Senior officials of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation met in Moscow on 10 and 11 September to address concerns with regard to compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The U.S. Delegation was led by Under Secretary of State Frank G. Wisner, the United Kingdom Delegation by Assistant Under Secretary of State Paul Lever, and the Russian Delegation was headed by the Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov. Senior Defense, Foreign Affairs, and other relevant officials also participated. The leaders of the United States and the U.K. Delegations were received by the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.

The three Governments confirmed their commitment to full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and stated their agreement that biological weapons have no place in their Armed Forces.

During these meetings, the Russian Government stated that it had taken the following steps to resolve compliance concerns:

A. Noted that President Yeltsin had issued on 11 April, 1992, a decree on securing the fulfillment of international obligations in the area of biological weapons. This affirms the legal succession of the Russian Federation to the obligations of the Convention and states that the development and carrying out of biological programs in violation of the Convention is illegal. Pursuant to that decree, the Presidential Committee on Convention-related problems of chemical weapons and biological weapons was entrusted with the oversight of the implementation of the 1972 Convention in the Russian Federation.

B. Confirmed the termination of offensive research, the dismantlement of experimental technological lines for the production of biological agents, and the closure of the biological weapons testing facility.

C. Cut the number of personnel involved in military biological programs by fifty percent.

D. Reduced military biological research funding by thirty percent.

E. Dissolved the department in the Ministry of Defense responsible for the offensive biological program and created a new department for radiological, biological and chemical defense.

F. Submitted the Declaration to the United Nations under the terms of the confidence-building measures agreed at the Third Review Conference of the Convention in 1991.

G. President Yeltsin has ordered the conduct of an investigation into activities at the Institute of Ultrapure Biological Preparations at St. Petersburg, in response to concerns raised by the U.S. and the United Kingdom. United States, U.K. and other experts are invited to take part in the investigation, including a prompt visit to this facility, and the report will be made public.

H. The Russian Parliament has recommended to the President of the Russian Federation that he propose legislation to enforce Russia's obligations under the 1972 Convention.

As a result of these exchanges Russia has agreed to the following steps:

A. Visits to any non-military biological site at any time in order to remove ambiguities, subject to the need to respect proprietary information on the basis of agreed principles. Such visits would include unrestricted access, sampling, interviews with personnel, and audio and video taping. After initial visits to Russian facilities there will be comparable visits to such U.S. and U.K. facilities on the same basis.

B. The provision, on request, of information about dismantlement accomplished to date.

C. The provision of further clarification of information provided for in Form F of its U.N. declaration.

D. Prominent independent scientists will be invited to participate in the investigation of cases concerning compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

In addition, the three governments agreed to create working groups, including experts, to address the following:

A. Visits to any military biological facility, on a reciprocal basis, in order to remove ambiguities, subject to the need to respect confidential information on the basis of agreed principles. Such visits would include unrestricted access, sampling, interviews with personnel, and audio and video taping.

B. A review of potential measures to monitor compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and to enhance confidence in that compliance.

C. A review of potential modalities for testing such measures.

D. An examination of the physical infrastructure of biological facilities in the three countries to determine jointly whether there is specific equipment or excess capacity inconsistent with their stated purpose.

E. Consideration of cooperation in developing biological weapon defense.

F. Examination of ways to promote cooperation and investment in the conversion of biological weapons facilities, including visits to already converted facilities.

G. Consideration of an exchange of information on a confidential, reciprocal basis concerning past offensive programs not recorded in detail in the declarations to the U.N.

H. The provision of periodic reports to their legislatures and publics describing biological research and development activities.

I. The encouragement of exchanges of scientists at biological facilities on a long-term basis.