursuant to paragraph 3 by conversion, then it will be able to reduce by conversion only an additional 283 battle tanks that may be applied toward its reduction liability calculated in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty. This result follows from the terms of paragraph 3 of Section III, which provides that conversion must be "in accordance with the procedures established by the Treaty," and the terms of Section II of the Statement, which provides that the Soviet Union must respect "the levels and sublevels that ensue from the obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Of course, conversion carried out by the Soviet Union pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section III outside of the area of application would not apply toward the limitations set forth in paragraph 2 of Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction.

Section IV provides that the holdings of armored combat vehicles in the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not be subject to the numerical limitations of the Treaty, in accordance with subparagraph l(F) of Article III of the Treaty. Section IV also provides that these forces shall not be equipped with conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories, other than armored personnel carriers.

Note that Section IV excludes armored combat vehicles in the Strategic Rocket Forces from the Treaty's counting rules based on the internal security function of this equipment. This is the reason for the reference to subparagraph l(F) of Article III of the Treaty. On the other hand, Section II of the Statement places a limit on the number of items that may be held by the Strategic Rocket Forces. Also, Sections II and IV of the Statement make clear that, within the category of armored combat vehicles, the Strategic Rocket Forces may only hold armored personnel carriers, and not armored infantry fighting vehicles or heavy armament combat vehicles. Such restrictions are not placed on other internal security organizations under the Treaty. Finally, although it is not specifically stated in Section IV, the restrictions therein apply only to Strategic Rocket Force units located within the area of application of the Treaty.

Section V sets forth provisions with respect to challenge inspections and information exchanges relating to conventional armaments and equipment held by Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense forces within the area of application.

Section V provides that the conventional armaments and equipment of Coastal Defense forces and Naval Infantry in the categories subject to the Treaty within the area of application of the Treaty shall be subject to challenge inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection. In this regard, it had been agreed during the negotiation of the Treaty that Naval Infantry forces would not have to constitute objects of verification, and thus would be subject only to challenge inspections.

Section V also provides that effective verification of such armaments and equipment shall be ensured. Section V further provides that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide separate information to all States Parties on such armaments and equipment of the same scope and with the same degree of detail as provided for in paragraph 2 of Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange, and under the same timetable for the provision of information as provided for in Section VII of that Protocol.

Three additional points should be noted with respect to Section V. First, the phrase "conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty" was specifically used instead of the phrase "conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories." The former phrase was used in order to make clear that, in addition to battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, any primary trainer aircraft, unarmed trainer aircraft, unarmed transport helicopters, armored vehicle launched bridges, armored personnel carrier look-alikes (e.g., MT-LB-ATs), and armored infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes held by Naval Infantry or Coastal Defense units within the area of application also would be subject to challenge inspections in accordance with Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection.

Second, during the negotiation of Section V, the representatives of the Soviet Union, while reserving the right in exceptional cases involving national security interests, stated that any systematic refusal of requests for challenge inspection of Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense units would constitute a rejection of the obligation to ensure "effective verification of such armaments and equipment."

Third, the use of the word "separate" in the third sentence of Section V makes clear that the Soviet Union does not consider its holdings of Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense to be conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces. On the other hand, the reference to paragraph 2 of Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange requires the Soviet Union to provide reporting on such holdings as if they were conventional armaments and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces, and to provide information about any battle tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, combat support helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters, armored vehicle launched bridges, armored infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes, armored personnel carrier look-alikes, primary trainer aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, and excepted Mi-24R and K helicopters held in Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense units.

Section VI provides that, unless otherwise specified (a) in the Statement, (b) in the Treaty, or (c) in the Declaration on Land-Based Naval Aircraft, all conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories, based on land within the area of application of the Treaty, irrespective of assignment, shall be subject to all numerical limitations of the Treaty.

Section VI is in many ways the most important provision in the Statement. It is intended to preclude further disputes about the application of the counting rules in the Treaty. It does so by making clear that the subordination of conventional armaments and equipment of a type limited by the Treaty may not constitute grounds for claiming that they do not count under the Treaty, unless such an exemption is specifically set forth in the Statement, the Treaty or its associated documents. In particular, since there is no such specific exemption for civil defense units in the Treaty, Section VI means that any conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories held by Soviet Civil Defense units within the area of application shall be subject to the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty.

Section VII provides that the Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the aforementioned obligations assumed outside the framework of the Treaty shall enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty, shall be legally binding and shall have the same duration as the Treaty.

Three points should be noted with respect to Section VII. First, it clearly states that the Statement is legally binding upon the Soviet Union.

Second, Section VII reiterates that the Statement is outside the framework of the Treaty.

Taken together, these two points mean that the Statement, like the Treaty, is a legal instrument governed by international law. As such, the Treaty and the Statement are equally legally binding. However, the Statement is not part of the Treaty. Violations of the Statement do not necessarily constitute violations of the Treaty. Of course, they may constitute "extraordinary events" jeopardizing the "supreme national interests" of the States Parties, thereby permitting withdrawal from the Treaty pursuant to Article XIX thereof.

Third, because Article XIX of the Treaty provides that the Treaty is of unlimited duration, this means that the Statement is of unlimited duration as well. This point has some significance in that the Statement does not make provision for its amendment.

The Statement of the United States, which is legally binding, was made in response to the Soviet Union's legally binding Statement. The other 20 Treaty Signatories also made statements identical in content to the U.S. Statement. As a result, these responding statements, when read in conjunction with the Soviet Statement, constitute an international agreement among the other 22 Signatories.

The first paragraph of the Statement provides that the Government of the United States of America hereby agrees that the Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of today's date (i.e., June 14, 1991) provides a satisfactory basis for proceeding toward ratification and implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (the Treaty).

The second paragraph of the Statement provides that the aforementioned Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Statement of the Government of the United States of America shall be equally legally binding; they shall enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty, and shall have the same duration as the Treaty.

The response Statement legally obligates the United States and the other 20 Signatories in two ways. The first paragraph obligates the Signatories to accept the settlement offered by the Soviet Union. This point is particularly important because Section VI of the Soviet Statement reinforces the comprehensive scope of the Treaty's counting rules.

The first paragraph also obligates the responding Signatories to proceed toward ratification of the Treaty. However, this provision does not obligate the United States or any other responding Signatory to ratify the Treaty. The phrase "proceeding toward ratification" merely means, in the case of the United States, that the President will proceed to seek the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate with respect to ratification of the Treaty.

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