Chapter 7 -- Reduction Years

U.S. inspectors at a Belarussian reduction site.

Shortly after the third reduction year, Armenia announced its holdings, as did Azerbaijan; both still had more ACVs than the Tashkent agreement allowed, Armenia by 65 and Azerbaijan by 615. Azerbaijan also held 58 more pieces of artillery than the 285 agreed upon at Tashkent. Belarus faced economic problems that forced a postponement of its reductions during the third reduction year; it held 548 tanks, 446 ACVs, and 88 aircraft to be reduced. Although Belarus resumed reductions, it did not meet its goals before November 17, 1995.

Despite these problems, the former Soviet states reduced enough TLE as a group to be below their ceilings for all categories of TLE. These reductions, coupled with the success of the Eastern European states during the third reduction year, led to the former Warsaw Pact states' meeting their CFE treaty ceilings. As of November 1995, all NATO nations met their reduction goals and both groups of states were under the treaty ceiling for all categories of TLE.

The U.S. reduction liability at treaty signature and entry into force was 1,898 tanks, 375 ACVs, and 109 pieces of artillery. The United States quickly decreased its reduction liabilities, because the NATO group of states agreed to transfer equipment, along with the equivalent reduction liability, among themselves. A treaty-authorized transfer, colloquially called "cascading," allowed the United States, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy to transfer TLE to other NATO states. The NATO Equipment Transfer Plan allowed donor states to bring their TLE holdings down to treaty-declared levels to avoid reduction costs and to modernize and standardize armaments throughout the alliance. The initial planning for cascaded NATO equipment totaled 2,578 tanks, 1,114 ACVs, and 180 pieces of artillery. By the end of 1993 the final distribution differed only slightly from the initial plan.

Table 7-2. NATO Equipment Transfers
Donor	Recipient	Tanks	ACVs	Artillery
U.S.	Greece	671	150	84
	Norway	0	136	0
	Portugal	80	0	0
	Spain	311	100	24
	Turkey	932	250	72
U.S. totals		1,994	636	180
Germany	Denmark	110	0	0
	Greece	0	200	0
	Turkey	85	187	131
	Norway	92	0	0
	Portugal	0	50	0
German totals		287	437	131
Netherlands	Greece	169	0	171
	Portugal	0	104	0
Netherlands totals		169	104	171
Italy	Turkey	0	97	0
NATO totals		2,450	1,274	482

Source: Report, Under Secretary of Defense Tactical Warfare Programs, "Reports on Transfer
of Certain CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment," August 30, 1994.

The U.S. European Command, the United States' executive agent for the CFE Treaty, managed the cascading of U.S. TLE and contracted for the destruction of the 632 excess M-47 tanks in Buccino, Italy, and 7 M-47 tanks and 4 M-44 howitzers at the U.S. Army Depot at Germersheim, Germany. Italian contractors conducted the first U.S. reductions at Buccino on January 28, 1993. Buccino was also the site for the final U.S. TLE reductions on November 12, 1993. The combined cascading and destruction of TLE enabled the United States to reach its declared TLE ceilings of 4,006 tanks, 5,372 ACVs, and 2,492 pieces of artillery. The United States had no reduction liabilities for combat aircraft and helicopters because it held 334 combat aircraft against a ceiling of 784 and 341 helicopters against a ceiling of 518. Thus there was no U.S. cascading or reduction for either category.⁵

REDUCTION METHODS

Reduction methods varied depending on the type of equipment, and several options were available to reduce any piece of equipment. Destruction was the primary means of reducing TLE, and technicians could employ several methods to accomplish it. As an option to destroying all equipment, the treaty authorized modifying a small portion of TLE for nonoffensive purposes. Tanks could be converted into bulldozers, or combat helicopters into support helicopters. States could also elect to modify equipment for use as trainers, static displays, or training targets.

The Protocol on Reduction allowed severing as a method of destroying all types of TLE, such as the American M-47 tanks. The protocol did not dictate a particular technology to sever TLE, but it detailed the cuts required for each category of equipment. Tanks, for example, required specific cuts for the gun breech ring, the gun tube, one gun trunnion and mount, and the hull. The guidance on specific cuts included location, length, and number of cuts, as well as the extent of material to be removed in a cut. Severing with torches was the primary method used to reduce TLE.

While most states chose to sever equipment, Poland chose to smash much of its TLE. Smashing was cheap and efficient. Technicians positioned equipment on a pad below an eight-ton wrecking ball suspended on a crane and repeatedly dropped the ball on tanks, ACVs, and artillery until they achieved the desired results. The pad on which the technicians centered the TLE enabled them to smash their equipment successfully. According to Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski, Director of the Polish Verification Center, "It has to be made of a special material that can be enduring. If not, it is easily smashed up with three or four droppings of the ball. So the composition, the material that is used...is patented by Poland." The surface withstood the pounding as the Poles successfully destroyed their TLE.⁶

The treaty provided for two other destruction methods, but states did not use them because they were expensive and less efficient. NATO allies conducted tests to develop an inexpensive and effective method for explosive demolition of TLE, but the tests produced poor results. The treaty also allowed for the deformation of tanks, helicopters, and combat aircraft. Superheating the equipment before pressing the weakened metal led to satisfactory results, but the expense and efficiency precluded that method.

Team Drach checking the length and location of a cut on a gun tube.

	Reduction by conversion to static display.
Reduction by conversion to nonmilitary equipment.