Chapter 1 -- The Treaty and the Mission

Severing was the primary reduction method for all treaty-limited equipment (TLE).

While destruction was the most common option selected for reduction, the treaty permitted other means as well. States owning the equipment were allowed to put it to use as something other than a weapon. Certain tanks and ACVs could be converted to nonmilitary equipment such as bulldozers, fire fighting equipment, and rescue vehicles. Any item could be reduced for static displays or placed in military museums. Tanks, ACVs, and artillery could be reduced for ground targets, and aircraft and attack helicopters could be reduced for ground instruction purposes. The key concept in these reductions was that specific components required disabling damage before certification for use for other purposes. However, the number of items that could be reduced using these treaty options was limited.

Recategorization presented another reduction option, such as in the case of multipurpose attack helicopters. By treaty definition, these helicopters performed multiple military functions and employed guided weapons. By removing their weapon systems, mounting points, fire control systems, and wiring, the owning state could recategorize these helicopters as combat support helicopters not limited by the treaty. Well before any nations began these reductions, however, they collected and exchanged specific treaty data concerning their own forces and equipment.

Data Exchange

The initial, massive CFE Treaty data exchange occurred on November 18, 1990, the day before treaty signature. Freely provided, this data exchange listed the order of battle for every signatory nation's conventional forces stationed on the European continent. Experts scrutinized these data immediately, and they became one of the primary sources for preparing and planning treaty implementation. Previously, a small army of intelligence officers would have been necessary to gather this information; now signatory nations were exchanging these data as part of their initial treaty obligation. Article XIII, the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, and its Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information required each signatory party to provide all other parties specific information on the status of its forces. The information was provided in six charts.

Chart I provided the command structure for each nation's conventional ground and air forces stationed in the ATTU. This chart identified each unit and assigned it a designator used in subsequent charts. Chart I also indicated the next two higher echelons in the unit's chain of command. Charts IIA and IIB listed each nation's total holdings of TLE. Chart IIA identified a state's total holdings in treaty-limited tanks, ACVs, and artillery. It also revealed the quantity of TLE in each treaty area by category, subcategory, and type. Chart IIA also showed TLE in designated permanent storage sites (DPSSs). Chart IIB provided the same information for treaty-limited aircraft and helicopters, with two exceptions. There was no reporting by treaty zones for aircraft and helicopters nor did DPSSs apply. In Charts IIIA and IIIB, states reported all of their conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty (CAEST). They reported not only those units holding TLE, as required in Chart I, but also those holding equipment not limited but nonetheless subject to the treaty, including naval units. In addition, the states reported all DPPSs, reduction sites, and locations where CAEST were routinely present, such as repair facilities or training establishments. Chart IIIA dealt with ground forces, and Chart IIIB covered air units. Any TLE located in the ATTU, but not in service with a state's conventional armed forces, was reported in Chart IV. Also, internal security military organizations and their equipment that were not trained for combat against another military force were reported on Chart IV. Equipment being refurbished or held for export-for example, tanks and ACVs that had been reduced or were awaiting conversion-and equipment that had been decommissioned and was awaiting disposal were reported on Chart IV.

On Chart V, states reported their objects of verification (OOVs). An OOV was any unit at the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, independent battalion/artillery battalion level, independent squadron, or equivalent unit holding TLE. Designated permanent storage sites, maintenance units, military training establishments, and airfields where TLE was permanently or frequently present were also OOVs. Reduction sites were OOVs as well, because of the excess TLE positioned on these sites. States also reported their declared sites on Chart V.

On November 18, 1990, all CFE nations exchanged detailed information on their military forces.

The Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information provided specific formats for presenting treaty-required exchange data.

CFE Treaty periods.

While a nation's total number of OOVs dictated the number of inspections it was liable to receive during the various phases of the treaty, the definition of a declared site dictated what was inspectable. A declared site was a precisely delineated geographic location containing one or more OOVs. Examples of declared sites were specific air bases, army posts, and storage depots on which the OOVs were located. A declared site included all territory within its natural or man-made boundaries. A declared site also encompassed areas associated with the operations of the unit that might not be colocated, such as a railhead or a training area, but where CAEST and TLE were routinely present. For example, the 36th Fighter Wing, a U.S. OOV, operated from a declared site, the Bitburg Air Base in Bitburg, Germany. This ratio of one OOV to one declared site was typical of most U.S. air unit OOVs, but ground units frequently colocated OOVs on a single declared site. For instance, three OOVs-the 3rd Battalion, 1st Field Artillery; 82nd Engineering Battalion, 3rd Engineering Brigade; and 2nd Battalion, 14th Field Artillery-operated from one declared site: Warner Barracks in Bamberg, Germany. A declared site containing multiple OOVs was typical for the national militaries of the Eastern group of states. Declared sites and OOVs were critical for treaty implementation.

Chart V listed the points of entry (POEs) associated with each declared site. Inspection teams entered and exited the inspected nation through the specific POEs designated for each declared site. Chart VI provided a listing of all designated POEs, categorized by the means of transportation used to reach them. In November 1990, Greece, for example, reported two POEs on Chart VI, one at Athens International Airport for air arrivals and the other at the Port of Piraeus for arrivals by sea. The Greek government designated both POEs as acceptable for 47 of their declared sites, while designating only one POE for the remaining declared sites.