By Jacquelyn S. Porth
USIA Security Affairs Correspondent
Washington -- "Problems with Russia" on a range of arms control agreements related to conventional, chemical and biological weapons and definition of anti-ballistic missile systems underscore the value of legally-binding treaties designed to prevent the renewal of a strategic arms race, says a U.S. arms control official.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director John Holum told reporters on July 19 that the United States had been consulting with high-level Russian officials on Russia's compliance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. While the Russians have taken a number of steps to allay concerns through the U.S.-British-Russian Trilateral Process, he said, U.S. officials are "not satisfied" about Russian activities at plants where legitimate biological activities are "co-located" with former biological weapons (BW) efforts.
ACDA's 1994 annual report to Congress on "Threat Control Through Arms Control," which was sent to key congressional leaders in mid-July, notes that the United States is continuing to work with the Russian government "to ensure complete termination of the illegal BW program."
Holum told his audience that "we remain very much concerned with Russian compliance" with both the global biological weapons accord and bilateral chemical weapons agreements.
In addition, the ACDA director said, the United States has some concerns regarding Russian compliance with the 1988 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. As an example, he cited inspection procedures for new Russian missiles that will be exiting from the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, emphasizing the importance of ensuring that no INF-prohibited missiles leave current production facilities.
Holum also highlighted the need to agree with Russia on how the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) applies to former Soviet ballistic missiles that are being converted for non-military space use. The ACDA report, which includes current information through January 20, 1995, states that space launch vehicles have both strategic and proliferation implications.
Referring to the provisions of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Holum noted there are concerns that Russia will be unable to meet the CFE-imposed deadline of November 16, 1995, for destruction of military equipment outside the CFE area of application.
Holum said the U.S. believes that Russian concerns regarding military security issues on its southern border can be addressed in accordance with the terms of the CFE Treaty, but he suggested that the subject should be reexamined when the accord comes up for review in 1996.
Holum also termed CFE "a remarkable success," with some 46,000 pieces of equipment limited under the treaty having been destroyed thus far.
On congressional efforts to require the administration to have a multi-site national missile defense system in place by the year 2003, Holum said this is a "very risky proposition." Forcing the issue, he explained, could jeopardize the two existing START treaties for a threat that may never materialize.
On U.S.-Russian negotiations to establish a demarcation line on missile defenses, Holum said there has been "some progress" but a solution is not near.
Asked to clarify the U.S. position on nuclear testing, he said it is "very important" to follow up on the success of the indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May and to "aggressively" seek a comprehensive test ban.
There has been "no change" in the U.S. position on nuclear testing, Holum said, reiterating that the United States is not considering undertaking any tests. There has been no retraction, he said, of President Clinton's decision to extend the nuclear testing moratorium pending the outcome of the Geneva test ban talks.
On China, Holum said there has been no "definitive finding" that China has made "sanctionable transfers" of missile parts or systems to Pakistan. "There are remaining serious concerns that we're looking at very hard," he said. "We have not yet reached the point of a finding, but I wouldn't rule that out." If there is a determination that that has occurred, he added, sanctions will be imposed.
In reference to China's biological weapon capability, the unclassified version of the ACDA report, which was distributed at the Holum briefing, states that the United States believes China had an offensive program before it became a party to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1984. The report also states that China's "mandated declarations have not resolved U.S. concerns about this program and there are strong indications" that it "probably maintains its offensive program."